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This study deals wi th the remedies of 
the unpaid seller in international sale of goods from 
the viewpoint of two conventions. The first is the Hague 
Convention of 1964 to which the Uniform Law on the Inter-
national Sale of Goods (ULIS) is annexed, and the other 
is the 1980 UN Convention on Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods. 
The study falls broadly into five c'hapters and a 
preliminary chapter as well. 
The preliminary chapter will deal with the main 
problems concerning the buyer's obligation of payment 
such as the nature of price, place and time of payment. 
The first chapter will deal with the remedy of 
avoidance. Five main questions will be examined here, 
that is, the doctrine of fundamental breach, additional 
time notice, process of avoidance, avoidance in case vf 
anticipatory breach and of sale by instalments and, 
finally, the effects of avoidance. 
The second chapter will be concerned \ri th damages 
where the general principles on this remedy including 
the foreseeability test and the doctrine of mitigation 
will be discussed. The assessment of damages on the 
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basis of the resale as well as the current price formula 
will also be considered under this chapter. 
The third chapter will deal with the seller's action 
for the price. Two main questions will be considered 
here. Firstly, the general rule to the effect that the 
seller has the right to require payment to be made ; 
secondly, the exceptions to this rule. 
The fourth chapter will deal with the doctrine of 
"exemptions" , that is,the buyer's non-liability for his 
failure to perform. The two main questions to be con-
sidered under this chapter are the conditions required 
for the exemption and the effect of this doctrine. 
The last chapter will study the remedy of suspen-
sion of performance including the stoppage in transit. 
This chapter is divided into two main topics: avail-
ability of suspension and its effects. 
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1 • Laws covered by this study 
The subject of the current study is discussed from the 
viewpoint of the international sale of goods as codified on 
a global level by two laws. 
The first is the ItUniform Law on the International Sale 
of Goods" (ULIS) which was the outcome of the Hague Conven-
tion of 1964. This Convention entered into force on 17 August 
1972 and the Law annexed thereto has become operative in the 
UK by the Uniform laws on International Sales Act 1967$1) By 
virtue of s.3.3 of this Act, the Uniform Law shall apply to a 
contract of sale only if it has been chosen by the parties as 
the law of the contract(2) 
The Law consists of six chapters: sphere of application, 
general provisions, obligations of the seller, obligations of 
the buyer, provisions common to the obligations of both par-
ties and passing of the risk. It is noteworthy that this Law 
does not contain a unified remedial system; its policy is based 
------------------------------
1- 1) See Graveson & Cohn, Uniform Laws on International Sales 
Act 1967, (1968); Feltham, 30 fv1.L.R. 1967, p 670;Halsubry's 
Laws of England, vol.41, 4th ed. 1983, para. 962; Simmonds, 
111 Solicitors' Journal, p 781. 
2) According to Art.V of the Hague Convention, "any state may 
••• declare ••• that it will apply the Uniform Law only to 
contracts in which the parties thereto have ••• chosen 
that Law as the law of the contract". In this connexion, 
it may be interesting to mention that in German-British; 
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on the fact that each obligation, whether undertaken by the 
seller or by the buyer, is followed by its own remediesf 3 ) 
The second is the "UN Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods" of 1980 which came into exis-
tence as a result of UNCITRAL's efforts. In its second session, 
the Commission established a Working Group in order 
to ascertain which modifications of the existing texts "might 
render them of wider acceptance by countries of different 
legal, social and economic systems, or whether it will be 
necessary to elaborate a new text for the same purpose ••• 1I~4) 
After preparing a (new) draft convention, the Working 
Group recommended the adoption of new texts~5) According to 
a resolution taken by the General AsSembly;6) a UN Conference 
was then held at Vienna in 1980 to consider the final draft 
convention as approved by UNCITRAL~7) The outcome of the 
Conference was the adoption of the above Convention(8) which 
----------------------------
1- =) and DU.tUr-Bri tish sales transactions, German and Dutch Courts 
held, as noted, that ULIS was applicable and the reserva-
tion of the foreign state should be disregarded unless the 
parties had expressly Chosen English Law as the law of 
their contract, (Magnus, 3 Com. L. YB, 1979, p 105, 
110). 
3) For a discussion of this approach and its disadvantages, 
see A/CN.9/WG.2/WP.15, passim; see also A/CN.9/87, annex 4, 
paras. 22 ff. 
4) Off. Rec. of the G.A.24th Sess. SuPP. No. 18 (A/7618), para. 
38, in UNCITRAl Yearbook 1968-1970, p 95. 
5) For those texts, see A/CN.9/11 6, annex 1. 
6) Resolution 33/93, in A/CONF.97/19, p xiii. 
7) For the texts of that draft, see A/CONF.97/19, p 5. 
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consists of four parts: sphere of application and general 
provisions (part I), formation of the contract (part II), 
sale of goods (part III) and final provisions (part IV). This 
Convention has not yet come into force~9) 
It is to be noted that, while the UN Convention contains 
provisions for the formation of the contract (part II), ULIS 
is not concerned with this question which was left to another 
convention, that is, the Hague "Convention Relating to a 
Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods ll of 1964 to which the "Uniform Law of Formationll 
(ULFIS or ULF) is annexed ~ 10) By virtue of Art- 92 of the UN 
Conventio~however, a contracting state may declare at the time 
of signature,ratification, acceptance, approval or accession 
that it will not be bound by either part II (formation of the 
contract)or part III (sale of goods) of the convention\11) 
----------------------------------
1- 8) For the t~ts of the Convention, see ibid, p 187. It was 
reprinted in 1980 International Legal Materials, p 668. 
9) According to Art.99.1, the Convention rrenters into force 
••• after the date of deposit of the tenth instrument of 
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession ••• ". But 
until 6 June 1984, only 6 states have become parties to 
it, see A/CN.9/257, p 4. 
10) This Law has also been given effect in the UK by the same Act 
referred to above;see the authorities cited in note 1,supra. 
11) For example, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden declared 
that they would not be bound by part II of the Convention 
(A/CN.9/257, p 4). 
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As to the relation between the UN Convention and ULIS, 
Art. 99.3 of the former provides that any state which is a 
party to the Hague Convention becomes a party to the UN 
Convention must at the same time denounce the Hague Conven-
tion by notifying the government of the Netherlands to that 
effect~12) 
Insofar as the question of remedies is concerned, it 
will be seen later that there are considerable differences 
between the two laws. Suffice it here to say that, unlike 
ULIS, the relevant provisions under the UN Convention have 
been consolidated. It contains two unified sets of provisions: 
the first is designed for the buyer's remedies while the other 
is concerned with the seller's remedies~13) Under both laws, 
however, there are various common provisions relevant to 
remedies, which apply to both parties~14) 
A particular attention, on the other hand, has been given 
in this study, where this is necessary, to English and French 
Law as well. While the former constitutes the origin and basis 
of Common Law system, the latter is undoubtedly considered a 
good pattern of Civil Law system. In fact, both systems con-
stitute the main source from which the provisions of ULIS and 
the UN Convention have been derived. 
---------------------------------
1- 12) See generally r·lonaco, 3 Italian YB. of Int.L. 1977, P 50. 
I. 
13) Arts.45-52 and Arts.61-65 respectively; see further the 
documents cited in note 3 supra. 
14) These provisions, which will be discussed later, are stated 
under part III, Ch.V of the Convention (Arts.71-88) and 
under Ch.V of ULIS (Arts.71-95). 
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Finally, some other domestic laws have also been con-
sidered in the notes. In particular, reference has been made 
to American Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), Czechoslovak 
International Trade Code : Act 101 /1963 (CITC) and ( Canadian) 
Draft Uniform Sale of goods Act (DUSA) as adopted by the 
Uniform Law Conference in its 63rd annual meeting held in 1981. 
2. Availability of seller's remedies 
Under English Law, the remedies relevant to the current 
study are available to the unpaid seller who is defined by 
s.38.1 of the SGA as follows: 
"The seller of goods is an unpaid seller within the mean-
ing of this Act-
a) When the whole price has not been paid or tendered; 
b) vfuen a bill of exChange or other negotiable instrument 
has been received as conditional payment, and the condition on 
which it was received has not been fulfilled by reason of the 
dishonour of the instrument or otherwise." 
There is no need to discuss this sub-section which has 
been given the most careful consideration by English Law 
writers, and it is s~ficient to point out the following 
observations. 
Firstly, the seller is considered to be unpaid so long 
as any part of the price has not yet been paid. 
Secondly, the seller is no longer an lIunpaidlr seller if 
a valid tender of the price is made~1) Therefore, he cannot 
6 
exercise his rights against the goods(2) nor can he claim 
interest on the unpaid sum after the tende~ though such 
tender does not discharge the buyer from performance~3) 
Finally, the seller's lien, stoppage in transit and claim 
for damages may be exercised even before maturity of payment. 
This is the case when, in respect of the first two remedies, 
the buyer becomes insolvent after the conclusion of the con-
tract(4) or when, with relation to the third remedy, the 
buyer's breach is anticiPatory~5) 
In contrast, neither ULIS nor the Convention has even 
used the term rtunpaid seller fl • Both, however, have linked the 
seller's remedies with the buyer's failure to perform (or to 
pay) .in accordance with the contract and the Law~6) This fact 
would suggest that there is a failure on the part of the 
buyer if he never tenders payment. Likewise, any tender which 
is not in conformity with the contract and the Law, such as a 
tender in a place or in currency other than that required by 
thecontrac~may be regarded as a bad tender and, therefore, 
-----------------------------
2- 1) For the meaning of a valid tender (of money) see Cheshire, 
Fifoot and Furmston,Law of Contract, 10th ed. 1981, p 501; 
Chitty on Contracts, vol.1, 25th ed. 1983, paras. 1444 ff; 
Halsbury's Law of England 4th ed., vol.9 paras. 523 ff. 
2) See also Benjamin, Sale of Goods, 2nd ed., 1981, para. 1152. 
3) Benjamin, ibid, para. 1282; see also Halsbury's Laws of 
England, vol.9, para. 521. 
4) Post, paras. 168, 171 f. 
5) 
6) 
Post, particularly para. 66. 
-See in particular Art.61.1 of ULIS; Art.61.1 of the Con-
vention. 
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the seller is not bound to accept it. Nevertheless, it may 
well be that his refusal to accept such tender is restricted 
by the principle o£ good £aith which prevails in international 
trade law(7) and by the fact that the buyer is entitled, in 
certain circumstances, to furnish a commercially reasonable 
substitute instead of his original performance~8) 
On the other hand, some remedies may become available to 
the seller £or the mere anticiPatory(9) or prospective(10) 
failure (breach) by the buyer. Moreover, the fact that the 
buyer's failure is not due to his fault may prevent the seller 
from resorting to some, but not all, remedies. In other words, 
the buyer may not, in these circumstances, be liable for 
damages or interest in spite of his failure; even so, the 
seller may be entitled to avoid the contract or even to 
recover the price as the case may be\11) 
3. Division 
The questions relevant to this study will be examined 
under six chapters as follows: 
Preliminary chapter: Buyer's Obligation of Payment. 
Chapter I: Avoidance of the Contract. 
Chapter II: Damages. 
--------------------------------------
3- 7) See, e.g., Art.7.1 of the Convention in which this principle 
is expressly recognized. 
8) Post, para. 153. 
Chapter III: Recovery of the Price. 
Chapter IV: The Doctrine of Exemptions. 
Chapter V : Suspension of Performance. 
-------------------------------
3- 9) Post, paras. 65 f. 
10) Post, Ch. V, particularly para. 164. 
8 
11 See the effects of the doctrine of exemption, post, paras. 
155 ff. 
PRELIMINARY CHAPTER: 
BUYER'S OBLIGATION OF PAYMENT 
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4. Introduction 
There is no doubt that the buyer's duty to pay the price, 
which constitutes the consideration for the various duties 
undertaken by the seller, is the most important obligation 
imposed upon him in every contract of sale. Both ULIS and the 
Convention have provided for several primary questions relating 
to this duty, i.e., the concept of the price, its determination, 
place and time of payment. These questions will be considered 
in the succeeding paragraphs. 
5. Nature of price 
The price is an essential element in every sale without 
which the contract does not exist at all, that is to say that 
it is void. But this granted fact must not give rise to con-
tusion; as will be seen below, the contract may be validly 
concluded even though, in some legal systems, it does not 
contain any reference to the price. On the other hand,neither 
ULIS nor the Convention directly defines the contract of sale; 
nor do they provide that the price must be expressed in money 
or otherwise. Nevertheless, at first sight it is quite easy 
to conclude that the whole structure of either is based upon 
the existence of a contract of sale in its narrow sense. That 
is, the contract must be concluded between a buyer and a selle£; 
while the obligations of the latter are focused on goods, the 
basic obligation of the former, setting aside taking delivery, 
is to pay the price which must be expressed, it is suggested, 
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in some national currency~1) If, at any rate, this question 
is to be governed by the proper law of the contract, it is 
also true that almost all national laws require that the price 
must be paid in money(2) and this is the clear position of 
both English(3) and French(4) Law. 
The question which may arise here relates to the situa-
tion in which the price is payable partly in money and,parti-
cularly, partly in goods. In answering this question, the 
rule under English Law amounts to this: a contract may be 
treated as a contract of sale notwithstanding the fact that 
part of the price is something other than moneyf5} And it 
has been suggested that the crucial answer depends upon whether 
the money or the goods are the substantial part of the con-
sideration given by the buyer; while the contract in the former 
event is considered sale, it is one of barter or exchange in 
--------------------~---------
5- 1) It may be interesting to mention that there was a proposal 
before the W.G. to make a reference, in a particular case 
concerning payment, to the currency of the seller's country; 
one main reason for rejecting that proposal was that the 
question of international payments should be left outside 
the purview of the law, see A/CN.9/75, paras.158f. See, how-
ever, note 7 below. 
2) Langen, Transnational Commercial Law, 1973,p 158. But see 
SSe 2-304(1) of UCC and 2.6(1) of DUSA; under both, the price 
may be made payable in money or otherwise. 
3) S.2.1 of the SGA. 
4) Mazeaud, Le20ns de Droit Civil, t.3, vOI.2, paras.735, 860. 
5) See eg. G.J. Dawson (Clapham) Ltd. v. H & G.Dutfield(j936] 
2 All E.R. 332;see further Atiyah, Sale of Goods, 6th ed. 
pp 5f; Schmitthoff, Sale of Goods, 2nd ed. p 50; see also 
OLRC Report, vol. 2, p 65. 
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the latter~6) Conceding that the contract price must, under 
ULIS and the Convention, be expressed in money, it may never-
theless be so difficult to assume that neither applies where 
part of such price has been expressed in gOOds~7) However, it 
is important to bear in mind in advance that this study is 
based upon a primary assumption, that is, the price is payable 
only in money. 
6. Validity of contract 
Art. 14.1 of the Convention provides that: "A proposal for 
concluding a contract addressed to one or more specific persons 
constitutes an offer if it is sufficiently definite and indica-
tes the intention of the offeror to be bound in case of accept-
tance. A proposal is sufficiently definite if it indicates the 
goods and expressly or implici t\Y fixes or makes a provision 
for determining the quantity and the price." An equivalent 
provision may not be found under ULIS for it does not govern 
the questions concerning the formation of the contract or,more 
precisely, the offer and acceptance which were left to another 
Uniform LawS 1) 
-------------------------------
5- 6) Atiyah,ibid, p 6. 
7) As regards ULIS, see Graveson & Cohn, Uniform Laws on Inter-
national Sales Act 1967 (1968), p 52, who indicate that the 
Law applies to part-exchange contracts but not to pure 
exchange contracts; this view is based on the conference 
document Doc. Conf./C.R./Cemm. 6. 
6- 1) Supra, para. 1. 
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standing alone, the above provision leads to the conclu-
sion that the contract is not deemed to be concluded if it 
neither determines the price nor includes the criterion for 
its determination(2); the parties' will to this effect may be 
express or implicit. This approach is closer to French than 
to English Law. The rule prevailing under the former is that 
the price ought to be fixed by the parties in their contract, 
or at least the means for its calculation ought to be indicated 
thereunder; otherwise, the contract is void~3) But this is not 
the approach of English Law in which the contract may be con-
sidered valid even though it does not contain any reference for 
determining the price; in such a case, the buyer must pay a 
reasonable price~4) It has been held, however, that this rule 
applies only to the situation in which the contract is silent 
about the price; if, therefore, the contract provides, for 
example, that "the price or prices shall be agreed upon from 
time to time", there is no contract at all~5) 
----------------------------------
6- 2) See also A/CONF. 97/5 comment on art.12,particularly paras. 
1,14; but £!, Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sale 
Under 1980 UN Convention, 1982,para.137, particulary note 8. 
3) Houin, 1964 ICLQ, Supp. Pub. 9, p 16, 19; see also Nazeaud, 
t.3, vol. 2, particularly paras. 862, 870. 
4) By virtue of s. 8 of the SGA; see further para. 7 below. 
But it has been considered that the absence of an agreement 
as to the price may provide good evidence that the parties 
have not yet reached a concluded contract (Atiyah, p 20). 
5) May & Butchers Ltd. v. The King \].934J 2K.B. 17, 21. 
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Another relevant provision stated in ULIS and the Con-
vention as well calls for consideration. Art. 57 of the former 
reads: "Where the contract has been concluded but does not 
state a price or make provision for the determination of the 
price, the buyer shall be bound to pay the price generally 
charged by the seller at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract. h The equivalent provision under the Convention is 
Art.55 which reads: "Where a contract has been validly con-
cluded but does not expressly or implicu\y fix or make provi-
sion for determining the price, the parties are considered, 
in the absence of any i~diCd.-tion to the contrary, to have 
impliedly made reference to the price generally charged at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract for such goods under 
comparable circumstances in the trade concerned." 
The criteria set forth by these provisions for calculat-
ing the price will be discussed below. For the moment, it is 
sufficient to consider whether the above language of both laws 
regards the contract as being validly concluded even where it 
does not include any reference to the price. In answering 
this question, the opening words of Ar~ 57 of liLIS are quite 
plain to the effect that this Article is confined to cases in 
which the contract has been concludedf 6) and, by virtue of 
Ar~ 8, ULIS does not govern, as a rule, the formation of the 
contract. The result is in brief that Art. 57 does not apply 
--------------------------------
6- 6) See also A/CN.9/87, annex 2 (comment of UK, para.3); 
A/CN. 9/WG. 2/\·[P. 15, para. 13. 
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unless the contract has been (validly) concluded according to 
the proper law of the contract~7) As to the Convention, it 
is indeed difficult to assume that it produces any definite 
answer. Remembering Arn 14, which has just been considered, 
Ar~ 55 seems to be liable to dual interpretation. 
It may be argued, in the first place, that this Article 
does not apply except tlwhere the contract has been validly 
concluded, But, unlike ULIS, the validity or invalidity of 
the contract is not necessarily subject to national lawsf8) 
rather, a distinction should be drawn between whether or not 
part II of the Convention under which Art 14 falls is appli-
Cable~9) If so, the result is that the contract is invalid 
according to the Convention itself (Ar~!14). If not, then the 
question is subject to the law applicable to the contract. 
In the second. place, it is possible to say that Art. 55 
makes it clear that a contract may be "validly concluded" even 
though it does not contain any reference for determining the 
price. In that cas~the parties are considered to have impliedlx 
made reference to the criteria stated in this Article~10) 
-----------------------------
6- 7) A/CN.9/75,para.153; A/CN.9/100 ,para.83. £f.,art.67 of draft 
ULIS (1956) which readsll ••• the parties may not plead any 
rule of municipal law which renders invalid a contract which 
does not stipulate a pricen;~.,also Kahn,17 Rev. Trim 
Dr. Com. 1964, p 689, 721. 
8) Cf,Kahn, 33 Rev. Int. Dr. Comp. 1981, p 951,980, who 
seems to adopt another view. 
9) See supra, para. 1, see also Bonell, Dr. et Pratique du 
Com. Int. (1981) p 7, 24. 
10) This is the express view of Honnold, ibid, paras.137,325; 
but cf, Kahn, ibid. 
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This might mean, in other words, that the provision stated in 
Art- 14, so far as the determination of the price is concerned, 
has been amended by Art. 55. 
7. Determination of price 
Bearing in mind the foregoing discussion, the criterion 
for determining the price in ULIS and the Convention presuposes 
that the contract neither fixes the price nor contains a provi-
sion for its determination; that is to say, that the contract 
is silent about the price. It would suggest that this also 
includes the case in which it is not possible, for any reason, 
to apply the contractual term concerning the price, as, for 
instance, when it states that the price is to be agreed upon 
later but the parties could not reach an agreement to this 
effect~1) In these circumstances, the buyer must pay, accord-
ing to ULIS, that price which is "generally charged by the 
seller at the time of the conclusion of the contract."( 2) 
Certainly, this language is vague and therefore subject to 
different interpretations. 
In one view, for example, it has been argued that the 
price imposed by the seller is absolute even if it is unexpected 
-------------------------------
7- 1) In English Law, such terms may even lead to the invalidity 
of the contract (supra, para.6). 
2) Art.57 (supra, para.6). See also s.340.2 of CITC:" ••• the 
buyer shall pay such purchase price, which the seller 
usually obtains for the same goods ••• ". 
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or unfair since it is the duty of the buyer to inquire and 
dlscoverwhat the contract price is~3) According to another 
view refuting this argument,the seller cannot demand such 
price if that would contravene the principle of good faith 
which rules ULIS; so the price is invalid unless it is fair~4) 
In this context, it has also been said that where the price is 
not stated in the contract, the previous price between the 
parties, by virtue of Art. 9 of ULIS on course of dealing, would 
be the agreed price; and in the absence of previous dealings 
between the parties, the price generally charged to the third 
parties would be apPlied~5) 
In any case, it may be that the key question is not whether 
or not the seller can demand whatever price he wants, for his 
demand is expressly confined to such price which is IIgenerally" 
charged by him and this is, on the other hand, the only restric-
tion; rather, it relates to the meaning of the word IIgenerally" 
which is indeed a matter of circumstances to be decided at the 
time of making the contract. At one extreme, it would be quite 
easy to diScover what price is II generally" charged by the seller; 
this is so when, for instance, the goods sold are fungible(6) 
and the seller's prices are fixed in advance. At the other 
------------------------------
7- 3) Graveson & Cohn, p 86. 
4) Langen, p 160. 
5) A/CN.9/WG.2/WP.15, para.15. 
6) On the meaning of fungible goods, see post, para. 120. 
17 
extreme, the goods sold may be unique in the sense that each 
item of this type has its own price; or such goods may be 
fungible but, simply, the seller is not a "merchant" without 
dwelling upon the meaning of this expression. In these circum-
stances, it may be impossible to say that there is a price 
ugenerally" charged by the seller. The result may then be clear, 
that is, it may not be possible to apply the relevant text to 
these situations or the like~7) 
However, after excessive and considerable discussions~8) 
that criterion was replaced in the Convention by lithe price 
generally charged at the time of the conclusion of the contract 
for such goods sold under comparable circumstances in the trade 
concerned!(9) Obviously, this language, as has been observed, 
eliminates the possibility that the price charged by the seller 
will control when the seller's price is out of line with prices 
generally charged; but the seller's price might provide some 
evidence of the price that is II generally chargedl1 and might be 
--------------------------------
7- 7) But see s.340.2 of CITC in which the buyer must, in these 
circumstances, pay " ••• such purchase price, which is paid 
for similar goods and under similar contractual conditions 
at the time of the conclusion of the contract". Cf., art.67 
of draft ULIS in which reference was made to 11 a reasonable 
price determined, if possible, on the basis of the current 
market price at the time of the conclusion of the contract". 
8) See in particular the debate of the Conference (First 
Committee), in A/CONF.97/19, pp 120 (amendments to art.51) 
363-366, 367f and 392f. 
9) Art.55, supra, para. 6. 
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significant when a comparable product is not sold by others~10) 
Again, however, the same difficulty of interpreting the word 
II generally If stated in ULIS' text arises here~11) 
On the other hand, both laws are in agreement to the effect 
that the relevant time for determining the price is that at 
which the contract was concluded. Thus, any subsequent rise or 
fall of prices generally charged for the same type of goods 
sold is immaterial. 
In English Law, by contrast, where the contract is silent 
about the price, the buyer must pay a reasonable price which is 
a question o£ fact dependant on the circumstances of each partiC-
ular case~12) Presumably, it may be difficult to conclude 
that the application of the above criteria, at least under the 
Convention, would result in binding the buyer to pay other 
than a reasonable price. In spite of that, it has been con-
sidered that the reasonable price under English Law is usually 
ascertained by reference to the current price at the time of 
deliveryS13) and this is the main difference between English , 
--------------------------------
7- fO) Honnold,Uniform Law, para. 327. £!., the draft text as 
adopted by UNCITRA~ (art.51) where the primary reference 
was made to the seller's price. 
11) In his comment on the draft convention as adopted by the 
VI .G., the S.G. has noted that the relevant provision 
offers no formula for creating a reasonable price if the 
price "generally charged" does not eXist(A/eN.9/116, 
annex 2, comment on art.36, para.9). 
12) S.8 of the SGA; which is the same under 5s.2-305 of uee & 
5.3(1) of DUSA. 
13) Benjamin, para.185. This is clearly the position of both 
uee and DUSA (ibid). 
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Law, on the one hand and, on the other, both ULIS and the 
Convention. 
One further rule, \'ihich is agreed upon by ULIS and the 
Convention need not be considered in detail. If the price is 
fixed according to the weight, in case of doubt it is to be 
determined by the net weight~14) Thus, this rule, which seems 
to be in conformity with usages generally followed in inter-
national trade~15) does not apply where it is clear from the 
contract or otherwise that reference is to be made to the gross 
weight for determining the price. 
8. Preliminary steps for payment 
Art. 69 of ULIS provides that: "The buyer shall take the 
steps provided for in the contract, by usage or by laws and 
regulations in force, for the purpose of making provision for 
or guaranteeing payment of the price, such as the acceptance 
of a bill of exchange, the opening of a documentary credit or 
the giving of a banker's guarantee. II 
While Art. 54 of the Convention provides that:"The buyer's 
obligation to pay the price includes taking such steps and 
complying with such formalities as may be required under the 
contract or any laws and regulations to enable payment to be 
made." 
--------------------------------
7- 14) Arts.58 of ULIS and 56 of the Convention. 
15) Document V/Prep/1, in Hague Conference, vol. 2, p 65. 
8-
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It is of prime significance to note that the provision of 
ULIS falls under the title of "other obligations of the 
buyer ll .(1) Thus, the preliminary steps undertaken by the 
buyer in respect of payment are distinguished from his duty 
to pay. The effects of this distinction is important in prac-
tice so far as the seller's remedies are concerned. For example, 
the concepts of ipso facto avoidance(2) and of additional time 
notice;3) which are relevant to the remedies for non-payment, 
do not appear under the remedial provisions designed for the 
buyer's failure to perform "other obligations" imposed upon 
him~4) 
But this is not the situation under the Convention where 
Ar~ 54 above is clear to the effect that any preliminary step 
necessary to enable payment to be made is regarded as part of 
the buyer's duty to payf5) This may include registering the 
contract at a governmental body, submitting an application or 
obtaining in advance a liscence for remitting the funds abroad 
and (or) the providing of a guarantee for timely payment. 
Therefore, the buyer's failure to comply with any of these 
duties or the like is considered to be: firstly, an actual 
breach and not anticipatory, and,secondly, a failure relating 
to payment of the price. As to the latter fact, it seems that 
------------------------------
1 ) For a criticism of this approach, see A/CN.9/87, annex 4, 
para. 33. 
2) Post Ch. I, s. 111.1. 
3) Post Ch.I, s.ll. 
4) By virtue of Art.70. 
5) See also A/CONF. 97/5, comment on art.50, paras.1-2. 
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no practical benefit could be gained from it insofar as the 
seller's remedies are concerned;( 6) by virtue of R.rt. 61 , these 
remedies are available for any (actual) breach committed by 
the buyer whether it relates to payment of the price or other-
wiseS 7 ) Accordingly, the major significance of Ar~54 of the 
Convention lies in the former fact, i.e, in considering the 
buyer's failure in these circumstances as an actual breach 
giving rise to the (seller's) remedies under Art~61-64S8) 
9. Place of payment 
This question does not raise any difficulty in practice 
where the intention of the parties as inferred from the con-
tract, usage or course of dealing between them indicates the 
place of payment. In this case, the buyer is bound to make 
payment at that place. Otherwise, payment must be effected, 
under ULIS and the Convention, at the seller's place of 
business(1) or, if he does not have a place of business, at 
his habitual residence~2) The result of this rule is that 
---------------------------------
8- 6) But £!.,Honnold, Uniform Law, para. 323. 
7) See, however, Art.64.1 (post.para.34) and compare this 
language with Art.63.1 (post, para.34) 
8) See A/CONF.97/5, para.50; Honnold, ibid. 
9- 1) Arts.59.1 of ULIS and 57.1 of the Convention.Cf,s.348.1 of 
-CITC in which payment must be madellat the contracted place,or 
otherwise,at the place of the seller's seat(domicile)";cf., 
-
also 8s.2-310(a) and 5.8(1) of DUSA:"payment is due at the 
••• place at which the buyer is to receive the goods ••• II • 
2) Art.59.1 of ULIS (see also Art.1.2); Art.10(b) of the 
Convention. 
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the buyer would bear the risks and costs of payment~3) A 
similar principle seems to be applied in English Law(4) as a 
result of the well-established rule which amounts to this:"If 
there is no stipulation as to the place of payment, it is the 
duty of the debtor to seek out the creditor at whatever place 
he happens to be llS5) Similarly, if the goods are sold by a 
seller who is in England to someone resident abroad, the courts 
mostly conclude that payment should be made in England~6) 
The general rule under French Law is different. According 
to which, payment must be made at the place of deliVery(7) 
which is, in principle, the place at which the goods sold were 
located at the time of the contract; and if the goods were not 
located at any particular place, delivery and payment must be 
effected at the seller's domicile~8) 
Again, under ULIS and the Convention the buyer must 
follow the seller even if he has changed his place of business 
(or his habitual residence); but in such an event, the latter 
------------------------------
9- 3) See also Langen, P 161.; Doc. V/Prep/1, in~e Conference, 
vol. 2, p 66; s.348.1 of CITC. 
4) Benjamin, para.705. 
5) Korner v. \VitkowitzerB95g2K.B.128, 159; see also Drexel 
v. Drexel ~916J 1 Ch.251, 259-260. 
6) See ego Charles Duval &. Co.Ltd.v. Gans ~90~ 2K.B.685jRein 
v. Stein [1892J 1Q.B.753. 
7) Art. 1651 of c.e. 
8) Mazeaud, t. 3, vol.2, para. 999. 
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must bear any additional expenses incurred by the former as a 
result of such changef 9 ) In English Law, it seems that there 
is no authority in the case law supporting this rule; and it 
has been suggested that the question whether or not the place 
of payment is changed in these circumstances should depend 
upon a reasonable inferenc~ to be drawn from all the circum-
stances surrounding the formation and the performance of the 
contract (1 0) 
If, on the other hand, the buyer is bound to pay the price 
against handing over the goods or document~ he must pay it at the 
place where such handing over takes place~11) Whether pay-
ment is to be made against goods (or documents) is again 
subject to the parties' intention; otherwise, it seems that 
the general rule as described above applies. It has rightly 
been noticed~12) however, that this provision is tautology; 
for it is granted that the place of payment and that of hand-
ing over the goods (or documents) must necessarily be the same 
whenever payment is to be made against such handing over. 
10. Time of payment 
Art 71 of ULIS provides that: II Except as otherwise provided 
in Article 72, delivery of the goods and payment of the price 
------------------------~---------
9- 9) Arts. 59.2 of ULIS & 57.2 of the Convention. See also s.348.1 
of CITe where a similar principle is adopted therein. 
10) Benjamin, para.705. 
11) Arts.59.1 of ULIS ru1d 57.1 of the Convention. 
12) A/CN.9/87, annex, 4, para.6. 
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shall be concurrent conditions". And Art. 72.1 provides" inter 
alia, thatf 1 ) "Where the contract involves carriage of the 
goods and where delivery is, by virtue of paragraph 2 of 
Article 19, effected by handing over the goods to the carrier, 
the seller may ••• postpone the despatch of the goods until he 
receives payment." 
The expression "concurrent conditions" in the former 
provision~2) which is not defined by ULIS, seems to indicate 
that: firstly, payment must be made at time of delivery(3) 
and, secondly, either party is entitled not to perform until 
and unless he receives the other's performancef 4) Both 
principles are well-admitted in French Lawf5) It is suggested, 
on the other hand, that the phrase "delivery of the goods" 
includes delivery of documents controlling their disposition 
as well~6) 
-------------------------------
10- 1) See 
2) See 
further para.169, post. 
also s.361.1 of CITC in which payment and delivery 
"must take place simultaneously". 
3) Cf,ss.2-310(l) of UCC and 5.8(1) of DUSA; in both payment 
is due nat the time at which the buyer is to receive the 
goods even though the place of shipment is the place of 
deliverylf. 
4) A/CN.9/87,aru1ex 4, para.7;see also Document V/Prep.1 in Hague 
Conference, vol. 2, p38, which is the same under CITC(s.361.3) 
5) As to the first principle, see Article 1651 of C.C;Mazeaud, 
ibid,para.997. As to the second principle, see Article 1612 
of C.C; Mazeaud, ibid, para.1007; see further para.167,post. 
6) See also s.361.2 of CITC where a particular reference is 
made to such documents. 
25 
One may well say, therefore, that ULIS does not consider, 
as a rule, payment of the price a condition precedent to 
delivery. This view may also be supported by the opening 
phrase of Art. 71 which considers the provision laid down in 
Art. 72 above as an exception to' the "concurrent conditions" 
rule; and '. payment under Art. 72.1 is a condition 
precedent to delivery which is effected in these circumstances 
by handing over the goods to a carrier for transmission to the 
buyer. 
Likewise, under s.28 of the SGA delivery and payment are 
"concurrent conditions" in the sense that the buyer and seller 
must be ready and willing to make payment and delivery respec-
tively. The question of readiness and willingness is sub-
stantially a question of fact~7) In this respect, it has been 
suggested that payment becomes due when the seller informs the 
buyer that he is ready and willing to effect delivery~8) 
However, the term IIconcurrent conditions" was inten-
tionally excluded from the Convention because, as has been 
said, it is a legalistic concept not readily understandable by 
merchants or ~ven by lawyers from different legal systems~9) 
Instead, Art. 58.1 provides that: "If the buyer is not bound to 
pay the price at any other specific time, he must pay it when 
-----------------------------
10- 7) Levy & Co. v. Goldberg E92~ lK.B.688, 692. 
8) Benjamin, para. 713. 
9) A/eN.9/87, annex 4, ibid. But see Arts.81.2 (post, para. 83) 
and 85 (post, para. 182) of the Convention where the word 
"concurrently" has been used in both. 
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the seller places either the goods or documents controlling 
their disposition at the buyer's disposal in accordance with 
the contract and this Convention. The seller may make such 
payment a condition for handing over the goods or documents ll • 
This provision is quite plain to the effect that: firstly, 
payment of the price must be made at the time of placing the 
goods (or documents) at the buyer's disposal; and, secondly, 
such payment is a condition precedent to handing over the 
goods (or docwnents) to the buyer~10) The phrase "places the 
goods ••• at the buyer's disposal" does not mean, as submitted, 
other than "deliveryU as provided for in Art. 31(b) and (c) 
where the same phrase has been used in defining delivery when 
the sale does not involve carriage of gOOds~11) If this is 
correct, it means that Art· 58.1, like Art. 71 of ULIS, only 
faces the situations envisaged by Art-31(b) and (c). Never-
theless, it may be that similar principles apply, by analogy, 
to the situation stated in paragraph(a) of the same Article 
under which delivery, where the sale involves carriage of 
goods, is effected by handing over the goods to the first 
carrier for transmission to the buyer. In such an event, 
----------~------.-. ... ----------- .... -~ 
10- 10) But cf.,A/CN.9/125 and add.1-3(Finland para.12) where it 
-
was suggested that the second sentence of art.36.1(ie,58.1) 
should be deleted on the ground that that sentence added 
nothing to the first sentence. 
11) In this connection, it may be interesting to note that the 
phrase "hand over" appeared in an earlier stage of draft-
ing the relevant text, but it was then replaced by "place 
the goods at the buyer's disposal"; the clear purpose for 
this change was to bring the text in line with art.21(ie, 
31) of the (draft) convention, see A/CN.9/87, paras.29,35 
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therefore, payment must be made on the date fixed for despatch-
l~g the goods, and the seller is entitled not to despatch until 
he receives payment~ 
But placing the goods (or documents) at the buyer's dis-
posal must be in conformity with the contract and the Convention. 
Otherwise, the seller cannot rely on the buyer's failure to 
perform to the extent that such failure is due to the former's 
act or omission~12) 
By way of summary, the following points must be emphasized. 
Firstly, the expression "concurrent conditions" in ULIS 
may be liable in practice to different interpretations,especi-
ally in those legal systems to which this expression is not 
familiar. 
Secondly, under the Convention, payment of the price is a 
condition precedent to despatching the goods or handing them 
over to the buyer as the case may be; while it is so under 
ULIS only in the former situation on the assumption that the 
contract does involve carriage of the goods. 
Finally, under both laws, the seller is not bound to grant 
the buyer any credit for payment, however short, which is also 
the approach of Common Law in interpreting the term "concurrent 
condi tions!'( 13) 
---------------------------------
10- 12) See post, para. 159. 
13) See OLRC Report, vol. 2, P 350. 
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11. Payment before examination 
As a rule, the buyer is not bound, under ULIS and the 
Convention as well~1) to pay the price until he has had the 
opportunity to examine the goods to ascertain whether the 
seller has performed his obligation as to conformity of them. 
Accordingly, it may be that the latter cannot claim payment 
before giving the buyer such opportunity which is presumed to 
be reasonable in the circumstances. The question of examin-
ing the goods is outside the scope of this study; but it is 
important to note here that the buyer is obliged to make pay-
ment even before having any opportunity to examine the goods 
if, in the language of ULIS, the contract requires payment 
against documents(2) or, in the words of the Convention, the 
procedures for delivery or payment agreed upon by the parties 
are inconsistent with his having such an opportunityS3) The 
most obvious illustration of this is the case in which payment 
is to be effected against documents during the transit.In such 
a case, the buyer cannot defer payment until he receives the 
goods on the ground that he has not previously been given the 
opportunity to examine them~4) 
------------------~---------------
11- 1) Arts.71,72 of ULIS; Art.58.3 of the Convention. A similar 
principle is provided for in CITC (s.361.1). 
2) Art. 72 of ULIS, which is the same under CITC (s.361.2). 
3) Art.58.3 of the Convention. 
4) There was a suggestion to add "payment against documents"to 
the text, but that. suggestion was opposed on the ground that 
the current language (of the convention) covered such situa-
tion, see successively A/CN.9/100, annex 2(Bulgaria,para.15; 
Norway, art.59 bis); A/CN.9/100, paras.86-87. 
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But it is important to bear in mind that the Convention 
is. not completely in line with ULIS. What is crucial under 
the former is not whether payment is to be made against 
documents, which is the case under the latter, but rather 
whether the IIprocedures for delivery or payment are incon-
sistent" with examining the goods prior to payment. It is true 
that the Convention does not set forth which procedures are 
inconsistent with such right; and it is also true that the 
above setting is the most common example in practice(5) on 
which both laws seem to be in agreement. But in some cases, 
payment against documents is not necessarily inconsistent with 
the right of examining the goods prior to payment. This is in 
particular the situation in which such payment falls due after 
receiving the goods by the buyer where examining them becomes 
available to him before making payment. In this case, it may 
well be that he is not bound, under the Convention, to make 
payment before having the opportunity of examination(6) while 
the approach of ULIS is (apparently) different since the only 
criterion for depriving him of this right, ie, payment against 
documents, is met~7) 
--------------------------------
11- 5) A/CN.9/116, annex 2, comment on art.39, para. 6; A/CONF.97/5, 
comment on art.54, para. 7. 
6) Which is the clear approach of both UCC:s.2-513(3)(b) and 
DUSA:s.7.12(4)(b); see also A/CN.9/1 16, para.7; A/CONF. 
97/5, para. 8. 
7) See, however, A/CN.9/87, annex 4, paras.19-20 where it is 
said that it seems difficult to work out a satisfactory 
solution for this standard situation under ULIS. 
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Moreover, it seems that the buyer cannot refuse making 
payment on the ground that he has not been given the oppor-
tunity of examining the goods if those goods have been \OSt \~ 
transit but after the passage of the risksf 8 ) this is so, it 
is submitted, even where payment is not to be made, in ULIS, 
against documents or where the procedures for payment, under 
the Convention, are not originally inconsistent with examina-
tion before making payment. 
Finally, the above criterion under the Convention depends 
merely upon the agreement of the parties. Nevertheless, it is 
important to remember Art. 9 which expressly states two basic 
principles; the first is that the parties are bound by any 
usage which they have agreed upon and by any practices which 
they have established between themselves; the second is that 
they are considered, subject to certain requirements, to have 
impliedly made a~Elicable to their contract a usage which is 
widely known in international trade. 
12. Payment without request 
Art· 60 of ULIS provides that:"Where the parties have agreed 
upon a date for the payment of the price or where such date is 
fixed by usage, the buyer shall, without the need for any 
formali ty, pay the pri ce at that date. /I 
While Art 59 of the Convention provides that:IIThe buyer 
must pay the price on the date fixed by or determinable from the 
contract and this Convention without the need for any request or 
compliance with any formality on the part of the seller." 
-----------------------------------
11- 8) See post, para. 133. 
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The significance of these provisions becomes clear when 
comparing them with Civil La,,, or, more precisely, wi th French 
Law in particular. Under this lawf 1 ) the general rule is that 
the creditor may not resort to any remedy on the ground of tile 
debtor's delay in performance until he puts him in default 
(mise en demeure). The "mise en demeure", in which the credi-
tor demands his debtor to pa~ takes the form of a notice or 
any other equivalent form including a swnmons (citation en 
justice). 
This is not the approach of either ULIS or the Convention 
where it is quite clear from the above provisions that the 
buyer is bound to make payment without the need for serving 
him a swnmons or otherwise. The result of this approach is 
that the buyer becomes in default once the date of payment 
passes without making such payment and, accordingly, the 
seller's remedies become available forthvli the Nevertheless, 
it is important to note that the remedy of avoidance, where 
the breach is not fundamental, may not be available unless the 
buyer fails to comply with a reasonable notice of performance 
given to him by the sellerS 2 ) To a great extent, the position 
of English Law is similar to this approach. In the first place, 
it seems that there is no authority supporting the idea that 
giving the buyer a notice of performance or otherwise is a 
condition precedent to the availability of the seller's 
remedies. If, in the second place, time of payment is not of 
-----------------------------------
12- 1) See Article 1139 of C.C; Starck, Droit Civil(Obligations), 
1972, paras. 2035 ff, 2175. 
2) Post, para. 38. 
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the essence of the contract, which is the general rule, the 
seller cannot resort to avoidance unless:-firstly, he gives 
the buyer, after undue delay in making payment, an additional 
time notice; secondly, this notice has expired "without 
complying with it~3) 
Read literally, however, the provision of ULIS is con-
fined to the case in which payment is to be made on a date 
fixed. If, therefore, the contract calls upon the buyer to 
effect payment during a period of time as, for instance , during 
May, the provision does not apply. But doubts may be expressed 
as to whether this understanding is intentionally intended. 
The reference to usage, on the other hand, seems to be super-
fluous where the parties, by virtue of Art. 9 of ULIS, are 
originally bound by usages; and that is, perhaps, the reason 
why the relevant text of the Convention does not make any 
reference to usage. 
---------------------_ ... _-------
12- 3) Post, para. 39. 
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Introduction 
13. l1eaning in- general 
The term lI avoidance" as used in both ULIS and the Conven-
tion mean~ in general~1) that right which is given to the 
injured party, say the unpaid seller, to put an end to the con-
tract upon the buyer's failure to make payment if certain 
requirements are satisfied~2) Avoidance may be total or 
partial depending upon the case; contrary to the former, it 
does not relate, in the latter, to the whole contract but to 
such part of it which has been affected by the breach~3) In 
both cases, however, the remedy of avoidance is not directed to 
the goods but to the contractual relationship itself~4) The 
question of possession of, or property in, the goods is irrele-
vant; thus, the unpaid seller may be entitled to avoid the con-
tract even if both possession and property have already been 
vested in the bUyer~5) or even if the goods have lost or 
deteriorated while they were in the hands of the buyer~6) 
----------------------------------
13- 1) As to ipso facto avoidance in ULIS, see post, paras.48 ff. 
2) Avoidance in both laws should be based on either the funda-
mental breach (post, paras.17 ff) or the additional time 
notice (post, paras.34 if). 
3) Post, paras. 78 i. 
4) \ See, however, Baer, Seller's Remedies (MS), p 104 where the 
avoidance has been considered a remedy in rem. 
5) Cf, in English Law, post, para. 80. 
6) Post, para. 86. 
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14. Terminology 
In English Law, the terms IIdischarge,,(1) by breach or from 
further performance, Utermination~2) rrcancellation~3) "rescis-
sion,,(4) and others(5) have all been used to cover the meaning 
of avoidance as referred to above; while in French Law, it seems 
that the only expression used in this respect, following the 
Civil Code approach}6) is "resolution". If, however, the 
avoidance relates to what so-called "contracts successifS u,< 7) 
it is familiar to refer to Ifresiliation" rather than "resolutionll • 
So that, neither liLlS nor the Convention has faced any dif-
ficulty of terminology when drafting the French texts where both 
have used the term uresolution". But in the English texts, the 
------------------------------
14- 1) Eg, Johnson v. Agnew ~98g A.C. 367, 392. 
2) Eg, \'lickman Machine Tool Sales Ltd. v. L.Schuler A.G. ~97~ 
A.C.235,264. 
3) Eg, The Mihalis Angelos E97~ 1 Q.B.164,199 (a contractual 
term); Millar's Karri and Jarrah Co. (1902)v. Weddel,Turner 
and Co.(1908) 14 Comm. Cas.25,29; Panoutsos v. Raymond 
Hadley Corp. of N.Y. ~91~ 2 K.B.473. 
4) Eg, Alexander v. Railwax Executive ~92~ 2 K.B.882,889. 
Moschi v. Lep Air Services D973] A.C.331,349; Suisse 
Atlantique Societe d' Armement Maritime S.A. v. N.V. 
Roterdamsche Kolen Centrale Q_96~ 1 A.C.361 ,367. This 
expression has also been used under s.48 of the SGA. As to 
a criticism of such usage in general see Cheshire, Fifoot 
and Furmston, p 491. 
5) Eg, Bradford v. Williams(1872)7 L.R.Ex.259,261 (to declare 
the contract as at an end); see, also, Photo Production Ltd. 
v. Securicor Transport Ltd. ~98~ • A.C. 827,844. 
6) Arts. 1183, 1184 (general rules of obligations) & Arts.1654 ff 
(contract of sale). 
7) Post, para 70. 
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expression "avoidance" has been used thereunder though this 
expression is not familiar to Common Lawyers~8) 
15. Sources of provisions 
The machinery of avoiding the contract in ULIS owe~ as 
said, nothing to French Law}1) and the same may be true with 
relation to the Convention. The provisions of avoidance under 
both include, as will be seen later, the doctrines of funda-
mental breach, additional time notice, anticipatory breach and 
instalment contracts. In addition, the avoidance is exercised 
by the unilateral will of the aggrieved party without the inter-
ference of the court. In fact, all these ideas are generally 
familiar to Common Law rather than Civil Law. 
The situation in respect of the effects of avoidance is 
quite different. As a rule, the avoidance under ULIS and the 
Convention operates retrospectively, which is broadly the 
position of French but not English Law~2) If, however, the 
contract is by instalments, the avoidance does not generally 
affect previous deliveries nor any other right which has already 
matured before the avoidance takes place. A similar principle is 
clearly recognized by English Law and, to some extent, by French 
--------------------------------
14- 8) See further A/CN.9/62, annex 2,para.38 where doubts had been 
expressed whether the term "avoidance tl was the appropriate one 
in English or either "termination"or "cancellation"; see also 
A/CN.9/W.G.2/W.P.16,para.38; Document V/Prep/8, in Hague Con-
ference, vol. 2, p 236(the view of US' representative). 
15- 1) Treitel, Remedies for Breach of Contract, in lnt.Enc. of Com. 
Law, vol. 7, ch. 16, s. 144. 
2 ) Po s t , thi s ell., s. v. 
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Law as well. 
In short, one may well say that the provisions concern-
ing the process of avoidance are mainly derived from Common 
Law syste~while those relating to its effects have certain 
parentage in both Civil and Common Law. 
16. Division 
Under this chapter, the questions relating to the remedy 
of avoidance will be examined under five sections as follows: 
Section I • Fundamental Breach • 
Section II • Additional Time Notice • 
Section III • Mechanism of Avoidance • 
Section IV • Avoidance in Particular Cases • 




1. In general 
17. Texts 
Art. 62.1 of ULIS provides that: 
"Where the failure to pay the price at the date fixed 
amounts to a fundamental breach of the contract, the seller 
may ••• declare the contract avoided"; and Art. 10 provides 
that: IIFor the purposes of the present Law, a breach of con-
tract shall be regarded as fundamental wherever the party 
in breach knew, or ought to have known, at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract, that a reasonable person in the 
situation as the other party would not have entered into the 
contract if he had foreseen the breach and its effects". 
While Art. 64.1 of the Convention provides that: 
"The seller may declare the contract avoided ••• if the 
failure by the buyer to perform any of his obligations under 
the contract or this Convention amounts to a fundamental breach 
of contract ••• ,~(1) and Art· 25 provides that: A breach of 
contract committed by one of the parties is fundamental if it 
------------------------------
17- 1) For a legislative background of the text, see the following 
documents successively: A/CN.9/87, annex 4, paras. 22 ff, and 
paras. 40 if of the original document; ibid., annex 1, art.72 
bis; A/CN.9/100, annex 1, art.45 (72 bis); A/CN.9/116, annex 
1 (art. 45); A/32/17, annex 1, paras. 380 ff, and para. 35 
(art.46) of the original document; A/33/17, para. 28 (art.60); 
A/CONF.97/19, pp 123 (art.57), 371 (para. 64b), 162(art.60) 
and 312 (para. 51). 
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results in such detriment to the other party as substantially 
to deprive him of what he is entitled to expect under the con-
tract, unless the party in breach did not foresee and a reason-
able person of the same kind in the same circumstances would 
not have foreseen such detriment.',(2) 
18. Criticism of ULIS 
The definition of fundamental breach under ULIS has been 
liable to various criticisms\1) It has been said, for example, 
that this definition is too complex(2) and is based on a hypo-
thetical situationf 3 ) therefore, it would be difficult to 
apply~4) Moreover, its application does not depend upon 
objective factors but, rather, upon the subjective judgment of 
the parties\5) Finally, the words used in the definition would 
lead to different interpretations by courts in different 
countries~6) 
In brief, the whole definition of ULIS was unsatisfactory 
---------------------------------
17- 2) For a legislative background of the text, see the following 
documents successivelY:A/CN.9/52, paras.83 ff; A/CN.9/100, 
paras.43 ff; ibid, annex 1, art.9(10); A/CN.9/116, annex 1 
(art.9);A/32/17,annex 1, paras.88 ff, and para.35 of the 
original document (art.8); A/33/17, para.28 (art.23). 
A/CONF.97/19,pp 98 f (art.23), 295-303,329-330,157 (art.23) 
and 206 (paras.12 ff). 
18- 1) See generally Eorsi, 31 A.J.C.L. 1983, P 333, 339; Graveson 
and Cohn, pp 55 ff; A/CN.9/W.G.2/WP.9, paras. 32 ff. 
2) A/CN.9/52, para. 87. 
3) Graveson & Cohn, p 55; Honnold, Uniform Law, para.182. 
4) A/CN.9/100, annex 3, para. 67. 
5~ A/CN.9/WG.2/~W.9, para. 34; A/CN.9/31, para. 86. 
6) A/CN.9/52, para. 86; see also A/CN.9/100, ibid. 
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to the draftsmen of the Convention~7) After excessive and 
difficult discussions~8) the above definition under the Conven-
tion has been adopted which is, also, not free from criticisms 
nor from difficulties in practice~9) 
19. English and French Law 
However, the doctrine of fundamental breach, so far as the 
avoidance of the contract is concerned~1) is well-recognized 
in Common Law system~2) According to which, breaches of con-
tract are of two types~3) The first, while it is not so 
serious, may enable the aggrieved party to claim damages but 
----------------------------
18- 7) See, however, the view of Bulgaria, in A/CN.9/100, annex 2, 
para. 4, and of UK's representative at UNCITRAL, in 
A/eN. 9/WG. 2/VlP. 6, para. 69. 
8) See the documents cited in para. 17, note 2, supra, particu-
larly A/CONF.97/19, pp 295-300, 329-330. 
9) Post, paras. 23 f. 
19- 1) This doctrine is also connected with "ex-emption clauses"; 
for illustrations of this from recent cases, see Photo 
Production Ltd. v. Securicor Transport Ltd. ~98g A.C.827; 
~uUse Atlantique Societe d' armement Maritime S.A. v. 
Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale ~96~ 1 A.C.361. 
2) See further post, paras.26 ff. It is to be noted that a 
similar principle is also provided for in CITC (55 235 f: 
"essential breach"). But it seems that neither UCC nor OUSA 
has adopted the doctrine of fundamental breach as such. 
3) See, for example, Decro-Wall International S.A. v. Pracil-
tioners in Marketing Ltd.~97~ 2 All E.R. 216,221; Photo 
Production case, supra, 849; HOng Kon~ Fir Shipping Co. Ltd. 
v. Ka\'/asaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. ~96~ 2 Q.B.26, 71-73;Wickman 
Machine Tool Sales Ltd.v.L.Schuler A.G. ~97~ A.C.235,264. 
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not to avoid the contract. The other, which has been described 
particularly in recent cases as I1fundamentalll~4) does not mean 
either more or less than the well-known type of breach which 
entitles the innocent party to treat it as repudiatory and to 
avoid the contractf5) or, in other words, it is a breach which 
goes to the root of the contract and, accordingly, the innocent 
party is entitled to regard it as a repudiation of the whole 
contract~6) 
The principle of fundamental breach is likewise known, to 
some degree, in French Law~7) For example, when the seller is 
in default, the buyer can go to the court to demand avoidance 
if the former's bad or partial performance affects an essential 
element of the contract~8) Moreover, it will be seen below 
that the court before granting a decree of avoidance takes into 
account the degree of breach. Nevertheless, it may well be that 
this doctrine as a whole is not familiar to French Lawyers and 
may-be to Civil Law in general~9) nor does French C.C. require 
for avoiding the contract that the breach must, as a rule, be 
fundamental. The whole process of avoidance in French Law is, 
however, completely different from that followed in Common Law; 
this will be considered in the next paragraph. 
-----------------------------
19- 4) E.g., Mosch! v. Lep Air Services E97~ A.C. 331, Photo 
Production case, supra, 489; Suisse case, supra, 397, 421. 
5) Suisse case, supra, 397. 
6) Ibid., 421-422. 
7) Treitel, Remedies, s.161. 
8) Houin, 1964 IeLa, Supp. Pub. 9, p 16, 26. 
9) The whole concept of "fundamental breach" is unacceptable, 
as has been said, to the most legal systems of the "con-
tinential" type,see A/CONF.97/19 P 206, para. 15(Garrigues 
of Spain). 
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20. Decision of avoidance 
The general rule prevailing in French Law is that avoidance 
of the contract on the ground of breach must be sought in 
justice~1) i.e, before the court according to normal judicial 
procedure. Therefore, declaration of avoidance by the unilateral 
will of the non-defaulting party has no legal effect. In fact, 
the court is empowered to award avoidance or, on the contrary, 
to grant the debtor a period of grace for performancef 2 ) its 
discretion also includes awarding partial avoidance instead of 
avoiding the whole contract~3) In all cases, the court takes 
into consideration all surrounding circumstances including of 
course the degree of breach\4) Further, French jurisprudence 
requires before awarding avoidance that the breach must be 
serious; whether it is so is again a matter to be decided by 
the court~3) 
Indeed, this is not the case in English Law in which it 
seems to be settled that the decision of avoidance is the act 
of the parties or one of them, and not that of the court~5) 
Moreover, it may be that the court has no discretion, at least 
in theory, in the matter; its role seems to be confined to 
--------------------------------
20- 1) Article 1184 of C.C. But this rule is subject to certain 
exceptions, see Harty et Raynaud, Droit Civil, t.2, 1962, 
paras. 296, 305. 
2) A~ticle 1184 of C.C. 
3) Marty et Raynaud, para. 300. 
4) Treitel, Remedies, s. 147. 




ascertaining whether the breach, according to the appropriate 
test, justifies avoidance; if so, then it must confirm the 
decision of avoidance which is presumed to have already been 
taken by the innocent party. 
The approach of ULlS and the Convention is similar to that 
followed in English Law. Apart from ipso facto avoidance under 
the former}6) the provisions of both laws are clear to the 
effect that the avoidance should be made by a declaration 
to be taken by the innocent party, otherwise the contract 
remains alive\7) There is no indication in either that the 
court has a decision in the matterf8) 
21. Parties' agreement 
On the other hand, it may well be that the distinction 
between fundamental and non-fundamental breach in ULIS and the 
Convention has no value when the avoidance is based upon a 
contractual power. For example, the contract may give the 
seller the right to avoid the contract if the buyer fails to 
make payment exactly on the fixed date, or to comply with the 
-----------.-.------------------
20- 6) Post, para. 48. 
7) Post, paras.55 ff; see also Mazeaud, t.3, vol. 2,para.1011 
(ULlS); Kahn 33 Rev. Int. Dr. Com. 1981, p 951 ,978 
(Convention:Seller's avoidance);Cumming, 9 Cal.W.Int.L.J. 
1979, p 157,175 (UlJCITRAL draft convention). A similar 
principle seems to be applied in CITC (s. 235.1). 
8) In addition, the principle of IIperiod of grace" in French 
La\,l is expressly rejected by both laws (post, para.135). 
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method of payment so specified. In these cases and the like, 
the question which may arise is not whether or not the buyer's 
breach is fundamental bu~rather, whether such agreement is valid 
and, if so, whether the breach so defined has taken place. 
In fact, there is no provision to that effect in either 
ULIS or the Convention; instead, both provide that the parties 
are free to exclude (or vary) any of their provisions~1) The 
application of this rule, which has no exception whatever under 
the former, is subject, under the latter, to another provision 
which is irrelevant here~2) This does not mean, however, that 
the parties' agreement is valid; the question of validity of 
any contractual term is outside the scope of eitherS 3) It only 
--------------------------------
21- 1) By virtue of Arts.6 of the Convention and 3 of ULIS which 
adds that the parties' agreement may be express or implicit. 
However, German judges often refuse~, as said, to recognize 
tacit exclusion of ULIS in order to save the Law (Bonell, 
p 7, 12); for an illustration of this approach, see 
Oberlandesgericht Hamm, 3.X. 1979, 20 U 98/79, quoted in 
UNIDROIT (1980) vol. 1, p 31-8. But in another case it was held, 
also in W. Germany, that the parties might exclude the 
application of ULIS even as late as during court proceedings 
(quoted in 9 European Law Report, 1981, p 343). 
2) I.e.,Art. 12 of the Convention which expressly provides that 
the parties may not derogate from or vary the effect of it. 
3) According to Arts.8 of ULIS and 4(a) of the Convention; but 
cf., post, para.149. 
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means that the fundamentality of breach in respect of avoidance 
becomes immaterial provided that there is an agreement to the 
contrary and, further, that such an agreement is valid accord-
ing to the proper law of the contract. 
In this context, the clear position of English Law is that 
.. 
the parties' agreement as to avoidance is respect~,,:t ;. If, there-
fore, the contract so provides, the innocent party may avoid 
it even if the other's breach is considered to be so slight in 
normal circumstances~4) A similar principle seems to be 
generally admitted in French Law~5) Nevertheless, there are 
remarkable differences between the two laws. 
Firstly, in English Law the avoidance in such a case is 
orginally based upon dividing the contractual terms into 
"Conditions rr and "Warranties IlS6) Any term belonging to the 
-----~----------------------------
21- 4) See, for example, Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Kawaski 
Kaisen Kaisha Ltd. Q96~ 2 Q.B.26,63; The Mihalis Angelos 
~97~ 1 Q.B.164,193 (breach of a condition); Photo Production 
Ltd. v. Securicor Transport Ltd. ~98g A.C.827,848-849; 
Suisse Atlantique Societe d' armement I'lari time S.A. v. 
Rotterdamsch Kolen Centrale ~ 96~ 1 A. C. 361 ,421-422; see also 
Lord Devlin, 1966 C.L.J. P 192,198-199 (breach of a funda-
mental term). 
5) Marty et Raynaud, para.306; Mazeaud, t.3, vol.2, para.1011; 
Planiol et Ripert, t.10, para.165. As to the exceptions to 
this rule, see Marty et Raynaud, para.307. 
6) This is also recongnized by the SGA (s.11.3); so it has 
become, as has been said, a general but not a universal 
feature of the English Law of contract (Cheshire, Fifoot and 
Furmston, p 132). 
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former has been described as an "essential,,(7) or a "fundamen-
tal"(8) term in the contract. The breach of which, therefore, 
enables the victim to avoid the contract(9) while the breach 
of a "warranty", which is regarded as a collateral(10) matter 
in the contract, may entitle him to claim damages but not to 
avoid the contract~11) Vfhether a term is a "conditionll or 
"warranty" depends, in the absence of the parties' intention~12) 
upon the true construction of the contract in the light of all 
surrounding circumstances~13) 
This dichotomy of contractual terms is not known in 
French Law. The practical importance of such a difference is 
that it is sufficient, under English but not French Law, that 
the contract states that a particular term is a IIcondition" or 
"warranty" in the above meaning; in such an event, it becoJJes 
known in advance whether or not its violation justifies the 
---------------------------------
21- 7) Lord Devlin, p 192. 
8) Suisse Case, supra, 422; but cf, Lord Devlin, p 204. 
9) See, for example, Bentsen v. Taylor (1893)2 Q.B.274,280-281; 
Suisse case, ibid; The Hansa Nord E97~ Q.B.44, 59; The 
Mihalis Angelos ~ 97~ 1 Q.B.164, 193. 
10) s. 61.1 of the SGh. 
11) See, for example, Bentsen case, ibidj The Hnsa Nord, ibid; 
see also Lord Devlin, p 191. 
12) As well as a statutory provision; see Hong Kong case, supra, 
66.It has been held, further, that "if ••• a provision ••• has 
generally been regarded as a condition ••• it would be regrett-
able at this stage to disturb an established interpretation" 
(The Mihalis Angelos, 'supra, 199). 
13) Bentsen case, supra, 281; see also, Hong Kong case, supra, 
63. 
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avoidance of contract~14) 
Secondly, the parties agreement in French Law must be 
express(1 5)while in English Law it might be implicit~16) 
Finally, even where the avoidance is derived from a con-
tractual power, the avoiding party is not released under 
French Law(17) from putting the other in default (mise en 
demeure)(18) unless the contract provides otherwise~17) There 
is no similar rule in English Law. 
2. Detriment Formula Under Convention 
22. Generally 
According to the Convention, the buyer's breach is not 
considered to be fundamental unless it results in such detri-
ment to the seller "as substantially to deprive him of what he 
is entitled to expect under the contract".( 1 ) Those words were 
added at the diplomatic Conference whereas UNCITRALts fDrmula 
only referred to the "substantial cle.briment ll (2) sustained by 
--------------------------------
21- 14) It is to be noted, however, that this dichotomy is not 
exhaustive (post, para. 26 ff). 
15) I~arty et Raynaud, para. 306; Hazeaud, t.2, vol. 3 para.1011j 
Planiol et Ripert, t.10, para. 165. 
16) Hong Kong case, supra, 63, Photo Production case, supra, 
849; Suisse case, supra, 422, see also Lord Devlin, 
pp 198-199. 
17) Mazeaud, ibid; See alSO post, para. 38. 
18) Supra, para. 12. 
22- 1) Art. 25 of the Convention, supra, para. 17. 
2) Art. 23 of the draft convention. 
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the seller. But this formula \'las liable to various cri ti-
.. (3) . C1Slms especlally on the ground that it included a subjec-
ti ve cri terionf 4) accordingly, there \'1as a clear trend to 
replace it by an objective one(5) and that might be achieved 
by establishing some kind of link between the detriment and 
the contract~6) As a result, the current formula has come 
into existence. 
23. Criticism 
So that, the above formula is based upon several factors. 
Firstly, the buyer's breach must result in detriment to the 
seller. Secondly, such detriment should be substantial. Thirdly, 
this substantial detriment should reach a high degree to the 
extent that it deprives the seller of his expectation. And) 
finally, such expectation is to be inferred only from the con-
tract itself. This formula as such is, as clear, so complex 
-----------~------~----------------
22- 3) See A/CN.9/126, comments on art.9; the debate of Conference 
(First Committee) on art. 23, in A/CONF.97/19, particularly 
pp 299-301, 329-330; Cumming, pp 177 f. 
4) A/CONF.97/19, p 299 para. 54 (Szaszy of Hungary), para. 50 
(Olivencia Ruiz of Spain) and p 300 para. 32 (Kopak of 
Czechoslovakia). But £1, ibid, P 300, para. 57 (Ghestin of 
France); A/CN.9/125 and add 1-3,cornment on art.9(Yugoslavia 
para. 13). 
5) A/CONF.97/19, pp 329-300 pass~. 
6) See the proposals presented by F.R. of Germany and Pakistan, 
A/CONF.97/19, pp 98, 99; ibid, p 330, paras. 31 (Olivencia 
Ruiz of Spain) and 36 (Boggiano of Argentina). £E., ibid, 
P 300 para. 10 (Feltham of UK) and p 330, para. 32 (Kopak 
of Czechoslovakia). 
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and vague~1) In addition, it seems to be impractical; for 
example, the contract price may be less than the market price 
and the seller can readily dispose of the subject-matter of 
the goods for a higher price. In this setting, he cannot resort 
to avoidance on the ground of fW1damental breach even if it is 
clear that the buyer, who fails to pay in time, would never 
make payment; nor can he re'y on the doctrine of anticipatory 
breach which is also based, inter alia, on fundamentality of 
breach\2) This is simply so because the seller has not, or, 
at any rate, on the assumption that he has not, sustained any 
detriment though the buyer's breach has deprived him of all 
his expectations under the contract~3) 
Suppose, on the other hand, that the court before which 
the dispute is brought would not allow, by applying its own 
law, the seller to recover the price~4) In this case, the 
seller would be put in a crit\cal position where he can neither 
avoid the contract nor claim the price. 
In brief, it might be more likely had the Convention 
focused on the aggrieved party's expectations under the contract 
than on the detriment sustained by him, and this view seems 
to be in line with recent English cases~5) In practice, 
-----------------------------
23- 1) See also, ibid, p 329, para. 18 (Szaszy of Hungary); Eorsi, 
31 A.J.C.L. 1983, pp 333, 340 ff. 
2) Post, para. 63. 
3) See also A/CN.9/125 and add.1-3, comment of Czechoslovru(ia 
on art. 9, para. 5. 
4) Post, para. 139. 
5) Post, para. 29. 
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however, this thorny difficulty could easily be solved, as far 
as avoidance is concerned, as follows: the seller may give the 
buyer a reasonable notice of performance; if the latter does 
not comply with it, the former can avoid the contract where the 
degree of breach becomes irrelevant~6) 
24. Subjective or objective test? 
It seems that the test of detriment includes both objec-
tive and subjective elements. The latter is based upon the fact 
that the (actual) detriment, as described above, is to be 
suffered by the seller himself. If, for instance, he has not 
suffered such detriment, the test is not satisfied, even if any 
other person would have suffered it had been put in the same 
position and circumstances as the seller. The converse is also 
true; it is sufficient for satisfying the criterion that the 
seller has sustained such detriment even if the presumed person 
would not have suffered it. 
The objective element could be inferred from two facts. 
Firstly, there must be an actual detriment suffered by the 
seller in consequence of the buyer's breach. Secondly, such 
detriment, however serious, may only be based upon, or drawn 
from, the seller's expectations under the contract. Therefore, 
the test is not considered to be met where either the seller 
has suffered no detriment or, presumably, such detriment, 
assuming its occurrence, is inferred from circumstances other 
-------------------------------
23- 6) Post, para. 36. 
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than the contract~1) It is true, however, that whether or not 
the breach results in detriment and, if so, whether such detri-
ment is sUbstantial to the extent described above is subject 
to the estimation of the court. But in doing so, it may be 
that the court would confine itself to examining the term of 
the contract and ignore the circllifistances of the case~2)~nd 
this seems to be another gap in the Convention. 
In many situations, the contract may not make it clear 
that one party's breach would result in substantial detriment 
to the other, but this fact might easily be concluded from 
surrounding circumstances including of course the contract 
itself. Suppose, for instance, that the seller has informed 
the buyer that payment on the date so fixed is of particular 
importance for him to settle his debts; but this fact has not 
been inserted in the contract. In such a case, the seller cannot 
avoid the contract on the ground of fundamental breach. This 
is not, however, the situation under English Law(3) in which 
all surrounding circumstances are to be taken into account 
when deciding whether or not the breach is fundamental. 
Nevertheless, it would seem that the court is likely to 
to take the circumstances of the case into consideration under 
----------------------------------
24- 1) Cf.,Herber of F.R. of Germany whose proposal was the basis 
of the current text where he considered that the proposal 
was not to exclude the circumstances of the case(A/CONF. 
97/19, p 301, para.78).But see the view of Feltham (UK) 
and of Lebdev (USSR),ibid, paras.70, 75. 
2) See Feltham, ibid. 
3) Post, para. 29. 
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the cover of interpreting both the contract and the relevant 
text of the Convention. In this connexion, it may be useful 
to remember that the principle of good faith, by virtue of 
Art.7 of the Convention, constitutes a basic principle for 
interpreting any of its provisions. 
25. Parties' agreement and objectivity 
The objective factor discussed in the preceding paragraph 
must not be confused with a contractual power given to the 
seller for avoiding the contract. Both are based on, or inferred 
from, the contract; but while the former presumes that the 
buyer's breach results in detriment to the seller, the question 
of detriment or, more precisely, the whole concept of funda-
mental breach is irrelevant in the latter}1) 
So, for instance, it might be clear from the contract that 
non-payment in time would result, according to the proper test, 
in substantial detriment to the seller. But suppose that such 
detriment had not, for any reason, taken place in spite of the 
buyer's breach. In that case, the seller could not rely on the 
doctrine of fundamental breach for avoiding the contract. If, 
however, there were an agreement to that effect, avoidance would 
be jUstified(2) notwithstanding that no detriment resulted from 
the breach. 
--------------~-------------------
25- 1) Supra, para. 21. 
2) On the assumption, of course, that the parties' agreement is 
valid (supra, para. 21). 
26-
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3. Innominate terms in English Law 
26. New trend 
Originally, the remedy of avoidance on the ground of breach 
in English Law was based on dividing the contractual terms into 
"condi tions" and "warrantiesll.( 1 ) The exhaustive feature of 
this dichotomy prevailed in the case law until the following 
principles have been declared~2) 
Firstly, many of the contractual terms cannot be classi-
fied as being conditions or warranties~3) 
Secondly, even if a particular term is regarded as a 
warranty, damages are not necessarily the only sufficient remedy 
for violating that term~4) 
Finally, the remedies available to the innocent party in 
this case depend entirely upon the nature of the breach and 
its foreseeable consequences~4) or, in other words, upon 
whether the breach gives rise to an event which will deprive 
him of substantially the whole benefit which was intended that 
he should obtain from the contract~3) 
It may well be that the doctrine of fundamental breach is 
linked, at least at present time, to these principles rather 
--------------------------------
1 ) Supra, para. 21. 
2) !!ong Kong Fir ShiEEing Co. Ltd. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha 
Ltd.. E96~ 2 Q.B. 26. 
3) Ibid, 70. 
4) Ibid, 64. 
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than the duality of conditions and warranties~5) 
This modern phenomenon has been recognized by several sub-
sequent cases(6) and it is well-admitted now that there is a 
third category of contractual term~or, at any rate, that the 
orthodox view of warranty is no more acceptable. This will be 
considered in the succeeding paragraphs. 
27. Relation with warranties 
Notwithstanding the recognition of this trend, the question 
which has not been decisively answered yet is whether the inno-
minate terms are absolutely separate from the above dichotom~ or 
they constitute part of warranties but the modern trend gives 
the "warranty" a meaning different from the orthodox view~1) 
----------------------------------
26- 5) In Suisse Atlantique Societe d'Armement Maritime S.A. v. N.V. 
Rotterdamsche Kolen Central B 96fl 1 A. C. 361,421-422 a 
distinction has been made between fW1damental breach and a 
breach of fUndamental term which rather means a "condition" 
strictly so called. 
6) See, for example, Bergerco v. Vegoil ~98~ 1 Lloyd's Rep. 
440. Bremer Handelsgesellschaft M.B.H. v. Vanden Avenne-
Izegem P.V.B.A. ~97~ 2 Lloyd's Rep 109, 113; Bunge v.Kruse 
~ 97~ 1 Lloyd's Rep. 279,290-291 where Bermer case was 
applied; Bunge COrporation v. Tradax Export S.A. B98~ 1 
Lloyd's Rep.294,303;Federal Commerce and Navi ation Co. Ltd. 
v. Molena Alpha Inc. ~ 979 A.C. 757, 783;The Hansa Nord ~97~ 
1 Q.B ..• 44; The Mihalis An~elos Q97~ 1 Q.B.164,193; Noschi 
v. Lep Air Services B97~ A.C.331,349;Readron Smith Line 
Ltd. v. Hansen-Tangen ~97~ 1 W.L.R.989,998; Tradax Inter-
national ,S.A. v. Goldschmids S.A. ~97~ 2 Lloyd's Rep. 604; 
Wikman Machine Tool Sales Ltd. v. L.Schuler A.G. E:73A.C. 
235,264. 
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Certainly, the effects of either are, at least in theory, 
different from the other. 
Adopting the former possibility means that the court must 
first ascertain whether or not the violated term, on the assump-
tion that it is not a condition, is a warranty. If so, the only 
remedy available to the innocent party is damages and, there-
fore, he cannot avoid the contract. If not, this means that 
such a term is classified as an innominate term where the 
remedies resulting from its violation depend upon the gravity 
of breach and its consequences; in a given case, he may be 
entitled to resort to both damages and avoidance while in others 
he may have the right to a claim for damages but not to resort 
to avoidance. 
But adopting the other possibility leads to the conclusion 
that the first step for determining the remedies available to 
the aggrieved party is not the strict distinction between con-
ditions and warranties, but rather whether or not the violated 
term is a condition. If not, remedies for breaking such a term, 
whether it is then called warranty or otherwise, depend frGm 
the beginning on the nature and effects of breach. 
28. Two different views 
In solving this problem , one may well say that there are 
two different views. The first considers that there is a third 
category of contractual terms which are neither conditions nor 
-----------------------------------
27- 1) See Benjamin, para. 758. 
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warranties. The existence of this category, which may be 
called intermediate termsf1) does not therefore affect the 
orthodox dichotomy~2) Indeed, this view is apparently suppor-
ted by the SGA itself under which the distinction between a 
condition and warranty is expressly recognized. By virtue 
of s.11.3, whether a stipulation in a contract of sale is a 
condition, the breach of which max(3) give rise to a right to 
treat the contract as repudiated, or a warranty, the breach of 
which may(3) give rise to a claim for damages but not to a 
right to reject the goods and treat the contract as repudiated, 
depends in each case on the construction of the contract; and 
a stipulation may be a condition, though called a warranty in 
the contract. 
The second view tends to give the term "warranty", a mean-
ing other than that which prevailed in the law until about the 
last twenty two years{4) For example, in the leading case of 
Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd~5) 
it has been considered that it would be unsound and misleading 
to conclude that the term broken being a warranty, then a claim 
for damages is necessarily a sufficient remedy~6) In another 
---------------------------------
28- 1) Terminology used in Bremer case, supra, 113; Bunge Corpora-
tion case, supra, 303. 
2) See, for example, Hong Kong case, supra, 69-71; Wickman 
case, supra, 264. 
3) See the comment of Atiyah on this word, p 46. 
4) Ie, until the Hong Kong case, supra. 
5) ~96~ 2 Q.B. 26. 
6) Ibid, 69-70. 
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case, the key question was whether the term broken was a con-
dition or, simply, an intermediate term~7) It has also been 
held that the court must first determine whether the violated 
term is a condition, and, if not, then it must look to the 
extent of breach~8) Finally, this view seems to be supported 
by some English Law writers~9) 
29. Appropriate criterion 
The fundamental breach, or say the modern trend recogniz-
ing the existence of innominate terms, turns on the gravity of 
breach, its nature and (or) consequences~1) Thus, the non-
defaulting party is entitled to avoid the contract whenever the 
breach is serious, substantial(2) or material(3) to the extent 
that it goes to the root of the contractf 4) or, in other words, 
--------~------- ... -------------
28- 7) Bunge Corporation case, supra, 300. 
8) The Hansa Nord, supra, 60, but see p 61 where it was con-
sidered that the term "Shipped in a good condition", which 
was the crux of the case, was not a condition strictly so 
called nor a warranty strictly so called, but an inter-
mediate stipulation. 
9) Atiyah, p 46; Reynolds in Benjamin's Sale of Goods, para.758. 
29- 1) Bremer case, supra, 113; Readron case, supra, 998; see also 
Hong Kong case, supra, 64. See, however, Bennett (of Australia 
at the Conference), A/CONF.97/19, p 298, para. 29. 
2) Tradax Internat:Lonal case, supra, 604. 
3) Wickman case, supra, 264. 




when the breach deprives him of substantially the whole 
benefit which was intended to be obtained from the contract~5) 
Whether the breach is so seems to be a question of fact to be 
decided in the light of all surrounding circumstances includ-
ing the contract provisions(6)and, presumably, the detriment 
sustained by the aggrieved party. 
This criterion as such shows two notable differences in 
contrast with the Convention which:-firstly, concentrates upon 
the detriment rather than upon the expectations under the con-
tract and, secondly, ignores, as already suggested, the 
circumstances of the casef7) 
4. Foreseeability 
30. Generally 
Under both ULIS and the Convention the breach is not con-
sidered fundamental unless the test of ~Q~eseeability through 
the defaulting party's angle is met~1) This test has also 
-------------------------------~ 
5) Hong Kong case, ibid; Photo Production Ltd. v. Securicor 
Transport Ltd. ~98~ 2 W.L.R. 283, 294; Lep Air Services 
Ltd. v. Rolloswin Investments Ltd. r97~ A.C. 331, 349. 
6) Suisse case, ibid. 
7) Supra, para. 24. 
1) See the text of both, supra, para.17; this test is also 
provided for under CITe (s.236).See , however, the opinion 
of PhilipPines which opposed the whole test, in A/CN.9/125, 
and add 1-3 (Phllippi,,'s, comment on art.9); but .£!. ,Hichida, 
27 A.J.C.L. 1979, P 279, 284. 
59 
been referred to in English case law without giving any 
further details}2) Under ULIS, moreover, the whole structure 
of fundamental breach is basically based upon the test of fore-
seeability and this is quite clear from Article 10 abovef 3 ) 
As to wording, the Convention uses the words "foresee" 
and "foreseenll to establish the proper test while ULIS uses the 
phrase "knew or ought to have knoaun ••• " for the same purposef4) 
However, the latter also uses the \'lord II foreseen" through the 
aggrieved seller's angle; that is to say, the buyer's actual 
or presumed knowledge is (to be) focused on the seller's fore-
seeability of the breach and its effect~5) 
Finally, it may well be that ULIS does not mean by the 
word flknew" or the like other than the "foreseeability" test 
though it seems to be more accurate in these circumstances to 
talk about "foreseeability" rather than IIknowledge". 
31. Whose foreseeability? 
Under the Convention, the foreseeability test is con-
sidered to be satisfied when either the buyer himself has 
(actually) fo~seen the result of his breach or a reasonable 
------------------------------
30- 2) Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha 
Ltd. ~96~ 2 Q.B. 26, 64:" ••• the remedies depend entirely 
upon the nature of the breach and its forseeable con-
sequences"; see also Lord Devlin, 1966 C.L.J., pp 192,194 f. 
3) Supra, para. 17. 
4) In CITe, too, a similar phrase has been used (s. 236):" ••• 
knew or must have known" 
5) Para. 32, below. 
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person of the same kind to be put in similar circumstances 
would have foreseen it~1) It is quite plain that the test as 
such is of objective nature since it does not turn merely on 
the buyer's own judgment~2) 
On the other hand, it may be that the burden of proof con-
cerning the criteria for foreseeability is rested with the 
defaulting buyer. This is so although a particular reference 
to this effect, while .d l-$(u.Ss~,the relevant text of the Conven-
tion, was expressly excluded(3) and notwithstanding the fact 
that the question of proof is generally(4) outside the scope 
of both ULIS and the Convention. In fact, the formula as 
approved by the \Y. G. was to the following effect"... and the 
party in breach fol"tsaw or had reason to foresee such a resul t".(5) 
But it was noted that that formula was unsatisfactory because in 
cases of litigation the burden of proof would be on the inno-
cent party and this could not be considered a proper solution\6) 
Accordingly, UNCITRAL adopted the following formula: ~ •• unless 
--------------------------------
31- 1) Art.25, supra. para. 17. 
2) See fUrther the debate of the Conference, A/CONF.97/19, 
particularly Shafik's view (of Egypt) whose proposal was the 
basis of the current formula (p 295, para.3). See, however, 
Michida, 27 A.J.C.L. 1979, pp 279, 282-283 who argued that 
the formula as adopted by the W.G.(below) was subjective. 
3) A/CONF.97/19, pp 99 (the proposal) and 294 ff (debate on it). 
4) There are certain exceptions to this rule; for an example 
of this, see para. 152, post. 
5) Art. 9 in A/CN.9/116, annex 1. 
6) A/32/17, annex 1, para. 89. 
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the party in breach did not f~esee and had no reason to foresee 
such a resul ~/~7) So that, the clear reason for replacing the 
word fland ll by "unless", which appears in the current text, was 
to place the onus on the defaulting party. 
It is to be observed, further, that the reference to the 
(presumed) reasonable person is not an alternative to the 
buyer's (personal) view relating to foreseeability; rather,the 
two elements are complementary and indivisible~8) Prima facie, 
therefore, the breach is deemed to be fundamental once it 
results in such detriment to the seller; and the buyer who 
alleges otherwise must prove that the result of his breach was 
not (actually) foreseen by him nor a reasonable person of the 
same kin~had been put in the same circumstance~would have 
foreseen such a result. 
Despite the difference in wording, it seems that ULIS, on 
the assumption that the reference to the buyer's knowledge or 
the like rather means the foreseeabilityf 9 ) follows a similar 
approach. As has been seen ~ 10) Art. 10 consideres the buyer' s 
breach fundamental when he n... knew or ought to have known ••• II 
the effect of such breach; and by virtue of Art. 13 this 
expression refers to n ••• what should have been known to a 
-------------------------------
31- 7) Ibid, para.69 (art.S) and para.35 (art.S) of the original 
document. See also the final text as adopted by UNCITI{AL, 
A/CONF.97/5 (art. 23). 
8) A/CONF.97/19, p 298, para. 41 (Shafik of Egypt). 
9) Supra, para. 30. 
10) Supra, para. 17. 
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reasonable person in the same situation /' Read literally, 
however, these words may lead to the conclusion that the 
satisfaction of the test always turns on the view of a reason-
able person. If, therefore, a buyer, assuming that he is a 
prudent (or say is more than a reasonable) man, has foreseen 
the result of his breach while a reasonable person ifTould not 
have foreseen it,the criterion is not met. But it is sub-
mitted that this theoritical asswnption is not intended and, 
again, no difference in this connexion could be found, at 
least in practice, between ULIS and the Convention. 
Two further points are to be noted. Firstly, elastic words 
of this type, whether under ULIS or the Convention, would 
suggest that the question mainly depends upon the court's own 
estimation~11). Secondly, unlike the Convention, the burden 
of proof under ULIS is, presumably, rested with the innocent 
party.( 12) 
32. Foreseeability of what? 
The answer to this question shows a remarkable difference 
between ULIS and the Convention. Under the latter, as was 
-----------------------------
31- 11) Cf, s.236 of CITC under which the general principle is 
-that If ••• in cases of doubt, a breach of contract shall not 
be considered essential"; but see s. 350. 2 which reads "In 
cases of doubt, failure to pay the purchase price in time 
shall be considered as an essential breach of contract. 1I 
12) See also Document V/Prep/11 (Austria) in Hague Conference, 
vol. 2, p 272; Ziontz, NW J. of Int. L. and Bus. (1980), 
p 129, 154. 
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indicated, the whole concept of fundamental breach basically 
turns on such sUbstantial detriment suffered by the injured 
seller}1) and to this fact the foreseeability test is linked. 
In other words, the defence of non-fundamentality of breach 
may not succeed unless it is proved that the seller's detriment 
as described above was not,according to the appropriate test, 
foreseeable. 
The position of ULIS is quite different where the fore-
seeability is addressed to the supposition that a reasonable 
person in the same situation as the innocent seller would not 
have entered into the contract had he foreseen the breach and 
its effectsf2 ) Indeed, nothing in ULIS' formula in general 
produces guidelines for determining when the breach is con-
sidered fundamental. The definition is not based on the detri-
ment sustained by the seller which is the case in the Conven-
tionf1) nor on the gravity of breach and its consequences 
which is the position of English Law in respect of innominate 
terms{3) nor, finally, on the importance of the contractual , 
term so violated which is also the situation in English Law so 
far as the dichotomy of conditions and warranties is concerned~4) 
In this respect, it has been considered that ULIS' definition 
simply means that the question would ultimately depend upon the 
judge's subjective OPinionf 5 ) and if taken literally, such a 
----------------------------------
1) Supra, paras. 22 ff. 
2) Art. 10, supra, para. 17. 
3) Supra, para. 29. 
4) Supra, para. 21. 
5) Goldenhielm, 10 Sea. Stud. in Law, 1966, p 10, 26. 
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definition might make all breaches fundamental}6) 
However, it is worth noting that it has been held, in an 
Australian case,(7) that: tithe question whether a term in a con-
tract is a condition or a warranty, i.e., an essential or a 
non-essential promise, depends upon the intention of the parties 
as appearing in or from the contract. The test of essentiality 
is whether it appears from the general nature of the contract 
considered as a whole, or from some particular term or terms, 
that the promise is of such importance to the promisee that he 
would not have entered into the contract unless he had been 
assured of a strict or substantial performance of the promise, 
as the case may be, and that this ought to have been apparent 
to the promisor." 
Without ignoring the tact that Common Law makes a distinc-
tion between a fundamental breach and a breach of a"condition" 
strictly so called}8) the above principle defining the essen-
tiality is somewhat similar to the definition of fundamental 
breaCh under ULIS; and it may even be difficult to find a not-
able difference between them in practice. 
33. Time of foreseeability 
It is expressly settled in ULIS that the only relevant 
time for considering the foreseeability test is that at which 
------------------------------
32- 6) Perrott, 1 Int. Co~t. L. and F. Rev. 1980, p 577, 581. 
7) Tramways Advertising Pty Ltd. v. Luna Park (N.S.W.) Ltd. 
(1938) 38 S.R.(N.S.W.) 632, 641. 
8) Supra, para. 26, note 5. See further paras. 21, 26 ff, supra. 
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the contract was concluded$1) Thus, any circumstances sub-
sequent to that time have no value. Although this approach 
seems to be questionable~1a) it is quite wise to defend it 
since the parties determine their mutual interest at that tim~1) 
if, moreover, the question were left open, there would be the 
risk that a party might take some unilateral action to render 
more serious the breach on the part of the other party~3) 
However, this is not the approach of the Convention in 
which no reference as regards the time of foreseeability could 
be found~4) and this was the clear intention of the drafts-
men~5) So that any information provided after the conclusion 
of the contract could modify the situation relating to foresee-
ability test~6) In brief, whether the criteria for this test 
are met is a question to be decided in the light of all sur-
rounding circumstances from the time of concluding the contract 
until the time at which the breach, or even avoidance, took 
place. 
------------------~-----------33- 1) Art.10, supra, para. 17, the same is true under CITC(s.236). 
1a) See also Document V/Prep./9 (Finland), in Hague Converence, 
vol. 2, p 271. 
2) A/CONF.97/19, p 302, para.1 (Feltham of UK). 
3) Ibid, p 297, para. 20 (Staleve of Hungary). 
4) See Art. 25, supra, para. 17. 
5) Fe 1 tham , 1981 J.B.L., P 346, 353, see also Perrott, 1981 
Int. L. and F. Rev. p 582 who,however, considers this 
approach as "unfortunate" (ibid,pp 581-582). For different 
views, see generally the debate of the Conference (First 
Committee) on Art. 23 of the draft convention,A/CONF.97/19, 
pp 295 ff. 
6) A/CONF. 97/19, p 302, para.2 (Rognliem of Norway). 
34. Texts 
Section II 
Additional Time Notice 
Ar~ 62.2 of ULIS provides that: 
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"Where the failure to pay the price at the date fixed 
does not amount to a fundamental breach of the contract, the 
seller may grant to the buyer an additional period of time of 
reasonable length. If the buyer has not paid the price at the 
expiration of the additional period, the seller may either 
require the payment of the price by the buyer or, provided 
that he does so promptly, declare the contract avoided." 
While Ar~ 63 of the Convention provides that: 
"1_ The seller may fix an additional period of time of 
reasonable length for performance by the buyer of his obliga-
tions. 
2- Unless the seller has received notice from the buyer 
that he will not perform within the period so fixe~ the seller 
may not,during that period, resort to any remedy for breach of 
contract~ However, the seller is not deprived thereby of any 
right he may have to claim damages for delay in performance.u( 1 ) 
---------------------------------
34- 1) For a legislative background of the text, see the following 
documents successivelT--A/CN.9/87,annex 5.(art.72);A/CN.9/87, 
para. 52, and annex 1 (art. 72); A/CN.9/100, annex 1, art.44, 
(72); A/CN.9/116, annex 1 (art. 44);A/32/17, annex 1, 
para.373, and para.35 (art.45) of the original document; 




And Arn 64.1 of the Convention provides, inter alia, that: 
"The seller may declare the contract avoided if the buyer does 
not, within the additional period of time fixed by the seller 
in accordance with paragraph (1) of article 63, perform his 
obligation to pay the price ••• , or if he declares that he will 
not do so wi thin the period so fixed."( 2) 
1. Notion of notice 
35. Generally 
The addi tiona! time notice as provided for in both ULIS 
and the Convention is linked with the remedy of avoidance. 
Indeed, the aggrieved seller need not give it whenever he 
requires performance or claims damages~1) It simply presumes 
that the seller seeks avoidance as a result of the buyer's 
actual breach, but either the breach is not fundamenal and does 
not therefore justify the avoidance or it is so but the seller 
wants to be certain of his step~2) In either case, however, 
the seller is entitled to grant to the buyer an additional time 
notice for performing his obligation and if it expires without 
complying with it, the avoidance would then be justified(3) 
regardless of the degree of breach~2) 
----------------------------------
a) were submitted and the text as such was adopted, see 
A/CONF.97/19 , pp 124 (art.59) and 212 para. 47. 
2) For a legislative background ot the text, see supra, para. 
17, note 1 '. 
1 ) Post, para. 37. 
2) ct., however, the provision of ULIS, post, para. 42. 
-
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On the other hand, it is familiar when considering this 
(4) 
notice to think about what so called in German Law'Nachfrist", 
This is a notice calling on the non-performing party to perform 
within an additional period of time and stating that the 
creditor will after the expiration of the period refuse to 
accept performance~4a) Nevertheless, it must be noted that 
the notion of a notice for performance is well-known in various 
domestic laws including English and French Law~5) It is not 
exactly the "Nachfrist" (6) in German Law nor the "mise en 
demeure'(7) in French Law though it has certain pa~entage in 
either~8) Nor is it the additional time notice given in 
English Law for making time of the essence of the contract~9) 
The differences be~leen these notices will be shown in the 
succeeding paragraphs. 
------------------------------
35- 3) Post, para. 46. 
4) See A/CN.9/100, annex 3, paras. 66, 164; Goldenhielem, 10 
Scan. Stud. in Law 1966, p 10, 15; Honnold, Uniform Law, 
para.290; Lagergren, 1958 J.B.L., P 138; OLRC Report, 
vol. 2, pp 392 f, and note 18. 
4a) Treitel, Remedies, 5.11, see also Williston on Contracts, 
para. 1337A. 
5) As well as Italian and Greek Law, see Lagergren, ibid. 
6) On the "Nachf'ristlt in general, see Treitel, Remedies,s.149; 
the main aspects of this expression in German Law will be 
shown below. 
7) On the meaning of this term, see supra, para.12. 
8) See A/CONF.97/5, comment on art.59, para. 8. 
9) Post, para.39; see, however, Lagergren, ibid, who considered 
that the notice in draft ULIS 1956 was a compromise between 
French and Common Law. 
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36. Advantages 
The additional time notice is to the benefit of both parties: 
the buyer and seller. As to the former, it gives him the oppor-
tunity to cure his breach by tendering performance during the 
extra time so given to him. In such a case, the seller is bound 
to accept the tender even where the buyer's breach is considered 
to be fundamental, or else he would become the party in defaulf~) 
As to the latter, the notice is of particular significance. 
This is due to the fact that the innocent seller, on whom the 
estimation of the degree of breach falls in principl~may misjudge 
the real situation;and in the belief that it is fundamental he 
may declare the contract avoided while the court is likely to 
reach another viewf2 ) The result of such assumption is clear, 
that is, the unjustified declaration of avoidance is in itself 
a breach of contract which militates against the seller~3) In 
other words, the seller, instead of being the aggrieved party, 
would become in these circumstances the defaulting party. In 
an English case)4) for example, the defendants were appointed 
as a concessionaire for marketing the plaintiff's products in 
Britain. In the belief that the former's non-payment in time 
constituted a repudiation of the contr~ct, or Bay a fundamental 
breach, the plaintiff sent him a notice of avoidance. It was 
held that the breach was not so; rather, the plaintiff's act, 
-----------~-~--~~---~-------
36- 1) Post, para. 45. 
2) See, for example, the case cited in note 4 below. 
3) See Magnous, 3 Com. L. Yearbook 1979, p 105, 115. 
4) Decro-Wall International S.A. v.Practlt!oners i~ Marketing 
h!£. Q97] 2 All E.R. 216. 
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which was accompanied by appointing another concessionaire, 
constituted a repudiation. 
But in giving an additional time notice for performance, 
it is sufficient for the seller to wait until its expiration 
without payment by the buyer whereupon the avoidance would be 
jUstifiedf5 ) and the degree of breach becomes irrelevant~6) 
This too would facilitate the task of the court. Certainly, 
1 t is much easier for it to asc:ertain the legality of avoidance 
if based on the additional time notice, than upon the principle 
of fundamental breach which is, as has been seen, a very comp-
licated term under both ULIS and the Convention\7) 
37. Whose responsibility?? 
Giving the additional time notice under both ULIS and the 
Convention is the act of the innocent seller and not that of 
the court, which is the same in English Law with relation to 
the notice required for making time of the essence~1) A similar 
principle is likewise applied in respect of the German 
II Nach.fristn .( 2) 
In French Law, too, putting the non-performing party in 
default i e IImise en demeuren ,(3) when this is necessary,(4)must , .. , 
-------------------------------
36- 5) Post, para. 46. 
6) This is at least the clear position of the Convention(post, 
para. 42). 
7) See supra, this Ch., s.I. 
37- 1) Para.39 below. A similar rule seems to be applied under 
CITC (5.351). 
2) Treitel, Remedies, s.151. 
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be done by the other party whether the avoidance is based on 
a contractual power or not~5) In the latter situation, however, 
the court is empowered to give the debtor such a period of time 
for performance which is called here "a delai de grace". (6) 
Therefore, giving an extra time for performance in French Law 
is the act of the creditor or the court depending on the case. 
But it should be remembered that the idea of giving a "delai de 
grace" by the court is expressly rejected by both ULIS and. the 
Convention~7) 
38. Mandatory or permissive?? 
The general principle underlying German Law is that the 
aggrieved party cannot resort to any remedy available to him, 
or, more precisely, to aVOidance, performance or damages unless 
he gives the other party a nNaChirist l1 51) Exceptionally, how-
ever, a party is released from giving such a notice where, in 
particular, the defaulting party has expressly declared that he 
will not perform his obligationsf2) 
-~-------------~---------------
37- 3) Supra, para. 12. 
4) See para. 38, below 
5) Supra, para. 21. 
6) Supra, para. 20. 
7) Post, para. 135. 
38- 1) Treitsl, Remedies, sa.11, 149. 
2) Ibid, 6.150; Williston on Contracts, 3rd ed. s.1337A; 
Zweigert, 1964 ICLQ, Supp. Pub. no. 9, p 1, 10. 
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Likewise, the "mise en demeure ll in French Law is necessary 
before resorting to any of these remediesf 3) and the fact 
that the avoidance is derived from a contractual power does not, 
nevertheless, release the innocent party from his duty to put 
the other in default unless the agreement itself provides other-
wlse~4) But 1 t must be noted that the serving of a writ or 
summons produces the same effects of "mise en demeurenf5) In 
such a case, therefore, the "mise en demeure" is unnecessary. 
By contrast, there is nothing in either ULIS or the Con-
vention indicating that the unpaid seller is bound to grant the 
buyer an additional/time notice for performance before resort-
ing to any of his remedies. And this is thoroughly true in 
respect of performance, damages and avoidance when it is based 
on the fundamental breach. But when the ,breach is not .funda-
mental and there is no agreement entitling aVOidance~4) the 
only ground for avoiding the contract is.the additional time 
notice, which means that this notice is mandatory in these 
circumstances. On the other hand, neither ULIS nor the Conven-
tion contains a rule similar to that followed under both French 
and German Law, to the effect that the seller 1s freed from 
giving such notice if the buyer has expressly declared his 
intention not to perform; nor is it possible to conclude 
that the general principles on which either is based require 
this notice~6) 
--~-----------------------------
38- 3) Supra, para.12. 
4) Supra, para.21. 
5) Starck, para. 2175, note 102. 
6) By virtue of Arts.17 of ULIS and 7.2 of the Convention. 
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In English Law, finally, giving an extra time notice for 
performance is necessary before declaring the centract avoided 
only in the case in which time of payment is not of the essence 
of the contract~7) Before considering this question below}7) 
two points must be emphasized. Firstly, the giving of such 
notice is cOnfined to the remedy of avoidance; therefore, the 
aggrieved party need not grant it whenever he seeks either 
performance or damages, which is the same, as has just been 
seen, under both ULIS and the Convention while another approach 
is followed in German as well as French Law. Secondly, it has 
been held(S) that if it is clear from the circumstances that 
the party in default (a seller of a freehold property) would 
not answer the other party's notice, it is quite unnecessary to 
give any notice for making time of the essence. As clear, this 
approach is similar, to some extent, to that foll~ed in both 
German and frenCh Law while the position of ULIS and the 
Convention is, as already mentioned, quite different. 
39. English Law: time & essence 
Under the English general law of contract, a sharp distinc-
tion has been made between two situations, that is, whether or 
not time of payment is of the essence of the contract~1) If 
-------------~----------------
38- 7) para. 39, below. 
8) Re-Stone and Saville's Contracts ~ 96~ 1 W.L.R.163, 171. 
39- 1) See the authorities cited in the following notes. It has 
been considered in this respect that the above distinction 
seems to be an application to the dichotomy (supra, para.21) 
of "conditions" and "warranties"; see Bateson, 1957 J.B.L., 
P 357. 
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so, the innocent party is entitled to avoid the contract 
immediately upon the other's delay, however short, in making 
payment. If not, avoidance may not be available unless two 
requirements are satisfied~2) Firstly, the delay in payment 
is improper, undue, UIUlecessary or the like ~ 3) Secondly, the 
aggrieved party has given the other a reasonable notice for 
performance which has been expired without complying with it~4) 
However, it seems to be settled that time of payment is of 
the essence only in three cases~5) if the contract so provides, 
where the circumstances including the nature of the subject-
matter indicate that and where the defaulting party 
is given a reasonable time notice for performance. This 
principle is of general nature(6) and therefore applies to 
-----------------------------------
39- 2) Or unless the delay, as has been said, is so great as sub-
stantially to destroy the consideration which was promised; 
see Llngren, Time and Performance of the Contract,1976 p 42. 
3) See Aji t v. sammy @96IJ 1 A.C.255 where Stickney v. Keeble 
B91~ A.C. 386 was applied; Re-Bayley & Shoesmith's Contract 
(1918) 87 L.J.R. Ch.626, 628; Smith v. Hamilton G95~ Ch.174, 
181; Thol12e v. Fasey @94~ Ch.649, 655. 
4) Ajit case, ibid;·,Hartley v. Hymans ff92~ 3 K.B.475; Luck v. 
White (1973) 26 P & C.R 89; Charles Rickards Ltd.·v. 
Oppenhaim Q95g 1 K.B.616, 624; Re-Bayley case, ibid; 
Stickney case, ibid. 
5) See Chechire, Fifoot & Furmston, p 499; Halsbury's Laws of 
England, vol. 9, para. 481; see also note 7, below. 
6) The general rule under CITC too (5.236) 1s that tI ••• in cases 
of doubt, a breach of contract shall not be considered 




On the other hand, the non-defaulting party may waive his 
right as to time of payment; in that case, he cannot rely on 
the previous delay for resorting to avoidance whiCh means that 
such time no more remains of the essence. In such a case, 
however, time becomes again of the essence upon giving a 
reasonable notice for performance~8) 
So far as the sale of goods is concerned, s.10.1 of the 
SGA provides that time of payment is not of the essence of the 
contract~9) If, therefore, the principle laid down under the 
general law of contract is to be applied, which is assumed, the 
unpaid seller may make time of the essence by giving the buyer 
an additional time notice of reasonable length for payment;and 
if it expires without complying with it, the declaration of 
avoidance would be legally justified. But a different rule 
seems to be followed where, in international sales in particu-
lar, payment is to be made by a letter of credit. In that case, 
---------------------------------
39- 7) See United Scientific Holdings Ltd. v. Burnley Borough 
Council [97~ A.C. 904, 958; see also Beale, Remedies for 
Breach of Contract, 1980, p 90. 
a) See Charles Rickards case, ibid; Hartley caseJ ibid; Luck 
case, ibid. 
9) See also United Dominions Trust (commercial) Ltd. v. Eagle 
Aircraft Services Ltd. n96§j 1 W.L.R. 74; Decro-vlall Inter-
national S.A. v.Praeti t,ioners in Ivlarlceting Ltd. [!97~ 2 All 
E.R. 216, particularly at p 222. But £f., s.350 of CITC which 
reads: "In case of doubt, failure to pay the purchase price 
in time Shall be considered as an essential breach of 
contract." 
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time of opening the credit, as has been observed~10) is of the 
essence and if the buyer does not open it on the date so fixed, 
the seller is entitled to avoid the contract without being 
bound to grant him any extra time for performance. If, however, 
the contract does not determine the date of opening the credit 
but simply specifies a period for shipment, which is very 
familiar in international trade, the buyer must open it prior 
to the earliest date for Shipment~11) 
In all cases, the seller is entitled, by virtue of s.48.3 
of the SGA, to resell the goods if he has given the buyer a 
notice of his intention and the latter does not within a 
reasonable time payor tender the price. In suCh a case, the 
contract is deemed to be avoided by the resale~12) Once again, 
it is suggested that a seller who seeks avoidance is not bound 
to resell the goodsf 13) rather, he can avoid the contract by 
turning on the general rule dealing with the additional time 
notice, and keep the goods for his own use. 
-----------------------------
39- 10) Benjamin, para. 2166. 
11) Ian Stach Ltd. v. Baker Bosley 0958J 2 Q.B.130; Pavia & Co., 
S.P.A. v. Thurmann-Nielsen U95~ 2 Q.B.B4. But when payment 
is to be made cash against documents, the buyer must pay the 
price within a reasonable time of presentation of documents, 
see Rlan v. Ridley (1902) 8 Com. Cas. 105, 107. 
12) See R. V. Ward v. BignaJ.l ff967J 1 Q.B. 534. 
13) See Benjamin, paras. 1235, 1249. 
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40. Content of notice 
It seems that neither English nor French Law requires any 
specific S\:o.~trt-ent to be mentioned in respect of the additional 
time notice for making time of the essence, or of the "mise en 
deme \Lye 11 respectively5 1) Thus, it is sufficient that the 
unpaid seller calls upon the buyer to make payment within a 
reasonable time or the like. In particular, he need not 
mention the consequences which are likely to occur in case of 
buyerts failure to comply with the notice such as avoidance or 
otherwise. The reason for that is, perhaps, that the seller is 
not obliged to avoid the contract when the requirements of 
avoidance are met; instead, he may insist on claiming perfor-
mance and treat the grounds for avoidance as never having 
existed. In other words, he has the right of option either to 
avoid the contract or to affirm it~2) 
One may well say that this is also the approach of ULIS 
as well as the Convention where both obviously consider the 
avoidance on the ground of the additional time notice as the 
sellerts right, and not a duty imposed upon him~3) That is 
to say, that the unpaid seller has, in these circumstances, 
the right of election between avoidance and performance~4) 
-------------~-----------------
40- 1) The same may be true under CITC (SSe 237, 351). 
2) For further details of the doctrine of option, see post, 
paras. 49, 52. 
3) See art.62.2 of ULIS and Art.64.1 of the Convention (supra, 
para. 34) • 
4) See further post, paras. 46, 52. 
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and this would suggest, again, that no particular statement 
must be inserted in the relevant noticef5) 
The solution followed in German Law is quite different. 
As was indicated, one of the main features of the ItNachf'rist" 
is that the creditor must state that he will not after the 
expiration of the extra period accept performancef 6 ) and in 
doing so, he would be deprived of the right to claim perfor-
mance at the end of the designated period~7) 
2. Requirements of notice 
41. Delay in Eerformance 
It is clear from the relevant provisions of ULIS and the 
Convention that the unpaid seller is not entitled to give 
the notice unless and until there is an actual breach committed 
by the buyerf1) otherwise it is assumed that the notice has no 
--------------------------------
40- 5) Cf., Honnold, Uniform Law, paras. 2~;q, 351 who says that the 
-
notice may serve as basis for avoidance only 'if it states that 
the other party has an additional and final period for 
performance. 
6) Supra, para. 35. 
7) Treitel, Remedies, 5.149. 
41- 1) See Art.62.2 of ULIS (supra, para.34):IfWhere the failure 
to pay the price at the date fixed ••• ", and particularly 
the first sentence of Art.61.1 of the Convention:"If the 
buyer fails to perform ••• ". See also CITC, s.237.1:"If the 
delay ••• ", and 8.351:" If the buyer commits a breach of 
contract by failing to pay the purchase price ••• in accor-
dance with the contracted conditions •••• II • 
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legal effect and, therefore, the seller cannot rely on it for 
avoiding the contract. But unlike English Law;2) he may give 
the notice immediately after the buyer's breach without being 
bound to wait the lapse of any period of time. 
On the other hand, it seems that it is not possible to 
talk about an "additional periodll under both ULIS and the 
Convention without assuming in advance that the original period 
for performance has already expired. In other words, the seller 
cannot turn on the notice unless there is an actual delay in 
paying the price(3) even if the buyer has already violated the 
contract in respect of payment. To illustrate, suppose that a 
contract provides that payment must be made during three months, 
say May, June and July by a confirmed letter o£ credit. Suppose 
too that on June 1, the buyer has opened an uncon£irmed credit 
where the seller has immediately given him a notice of reason-
able length which expires on June 20. In this setting, the 
notice may not constitute a good ground for avoidance. The 
resul t of this assumption is that the buyer can cure any defect 
in his performance so long as time of payment has not expired 
yet. 
In English Law, moreover, the mere delay does not justify 
giving the notice; rather, it must be, as has been seen, 
-----~-----------------...-----------
41- 2) Supra, para. 39. 
3) See also CITe, 85.237 (where there must be a "delayll), 350 
& 351: "additional term". It is to be noted that 
s.237 provides for the general rule while the other two 




improper~4) As to the buyer's right to cure his failure in 
these circumstances, the general rule seems to amount to this: 
a valid tender subsequent to a bad one must generally be 
accepted(5) even where, presumably, the time of payment has 
elapsed provided that such time is not of the 
essence\4) And this is so unless, of course, the debtor's 
first tender amounts to a repudiation of the contract which has 
been accepted by treating the contract by the aggrieved party 
as avoided(6) 
42. De~ee of breach 
It is quite plain from the Convention that the seller may 
..... e'9 on the additional time notice for avoiding the contr--Clct 
irrespective of whether or not the buyer's breach is funda-
mental~1) A valid notice, however, makes the degree of breach 
irrelevant <'2) 
The apparent meaning of the relevant provision under ULIS 
gives another understanding, that is, the notice does not 







Supra, para. 39. 
Treitel, Remedies, s.174, and in Law of Contract, pp 565 f; 
see also Tetley v. Shand (1871)25 L.T.65a (a seller was in 
default) • 
Treitel, Law of Contract, p 566. 
Art.63.1, supra, para. 34. 
Only in respect of the avoidance, for there are other situa-
tions in the Convention which depend on the fundamental 
breach 'e.g, Arts.46.2 and 70). 
3) The same may be true under CITe (ss.237.1 and 351). 
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construction as such is indeed difficult to be justified. In 
addition to the practical advantages ensuing from the notice 
even where the breach is tundamentalf 4) it seems to be unsound 
that a seller who has made an attempt to maintain the contract 
alive is to be penalized. It may be argued in this respect that 
the fundamentality of breach, instead of the notice, con-
stitutes a good ground for aVOidancef5) although this is 
quite true, it is to be noted that two main problems are highly 
likely to arise in these circumstances. 
Firstly, the difficulty of proving the degree of breach 
where at least part of the onus will rest with the seller~6) 
Secondly, giving the notice by the seller, while he has the 
right to avoid the contract on the ground of the fundamental 
breach,might be construed as an affirmation of the contractf7) 
and in such an event another main difficulty arises, that is, 
whether he can retract his decision~8) 
43. Reasonable period 
The Convention expressly provides that the additional 
------------------------------
42- 4) Supra, para. 36. 
5) Supra, this Ch., S.l. 
6) See para. 31, supra. 
7) Where the affirmation may be express or implicit (Chitty, 
para. 1593); and it may be ~ade by words or acts or even by 
silence (Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston, p 489). 
8) See, by way of contrast, para. 46, post. 
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period must be reasonable(1) which is the same under both ULIS 
and English Law~2) Whether it is so, is a question of fact to 
be determined in each particular case in the light of its own 
circumstances~3) 
Further, the period as stated in the Convention must be 
IIfixed" either by specifying the date on which payment should 
be made, say on May 1, or by specifying a time period(4) say 
two weeks, one month or the like. But the relevant provision 
under ULIS which requires that the additional period must be 
of "reasonable length,,(5) is indeed capable of dual inter-
pretation. 
It may be said, on the one hand, that it is not possible 
to decide whether the length of the period so given is reason-
able without "fixingU it in advance. On the other hand, it is 
------------------------------
43- 1) Art.63, supra, para. 34; cf., s.351 of CITC which provides 
for an 11 addi tional term for payment" of the price, but see 
8.237 dealing with the general rule where a "reasonable 
term" is required. 
2) Art.62 of ULIS (supra, para. 34); as to English Law, see 
para. 39, supra. 
3) Ajit v. Sammy fl967J 1 A.C.255 where Stickney v. Keeble B91~ 
A.C. 386, 415 was applied; Charles Rickards Ltd. v. 
Oppenhaim ff95~1 K.B. 616, 624; United Dominion Trust 
(Commercial) Ltd. v. Eagle Aircraft Services Ltd. rr96~ 1 
W.L.R. 74, 82, 87; a similar principle applies when a 
reasonable notice is provided for in the contract, see 
Decro-Wall International S.A. v.Practitioners in Marketi~ 
~. B97j 2 All E.R.216, 229. 
4) A/CONF.97/5, comment on art. 59, para. 7. 
5) Art.62.2, supra, para. 34. 
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quite possible to assume that, while the reasonableness is a 
question of circumstances in each case, it is therefore suf-
ficient to grant the buyer such period of time without fixing 
it by saying, for instance, "wi thin a reasonable time". 
The difference between these two interpretations seems to 
be significant in practice. Under the Convention, for example, 
it has been suggested that the seller cannot rely on the notice 
for avoiding the contract if the period is not IIfixedn.(6) If, 
however, this understanding is correct, then it shows another 
difference between the Convention and the German "Nachfristfl 
under which the creditor need not specify any time at all but 
simply ask for performance within a reasonable time~7) 
3. Effects of notice 
44. Criticism of Convention 
In giving the buyer an additional time notice for perfor-
mance, the seller cannot during that period resort to any remedy 
for breach of contract. This generalization in the Convention 
1s misleading and in fact inaccurate. For example, it is granted 
--------------------------~----
43- 6) A/32/17, annex 1, para. 236 concerning the buyer's remedies 
but the same principle applies to the seller's remedies,£!.; 
the formula submitted by the S.G. to the W.G., A/CN.9/87, 
annex 4, para. 36 (art. 72); and the draft text as adopted 
by the W.G., in A/CN.9/116, annex 1 (art.44). 
7) Treitel, Remedies, s.149 •. 
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that the seller may exercise his right of withholding delivery 
if its requirements are met(1) even though the period has not 
yet expired~2) The true tenor of the Convention appears to 
refer to those remedies as indexed under the title of "Remedies 
tor breach of contract by the buyer" which are (claiming) per-
formance, avoidance and damages~3) But this remedial index is 
not comprehensive where the remedy of withholding delivery is 
expressly recognized by the Convention(1) though it is not 
inserted under that index. 
45. Suspension of avoidance 
So the seller cannot resort, under the Convention, to 
avoidance as long as the additional time is still running even 
where the buyer's breach was fundamental. The reason for this 
rule is, as said, to protect the buyer who might be preparing 
to perform the contract as requested by the former~1) Although 
---~---------------------.-----~-
44- 1) See Art.58.1 of the Convention (supra, para. 10). 
2) See, by way of contrast, vloods v. fwlackenzie Hill Ltd. 597~ 1 
W.L.R. 613, 615-16, approved in Rainerie v. Miles G98] 
A.C. 1050, 1086-87. In the former case, it was held that the 
notice, which was made according to an agreement, would not 
affect, as a rule, the remedies available to the innocent 
party. 
3) Part. II, Chapter III, Section III. 
45- 1) A/CONF.97/5, comment on art.59, para.9; A/CN.9/116, annex 2, 
comment on art.44, para.4. £f., s.350 of CITC which provides 
that the seller may avoid the contract even before the 
expiration of the period if he is likely to incur excessive 
costs or considerable damages due to the buyer's default; 
and for the reason of this rule, see Kopac, comment on 
s.350, pp 119-120. 
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ULIS does not '~flca.i,.. Cln express provision to this effect, common 
sense may lead to a similar rule. Since performance and 
avoidance are inconsistent, the seller cannot resort to the 
latter while requiring the formerf 2) and this is moreover in 
conformity with the principle of good faith which prevails in 
international trade law in particular. 
Accordingly, one may well say that the seller is bound to 
accept the buyer's performance if duly tendered during the 
currency of the notice, or else he would be a defaulting party. 
A similar principle is likewise adopted by English Lawf 3 ) 
46. E)(Pipo..·\:',O" of notice 
The seller's remedy of avoidance revives if the additional 
time expires without performance (or proper tender) by the 
buyer. Though ULIS and the Convention are in agreement on this 
matter~1) there 1s an important point of divergence between 
them. 
Under the latter, the seller's right of avoidance continues 
to exist so long as he is not yet paidf2 ) his mere silence, 
---~---------~--~----~---------
45- 2) The converse 1s also true, that is, he cannot demand perfor-
mance if he has already avoided the contract (A/CN.9/87, 
annex 4, para.36, art.72 as proposed by the S.G.). 
3) F1nkielkraut v. Monohan 694~ 2 All E.R. 234, 237. 
46- 1) Arts.62.2 of ULIS and 63 of the Convention (supra, para.34)j 
as to English Law, see supra, para. 39. 
2) Art.64.2 of the Convention under which the seller may lose 
the right of avoidance only if the buyer has paid the price; 
see also Honnold, Uniform Law, para.35Sj A/CN.9/116,annex 2,~ 
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therefore, may never be construed as an affirmation of the con-
tract depriving him of aVOidance~3) In fact, this is not 
exactly the position of ULIS where Ar~ 62.2 provides that a 
seller who relies on the additional time notice for avoidance 
must express his intention "promptlyft after the expiration of 
the notice. Insofar as avoidance is concerned this term,which 
was deleted from the convention~4) means by virtue of Art-11 
of ULIS that avoidance must be declared "wi thin as short a 
period as possible, in the circumstances from the moment" the 
avoidance "could reasonably be lf declared. In practice, how-
ever, elastic words of this type will empower the court to play 
a main role when deciding whether the avoidance has taken 
place "promptlyll. In other words, this question is of circum-
stances to be decided by the court on a case by case basis. 
The real, and may-be the only, understanding of ULIS' 
approach is that no more can the seller resort to avoidance if 
he has not declared it promptly. In these circumstances, however, 
he remains having the right of claiming payment of the price, 
interest and damages if any. But this approach, however defend-
able, may in certain events lead to unreasonable results and 
is therefore difficult to be justified. 
To illustrate, suppose that the seller has not declared 
-~-------~---------------------
46- =) comment on art.45, para.7; A/CONF.97/5, comment on art.60, 
para.B. A similar rule applies under CITe (s.352). 
3) See further para. 57, post. 
4) See further A/CN.9/100, para. 46. 
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avoidance promptly; suppose too that the buyer insists on non-
per~ormance; suppose, ~inally, that the judicaf competent is 
held to a court which shall not, according to ULIS itself;5) 
enter a judgment of specific performance, or say payment of 
the price, because it would not do so under its own law in 
respect of similar contracts not governed by ULIS. In this 
setting, it is clear that the seller cannot resort to avoidance, 
nor can he claim payment. The situation becomes more compli-
cated when recalling that the calculation of damages under 
ULIS is based on whether the contract has been avoided or 
notf6) and it is indeed difficult to envisage the latter 
situation without assuming that the seller has the right to 
require performance, i.e., payment of the price. The key 
question which may arise here is, therefore, how to assess 
damages where neither avoidance nor requiring payment is 
available to the seller. 
For solving this intricate problem, it is quite reason-
able to suggest that the right of avoidance revives if, again, 
the seller has served the buyer another additional time notice, 
but the latter has not complied with it. And this seems to be 
the real situation in practice where it has been held by a (W.) 
German CQurt(7) applying Ar~75 of ULIS, which will be examined 
-~----------~----~----------
46- 5) See in detail post, paras. 137, 139. 
6) See the remedy of damages, post, Ch.II. 
7) Bundesgerichtshof, 28 III. 1979-VIII ZR. 37/78, in UNIDROIT. 
1979, vol. 2, p 276. 
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later! 8) that the fact that avoidance must be declared 
promptly does not prevent the innocent party from only exercis-
ing his right of avoidance after he has given the other party 
a further period of time for performance. 
The rule adopted under the English general law of con-
tract is that the silence of the aggrieved party, who has the 
right to avoid the contract, may be construed, as will be seen 
later~9) as an affirmation of the contract; and this is in 
particular so where the delay in exercising avoidance is 
unreasonable. Accordingly, it may be that the seller's right 
of avoidance, on the assumption that it turns on an additional 
time notice~10) must be exercised without "unreasonable 
delay,,(9) otherwise he is deemed to have lost this remedy. A 
rule as such is obviously comparable to that adopted by ULlS; 
and it is really difficult in practice to assume that there is 
any difference betw'een the expressions "promptly" under ULlS 
and "without unreasonable delay" under English Law Where the 
application of either solely depends on the circumstanees of 
each particular case. 
On the other hand, it is submitted that the right of 
avoidance may revive in English Law if, by analogy with the 
doctrine of waiver~11) the defaulting party has not complied 
------------------------------
46- 8) Post, para. 75. 
9) Post, para. 57. 
10) Supra, para. 39. 
11) Supra, para. 39; see also Chitty, para. 1495 where it is 
considered that affirmation of contract may be regarded as 
a species of waiver. 
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with another extra time notice given to him for performance. 
Here again, this suggested rule is presumably in line with 
ULlS. 
47. Buyer's notice of non-payment 
The seller's remedy of avoidance under the Convention 
revives too if, before the expiration of the extra period, he 
has received a notice from the buyer to the effect that he will 
not perform his obligations~1) This provision has no counter-
part in either English Law or ULIS; and it is doubtful to 
assume that it could be inferred from the general principles 
on which the latter law is basedf 2 ) 
The buyer's notice must clearly declare his intention 
that he )will not perform his obligations. So, for instance, 
if he suggests the amendment of the contract or requests the 
seller to extend the additional period, the latter cannot rely 
on such notice for avoiding the contract. 
On the other hand, the buyer's notice has no legal effect 
unless the seller receives it. Obviously, this is an exception 
to the general rule under the Convention whereby any communica-
tion between the parties would have effect upon its despatch 
to the addressee if given by means appropriate in the circum-
stances~3) It should be noted that, while setting the 
------~-----------------------
47- 1) Art.64.1 of the Convention (supra, para.34). 
2) See Art.17 of ULIS. 
3) Post, para. 59. 
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relevant text, there was a clear tendency that its purpose is 
to place the risk of any loss, delay or error in transmission 
of the buyer's declaration of non-compliance with the seller's 
notice of performance on the buyer(4). But this point of view 
is questionable on the ground that the buyer's notice always 
operates to his detriment and at the same time to the benefit 
of the seller. This is due to the fact that such a notice 
revives the latter's remedy of avoidance. If, for exampl~ the 
notice has lost before receiving it, the seller cannot turn on 
it for avoiding the contract even assuming that he has obtained 
actual knowledge of its content. Furthermore, it may be that 
the buyer can withdraw his declaration of non-performance so 
long as the seller has not yet received it. This simply means 
that the receipt theory here operates against the draftsmen's 
intention. 
------------------~---~----
47- 4) A/32/17, annex 1, paras. 378 f. 
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Section III 
Mechanism of Avoidance 
1. Ipso facto avoidance in ULIS 
47A. Texts 
Art. 61.2 of ULIS provides that: 
"The seller shall not be entitled to require payment 
of the price by the buyer if it is in conformity with usage 
and reasonably possible for the seller to resell the goods. In 
that case the contract shall be ipso facto avoided as from the 
time when such resale should be effected." 
And ~ 62.1 provides that: 
"Where the failure to pay the price at the date fixed 
amounts to a fundamental breach of the contract, the seller 
may either require the buyer to pay the price or declare the 
contract avoided. He shall inform the buyer of his decision 
within a reasonable time; otherwise the contract Shall be ipso 
facto avoided." 
48. Cases of avoidance 
The term 1l,ip$O facto" avoidance under ULIS(1) means that 
the contract comes to an end by operation of law, ie, auto-
matically(2) irrespective of the parties' will or intention~3) 
---------------.----------
48- 1) See generally the study of the S.G., in A/CN.9/WG.2/WP.9. 
2) Ibid, para.20; A/8017, para.45; Burke, 22 H.I.L.J. 1981, 
P 374, note 30; Honnold, Uniform Law, para.187, and in 27 
A.J.C.L. 1979, P 223, 228, and in 30 Law and Con. Probe • 
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And this happens, as clear from the above texts, in either of 
two situations. 
In the first place, the seller has, as a rule, the right 
to require payment of the price\4) But he is not entitled to 
do so if it is in conformity with usage (5) and reasonably 
possible for him to resell the goods. In that case, the con-
tract is ipso facto avoided as from the time when such resale 
Should be effected, that is to say when it really takes 
place\6) It seems that lIusages" and "reasonably possible ll 
refer in practice, as said, to such circumstances where the 
seller remains in possession of the goods, otherwise usages 
are fairly uncommon~7) Similarly, where the resale is not 
possible, it is clear that usages could not require it and, 
therefore, this provision would not apply~8) Nevertheless,it 
Should be emphasized that the relevant provision, where its 
requirements are met, expressly imposes upon the seller a 
duty to resell the gOods(9) even at a price lower than the 
-----------------~----------
48- =) 1965, p 326, 344. 
3) A/CN.9/WG.2/WP.9, para.8; Baer, p 104. 
4) By virtue of Art.61.1 (post, para. 131). 
5) Inserting "usage" in the text has been criticised on the 
ground that usages always prevail over the Law according 
to Art.9(A/CN.9/87, para.45). 
6) Cf., A/CN.9/WG.2/WP.9, para.8 where it is said that the 
-
avoidance in that case is operative upon the breach. 
7) Baer, p 105. 
8) Document V/Prep/3, in Hague Conference, vol. 2, p 199. 
9) Document V/Prep/1, in Hague Conference, vol. 1, p 37. 
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contract price~10) In these circumstances, however, he may 
have the right to a claim for damages~11) 
In the second place, the buyer's breach may be funda-
mental in the meaning discussed above~12) In such a case, 
the seller has the right of option either to avoid the con-
tra,ct or to require paymentf 13) but he shall inform the buyer 
of his decision within a reasonable time, otherwise the con-
tract shall be ipso facto avoided\14) What constitutes a 
reasonable time(15) is a question of fact depending upon the 
circumstances of each particular case. The period starts to 
give effect, as suggested, as £rom the date at Which the seller 
has obtained actual knowledge of the buyer's breaCh~16) 
because it is not possible to give one party an option between 
two remedies and in addition to inform the other party of his 
decision without assuming such knowledge. 
----.... ....---.. ---~------------------
48- 10) Graveson and Colm, p 87. 
11) According to Arts.B4-86 (post, paras. 113,118, 121). 
12) Supra, this Ch., S.I. 
13) See also Khan, 17 Rev. Trim. Dr. Com. 1964, p 689,722. 
14) Another approach seems to be followed under both English 
Law (post, para. 57) and CITe which, however, uses the words 
"without undue delay" (5.235.1). In both, the silence of 
the innocent party may, in certain circumstances, lead to 
an affirmation of the contract but not to avoidance. 
15) As to the difficulties flowing from this expression, see 
A/eN.9/WG.2/WP.9, paras. 53 ff. 
16) Which is the same under CITe (8.235.1):" ••• as soon as he 
has learned of such breacht'. As to English Law, see para. 
49, below. 
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49. English Law 
The doctrine of ipso facto avoidance as adopted by ULIS 
has no counterpart in English Law in which two main principles 
are well-established. 
Firstly, the aggrieved party, assuming that he is entitled 
to resort to avoidance, has the right of election between this 
remedy and affirmation of the contract. This principle is of 
general nature in the Bense that it applies to all contracts 
including the contract of sale, and in spite of whether the 
breach is actual or anticiPatory~1) On the other hand, 
affirmation may not be presumed to have taken place so long as 
the innocent party has not possessed actual knowledge of the 
other's breach <.2) And thi s seems to be so notwithstanding 
that it has been held in one case that in waiving his right as 
to avoidance, the non-defaulting party need not have knowledge 
of the breach~3) 
----------------~-----------
49- 1) See, eg, Denmark Productions Ltd. v. Boscobel Productions 
Ltd. 596~ 1 Q.B. 699,731; Heyman v. Darwins Ltd. ff94~ A.C. 
356,361; Howard v. Pickford Tool Co. Ltd. ~95] 1 K.B.417, 
420-421; Johnstone v. Milling (1886) 16 Q.B.D. 460,467; 
Michael v. Hart and Co. ff90~ 1 K.B.482,490; The Odenfeld 
G97~ 2 Lloyd's Rep.357,374-375. And for further details, 
see para. 52, post. 
2) See, eg,Alexander v. Railway Executive ~95] 2 K.B. 882, 
889-890; Farnsworth Finance Facilities Ltd. v. Attryde 
ff97§j 1 W.L.R. 1053, ',1059. See also Beale, p 118; Thomson, 
42 M.L.R. 1978, p 137, 142. 
3) Panchaud Freres S.A. v. Etablissments General Grain Co. 
[97q] 1 Lloyd's Rep.53,57. And for a criticism of this case, 
see Dugdale and Yale, 39 M.L.R. 1976, P 680, 688. 
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Secondly, the contract may not, as a rule, come to an 
end automatically~4) Here again, another approach was fol-
lowed in one case where the court considered that the contract 
might, in certain events, be terminated automatically~5) 
Likewise, it has been argued that the breach always bring 
the contract to an end automatically unless the victim affirms 
it\6) But it is really difficult to regard this automatic 
theory, as it may shortly be described(7) as law at present 
time. 
However, it is relevant here to remember that the unpaid 
seller has been given, by s.48.3 of the SGA, a statutory power 
to resell the goods if they are of perish,Q.ble nature, or if he 
has given a notice to the buyer of his intention to resell but 
the latter has not within a reasonable time paid or tendered 
the price. And if the resale has actually taken place, then 
the contract is deemed to be avoided, say automatically, as 
-~-------------~-~------------
49- 4) See Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston, p 489. 
5) Harbut's Plasticine Ltd. v. Wayne Tank & Pump Co. Ltd. 
B" 97QJ 1 K.B.447, 465. 
6) Thomson, ibid, p 137. £f., Yate~1 Exclusion Clauses in Con-
tracts (1982, pp 199, 223,225) who, in distinguishing 
between a fundamental breach and a breach of fundamental 
term, argues that the contract in the latter situation 
must, ipso facto, be regarded as terminated because there 
is total failure of consideration and, therefore, there is 
nothing to affirm. 
o • 
, 
7) See MCMullen, 41 C.L.J. 1982, p 110, 111; see, further, 
Dawson, 40 C.L.J. 1981, p 83, 105. 
-
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from that time!8) This situation, therefore, may be regarded 
as an application of the doctrine of ipso facto avoidance. A 
similar principle also applies to the situation in which the 
resale is based on a contractual power derived trom s.48.4 of 
the SGA which provides that: II Where the seller expressly 
reserves the right of resale in case the buyer should make 
default, and on the buyer making default resells the goods, the 
original contract of sale is resolnded ••• ~ This means, in other 
words, that such resale (automatically) brings the contract to 
an end. 
Unlike the first case of ipso facto avoidance under ULIS, 
however, English Law does not impose on the seller a duty to 
resell the gOOds~9) rather, he may resort to avoidance and at 
the same time keep the goods for his own use~10) 
50. Criticism generally 
The doctrine of ipso facto avoidance as adopted in ULIS 
has been liable to various criticisms(1) 
----------------------------~--
49- 8) See R. V. Ward Ltd. v. Bignall 5967] 1 Q.B.534, overruling 
Gallagher v. Shilcock [94~2 K.B.765 in which s.48.3 of the 
SGA was construed to the effect that the resale did not 
terminate the contract. And for further details on the 
resale under the Act, see paras. 182 ff, post. 
9) Graveson and Cohn, p 87. 
10) Supra, para. 39. 
50- 1) See generally A/CN.9/35, paras.94 ff, and annex 2, paras.70 
ff; A/CN.9/WG.2/'VP.9 paras.12 ff; Burman & Kaufman, 1978 
H.L.J., P 221, 268; Goldenhielm, p 35; Honnold,30 Law & Con. 
Probe 1965, p 326, 384, and in 27 A.J.C.L. 1979, p 223,228; 
Treitel, Remedies, s.154. 
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As to form, the expression "de plein droitU , which is 
familiar to French Lawyers, has been used in the French text 
and this rendered into English as "ipso facto" which is an 
odd term for Common Lawyerf 2 ) 
As to substanc~ this "type of avoidance produces consider-
able uncertainty in international trade(3) where there may be 
situations neither party could know whether or not the contract 
has come to an end~4) The question becomes more complicated 
when recalling that ULIS uses for the ipso facto avoidance 
elastic terms such as "reasonably possible" and "reasonable 
time", both in practice would be liable to different inter-
pretations. 
Furthermore, the doctrine may in certain circumstances 
lead to an odd result by redounding to the benefit of the 
defaulting buyer and to the detriment of the aggrieved 
seller~5) This may happen where, for example, the prices 
fall Sharply and damages do not, for any reason, give the 
seller full recovery for his loss resulting from the buyerrs 
breach\6) 
-------------------------
50- 2) See Honnold, 27 A.J.C.L. 1979, note 24. 
3) A/CN.9/35, para. 94, and annex 2, para. 73. 
4) A/CN.9/WG.2/WP.9, paras. 53-54. 
5) Ibid, para. 58. 
6) But it has been said, where the seller is in default, that 
ipso facto avoidance might be fair in case of commodities 
of which the prices fluctuated rapidly, but not in the case 
where the prices tended to be more stable, see A/CN.9/31, 
para. 108. 
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In addition, where the seller has not yet declared his 
intention it would be more justifiable to presume his will to 
retain the contract and not to avoid it~7) while the converse 
is provided for by ULIS in respect of the second case of ipso 
~acto avoidance already discussed. It 1s noteworthy that when 
avoidance is based on an additional time notice, the seller 
must, by virtue of Art. 62.2 of ULIS~8) declare it promptly 
otherwise the contract is deemed to have been affirmed~9) 
Thus, the contradiction in ULIS' approach is obvious; in one 
case the seller's silence leads to avoiding the contract 
while in another it leads to an affirmation of it. 
Finally, it is really difficult to justify ULIS' trend in 
I 
imposing avoidance on both parties who may not Wish this 
result in spite of the breach or the expiration of any period 
of time subsequent to its occurrence. 
51. Criticism o~ first case 
The first situation of ipso facto avoidance under ULIS in 
particular is not free from criticism. 
In the first place, the wording of the text leads to the 
conclusion that the degree of breach is an irrelevant factor 
-----.... -... _-------.......... ------_ .... 
50- 7) A/CN.9/WG.2/WP.9, para.14; and this seems to be the situation 
under both CITe (s.235) and English Law (post, para. 57). 
8) SUEra, para. 34. 
9) Supra, para.46; Eost, para. 57. 
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with relation to the avoidance although this 1s obviously the 
most serious remedy especially in international trade~1) The 
result of this situation is that the seller can easily bring 
the contract to an end immediately after the breach by resell-
ing the goods even where such breach is deemed to be so trivial. 
So, for instance, the buyer may delay in making payment for one 
day only; even conceding that a breach as such has no import-
ance whatsoever, the seller may, nevertheless, resell the 
goods in the next day and, accordingly, the contract becomes 
avoided. 
In the second place, the provision as such may put the 
seller in a critical position; for he cannot demand perform-
ance, nor can he keep the goods for his own use, nor is he 
entitled to declare the contract avoided. By way of summary, 
he is bound to resell the goods though there is no rational 
justification to impose the resale upon him. 
52. Contrast with seller's option 
The doctrine of option, insofar as the unpaid seller is 
concerned, may be crystalized into two rules~ 
Firstly, the seller is not bound to avoid the contract 
nor to require performance; rather, he has the right of option 
------------------~-----------
51- 1) This attitude may, however, be justified when avoidance is 
based on an additional time notice (supra, para.42) on the 
ground that the buyer insists on non-performance notwith-
standing that he has been given another opportunity to make 
performance. 
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to resort to either of them~1) Secondly, in each case he is 
entitled to avoid the contract, he automatically has such right 
of option. Instead of avoiding the contract, therefore, the 
seller may affirm it and insist on requiring performance.But the 
converse is not necessarily true where he may have the right 
to demand performance but not to avoid the contract. And this 
is precisely so where neither the breach is fundamental nor the 
buyer has been given an additional time notice for perform-
ance~2) This principle is well-established in English Law~1) 
but as such is not known under French Law in which a distinc-
tion should be drawn between whether the avoidance is based on 
a contractual power or not. If so, the parties' agreement is, 
as has been seen~3) respeci:ed and the court has no discre-
tion in the matter. But the innocent party is of course not 
bound to resort to avoidance; rather, he may insist on per-
formance. In other words, he has a right of option similar to 
that applied under English Law. If not, then he has the option 
to request the court to enforce performance or to grant him a 
decree of avoidance, but the court has, in respect of the latter 
remedy, a large discretion to award avoidance or otherwise~4) 
---------------------------~-
52- 1) See the authorities cited in the notes of para.49, supra 
particularly in note 1. 
2) On both the fundamental breaCh and additional time notice, 
see this Ch., ss.I and II respectively. 
3) Supra, para. 21. 
4) Supra, para. 20. 
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By contrast, one may well say that the seller does not 
have, with relation to the first situation of ipso facto 
avoidance under ULIS, such right of choice; rather he is bound 
to resell the goods and, accordingly, the contract becomes 
ipso facto avoided as from the time when such resale should be 
effected. But a different approach is being followed by ULIS 
in respect of the second situation where the seller has in 
fact the option to resort either to performance or to avoidance; 
such right, howeve~ must be exercised within a reasonable time, 
otherwise the avoidance would take place automatically. 
53. Advantages are arguable 
Notwithstanding the plain disadvantages of ipso facto 
avoidance, the doctrine has been defended on various grounds 
as follows~1) 
On the one hand, the doctrine in certain sales is con-
sistent with commercial practice. On the other hand, a notice 
to be required for avoidance would deprive the innocent party 
of his right if he has not complied with a formality which 
would be completely unnecessary in certain circumstances. 
Further, a party who has to give such a notice would be 
obliged to retain proof of it. Thus, a simple clarification of 
the situation by telephone would be rendered impossible. 
Regardless of the first ground of defending the doctrine, 
the other two seem to be ar-suable • 
-------------------------------
53- 1) A/CN.9/35, para. 96; see also A/CN. 9/62 , annex 2, para.30. 
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Firstly, the law of contract in general is composed, as 
well-known, of rights and obligations; and it is granted that 
any party who seeks the exercising of any of his rights must 
comply with certain requirements. So it is not unusual to 
require for avoiding the contract that the innocent party 
should expressly declare his intention of avoidance. 
Secondly, as to the problem of proof, it generally 
relates to all communications provided for in both ULIS and 
the Convention, and is not confined to the declaration of 
avoidance. However, this question is completely another matter 
and was left, as a rule, outside the scope of both laws~2) In 
spi te of tha.t, it is submitted that such communications in 
general have been freed from any requirement as to form~3) 
Accordingly, this problem could easily be solved by tele~for 
example, which is widespread in modern international trade, 
on the one hand, and, on the other, is admitted as a writt~ 
means of communko.tion~ 4) 
-------------------------------
53- 2) £f., post, para.152; £f., also para.31, supra. 
3) See, for example, Arts.15 of ULIS and 11 of the Convention 
(conclusion of the contract); Arts.14 of ULIS and 27 of the 
Convention (post, paras. 58,60); 5.24.1 of CITC; Honnold, 
Uniform Law, para.130. Nevertheless, it may be that a 
telephone call, as has been held in W. Germany, does not 
constitute a valid notice if a party is not able to under-
stand sufficiently the language of the other party who is 
bound to make the notice (quoted in Magnus, Com. Law YB., 
1979, P 105, 115). 
4) See Art. 13 of the Convention; s.24.3 of CITC; s.2.1 of 
COMECON General Conditions of Sale of 1968. 
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54. Its elimination from Convention 
Whatever the advantages of ipso facto avoidance, its 
disadvantages are obviously much more and, as said, the only 
benefit ot the concept 1s that it could prevent the non-
defaulting party from profiting from the price fluctuations, 
but even this advantage could be dealt with directly without 
resorting to the concept itself\1) So almost all discussions 
relating to ipso facto avoidance under ULIS were to the effect 
that the whole concept should be excluded from the new 
convention~2) or at least the cases to which it applies 
Should be surrounded with more restrictions~3) But the former 
view prevailed(4) and the Convention in its current form 
requires in each case of avoidance that a declaration of 
avoidance by the injured party to be notified to the other 
party is necessary, or else the contract continues to exist~5) 
-.-------------~------------
54- 1) A/CN.9/62, annex 2, para. 29. 
2) But there was an opinion to the effect that the concept of 
ipso facto avoidance should be maintained (ibid, paras.29-30). 
3) See, eg, the opinion of Norway, in A/CN.9/31, para.127; see 
also A/CN.9/35, para.98. 
4) But there was an opinion which expressed the regret that 
the concept had been disappeared and the substitute texts 
were unattractive and complicated, see A/eN.9/S7, annex 2 
(Austria, para. 3). 
5) For a legislative background of this approach, see the 
following documents successively:-A/CN.9/35, paras.92 ff, 
and annex 2, paras. 70 ff; A/CN.9/WG.2/WP.9; A/CN.9/62, 
annex 2, paras. 28 ft. 
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and this has been described as one of the improvements of the 
Convention over ULIS(6) 
2. Declaration of avoidance 
55. Necessity of notice 
A~64 of the Convention entitles the seller to declare 
the contract avoided if either the buyer's breach is funda-
mental or the requirements of an additional time notice are met. 
Both concepts have already been examined in this work\1) A 
similar approach is followed by ULIS only where the contract 
is not ipso facto avoided~2) 
On the other hand, Art. 26 of the Convention reads: ftA 
declaration of avoidance is effective only if made by notice to 
the other party.u(3) Although ULIS does not contain a similar 
prOVision, Art.62.1 is quite clear to the effect that the 
seller's declaration of avoidance, where it is based on the 
fundam.ental breach, must be informed to the buyer, otherwise 
the contract subsists until the expiration of such reasonable 
time whereupon it becomes avoided automatically~4) As to 
------------------------------
54- 6) Cumming, 9 Cal. W. Int. C. J. 1979, p 157, 175. 
55- 1) This Ch., ss.I and II respectively. 
2) See Arts.62.1 (supra,para.17) and 62.2 (supra, para.34). 
3) For a legislative background of the text, see the following 
documents successively: A/CN.9/87, para.40 (art.72 bis),and 
annex 1 (art.72 bis); A/CN.9/100, para.98; A/CN.9/116 (art. 
10); A/32/17, annex 1, paras.97 ff, and para.35 of the 
original document (art.9); A/33/17, para.28 (art.24); 
A/CQNF.97/19, pp 99(ar~\.24), 303 (para. 17), 157 (art.24) == 
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avoidance on the ground of an additional time notice, it is 
assumed that the mere declaration of avoidance, which is 
provided for in Ar~62.2~5) would have no effect unless it is 
communicated to the buyer for it seems to be unsound to require 
such declaration without requiring its communication. This 
assumption, moreover, is in conformity with the principle of 
good faith prevailing in international trade. 
So that, giving a notice of avoidance by the innocent 
party to the other is a prerequisite to avoiding the contract 
under the Convention and, to the above extent, ULIS as well. 
This principle is of general nature where it applies to all 
case3 of avoidance whether it affects the whole contract or 
only part of it~6) and irrespective of whether it is based 
upon an actual or anticipatory breach. 
56. English Law 
In English Law, by contrast, various rules are well-
established and may be summarized as follows. 
Firstly, the decision of avoidance is treated as an 
"acceptance" to the defaulting party's breach(1) which has 
---------------------------------
55- =) and 206 (para. 18). 
4) Supra, para. 47A. 
5) Supra, para. 34. 
6) See post, para. 79. 
56- 1) See, eg, Bradley v. H. Newsom, Sons and Co. 0919J A.C.16, 
51-52; Decro-Wall International S.A. v. Practitioners in 
Marketing 597] 2 All E.R. 216,227-228; Denmark 
Productions Ltd. v. Boscobel Productions Ltd. 
96 1 Q.B. 699, 731-732; Golding v. London & Edinburgh = 
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been characterized as an "offer" to put an end to the con-
tract{2) In considering the rules of acceptance, therefore, 
a party must communicate his acceptance to the offeror(3) , 
which is the same in case of electing avoidance~4) In other 
words, the innocent party must make the other known of his 
decisi;n o~ avoidance\5) 
Secondly, an acceptance may be implicitly inferred from 
the offeree's conduct~6) and it seems that a similar 
principle applies to the decision of avoidance where it has 
been held that rescission of the contract, in the meaning of 
avoidance~7) is a question of fact~8) 
Noreover, it has been argued that the avoidance could be 
exercised in the proceedings brought on the contract~9) This 
may be the case, in particular, when the non-defaulting party 
brings an action for damages on the footing of the other's 
-----------------------------
56- =) Insurance Co. Ltd. (1932) 43 Lloyd's Rep.487, 488; Heyman 
v. Darwins Ltd. ff94~ A.C.356, 361; The Odenfeld ~7~ 2 
Lloyd's Rep. 357, 374. 
2) Denmark Productions case, ibid; Bradley case, ibid. 
3) See generally Cheshire,Fifoot & Furmston, pp 41 ff; Chitty, 
vol •. 1., paras.64 ff; Halsbury's Laws of England, vol. 9, 
para. 254; Treitel, Law of Contract, p 18. 
4) Halsbury's Laws of England, ibid, para. 556. 
5) Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston, p 492. 
6) See generally Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston, p 32; Chitty, 
para.55; Halsbury's Laws of England, ibid, para.252; 
Treitel, ibid, p 15. 
7) See supra, para.14. 
8) Kish v. Charles Taylor, Sons and Co. [[91~ A.C.604, 617. 
9) Treitel, ibid, p 688. 
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breach~10) Similarly, the seller may, as already mentionea11) , 
exercise his right of avoidance by reselling the goods when 
such resale is based on either a statutory or contractual 
power. 
This approach of English Law is plainly different from 
that followed by the Convention and ULIS where a declaration 
of avoidance under both laws, but without ignoring ipso facto 
avoidance under the latter, is always necessary before resort-
ing to this remedy. However, the first rule under English Law, 
which applies as a general rule, is broadly comparable to the 
principle of "declaration of avoidance" in ULIS and the 
Convention. 
57. Sellers' silence 
The general rule prevailing in the Convention is that the 
seller's silence, how long it lasts after the buyer's breach, 
may never lead to avoiding the contract automatically, nor to 
affirming it in the sense that he loses his right of 
avoidance\1) Simply, the unpaid seller, who is entitled to 
----------------------------
56- 10) Ibid, p 642; see also Dawson, 40 C.L.J. 1981, pp 83,89-90 
who argues that the innocent party in case of anticipatory 
breach need not, when he is the defendant, communicate his 
intention. But cf., Beale, p 109 who says that the aggrieved 
-party must notify the other if he wishes to terminate the 
contract by accepting the anticipatory breach. 
11) Supra, paras. 39, 49. 
57- 1) £f., in case of anticipatory breach (post, para.66) and of 
instalment contracts (post, para. 75).££., also CITe under 
Which the innocent party must declare avoidance without -
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declare avoidance, remains having this right so long as the 
buyer has neither paid nor duly tendered the price~2) 
This is not, of course, the position of ULIS. As was 
indicated, in one case a seller, who has the option between 
declaration of avoidance and demanding performance, must 
inform the buyer of his decision within a reasonable time, 
otherwise the contract shall be ipso facto avoided!3) that , 
is to say, that his mere silence leads· to an automatic 
avoidance. In another case~4) he must declare avoidance, if 
he prefers it, promptly or else his silence means, as sub-
mitted, that he has affirmed the contract in the sense that he 
cannot resort to avoidance unless some other grounds justify-
ing avoidance come into existence. 
Unlike ULIS, the seller's silence in English Law may never 
lead to an automatic avoidance; contrary to that, it may be 
construed, in certain circumstances, as an affirmation of the 
contract depriving him of avoidance~5) In other words, if a 
seller who has a right of option unnecessarily delays in taking 
-----------------------------
57- =) undue delay, or else he cannot resort to it; this remedy, 
however, revives upon giving an extra time notice for per-
formance (5s.235. 1 , 237.2). 
2) Supra, para. 46;see also supra, para. 45. 
3) Supra, para. 48. 
4) Supra, para. 46. 
5) Denmark Productions Ltd. v. Boscobel Productions Ltd. [96~ 1 
Q.B.699,731-732; The laconia [1977] 1 All E.R.545, 551, 556-
59; see, further, Dawson, p 90; Halsbury's Laws of England, 
vol. 9, para. 559; Thomson, p 142. 
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his decision, he may not be entitled to resort to avoidance 
any more~6) 
58. Form of notice(s) 
The Convention does not require that a notice of avoidance 
must be made in a particular form or by a specific means of 
communication; and this was the clear position of the drafts-
men where all suggestions opposing this principle were expressly 
rejected~1) This would suggest that the notice may be given 
in any form and by any means of communication whatsoever. It 
should be emphasized that this rule is not confined to the 
notice of avoidance; rather, it applies to all notices provided 
for in the Convention\2) If, however, any notice has been 
given by means not appropriate in the circumstances, the seller 
would, as will be seen below, bear the risk of its transmission. 
It seems that ULIS adopts a similar rule where Art. 14 
reads: "Communications provided for in the present Law shall 
be made by means usual in the circumstances.1I The question is 
therefore dependent on the circumstances of each particular 
casef3) in a given case, a registered letter may be necessary 
------------------------------
57- 6) Allenv~ Poples U96~ 1 W.L.R. 119'J Th~ laconi~, ibid; 
The Mihalios Xilas [97~3 All E.R. 865,876. 
58- 1) Such as the suggestion that the notice must be made in writ-
ing (A/CN.9/125, add 1, comment of USSR on art.10) or, 
alternatively, be immediately followed by written notice 
(A/32/17, annex 1, para. 102). 
2) See -also Honnold, Uniform Law, para. 130. Likewise, CITC 
expressly provides that no special form is required for 
legal acts (8.24.1); as to the definition of a legal act, 
see 5.22.1. 
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while a telephone call may be sufficient in another. It is 
assumed, however, that the failure to comply with the method 
of communication does not mean the nullity of the notice; it 
simply means that a party who gives it would run the risk of 
its transmission if, for instance, it fails to arrive in 
time!4) 
59. Time of effectiveness 
A valid notice of avoidance terminates the contract and 
the question which may then arise relates to the time at which 
such notice becomes effective. This question is of course 
confined to the situation in which the parties are absent from 
each other, and neither the means of communication is instan-
taneous, eg, telephone or telex~1) nor there is an agreement 
concerning this matter5 2) 
--------~---------------------
58- 3) A/CN.9/116, annex 1, comment on art.10, para.3; A/CONF.97/5, 
comment on art. 25, para. 3. 
4) Cf., Graveson and Cohn, p 60 where it is said that a commu-
-
nication made in an unusual manner would appear to be satis-
factory if it reaChed the addressee in due course and was 
not promptly (Art.11) rejected by him. £f., also, the judge-
ment declared in W.Germany, supra, para. 53, note 3. 
59- 1) But if the knowledge theory is to be considered, which is 
not the case in international trade law, the same question 
arises even with relation to communications made by telex 
if, eg, the notice has been received by the addressee who 
could not, for any reason, get actual knowledge of its 
content until few days later. 
2) As a rule, the contracting parties are free to vary or modify 
any provision stated under either ULIS or the Convention 
(supra, para. 21). 
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No answer to this question could be found under ULIS and, 
therefore, it depends according to Art. 17 on the general 
principles on which ULIS is based. However, it seems to be 
well_admitted in international trade law to adopt either the 
despatch or the receipt theory~3) But the adoption of the 
former in connexion with the various notices provided for by 
ULIS is, presumably, in line with Art. 14 which has just been 
mentioned. Accordingly, one may well say that the general 
rule under ULIS is as follows: if any notice has been given 
by an appropriate means of communication, the addressee would 
run the risk in its transmission (the despatch theory)}4) 
otherwise the sender would run it (the receipt theory). 
As to the Convention, the draftsmen obviously refused 
the receipt theory(5) and, instead, Ar~27 has been adopted. 
This article reads: "unless otherwise expressly provided(6) 
in this Part of the convention~7) if any notic~request or 
-----------------------------
59- 3) As to the receipt theory, see, eg, art.8 of ULF; s.25 of 
CITC; Arts.25,47.2, 48.4,63.2 and 65.1 of the Convention; 
the ECE General Conditions of Citrus Fruits (s.2.1) and of 
no. 420 (s.2.1); s.1.1.b of COMECON General Conditions of 
Delivery of 1968. As to the despatch theory, see, eg,s.2.1 
of nos.188,574,188A,574A and s.2 of no.730 of ECE General 
Conditions; Art.39 of ULIS. 
4) It is worth noting that ULIS expressly adopts the despatch 
theory in respect of the buyer's notice of non-conformity 
of goods (Art.39.3). 
5) See A/32/17, annex 1, pa~.99. 
6) For an illustration of this, see supra, para.47. 
7) Ie, Part III (sale of goods) under which the various pro-
visions relating to the declaration of avoidance fall. 
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other communication is given or made by a party in accordance 
with this Part and by means appropriate in the circumstances, 
a delay or error in the transmission of the communication or 
its failure to arrive does not deprive that party of the right 
to rely on the communication." 
Apart from the wording of the text which refers, as clear, 
to the main effect of the despatch theory rather than to the 
theory itself, a clear tendency, while setting the text, was 
to adopt this theory!8) But this is subject to an essential 
requirement, that is, the notice must be despatched by an 
appropriate means of communication; otherwise it is suggested 
to apply the receipt theory which is the alternative, as has 
just been seen, in international trade law in general and 
particularly in the Convention. In addition, it seems to be 
wise to conclude that the risk in transmitting the notice is 
to be born by the party who has chosen such inappropriate 
means of communication. 
----------------------------
59- 8) See A/CONF.97/19, p 303, paras. 20-23. 
60. Texts 
Section IV 
Avoidance in Particular Cases 
1. Anticipatory breach 
Art. 76 of ULIS provides that: 
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uWhere prior to the date fixed for performance of the 
contract it is clear that one of the parties will commit a 
fundamental breach of the contract, the other party shall have 
the right to declare the contract avoided." 
While Art.72 of the Convention provides that: 
"1-If prior to the date for performance of the contract 
it is clear that one of the parties will commit a fundamental 
breach of contract, the other party may declare the contract 
avoided. 
2-If time allows, the party intending to declare the 
contract avoided must give reasonable notice to the other 
party in order to permit to provide adequate assurance of his 
performance. 
3-The requirements of the preceding paragraph do not 
apply if the other party has declared that he will not perform 
his obligations~I(1) 
------------------------------
60- 1) For a legislative background of the text, see the following 
documents successivel~ A/CN.9/87, annex 2, comment on arts. 
75-77 of ULIS, paras.5 ff, and paras.128 ff of the original 
document; A/CN.9/116, annex 1 (art.49);A/32/17, annex 1, • 
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A. Requirements of the doctrine 
61. Generally 
The doctrine of anticipatory breach finds its substance 
in Common Law system(1) and has no counterpart in Civil Law 
in general\2) In its origin, it is based on two princiPle£?) 
Fir sly , that the time for performing the contract has not 
yet matured. Secondly, that the defaulting party, say the 
buyer, has shown his intention that he will not make payment 
when it falls due. 
The doctrine as such demonstrates a notable difference 
between English Law on the one hand, and, on the other, both 
ULIS and the Convention. This would be seen below, suffice 
it here to say that the seller is entitled upon the buyer's 
anticipatory breach to avoid the contract and to a claim for 
damages as well~4) 
----------------------------
60- =) paras. 428 ff, and para.35 of the original document,(art.49); 
A/33/17, para.28 (art.63); A/CONF.97/19, pp 130-131,378, 
419-422,163 and 221 (para.30) 
61- 1) See the leading case of Hochster v. De la Tour (1853) 2 
E & B,678; 118 E.R. 926. (An employment contract where 
prior to the date fixed for performance the defendant 
announced that he would not perform. Held: that the plain-
tiff was entitled to an immediate action for damages). 
2) Treitel, Remedies, s.177; Williston on Contracts, s.1337A. 
But see Gullota, 50 Tul.l. fttv. , p 927 who says that the 
doctrine of anticipatory breach has recently been admitted 
by various cases in L~u~siana. ~\\h.cl", 
3) See, eg, Hochster case~ Mersey steel & Iron Co. v. Naylor, 
Benzon & Co. (1884) 9 A.C.434, 442; Johnstone v. Milling = 
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62. Grounds for breach 
Avoidance on the ground of anticipatory breach under both 
ULIS and the Convention turns on whether If it is clearu ( 1) that 
one of the contracting parties, say the buyer, will commit a 
fundamental breach as to payment of the price when it matures. 
But the source or ground of such "clarity" is irrelevant~2) 
-
it may be concluded, for example, from the buyer's express or 
implicit intention that he will not perform, or from his 
apparent financi~J situation such as his insolvency, or even 
from any other reason beyond his control as, for instance, 
currency restrictions imposed by his country~3) 
But this is not the case in English Law or the doctrine 
itself as established and developed in Common Law. Originally, 
this doctrine came into existence where one of the contracting 
parties had unequivocally declared, before maturity of 
----------------------------
61- -) (1886)16 Q.B.D. 460, 468; Universal Cargo Carriers Corpora-
tions v. Citati IT95] 2 Q.B.401, 436. 
4) See, eg, Mersey case, supra, 442-443; see further post, 
paras. 65 t. 
62- 1) As to the word II clear", see the comment of France in 
A/CN.9/87, annex 3, para.19; £l., CITe (8.242) where the 
word "obvious ff has been used. 
2) See also A/CN.9/116, annex 2, comment on art.49, para.2; 
A/CONF.97/5, comment on art.63, para. 2. 
3) Cf., art.a7 of draft ULIS (1956) which provided that the 
-anticipatory breach should be based on the conduct of 
either party, that is to say that he disclosed his inten-
tion to commit a fundamental breach. 
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performance, that he would not perform his obligations when 
they matured~4) In a later stage, it was admitted that the 
intention not to perform might be implicitly inferred from 
conduct(5) and so the situation until now~6) In other words, 
the anticipatory breach occurs only where a party shows by 
words or conduct that he will abandon the contract~7) 
Indeed, it is difficult to justify the Convention's and 
ULIS' approach in widening the scope wi thin which the anti-
cipatory breach operates. This appears to be so strange when 
emphasizing that the buyer's breach remains anticipatory and 
not actual,at least in the case where it is based on grounds 
other than his words or conduct. But the notion of adequate 
assurance as recognized by the Convention, which is discussed 
below~8) would mostly reduce the cases of avoidance on the 
ground of anticipatory breach. In English Law, however, it 
may be interesting to note that such breach, though it is 
described as anticipatory, is not in fact so but, rather, an 
actual breach since it is based, as has been held, on the 
promiSor'S repudiation to his promise and that is wrongful~9) 
-~------------~-------------
62- 4) Hochster case, supra. 
5) Frost. v. Knight (1872) 41 L.J.Ex. 78. 
6) Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston, p 484. 
7) Benjamin, para.1237. But see Universal Cargo case, supra, 
438 where it has been held that " ••• if a man says I cannot 
perform, he renounces his contract by that statement and 
the cause of inability is jmmaterial." 
8) Para. 67; and for further details of this idea, see post, 
para. 180. 
9) Bradley v. H. Newsom, Sons & Co. [1912] A.C.16,53; see also 




63. Degree of breach 
The condition that the buyer's anticipatory breach which 
justifies the avoidance must be fundamental in the meaning 
discussed above(1) is agreed upon by ULIS and the Convention~2) 
In English Law too it has been considered that such breach 
must be substantial (i.e, fundamental)(3) or that it comes to 
an exception to that requirement\4) One of the main excep-
tions concerning this matter is the breach of a "condition" 
strictly so-called~5) Conceding that the parties are abso-
lutely free to consider any term as a "condi tion",( 6) this 
means that the doctrine of anticipatory breach in English Law 
extends to cover the parties' agreement. By contrast, it must 
be remembered that neither ULIS nor the Convention applies to 
the extent that there is a (valid) agreement different from 
that provided for in either~6) 
64. Time of breach 
It is quite true that the time at which it becomes clear 
that the buyer will commit a breach in future must generally 
be before mctturity of payment~1) and this is in fact one of 
---~------------~~----------
1) Supra, this Ch., s .I. 
2) See the texts of both in para. 60, sUEra. 
3) Treitel, Law of Contract, p 644; see also Beale, p 646; 
Swanton, 13 M.U.L.R. 1981, P 6~, 71. 
4) Treitel, ibid. 
5) Ibid, p 592. 
6) Supra, para. 21. 
1) £f., post, paras.69,73 ( instalment contracts). 
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the main features underlying the doctrine of anticipatory 
breach. However, it might happen in practice that the grounds 
on which such breach is based already existed at the time of 
making the contract and the seller, nevertheless, entered into 
the contract with the buyer. Suppose, for instance, that at 
the time o£ the contract the buyer was bankrupt or insolvent, 
or that currency exchange restrictions were imposed by his 
country to the extent that it was fI clearll that he would commit 
a fundamental breach when time of payment falls due. In these 
circumstances, the qeustion which may arise is whether the 
seller could turn on such grounds for avoiding the contract. 
A literal reading of the relevant provision under either 
ULIS or the Convention may give a positive answer since " ••• 
prior to the date ••• for performance it is clear that one of 
(2) 
the parties will commit a fundamental breach" of the contract; 
and nothing in either indicates that such "claritytt must 
necessarily be after making the contract. But doubts may be 
expressed as to whether this result is intentionally intended, 
and it is indeed difficult to justify the avoidance in such 
circumstances. In brief, it is suggested that the avoidance on 
the ground of the anticipatory breach necessarily requires 
that such breach becomes clear (only) after the contract was 
made; this understanding, moreover, is in line with the 
doctrine of "prospective" breach as recogni-z.ed by both ULIS 
and the Convention which is parallel to the "anticipatory 
breach(3) • 
----------------------------
64- 2) See the texts of both in para.60, supra. 
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65. Seller's option 
Like an actual breach~1) the seller is not bound in 
case of anticipatory breach to avoid the contract but,rather, 
he may affirm it and consider the circumstances from which 
the breach is inferred as never having taken place. This 
principle, which is well-established in English Law~2) is 
in conformity with the language used in both ULlS and the 
Convention~3) But it must be noted that the seller would 
run in these circumstances, as has been held, the risk of his 
decision(4) if, for instance, some events impeding the buyer's 
performance(S) have occurred after the affirmation. 
Instead of affirmation, however, the seller may, accord-
ing to English Law(6) and ULIS~7) avoid the contract. In 
other words, he has a right of option either to avoid or to 
affirm the contract. In contrast, this 1s not exactly the 
si tuation under the Convention where in certain circumstances 
the seller's request of an adequate assurance for performance 
and the buyer's fai lure to comply with i tis a condition 
-----------------~-----------
64- 3) Post, paras.164 f. 
65- 1) For further details, see sUEra, paras.49 and 52. 
2) Supra, para.49; £f., however, Eost, para.110. 
3) See the texts of both in para.60, supra; see also post, 
para. 110. 
4) Johnston v. Milling (1886)16 Q.B.D. 460, 470. 
5) For further· details, see the doctrine of nexempt'l~l1n, post, 
Ch. ,IV. 
6) Supra, para. 49. 
7) See Art. 76, supra, para. 60. 
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precedent to the remedy of aVOidance~8) while in otherS he 
has a right of option similar to that given to him by ULIS 
and English Law. 
66. Avoidance 
Thus, the seller may avoid the contract on the ground of 
the buyer's anticipatory breach, and it is important in this 
connexion to emphasize the follOwing points:-
Firstly, the seller's silence in English Law may in 
certain circumstances lead to affirmation of the contract and, 
accordingly, he may be deprived of later avoidance~1) There 
is no provision to this effect in either the Convention or 
ULIS. But in case of delivery by instalments, a seller who 
seeks avoidance for the future must do so within a tlreasonable 
timen in the Convention or "promptly" in ULIS; otherwise, it 
is assumed that he cannot resort to this remedy~2) Bearing 
in mind' that avoidance in that case is by all means an applica-
tion of the doctrine of anticipatory breach, it may be sound, 
therefore, to apply a similar principle to the doctrine in 
general. 
Secondly, in avoiding the contract the seller is entitled 
to an immediate action for damages~3) The rules of damages 
--------------------
65- 8) See post, para. 67. 
66- 1) Supra, para. 57 • 
2) Post, para. 75. 
3) See Arts.81.1 of the Convention (effects of avoidance in 
general) and 77 of ULIS. As to English Law, see supra, 
para.61, and the authori ties cited therein particularly ::z 
121 
1n general are to be sought elsewhere in this work~3a) but 
it is assumed in both the Convention and ULlS that if the 
anticipatory breach is based on events or circumstances other 
than the buyer's intention not to perform, the latter would 
not be liable for damages~4) 
Thirdly, the seller would run the risk of his decision 
concerning avoidance(5) which is the same, as already seen, 
in case of actual breach~6) 
Finally, the seller loses his right as to avoidance 
if, before exercising it, the buyer has provided him an 
adequate assurance, which will be considered below. 
67. Adequate assurance 
The concept of "adequate assurance" as provided for in 
the Convention has its parantage in various domestic laws~1) 
but as such has no equivalent in either ULlS(2) or English 
Law~3) It 1s quite plain that the purpose of which is to 
--------------~-~-------------
66- =) in note 3. 
38) Post, Ch.,lI. 
4) A/CN.9/116, annex 2, note 78; A/CONF.97/5, comment on art. 
63, note 1. But £f., the comment of U.S. on Arts.76-77 of 
ULIS and the reply of Hungary, in A/CN.9i87, annex 3, 
paras.7 and 21. 
5) A/CN.9/87, annex 3, para.21j A/CN.9/11 6, annex 2, comment 
on art.49, para.4; A/CONF.97/5, ibid, para. 3. 
6) Supra, para. 36. 
67- 1) Post, para. 180. 
2) But .£f., post, para. 180. 
3) See generally Beale, pp 77 ff. 
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reduce the cases of avoidance when it is based on the antici-
patory breach. This concept, however, consists of a general 
principle and an exception. 
The general principle is that a seller who seeks avoidance 
must, if time allows~4) give the buyer a reasonable notice 
demanding him to provide an adequate assurance guaranteeing 
payment when it falls due. In such a case, the buyer's failure 
to comply with the notice is a pre-requisite for avoidance. 
The exception is that the above rule does not apply to 
such buyer who has declared that he will not make payment~5) 
In that case, the seller is entitled to avoid the contract 
without being bound to request the providing of assurance even 
if time allows that. The buyer's intention in this respect must 
be clear to the effect that "he will not perform", or else the 
exception does not apPIy!5) for example, when he requests the 
seller to extend the time for performance. 
What constitutes an adequate assurance will vary with the 
circumstances~6) Several examples of this will be given 
later(7) and it may suffice here to emphasize that trade 
usages, pre-dealings between the parties and good faith(8) in 
international trade will play a great part in solving this 
problem~7) 
-------------------------------
67- 4) Cf., s.242 of CITC where demanding a "securityll is required 
-in all cases of avoidance when based on anticipatory breach. 
5) See, by way of contrast, supra, para. 47. 
6) Beale, ibid. 
7) For further details, see post, para. 180. 
8) See also Comment 3 on 5.2-609 of UCC. 
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It is suggested, on the other hand, that the buyer may 
always avoid It avoidance " of the contract by providing an 
adequate assurance even if the seller has not requested him 
to do so; for the latter becomes having no interest in resort-
ing to that remedy so long as payment has duly been secured. 
Finally, it might be preferable had the Convention not 
restricted the demanding of assurance by the phrase nif time 
allows" especially when recalling that the breach is merely 
anticipatory~9) In practice, however, the modern instan-
taneous means of communication, as has rightly been observed, 
would normally permit such request without undue hampering 
the seller's freedom of action\10) 
2. Delivery by instalments 
68. Texts 
Art- 75.1 of ULIS provides. that: 
"Where, in the case of contracts for delivery of goods 
by instalments, by reason of any failure by one party to 
perform any of his obligations under the contract in respect 
of any instalment , the other party has good reason to fear 
failure of performance in respect of future instalments , he 
----------------------------~--67- 9) There were several suggestions before the Conference to 
delete that phrase but all had been rejected, see A/CONF. 
97/19, P 432, paras.1 ff, P 131 (art. 63), para. 10. 
10) Honnold, Uniform Law, para. 398. 
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may declare the contract avoided for the future, provided 
that he does so promptly." 
While Art'73.1, 2 of the Convention provides that: 
"1_ In the case of a contract for delivery of goods by 
instalments, if the failure of one party to perform any of 
his obligations in respect of any instalment consti tutes a 
fundamental breach of contract with respect to that instal-
ment, the other party may declare the contract avoided with 
re~ect to that instalment. 
2- If one party·s failure to perform any of his obliga-
tions in respect of any instalment gives the other party 
good grounds to conclude that a fundamental breach of con-
tract will occur with respect to' future instalments, he may 
declare the contract avoided for the future, provided he does 
so within a reasonable time:(1) 
69. Introduction 
The peculiarity of deli very by instalments in both the 
Convention and ULIS is that it lumps together the actual and 
anticipatory breach. It presumes two main facts:- firstly, 
delivery of goods is to be made by instalments; secondly, 
-----------~------------------68- 1) For a legislative background of the text, see the following 
documents successively:- A/CN.9/87, annex 3 (comments on 
Arts.75-77 of ULIS)j A/CN.9/87, paras.116-127j A/CN.9/100, 
annex 1, art.4B(74); A/CN.9/116, annex 1 (art.48); A/32/17, 
annex 1, paras. 421-427, and para. 35 of the original 
document (art.50); A/33/17, para. 28 (art.64); A/CONF.97/19, 
p 221, para. 31. 
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the buyer has actually violated the contract in respect of one 
or more instalments. In that case, the seller may be entitled 
to avoid the contract ~n respect of those . instalments already 
violated as well as future . instalments. While the ground of 
avoidance in the former situation is the actual breach, it is 
the anticipatory breach in the latter. 
70. English and French Law 
Delivery by instalments as provided for in both the 
Convention and ULIS is a Common Law notion and has then been 
adopted by the SGA~1) Section 31.2 of the Act, which will 
be considered below, provides that: 
"Where there is a contract for the sale of goods to be 
delivered by stated instalments , which are to be separately 
paid for, and ••• the buyer neglects or refuses to ••• pay 
for one or more instalments , it is a question in each case 
depending on the terms of the contract and the circumstances 
of the case whether the breach of contract is a repudiation 
of the whole contract or whether it is a severable breach 
giving rise to a claim for compensation but not to a right to 
---------------------------~--
70- 1) See generally Atiyah, PP 337 ff; Benjamin, paras.636 if; 
Chalmer's Sale of Goods, 18th ed., pp 183 ff; Chitty vol.2. 
paras.4261 ff; Schmitthoff, Sale of Goods, pp 130 ff; see 
also OLRC Report, vol. 2, pp 541 ff. 
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treat the whole contract as repudiated~2) 
No similar provision could be found in French Civil Code; 
nor is this idea as such known to French Lawyers. Instead, 
/ 
there is what so-called in the general law of contract 
"contrat successiffl (3) ',n which \:."'e obligations are performed 
1n succession over a period of time, eg., a sale of goods by 
'instalments. (4) In this kind of contracts, avoidance, con-
trary to the general rule~5) operates prospectively and not 
retrospectively. Although this is generally a main feature of 
delivery by instalments in the Convention and ULIS~6) the 
notion as a whole is quite familiar to Common Law rather than 
to French and may-be Civil Law in general. In the Convention, 
for example, avoidance in instalment contracts is based upon 
two concepts, i.e., the "fundamental" and "anticipatory" breach; 
as indicated above, both are Common and not Civil Law ideas~7) 
------------------------------
70- 2) This sub-section is based on decisions before the Act(1893), 
and its language is substantially based on the language used 
in Mersey Steel and Iron Co. v. Naylor, Benzon and Co. 
(1884)9 A.C.434;see Maple Flock Co. 'Ltd. v. Universal 
Furniture Products (\'limbley) Ltd. [934] 1 K.B.184,154-155. 
3) See generally Colin et Capitant, vol. 2, 1959, paras.579 f; 
Marty et Raynaud, para.67; Mazeaud, t.2, v. 1, paras.109 f; 
Planiol et Ripert, vol. 6, para.45; see also Briere, in 
D. and S. 1957, ,chronique, p 153. 
4) Mazeaud, ibid, para. 109; £f., Planiol et Ripert, ibid. 
5) Post, para. 79. 
6) Post, paras. 74 f; but £f., post, para. 79. 
7) Supra, paras. 19 and 61 respectively. 
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71. Several deliveries 
The contract calls for the delivery by instalments when-
ever the seller is required or authorized to deliver the goods 
in separate lots~1) but the amount of each lot is irrelevant. 
Dividing delivery into instalments might be inferred from the 
contract itself(2) or the surrounding circumstances~3) Other-
wise, the buyer is not bound to accept delivery by instal-
ments~4) nor is the seller bound to make such deliveryS5) 
Moreover-, any instalment need not be "statedll in the con-
tract although a literal reading of s.31.2 of the SUA may lead 
to a different understanding~6) As seen above, this subsec-
tion provides that delivery under instalment contracts is to be 
made by "stated instalments". So, for instance, if deliveries 
were not to be made by "stated instalments" specified in the 
contract but rather at the option of either party1 7) which 
is familiar in practice, the subsection may not be applied. 
------------------~----------
71- 1) A/CONF.97/5, comment on art.64, para.1; see also s.8.10(1) 
of DUSA; 8.2-612(1.) of UCC; see further Regent OHG Aisenstadt 
und Barig v. Francesco of Jermyn Street Ltd. [1981] 3 All 
E.R. 327. 
2) Brandt v. Lawrence (1876)1Q.B.D.344, 347; Howell v. Evans 
(1926)134 L.T. 570. 
3) The Colonial Insurance Co. of New-Zealand v. The Adelaide 
Marine Insurance Co. (1886)12 A.C.128, 138. 
4) S.31.1 of the SGA; Behrend and Co.-Ltd., v. Produce Brokers 
Co. Ltd. [192cil 3 K.B.530, 534-535. 
5) Kingdom v. Cox (1884)5 C.B. 522; 136 E.R. 982. 
6) See Benjamin, para.649; see also Regent OHG case, supra. 
7) OLRC Report, vol.2, p 545. 
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But this is not law where it is considered that a similar 
principle applies even if the instalments are not" stated" (8) 
• 
However, there are many situations where the contract 
may call for both delivery and payment by instalments, yet it 
may not be considered as an "instalment contractU in the 
meaning intended for this term. For example, the subject-
matter of the sale may amount to an integrated whole, such as 
a machine set to be delivered in lots; payment is to be made 
by instalments but not apportioned to deliveries. In that 
case, if the buyer fails to make any payment, the seller's 
avoidance, which is presumed to affect the whole contract, 
may only be based upon the doctrine of actual breach~9) 
72. Several contracts 
On the other hand, the concept of instalment contracts 
is normally connected with only one contract. S~ for instance, 
if the same buyer and seller have entered into two separate 
-------------------------------
71- 8) Benjamin, ibid. 
9) Both the Convention and ULIS provide for the buyer's right 
to avoid the contract in respect of deliveries already 
made if certain requirements are satisfied. No correspond-
ing right is given to the seller in either, see Arts.75.2 
of ULIS and 73.3 of the Convention; see also Benjamin, para. 
653 (but cf., ibid, note 16); OLRC Report; ibid, P 544; 
-A/CONF.97/5, comment on art.64, paras. 4, 7 f; see further 
Graveson and Cohn, p 97; but £f., CITC whereby the creditor 
may repudiate the contract in respect of deliveries already 
received, if such received instalments alone are of no 
economic value for him (8.241.2). 
129 
contracts and the former violates one of them, the seller 
cannot avoid the other unl-ess avoidance is based on the anti-
cipatory breach in general. 
But it may happen in practice that a contract provides 
that each delivery should be treated as a separate contract, 
and the buyer may violate the contract in respect of one or 
more deliveries; in this setting, the question is whether the 
seller can turn on such a breach for avoiding the whole con-
tract. 
Again, a strict construction of 8.31.2 of the SGA(1) and 
the Convention as well may give a negative answer since both 
expressly refer to ff a contract" for deli very by instalments. (2) 
-
Indeed, this is not the situation in English Law~3) and such 
a term does not normally divide the contract into a number of 
separate contracts~4) There is still only one contract 
though for certain purposes, in the way of performance, parti-
cular instalments may be treated in separation from the others; 
and it is assumed that a similar construction may also be given 
to the Convention. 
-----------------------~------
72- 1) See generally OLRC Report, ibid, pp 543 ff. 
2) Cf., the wording of Art.75. 1, of ULIS, supra, para.68. 
-
3) Benjamin, para. 648. 
4) Schmitthoff, Sale of Goods, p 130. 
5) Ross T. Smyth and Co. Ltd., v. T.D. Bailey. Son and Co. 
0940J 3 All E.R.60, 73. A similar approach is followed by 
both UCC (s.2-612,1) and DUSA (s.8.10,1). 
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73. Buyer's failure 
The concept of instalment contracts as laid down by the 
Convention and ULIS presumes, in addition to dividing delivery 
into instalments, that the buyer has committed an actual breach 
in respect of one or more instalments. But it should be noted 
that the buyer's breach is not confined to his failure to make 
payment; on the oontrary, it includes any other failure what50-
ever(1) such as his failure to take delivery of the goods. 
Certainly, payment of the price and taking delivery of 
the goods are the most important obligations imposed upon the 
buyer, but of course they are not comprehensive. In many 
situations, the buyer may be bound to perform other duties 
such as his duty to accept the gOOds(2) or, in fob contracts, 
to nominate a vessel on which the goods would be loaded~3) 
In contrast, a literal reading of 8.3\.2 of the SGA, which 
clearly restricts the buyer's failure to either non-payment or 
non-taking deliverY, may lead to the conclusion that it does not 
apply to these situations or the like. 
On the other hand, one may well say that under the Conven-
tion and ULIS it is not necessary for considering the sale by 
-----------~------------------
73- 1) Arts.75.1 of ULIS and 73.2 of the Convention, supra, 
para.60. A similar rule is provided for in CITC (s.241.1). 
2) The SGA seems to make a distinction between the buyer's 
duty of acceptance and taking delivery of goods (Benjamin, 
para. 673). 
3) On the assumption that this obligation is other than taking 
delivery of the goods. But~, Arts.60(a) of the Convention 
and 65 of ULIS. 
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instalments that payment should also be divided into parts. 
In many cases, the contract may require that all the price 
must be paid at one time and it may nevertheless be considered 
by instalments. Suppose, for example, that a contract calls 
for three deliveries; the price is to be paid at one time after 
the second delivery which the buyer has refused to take. 
In this setting, the seller may be entitled to avoid the 
contract in respect of that instalment as well as the future 
one. So long as payment could be apportioned to deliveries, 
the seller cannot, as submitted, resort to avoidance in respect 
of the first instalment which has already been delivered 
provided that the buyer is ready, by offering performance or 
otherwise, to pay for ltf~) 
If this understanding is correct, another difference may 
then app ear between the SGA on the one hand, and, on the other, 
both the Convention and ULIS. As already seen, 5.31.2 of the 
Act expressly provides that the "stated instalments ••• are 
separately to be paid forff~5) which means, in other words, 
-------------------------------
73- 4) £f., supra, para.71 • See, however, A.A. Nortier and Co. v. 
\~. Maclean, Sons and Co. a92] 9 Lloyd's Rep.192. In this 
case, it was clear that payment of the whole price was to 
be effected at one time; the seller delivered part of the 
goods in time while he delayed in delivering the others 
which the buyer refused to accept.Held: the seller was 
entitled to an action for the price only in respect of the 
first delivery. See also Behrend and Co. Ltd., v. Produce 
Brokers Co. Ltd., 1192Q1 3 K.B.530, where the price was also 
apportioned to the deliveries. 
5) See also'H. Longbottom and Co. Ltd. v. Bass, Walker and Co. 
[92~ W.N. 245, 246. 
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that payment of the price must also be divided into instal-
ments. Otherwise, the apparent meaning of these words is that 
this sub-section would not apply. 
74. Avoidance of violated instalments 
Suppose, for example, that a contract calls for delivery 
by instalments where each instalment is to be separately paid 
for and the buyer has refused to pay for one instalment. In 
that case, the seller is entitled under the Convention(1) to 
resort to partial avoidance in respect of that 1nstalment(2) 
on condition that the buyer's breach is fundamental~3) The 
doctrine of fundamental breach has already been discussed 1n 
this study~4) but it may be important to add two further 
points. 
Firstly, whether or not the breach 1s fundamental, is to 
be considered in respect of the instalment so violated and not 
to the whole contract~5) Secondly, it is assumed that the 
---------------------------
74- 1) Art. 73.1, supra, para. 68., 
2)&ett~o 8.8.10(2) of DUSA whereby the seller's rights and 
remedies with respect to breach by the buyer to any instal-
.... 
ment are the same as 1f it were a separate contract; see 
also s.9.5(1)a. 
3) It is noteworthy that the avoidance could be exercised in 
that case even though the buyer's failure does not justify 
avoidance as regards future deliveries (below, para. 75; 
see also A/32/17, annex 2, para.423 but £f., art.48 of the 
draft convention as approved by the W.G. 
4) Supra, this Ch., s.I. 




doctrine of the ad~itional time notice may constitute a good 
ground for avoidance instead of fundamental breaCh~6) In 
other words, the seller may give the buyer a reasonable time 
notice for performance and if it expires without performance, 
the former would be entitled to resort to avoidance irrespec-
tive of the degree of breach~7) 
However, neither the SGA(8) nor ULIS contains a provision 
similar to that established in the Convention. But since the 
notion of an "instalment contract" is based upon its divis .. 
,bility where each instalment is assumed to be treated as if 
it were a separate contract~9) it may be sound, therefore, 
to apply the same principle under both English Law(10) and 
ULIS. 
75. Avoidance of future instalments 
In addition, the seller may be entitled to avoid the 
contract in respect of future deliveries, which appears to be 
the main purpose of the whole idea of delivery by instalments. 
------------------------------
74- 6) Supra, this Ch., s.II. 
7) Supra, paras. 35 f. 
8) See OLRC Report, vol. 2, P 552. 
9) See Calamari and Perillo, Contracts, 2nd ed., s.11.27; see 
also 8.8.10(2) of DUSA ,(note 2, above). 
10) Notwithstanding that s.31.2 speaks of a severable breach 
"giving rise to a claim for compensation but not to a right 
to treat the whole contract as repudiated", see OLRC Report, 
ibid,pp 551-552; see further Benjamin, para.655. 
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This is the situation in the Convention, ULIS(1) and EngI1sh(2) 
Law although different tests have been used for that 
purpose. Before considering these tests, it is important to 
note that the degree of the buyer's actual breach in both the 
Convention and ULIS is irrelevant to that effect~3) though it 
might be taken into consideration when ascertaining whether 
the appropriate test has been satisfied~4) 
Under the Convention, the test depends on whether the 
buyer's actual breach gives the seller rtgood ground to con-
clude that a fundamental breach will occur" or, in the language 
of ULIS, "good reason to fear failure of performance rr in 
respect of future deliveries. So it is quite clear from the 
former words, that the (anticipatory) breach should be funda-
mental in the meaning discussed above~5) A requirement as such 
--------------------------------
75- 1) See the texts of both, supra, para.58. 
2) According to 8.3'.1 the same prinCiple applies whether the 
defaulting party is the buyer or the seller.As to illustrations 
from the case law, see Freeth v. Burr (1874)43 L.J.C.P.91; 
Hoare v. Rennie (1859)29 L.J. EX.73; Jonassohn v. Young 
(1863)32 L.J.Q.B.385; Maple Flock Co. Ltd., v. Universal 
Furni ture Products (Wembley) Ltd., [1934] 1 K.B.14B; The 
Mersey Steel and Iron Co. v. Naylor, Benzon and Co.(1884)9 
A.C.434; Millar's Karri and Jarrah Co. v. Weddel Turner and 
Co. (1908)14 Com. Cas. 25; \'11 thers v. Reynolds (1831) 2 
-
B. and Ad '-, 882; (109)E.R.1370 • 
3) As to the Convention, see also A/CN.9/116, annex 2, comment 
on art.48, para.4; A/CONF.97/5, comment on art.64, para. 6. 
4) See the Maple case, supra, 157. 
5) Supra, this Ch., 8.1.2 and 3. 
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is obviously missed in ULIS, but it may be possible to require 
it according to the principles on which the anticipatory 
breach in general is based~6) 
Further, the Convention does not require for avoidance 
that the seller must first give the buyer an opportunity to provide 
an adequate assurance for performance even if time allows that. 
This approach is obviously different from that followed in the 
anticipatory breach in general~7) The reason is, perhaps, 
that avoidance for the future under an instalment contract 
presumes that the buyer has already violated the contract, and 
it is therefore reluctant to protect such a buyer. 
Another difference between the Convention and ULIS calls 
for attention. According to the former, the seller who seeks 
avoidance for the future must do so "within a reasonable time", 
while the term "propmtlyll (8) bas been used in the latter. In 
spite of that, it is worth noting that the wording of either 
leaves the question to the circumstances of each case. It is 
assumed too that the seller who unduly delays in exercising 
avoidance may, in both the Convention and ULlS, lose that 
right unless some new grounds come into eXistence~9) 
--------------------------------
75- 6) Supra, para. 63. 
7) Supra, para.67. 
8) For the meaning of this term under ULIS, see para. 46,supra. 
9) For example, the fact that avoidance for the future must, 
according to Art.75 of ULIS, be declared promptly does not 
prevent the seller from only exercising it after he has 
given the buyer a further period of time for performance, 
see Bundesgerichtshof,28 III. 1979-VIlI ZR 37/78, quoted 
in UNIDROIT (1979) vol. 2, pp 277 f. 
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So far as English Law is concerned, the test depends on 
whether the buyer's breach constitutes a repudiation to the 
whole contract; whether it is so, is a question of fact to be 
determined in each case in the light of its own circumstanc~1~) 
In other words, the seller is entitled to avoid the contract 
in respect of future deliveries if the buyer indicates by 
words or conduct that he intends to abandon the contract~11) 
---------------------------------
75- 10) See 5.31.2 of the SGA, supra, para.62. 
11) See the cases cited in note 2, supra, in particular Freeth 
case, p 93; The Mersey: case, p 439: "there must be an 
absolute refusal to perform his part of the contract". But 
ffthe true test will generally be not the subjective mental 
state of the defaulting party, but the objective test of 
the relation in fact of the default to the whole purpose 
of the contractU, see Maple case, supra, 156. 
Section V 
Effects of Avoidance 
76. Summary of effects 
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When avoidance validly takes place, it affects the con-
tractual relationship by putting an end to it. In that case, 
both parties are released from their obligations either wholly 
or in part as the case may be. Notwithstanding that, the 
contract remains alive for the purpose of settling any dispute 
between the parties including the question of damages. More-
over, either party is bound to make restitution of whatever he 
has received from the other under the contract. All these 
questions will be dealt with 1n the subsequent discussion. 
1. Effects on the contract 
77. Texts 
Art.78.1 of ULIS provides that:-
"Avoidance of the contract releases both parties from 
their obligations thereunder, subject to any damages which may 
be due." 
While Art.81.1 of the Convention provides that: 
"Avoidance of the contract releases both parties from 
their Gbligations under it, subject to any damages which may 
be due. Avoidance does not affect any provision of the con-
tract for the set!lement of disputes or any other provision of 
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the contract governing the rights and obligations of the 
parties consequent upon the avoidance of the contract.~(1) 
78. Termination in general 
Thus, the general principle as laid down in ULIS and the 
Convention is that avoidance releases both parties from their 
obligations under the contract~1) But this statement is 
somewhat misleading even as a general rule. In many events, 
some and maybe a great part of obligations may never be 
affected by avoidance. Indeed, a distinction should be drawn 
1n this respect between two different situations, that is, 
whether avoidance relates to the whole contract or only to 
part of it. In the former situation, both parties are 
certainly liberated, as a rule, from all their obligations 
arising out of the contract~2) But in the latter, avoidance 
terminates only those obligations which fall under such part 
of the contract that bas been avoided while other obligations 
survive~3) 
-----------------~------------77- 1) For a legislative background of the text, see the foll~ing 
documents successively: A/CN.9/87, para3. 138-144;A/CN.9/100 , 
para.108; ibid, annex 1, art.51(78); A/CN.9/116, annex 1 
(art.51); A/32/17, annex 1, para.462, and para.35 of the 
original document (art.52); A/33/17, para.28 (art.66); 
A/CONF.97/19, pp 136,387 f, 144, 146 (art.66) ' and 227, 
para. 32. 
78- 1) A simi~ar provision is stated in CITe (5.243.1). 
2) But £f., post, para. 82. 
3) Post, para. 81. 
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79. Total & partial avoidance 
In general, one may well say that the avoidance may be 
total affecting the whole contract or partial relating to part 
of it only; whether the seller is entitled to resort to either 
is a question depending on the case. 
In two situations, his right of avoidance is confined to 
total avoidance and, therefore, he cannot avoid only part of 
the contract. The first is where the buyerls breach is com-
pletelyanticiPatoryf1) the other is where the contract is 
not by instalments but rather is indivisible. An illustra-
tion of the latter event is the case in which payment of the 
whole price and delivery of the whole goods are to be made 
simultaneously; if, in such an event, the buyer fails to make 
payment, the seller who seeks avoidance cannot avoid only part 
of the contract while other parts remain alive; rather, he 
must avoid the whole contract or nothing and, again, a similar 
principle applies to the former situation. 
Contrary to that is the case in which the contract is by 
instalments and the buyer violates it in respect of one or 
more instalments other than the first one. In this setting, 
the seller cannot avoid the whole contract including previous 
deliveries which have already been paid for; he may only resort 
to partial avoidance in respect of deliveries so Violated and, 
at the most, of future deliveries as well!2) 
-----------------------~---------
79- 1) See also Treitel, Law of Contract, p 642. 
2) See supra, paras. 74 f. 
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Finally, in other situations the seller may, at his 
option, resort to either total or partial avoidance. An 
illustration of this is where the contract is by instalments 
and the buyer fails to make payment for the first instalment. 
Suppose in this setting that the requirements of avoidance 
with relation to that instalment and future instalments as 
well are met~2a) In such an event the seller has the option 
to avoid the contract either totally or only 1n respect of 
the first instalment. 
By contrast, the doctrine of total avoidance is in line 
with the general rule prevailing in French Law. According to 
which, avoidance operates not only prospectively but also 
retrospectivelyf 3) and it therefore affects the whole con-
tract as though it had never been made (4) But in fI contracts 
success1fS,u eg., an instalment contract, avoidance operates 
prospectivelyf5) In addition, a court before which the 
dispute is brought may, as previously stated, grant an order 
of partial and not total aVOidance~6) 
80. English Law 
Under the English general law of contract, avoidance of 
the contract, i. e., its II termination" (1) by the irmocent party 
------------------------------
79- 2a) Supra, paras. 74 f. 
3) See Marty et Raynau~,para.303; Starck,para.2180; Mazeaud, 
t.3, vol. 2, para. 1015. 
4) Planiol et Ripert, vol. 10, para.166. 
5) Supra, para. 70. 
6) Supra, para. 20. 
80- 1) See supra, para. 14. 
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on the footing of the other's breach operates prospectively 
and not retrospectivelyS2) Thus, termination is quite di~­
ferent from "rescission" ab initiO, such as may arise for 
example in case of misrepresentation where the contract is 
treated as never having come into existence~3) 
An obvious illustration of "termination" is an instalment 
contract in the meaning given abovef 4) Suppose, for example, 
that the buyer violates the contract in respect of one or more 
instalments; in that case, the seller may be entitled to 
avoid the contract in relation to future deliveries(5) but not 
to deliveries already made. Thus, it is clear that avoidance 
in such a case does not affect the whole contract but only 
part of it. 
If, on the other hand, avoidance is based on an antici-
patory breach, the acceptance of the breach must be complete • 
A party, as has been said, cannot accept an anticipatory breach 
of one term in a contract while treating the contract as still 
in existence for other purposes~6) 
Further, the contract may be indivisible, or, more 
precisely, the goods which are the subject-matter of the sale 
may be regarded as parts of indivisible whole, eg., parts of 
-----------------~-------------
80- 2) See Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston, p 491; Chitty, paras.441, 
1629; see further Heyman v. Darwins Ltd. [94~ A.C. 356, 
399; Johnson v. Agnew [98~ A.C.367, in particular at 392-393. 
3) Johnson case, ibid. 
4) Supra, this Ch., s.IV.2. 
5) Supra, para. 75. 
6) Treitel, Law of Contract, p 642. 
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a machine. In such a case, it is assumed that the seller may 
avoid the whole contract even with respect to those instalments 
which have already been deliveredf7) 
Finally, it has been argued that the seller is deprived 
of bis right as against the goods (which seems to include 
avoidance) whenever both possession of, and property in, the 
goods are vested in the buyerf8 ) If this conclusion is 
correct, the result is that the seller may be entitled to 
resort to partial avoidance in eaCh case the property in, or 
possession of, part of the goods is still vested in him. 
81. Termination of obligations 
Turning again to the Convention and ULIS where the general 
rule in both· is that uavoidance releases both parties from 
their obligations" under the contract~1) If avoidance is 
total, it liberates the parties from all their contractual 
obligations whether or not they have matured. SUPPosQ,for instance, 
that a contract calls £or delivery by instalments and the buyer 
has refused to pay for the first and second instalments; the 
result of which is that the seller has avoided the whole contract. 
In this hypothesis, neither the seller remains bound to 
make further deliveries nor is the buyer bound to take those 
--------~----------------------~-
80- 7) Supra,para.71; it has been suggested, however, that the same 
principle applies where the defaulting party is the seller 
(Benjamin, para. 653). 
8) Benjamin, para.1247; . Sutton, Sales and Consumer Law 3rd ed., 
1983, p 397. But cf., Chalmer, Sale of Goods, p 221 where it 
-is considered that there is no clear authority in support of = 
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deliveries or to pay for them. Moreover, the latter is 
released from his obligations even with respect to those 
deliveries which have already been effected. 
Similarly, if the seller, where he is entitled to do so, 
avoids only part of the contract, both parties are released 
from their obligations under that part(2) while other obliga-
tions remain alive as if there had been no avoidance. This 
principle applies irrespective of whether or not those obliga-
tions are mature. Suppose in the above example that the 
seller has avoided the contract only with respect to the 
second delivery. The position in such a case may be envisaged 
as if that instalment were not a part of the contract. As to 
the first instalment, the buyer and seller remain bound by 
its obligations such as payment by the former or the latter's 
duty to hand over any document relating to it. A similar 
principle also applies with respect to future deliveries. 
Again, those principles are closer to French more than to 
English Law. As indicated above, the general rule under the 
former is that avoidance affects the whole contract as if it 
had never existedf 3) This clearly means that both parties are 
------------------------------
80- =) this proposition. 
81- 1) Supra, para. 78. 
2) See A/CN.9/116, annex 2, comment on art.51, para.2; A/CONF. 
97/5, comment on art.66, para.3; see also A/CN.9/100, annex 
2, (a proposal by Norway to UNcrTRAL draft convention) 
comment on art.78. 
1) Supra, paras. 70, 79. 
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released from any obligation under the contract whether or not 
it falls due. But if the contract is "successif'~ a different 
rule applies; that is, ~voidance operates prospectively and 
not retrospectivelY}') which simply means that avoidance has 
no impact on those obligations which have already matured~4) 
Under English Law, by contrast, the avoidance releases 
both parties from their primary obligations to perform in the 
future~5) To this extent, therefore, all the laws relevant 
to the current study are in agreement. As regards other 
obligations already due by the time of the avoidance, the rule 
under English Law amounts to this: the avoidance does not 
affect the existing rights and obligations, and this is, as 
has just bee~ seen, a main difference between "rescission" and 
aVOidance~6) Nevertheless, it may be that even the avoidance 
may, in certain circumstances, affect the existing obligations; 
this question mainly depends, as suggeste~upon whether a 
particular obligation falls under such part of the contract 
that has been justifiably avoided; if so, then that obligation 
becomesat an end whether it is the duty of the innocent or the 
defaulting part1~7) 
-------------------------------
81- 4) However, there is a real trend in French Law to apply the 
principle of retroactive operation of avoidance to the 
"contrats successifsn, see Mar.ty et Raynaud, para.303. 
5 ) But the defaulting party becomes under a secondary obliga-
tion to pay damages, see eg., Moschi v. Lep Air Services 
Ltd. [197] A.C.331; Photo Production Ltd. v. Securicor 
Transport Ltd. [198Q] ·A.C.827,848; R. V. \vard Ltd. v. Bignal 
[}96Il1 Q.B.534, 548, 550. 
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82. Survival of the contract 
Although the avoidance terminates the contractual 
obligations to the extent discussed above, the contract 
survives ~or certain purposes in particular for assessing 
the seller's damages. 
ULIS~1) this principle 
and French Law~3) 
In addition to the Convention and 
is well-established in both English(2) 
Moreover, the Convention provides for two ~es of con-
tractual clauses which are not affected by avoidance. Firstly, 
the clauses rela.ting to the settlement of disputes, e.g., a 
clause providing for the law applicable to the contract or for 
choice of forum, and an arbitration clause~4) Secondly, any 
clause governing the rights and obligations of the parties 
consequent upon avoidance such as that providin8 for recipro-
cal notices, liquidated damages or restitution. 
It should be noted, however, that the survival of any 
contractual provision does not mean the validity of such a 
provision~5) As already mentioned, the validity of any 
---------~------------------
81- 6) Supra, para. 80; see further Beatson, 971£B, 1981, p 389; 
Treitel, ibid, pp 639 f. 
7) For an example of this, see supra, paras. 71, 80. 
82- 1) See the texts of both, supra, para. 78. 
2) See e.g., Michael v. Hart and Co. B90Z] 1 K.B. 482, 490; 
Moschi case, supra; Johnstone v. Milling (1886) 16 Q.B.D. 
460, 467; see also Beale, pp 105-106; Benjamin, para. 1240; 
Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston, p 492; Shea, 42 M.L.R. 1979, 
P 623, in particular pp 635, 642 ff. 
3) Mazeaud, t. 3, vol. 2., para. 1016. 
4) In English Law, too, avoidance does not affect an arbitra-
tion clause, see Heyman v. Darwins Ltd. a94~ A.C. 356. 
5) See A/CONF.97/5, para. 5. 
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provision under the contract is outside the scope of the 




Art. 78.2 of ULIS provides that:-
"If one party has performed the contract either wholly 
or in part, he may claim the return of whatever he has supp-
lied or paid under the contract. If both parties are required 
to make restitution, they shall do so concurrently." 
While Art-81.2 of the Convention provides that: 
"A party who has performed the contract either wholly 
or in part may claim restitution from the other party of what-
ever the first party has supplied or paid under the contract. 
If both parties are bound to make restitution, they must do so 
c'oncurrently. (1 ) 
84. Meaning in general 
The principle of restitution as provided for by the Con-
vention and ULIS presumes that the contract has already been 
performed either wholly or in part, and then avoided. In that 
case, either party is entitled to require restitution of 
-------------------------------
82- 6) And ULIS as well, supra, para. 21. 
83- 1) For a legislative background of the text, see the documents 
cited in para. 77, note 1, supra. 
147 
whatever the other 'has received(1) under the contract; and the 
party who claims restitution must also make restitution of 
that which he has received from the other party$2) Suppose, 
for example, that the seller has obtained part of the con-
tract price and the buyer has obtained the goods, and the 
former avoided the contract. In this case, the buyer and 
seller are bound to make restitution in respect of the goods 
and that part of the price respectively, and at the same time 
either party is entitled to require such restitution. 
Moreover, this principle applies irrespective of whether 
performance has been made by both parties or only by one of 
them. But in the former situation, where it is presumed that 
both are bound to make restitution, they must do so "con-
currentlytt. Neither the Convention nor ULIS clarifies the 
meaning of this term; but it is assumed that reciprocal 
restitution in such a case is to be made at the same timef3) 
in addition, either party is entitled to refrain from making 
restitution until the other fulfils his duty with respect to 
restitution. 
It should be noted, however, that the principle of resti-
tution only applies to such part of the contract that has been 
affected by avoidance. So, for instance, if a contract calls 
for delivery by instalments and the seller has validly avoided 
-------------~-----------------
84- 1)~, para. 88, post. 
2) A/CN.9/116, annex 2, comment on art.51, para.8; A/CONF. 
97/5, comment on art.66, para.8. 
3) Which is the same, as has been seen, in case of payment and 
delivery (supra, para. 10). 
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only one lnstalment~4) the restitution would be con-
fined to that instalment. In other words, the principle has 
no place wi th relation to any part of the contract which 
remains alive, nor of course if the contract has never been 
performed at the time of avoidance. 
85. Parentage 
Thus, it is plain that the purpose of restitution is to 
put the parties into the same position they would have 
occupied had the contract never been performed. The doctrine 
as such reflects, indeed, the retrospective feature of 
avoidance which is more familiar to French than to English 
Lawf1) As was indicated, the general rule Wlder the former 
is that avoidance operates retrospectively!2) accordingly, 
either party is bound to restore to the other what the former 
has acquired under the contract~3) 
Although English Law does not carry the concept of 
avoidance this far~4) it will be noted in the subsequent 
discussion that claiming restitution as a result of avoiding 
the contract may, in certain circumstances, be available to 
-----------------------------
84- 4) See supra, para. 74. 
85- 1) Supra, paras. 79 f. 
2) Supra, para. 79. 
3) See Mazeaud, t.3, vol.2, para.1015; Planiol et Ripert, vol. 
10, para.166; Starck, para. 2180; see also Marty et Reynaud, 
para. 303. r 
4) Honnold, Uniform Law, para.444. But when avoidance in the 
meaning of "rescissionll is based upon misrepresentation, -
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both parties including the defaulting buyer~5) 
86. Obstacles of restitution 
However, the fulfilment of restitution may be encountered 
by various obstacles whether material or legal. An obvious 
illustration of the former is the situation in which the goods 
have been consumed or have perished~1) An illustration of 
the latter is the case of the buyer who is insolvent or bank-
ruPt~2) or who has disposed of the subject-matter to a third 
party. In these circumstances or the like, it may be impos-
sible to restore the goods already delivered(3) and the 
question which then arises is concerned with the legal posi-
tion of the seller. 
-------------------------------
85- a) English Law approach is quite different;supr~ para. 80. 
S) Post, paras.89 f. 
86- 1) It may be worth noting that when the defaulting party is 
the seller, the buyer cannot, as a general rule, avoid the 
contract if it is impossible for him to make restitution 
of the goods substantially in the condition in which he 
received them, see Art.79.1 of ULIS and 82.1 of the 
Convention; see also 58.372 f of CITC. 
2) See A/CN.9/116, annex 2, comment on art. 51, para.10; 
A/CONF. 97/5 , comment on art.66, para.10; Honnold, ibid, 
para. 444; A/CN.9/87, paras. 139 f 
3) Where the benefit obtained is a sum of money, which is 
normally the only object of the buyer's claim, it has been 
considered that there is never any difficulty in making 
restitution, see Treitel, ibid, p 289; but so far as the 
international sale is concerned, the question seems to be 
different; for example, exchange control laws or other 
restrictions on the transfer of funds may bar the -
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Neither the Convention nor ULIS contains a provision 
designated for solving this problem. On the other hand, noth-
ing in either indicates that the impossibility of specific 
restitution of goods deprives the seller of his right to 
avoid the contract~1) or even to claim restitution upon its 
avoidance. But when restitution is impossible for any reason, 
one may well say that the only substitute for it is a reason-
able remuneration(4) which may be assessed by the value of 
the goods at the time of avoidance. 
87. Criticism 
As seen above, claiming restitution by either party is 
concerned with what that party has supplied or paid and not 
with what the other party has received under the contract. This 
language of both ULIS and the Convention may, in a given case, 
lead to unsound results and it is doubtful to assume that 
they have deliberately been sought by the draftsmen. 
Suppose, for example, that the seller has delivered the 
goods to a carrier for transmission to the bUyerp>suppose also 
that the former has avoided the contract. In this hypothesis, 
the seller would be entitled to claim restitution of the 
goods from the buyer who might never have the chance to take 
actual possession of the goods or documents representing 
them; and irrespective of whether the risk is still to be 
-------------------~---------
86- =) restitution of money, see A/CONF.97/5, ibid. 
4) Which seems to be the same in French Law (Starck, para. 
2185). 
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born by the seller. The same is true in respect of claiming 
restitution by the buyer if, for example, he paid the price 
by a letter of credit which had never reached the hands of 
the seller. 
The situation becomes more complicated if either 
party has performed his part of the contract which bas then 
been avoided. In that case, a reciprocal restitution is 
required even if neither party has received the other's per-
formance. 
It is submitted, however, that the restitution, as a 
general rule, is to be restricted to such performances that 
have actually been received by the party from whom the 
restitution is claimed, or, as regards the goods, to the case 
in which the risk of those goods has already passed to the 
buyer whether or not they have actually reached his hands. 
88. Restitution and damages 
In most cases, the restitution is concerned with the 
price and goods; but the language of ULIS as well as the 
Convention is wide enough to cover "whatever" has been paid 
or supplied under the contract; eg., documents, designs 
and drawings which may be supplied by the seller for the 
purpose of putting the subject-matter of the goods into 
-------------------------------
87- 1) The seller's obligation of delivery may, in certain events, 
be fulfilled by handing over the goods to a carrier for 
transmission to the buyer, see Arts.29 of the Convention 
and 19 of ULIS; see further para. 10, supra. 
88-
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operation. For his part, the buyer may supply the seller 
with a part of the materials necessary for manufacturing 
the gOOds(1) and the restitution also covers these 
materials. 
Again, the wording of both laws may confuse restitution 
with damages. For example, the contract may call upon the 
seller to pay such expenses for storing the goods or trans-
mitting them. In case of avoidance, it is submitted that 
his claim to recover these expenses is in damages and not a 
restitutionary claim. In effect, there are notable dif-
ferences between the two claims. For example, the buyer's 
foreseeability of the seller's 10ss(2) and the duty imposed 
on the latter to mitigate his damages(3) are confined to the 
claim for damages, and are not required when the seller 
claims restitution. 
89. Restitution of goods 
In any case, the seller is entitled to claim restitution 
of the goods from the buyer, which is certainly the most 
important, and sometimes the only, object of his claim. In 
addition, the buyer must account to the seller for all 
benefits which the former has derived from the goods or part 
---------------------------------
1 ) See, by contrast, Arts. 3.1 of the Convention and 6 of 
ULIS. 
2) See Arts. 74 of the Convention and 82 of ULIS, post, 
para. 92. 
3) See Arts. 77 of the Convention and 88 of ULIS, Eost, 
para. 105. 
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of themf1) for example. where the goods are trucks and the 
buyer has obtained some benefits from putting them into 
operation. The approach of the Convention and ULIS is in 
line with French Law~2) It should be noted, however, that 
the buyer's liability as regards the benefits is confined to 
those which he has actually acquired, and does not include 
any other benefit even if he could easily derive it from the 
gOOds~3) 
In English Law, by contrast, it has been noted that the 
seller loses his right of avoidance if, following the con-
tract of sale, the buyer has both possession of, and property 
in the goOds~4) But if the property is vested in the 
seller while possession is in the buyer, it seems that the 
former is not deprived of avoiding the contract nor, pre-
sumably, of resuming the possession of goods subsequent to 
avoidance~5) 
-----------------~-------------
89- 1) See Arts.84.2 of the Convention and 81.1 of ULIS; and for 
a legislative background of the former, see the following 
documents suCCeSS\vely:-A/CN.9/87, paras.155 f; A/CN.9/100, 
annex 1, art. 54(81); A/CN.9/116, annex '1, (art.54) ; 
A/32/17, and annex 1, paras.467 ff of the annex and para. 
35 of the original document (art.55); A/33/17, para.28 
(art.69.2); A/CONF.97/19, pp 137-138,388-392, 419, 146 
(art.69) and p 226, paras. 10-13. 
2) Mazeaud, t.3, vol.2, para.1015; see also Planiol et Ripert 
yol. 10, para. 166. 
3) Cf., the suggestion of Austria to the effect that restitu-
.......... 
tion of goods should also cover all benefits which the 
buyer reasonably could have derived from them; A/CN.9/125 
and add.1, the comment of Austria on art.54, para.9. 
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90. Restitution of the price 
The buyer, though he is the party in default, is also 
entitled to claim restitution of the price or any part of 
it~1 ) Moreover, the seller is bound to pay interest on it 
from the date of payment. Here again, these provisions in 
both the Convention and ULIS(1a) are in conformity with French 
Law~2) 
The Convention does not, however, contain any prOVision 
relating to the rate of interestf3) while it is plain from 
ULIS(4) that the interest is to be fixed at a rate equal to 
the official discount rate in the country where the seller(5) 
has his place of business or, if he has no place of business, 
his habitual residence, plus 1%~5a) 
-------------------------------------
89- 4) See supra, para. BO. 
5) See further Benjamin, paras. 1244 ff. 
90- 1) As to the place where the restitution of the price should 
be made, it has been held in W. Germany that this question 
is not expressly settled by ULIS and therefore has to be 
settled, in accordance with Art.17, in conformity with the 
general principles on which ULIS is based. The court con-
cluded that the place of performance would as a rule be 
the seller's place of business,and the same principle would 
be applied as regards the return of the purchase price. 
See BundesgerichtShof , 22.XI. 19BO-VIII ZR 264/79, quoted 
in UNIDROIT (1981) vol. 1, p 296. 
1a) See Arts.81.1 of ULIS and 84., of the Convention; a similar 
pr"ovision is provided for in CITC (s. 371 ). The reason for 
that is,as said, to prevent the seller from being enriched 
as a result of his possibility to dispose of the purchase 
price in the meantime (Kopac, p 126). 
2) See Mazeaud, t.3, vol.2, para. 1015. 
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The approach of English Law relating to the buyer's 
right to recover what he has paid under the contract is quite 
different. According to which a sharp distinction has been 
drawn between two kinds o£ payments~6) Firstly, any payment 
made as an earnest to guarantee the buyer's performance of 
his obligations is forfeited to the seller upon avoiding the 
contract because of the buyer's breach~7) Secondly, if what 
has been paid constitutes a part-payment of the price, the 
buyer may recover it(8) unless the contract expressly provides 
otherwise~9) 
------------------------------
90- 3) See post, para. 136. 
4) Arts. 81.1 and 83, 
5) Art.83 of ULIS (post, para.136) provides for the 5eller~ 
right of interest (and its rate) when the buyer delays in 
making payment; in such a case reference is made, with 
relation to the rate of interest, to the seller's place of 
business. And Art.81 which provides for the refund of the 
price already paid refers to the rate as stated in Art.83; 
read literally, therefore, the rate which is to be con-
sidered in these circumstances is that prevailing in the 
country where the seller has his place of business, though 
the buyer's place of business should, by analogy with Art. 
81, be the relevant one. Whether this result is inten-
tionally intended is doubtful and, accordingly, it may be 
that the lattersplace is to be considered when applying 
Art.83. 
5a) Cf., 58.371, 428 of CITC. 
-
6) See generally Beatson, 97 L.Q.R. 1981, pp 389, 390 f; 
Chitty, paras. 1971 fj Treitel, Law of Contract, p 754; 
see also Atiyah, p 320; OLRC Report, vol.2, p 425. 
7) Howe v. Smith (1884) 27 Ch.D. 89; but cf.,post, para.135. 
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Two further points should be observed; firstly, whether 
the sum paid is an earnest or a part-payment depends upon the 
construction of the contract(10) and where the language used 
in a contract is neutral, the general rule is that the law 
confers on the buyer the right to recover his money~11) 
Secondly, even if the sum paid is an earnest, the seller must 
bring it into account if he seeks to recover damages from the 
bUyerS 12 ) 
--------------------------------
90- 8) Mayson v. Clouet [192~ A.C. 980, 986. 
9) Beatson, ibid; Treitel, ibid. 
10) See Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston, p 535; Lindgren, Time 
in the Performance of Contracts, 1976, p 141. 
11) Dies v. British and International Mining and Finance Cpn. 
~. [1939J 1 K.B. 724, 743. 





The unpaid seller's claim for damages is connected with 
the loss he has suffered as a consequence of the buyer's breach 
of the contractf1) and its purpose is to compensate the 
former(2) for his loss by putting him, so far as money can do 
30(3) into the same financial position 
bee~had the contract been performed~4) 
always assessed by money~5) 
in which he would have 
Thus, damages are 
The present chapter will deal with the questions relating 
to damages under two sections:- the first will be concerned 
with the general principles on damages while the other will 
consider damages in case of avoidance. 
-----------~---------------------
91- 1) Post, paras. 98 ff. 
2) Benjamin, para. 1296; McGregor on Damages, 14th ed., para. 
9; see also Carbonnier, para. 70. Cf.,the seller's claim 
....... 
for interest, post, para. 96. 
3) British Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., 
v. Underground Electric Railways Co. of London B91~ A.C. 
673, 689; Wertheim v. Chicoutimi Pulp Co. ~91] A.C. 301, 
307; Victoria Laundry(Windsor)v. Newman Industries Ltd. 
ff94~ 2 K.B. 528, 539. 
4) Ibid; A/CN.9/116, annex 2, comment on art.55, para. 2; 
A/CONF. 97/5 , comment on art.70, para. 3. 
5) See Arts.74 of the Convention and 82 of ULIS; "damages 
••• consist of a sum ••• n; see also Carbo nnier, ibid 
(dommages-interets)j McGregor, para. 1. Cf., s. 253 of CITC 
in which damages may, subject to certain requirements, "be 
compensated by the restoration of the former state",rt may 
be interesting to recall, in this connexion, that the 
restoration or say the restitution in both ULIS and the 
Convention does not constitute a sort of damages but an 





Ar~ 74 of the Convention(1) provides that:-
"Damages for breach of contract by one party consist of 
a sum equal to the loss}2) including the los~ of profit, 
suffered by the other party as a consequence of the breach. 
Such damages may not exceed the loss which the party in 
breach foresaw or ought to have foreseen at the time of the 
. 
conclusion of the contract, in the light of the facts and 
matters which he then knew or ought to have known, as a 
possible consequence of the breach of contract. II 
------------~--------------~-
92- 1) For a legislative background of the text, see the follow-
ing documents successively:- A/CN.9/87, annex 3, passim; 
A/CN.9/87, paras.157 if; A/CN.9/100, para.114, and annex 1, 
art.55(82)j A/CN.9/116, annex 1, (art.55); A/32/17, annex 
1, paras.473 if and para.35 of the original document (art. 
56); A/33/17, para. 28 (art.70); A/CONF.97/19, pp 131,394 
(paras.19-23), 163 (art. 70) and 221 (para. 36). 
2) Cf., the suggestion of Mexico to the effect that the adverb 
-
"actually" should be added to the first paragraph of this 
article so as to confine payment for damages to those 
really suifered:- A/CN.9/87, annex 2, ibid, (comment of 
Mexico on Arts. 82-90 of ULIS , para.3);but see the 
comment of Hungary on that suggestion, ibid, para. 1. 
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Although ULIS does not contain, as will be seen below, 
a comparable provision, it is important for the subsequent 
discussion to mention Art· 82 which reads: 
"Where the contract is not avoided, damages for a breach 
of contract by one party shall consist of a sum equal to the 
loss, including loss of profit, suffered by the other party. 
Such damages shall not exceed the loss which the party in 
breach ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion 
of the contract, in the lights of the facts and matters which 
then were known or ought to have been known to him, as a 
possible consequence of the breach of the contract." 
1. Availability of damages 
"In general" 
93. The Convention and ULIS 
So it is plain from the above provision of the Conven-
tion, that the main principle upon which damages are based 
is the loss suffered by the seller as a result of the buyer's 
breach~1) The amount of damages should not, however, exceed 
the buyer's foreseeability~2) Both matters will be discussed 
later, (3) but it is of prime significance to notice that if the 
------------------------------
93- 1) The general rule in CITC is quite the same (damage): 8.251; 
Kopac in his comment on this section, p 85; but ££.,5.191 
(conventional fine) and s.356 (earnest). 
2) Post, paras. 100 ff. 
3) Post, this Sec., (2 and 3). 
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contract is avoided, the loss and foreseeability are irrele-
vant to the extent that damages are based on the resale(4) 
or current price(5) formula. To illustrate, assume that the 
requirements of applying the latter formula are sat1Bf1~; 
in this case the seller is always entitled to recover as 
damages the difference between the contract and the current 
price even if he has not sustained any loss, and irrespective 
of whether such a loss, if any, has not met the test of fore-
seeability. This principle is agreed upon by UL1S as well as 
the Convention. 
However, the general rule as laid down by the Convention 
(Art. 74 above) has no counterpart in ULIS; instead, it 
distinguishes between two events, i.e., whether the contract 
has been avoided or not. But this divergence between the 
two laws seems to be of formal nature; in fact, the same goal 
of the Convention has already been achieved by UL1S but in a 
different shape. 
Setting aside the seller's loss and the foreseeability 
test, it may well be that any other factor is immaterial as 
regards the seller's claim for darnages~6) In other words, 
such a claim may be available to him whether or not the breach 
results in avoiding the contract. If so, it is likewise 
irrelevant that avoidance is based upon an actual or antici-
patory breach. Moreover, the seller's right to claim interest 
does not deprive him of claiming damages for any further 
-------------------------------
93- 4) Post, this Ch., s.1I.1. 
5) Post, this Ch., s.11.2. 
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loss suf~ered by him(7). I t is granted too that the degree 
o~ the buyer's brea,ch is immaterial in this regard. 
Again, both ULIS and the Convention are in agreement 
with respect to those principles. 
94. Non-acceptance: English Law 
The unpaid seller's claim ~or damages under English SGA 
is linked with the buyer's non-acceptance of the goods(1) 
where 8.50.1 of the Act reads: 
"Where the buyer wrong.fully neglects or refuses to 
accept and pay for the goods, the seller may maintain an 
action against him for damages ~or non-acceptance" 
In this connexion , s.35 of the Act has determdnedthe 
situations in which the buyer is deemed to have accepted the 
goods; this may occur "when he intimates to the seller that 
he has accepted them, or (except wherfsection 34 ••• other-
wise provides)(2) when the goods have been delivered to him 
----------------------------------
93- 6) Except the buyer's non-liability under Arts.74 of ULIS 
and 79 of the Convention (post, para. 142). 
7) Post, para. 96. 
94- 1) See generally Atiyah, pp 322 ~; Benjamin, para.1316; 
Chalmer, pp 227 f~; Chitty, vol.2, para.4326~'hmitthoff, 
Sale of Goods,pp 173 ~. 
2) This section reads: "1-Where the goods are delivered to the 
buyer, and he has not previously examined them, he is 
not deemed to have accepted them until he has had a reason-
able opportunity of examining them for the purpose of 
ascertaining whether they are in conformity with the = 
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and he does any act in relation to them which is inGonsistent 
with the ownership of the seller, or after the lapse of a 
reasonable time he retains the goods without intimating to 
the seller that he has rejected them." 
The buyer's duty to accept the gOOds(3) differs from 
taking delivery of them; he may take the goods but until he 
has had the opportunity to examine them, he is not deemed to 
have accepted them~4) 
Similarly, the contract may provide that the buyer is 
to examine and accept the goods in the seller's works before 
a certain period of tendering delivery. In the former 
situation, it is plain that the acceptance occurs after 
taking delivery while the converse is true in the latter. 
Although this distinction is recognized by the SGA~5) . 
it has been argued that taking delivery is one of the most 
important aspects of the buyer's duty to accept the g:ods, 
and his failure to take deli very will very often be re 3rJ..«./ eel 
as a rejection of gOOds\5) Even so, it Should be emphasized 
--------------------------------
94- =) contract. 2-Unless otherwise agreed, when the seller 
tenders delivery of the goods to the buyer, he is bound 
on request to afford the buyer a reasonable opportunity 
of examining the goods for the purpose of ascertaining 
whether they are in conf'ormity with the contractll. 
3) See 8.27 of the SGA; and cf., Benjamin, para. 672. 
-
4) See 8.34 of the SGA above (note 2). 
5) Benjamin, para. 673. 
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that whenever the buyer fulfils his duty to accept the goods 
before taking delivery of them, as in the above hypothesis, 
the seller cannot base his action for damages on s.50 of the 
SGA for a subsequent refusal of taking delivery, and the 
significance of the distinction becomes clear. In such an 
event, it is possible to say that the seller's action may, 
according to s.62.2 of the Act, turn on the common law rules. 
Apart from the buyer's duty to take delivery, it is 
quite plain from s.50.1 of the Act that an action for 
damages may not be available to the seller for the mere 
non-payment of the price if it is not accompanied by non-
(50.) 
acceptance of the goods. If, however, the goods have been 
accepted, the seller may be entitled to an action for the 
price as well as for interest on the unpaid sum; both are to 
be sought elsewhere in this work~6) 
Moreover, it may well be that the non-acceptance, or 
say the rejection, of goods and the subsequent action for 
damages mean that the contract does not subsist any more; 
that is to say, that it has been avoided as a result of the 
buyer's breach. Indeed, no authority opposing this inference 
could be found particularly in the case law; contrary to that, 
it is easy to conclude that the relevant cases, which will 
be referred to in the proper places, were brought before the 
courts on the assumption that the contract had already been 
avoided. 
-------~--------------------------
94- 5a} eF., however, para. 96 below • 
• 
6 } Post, paras. 96, 136 and 150 f • 
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95. French Law 
According to Article 1153 of the French Civil Code, if 
the debtor's obligation is a sum certain, damages resulting 
from a delay in performance only consist of interest (at the 
legal rate). Nevertheless, the creditor, say the seller may 
be entitled to claim damages distinct from interest iH- firstly, 
the debtor, say the buyer, has caused him prejudice independ-
ant of the delay and secondly, the former has acted in bad 
faith(1) , i.e., he knows that his failure to pay in time will 
harm the creditor~2) Setting aside the question of interest 
for the moment, the faith of the defaulting buyer, whether it 
is good or bad, appears to be immaterial when assessing the 
seller's damages under the other laws relevant to this 
5tudy~3) 
Two further points should be added. Firstly, the buyer's 
obliSation to pay the sale price must be expressed in moneyi 4 ) 
consequently, article 1153 above applies to this obligation. 
Secondly, it is not possible, indeed, to talk about the buyer's 
---------------------------------
95- 1) See also Carbonnier, para.76; Marty et Raynaud, paras.520 
ff; Starck,.paras.2091 ff. There is, however, a particular 
rule relating to the situations in which the seller is 
entitled to claim interest on the price (Article 1652 
of e.e.); this will be considered later (post, para. 
136). 
2) Carbonnier, ibid. 
3) It is submitted that that fact may not be affected by Art.7.1 
of the Convention which refers to "the observance of good 
faith in international trade" when interpreting its 
provisions. 
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delay in making payment without assuming that the contract 
is still alive. In other words, the provision laid down by 
A.rticle 1153 would not be applied where the contract has been 
avoided. In this case, however, the seller may recover 
damages(5) which are normally assessed by the difference 
between the contract price and, assuming that the seller 
would resell the goods to a third party, the resale price~6) 
96. Damages & Interest 
Art. 83 of ULIS provides that: 
"where the breach of contract consists in delay in pay-
ment of the price, the seller shall in any event be entitled 
to interest on such sum as in arrears at a rate equal to the 
official discount rate in the country where he has his place 
of business or, if he has no place of business, his habitual 
1oL
." residence, plus jU 
While Art.78 of the Convention provides that: 
"If a party fails to pay the price or any other sum that 
is in arrear, the other party is entitled to interest on it 




95- 4) Supra, para. 5. 
5) According to Article 1184 of C.C. 
6) Mazeaud, t.3, vol.2, para. 1016. 
96- 1) For a legislative background of the text, see the following 
documents successively: A/CN.9/87, annex 3, passim, and 
para.166 of the original document; A/CN.9/87, annex 1 (art. 
83); A/CN.9/100, para.115, and annex 1, art.56(83); = 
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Setting aside the question of rate of interest which 
will be considered later~2) the principle of interest may 
be compared, as far as the aggrieved seller is concerned, 
with damages where there are remarkable differences between 
them. 
In the first place, the seller's claim for interest may 
be available only when the buyer's obligation which has been 
violated consists of a "liquidated" sum, and this probably 
underlies, as has been noted, the words \\ sum that 
is in arrearS C l~) II which are used in the 0 w-,,",e V\ \::~ 0"'. 
Accordingly, it seems that interest on damages is not recog-
nized under either the Convention(3) or ULIS. But damages 
may be claimed for any breach committed by the buyer where 
the nature of obligation so violated is completely irrelevant; 
and this includes, inter alia, the buyer's delay in paying 
any sum that is in arrearS 3a ) 
-------------------------------
96- =) A/CN.9/116, annex 1 (art.58); A/32/17, annex 1, paras.392 
ff,where it was decided to delete the provision dealing 
with interest from the new convention;A/CONF.97/19, pp 
415-418 (paras.1-52), 163 (art.73 bis) and 223-226. 
2) Post, para. 136. 1 t 
. • .' ~ u\...\ S o..ppr&tU ') . 3) Honnold, Uniform Law, para. 422; w~'<..~ \.5 S\I.04,\.;I..r 
3a) In this respec~it has been held in W. Germany that where 
the breach consists in delay in the payment of the price 
and the rate of exchange of the currency of the seller's 
country, in which payment is to be made, has fluctuated as 
against the currency of the buyer's country, to the detri-
ment o~,the former's currency, the seller is entitled 
not only to interest on such sum as in arrear at a rate 
equal to the official discount rate in his country plus 1~,= 
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Under English Law}4) by contrast, the court is generally 
empowered to award interest even on damages~5) On the other 
hand, the common law rule, which a1·80 applies to the buyer' 5 
obligation of payment of the price}6) is that damages may 
not be awarded for the delay in making payment of sum of 
money~7) Recently, however, it has been held(8) that this 
principle applies only to general but not to special damage£~) 
if, therefore, the plaintiff shows that he has incurred a 
particular loss as a result of the defendent's delay in pay-
ment of money and the reasonable contemplation (or say fore-
seeability)(10) test is met, he is entitled to recover 
damages for that 10ss~11) 
------------------------------
96- =) as expressly laid down in Art.83 of ULIS, but also to 
recover the loss he has sustained through the said fluctu-
ation in the exchange rate (Oberlandesgerlcht Munchen, 
18.X. 1978-7 U 2762/78, quoted in UNIDROIT, 1979, vol. 1, 
p 344). But cf., Magnus, p 117 where he expresses doubts 
-
as to whether this is the right solution given by Art.83 
of ULIS. 
4) See generally Beale, pp 168 ff; Benjamin, para.1273; Chitty, 
paras.1744 ff; Treitel, Law of Contract, pp 745 f. 
5) S.3 of The Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934. 
6) Benjamin, para. 1273. 
7) The London, Chatham and Dover Railway Co. v. The South 
Eastern Railway Co. [1893J A.C. 429; but see Trans Trust 
S.P.R.L. v. Danobian Trading Co. LJ952] 2 Q.B.297, 306.And 
this perhaps reflects a historical dislike of usury, see 
Kercher and Noone, Remedies, 1983, p 117. 
8) Wadsworth v. Lydall D 981J 1 W.L.R. 598. 
9) As to the meaning of these terms, see post, para.101. 
10) See post, para. 101. 
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In French Law, too, the unpaid seller may have the 
right to claim only interest or both interest and damages 
depending on the case~12) 
In the second place, the seller who claims interest need 
not in fact show that the buyer's delay has caused him 
any loss which is certainly an irrelevant factor here. This 
principle seems to be agreed upon by all the laws relevant 
to the current study~13) As was indicated, this is not the 
case in respect of claiming damages where the loss sustained 
by the seller is, ~s a rule, an essential condition for such 
a claim~14) 
Moreover, it may well be that a claim for interest under 
both ULIS and Convention presumes that the contract is still 
alive and not avoided while a claim for damages may be avail-
able in either case. Since interest in English Law may be 
claimed, as has just been seen, on damages, this means that 
- ... ------------------------
96- 11) See further Chitty, para. 1744. 
12) Supra. para. 95. 
13) See Arts.83 of ULIS & 78 of the Convention; A/CN.9/116, 
annex 2, comment on art.58, para.2. As to French Law,see 
Art.1153 of C.C; Starck, para.2091 • In English Law, too, 
it has been said that the interest is not awarded on the 
basis of any body's fault but on the simple commercial 
basis that if the money had been paid at the appropriate 
commercial time, the other party would have had the use 
of it (Chalmer, p 322). 
14) Supra, para. 93; cf., post, para. 97, note, 4. 
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the seller may, in a given case, be awarded interest even 
where the contract has been avoided because of the buyer's 
non-acceptance of goods. 
One further point under English Law calls for particular 
attention. According to which, the court's power to award 
interest is limited to situations where"any proceedings" are 
tttried fl ,(5) So that, it has no power to award interest on 
any sum which has been paid before the commencement of 
proceedings or, in other words, which is not the subject of 
the judgment~15) The arbitrator or umpire, however, has a 
sta.ll.Ltory power, as a rule, to award interest on any sum which 
is subject of the reference but which is paid before the 
award, for such period ending not later than the date of 
payment as he thinks fit(16) 
2. Seller's loss 
97. In general 
As was indicated, the purpose of damages is to compensate 
the aggrieved seller for his loss by putting him in the same 
d 1 f d th contrac (1.) financial position had the buyer u Y per orme e t 
This may be achieved only if the former is compensated for 
all the expenses he has incurred as well as his loss of 
profit. If strictly applied, this rule may in many cases 
------------------------------
96- 15) See Chitty, para.1745; Treitel, ibid, P 746. 
16) See Administration of Justice Act 1982,Schedule 1, Part 
IV (19A). 
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lead to awarding excessive damages and accordingly to unfair 
consequences. For that reason it is generally granted, 
despi te a.n~ differences in formulation, that the assessment 
of damages is subject to two rules, i.e., the foreseeability 
test and the seller's duty to mitigate his damages; both will 
be considered in the subsequent discussion. 
Bearing that in mind, the amount of damages may mathe-
matically be crystallized into the following formula:-
damages=(the seller's actual expenditures + his loss of 
profit) - (the savings he has made + the savings he could 
reasonably I make). 
In practice, however, this is not exactly the method of 
measuring damages(2) and it has rightly been said that the 
assessment of damages is not an exact sCiencef3) accordingly, 
the court or arbitral tribunal must calculate the seller's 
loss in a manner which is best suited to the circumstances~4) 
98. Actual loss 
There is no provision in either ULIS or the Convention 
determining what type of loss, other than the loss of profit, 
---------------------------------
97- 1) Supra, para. 91. 
2) See Williston on Sales, vol.2, s.24.9,p 428. 
3) Koufos v. C. Czarnikow [96~ 1 A.C. 350, 425. 
4) See A/CN.9/116, annex 2, comment on art. 55, para. 3; 
A/CONF.97/5, comment on art.70, para. 4. Thus, in English 
Law damages may be awarded even if the aggrieved party has 
suffered no loss; in that case, damages would be nominal 
(Beale, p 152); moreover, the mere fact that the victim = 
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the innocent seller is entitled to recover because of the 
buyer's breach~1) A similar approach is followed by French 
Civil COde~2) However, it is well-established under the 
English general law of contract that the aggrieved party may 
recover two types of expenditures~3) 
Firstly, the incidental expenses incurred by him after 
the breach has come to his attention, such as those wasted for 
reselling~4) storing(5) or retransmitting the goods. It is 
to be noted that the seller may recover such expenses whether 
or not the contract is avoided~6) 
-------------------------------
97- =) has not received the performance might itself be considered 
to amount to a loss to him; see Treitel, ibid, p 703. 
98- 1) See Art.74 of the Convention (supra, para. 92); Arts. 82 
(supra, para. 92) and 86 of ULIS. However, it has been 
held in W. Germany that damages cover both the direct and 
the indirect loss provided that the defaulting party ought 
to have foreseen it, at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract, as a possible consequence of the breach 
(Landesgericht Essen, 10. VI. 1980-45 0 237/79, quoted in 
UNIDROIT, 1980, vol.2, p 388). 
2) Article 1149. But damages in general are subject to the 
test of foreseeability except in case of dol (1150); and 
in all cases, recovery is limited to those damages resul-
ting immediately and directly from the breach (Article 
1151 ) • 
3) See generally Beale, pp 153 ff; Treitel, Law' of Contract, 
pp 706, 710; as regards the seller's loss in particular, 
see Benjamin, paras. 1295, 1342 ff. 
4) Eg., the advertising costs, see R.V. Ward Ltd. v. Bignal 
U96f1 1 Q.B. 534, 547; see also Fridman, p 390. 
5) See Harlow and Jones, Ltd. v.Panex(International),Ltd. 
U96~2 Lloyd's Rep.509,531; see also Benjamin, para.1344;= 
1~ 
Secondly, the reliance expenses(7) which are wasted in 
performing(8) or in preparation for performance(8a) of the 
contract. Unlike the former type, these expenses may have 
been wasted before or a£ter the buyer's breach~9) For 
example, the seller who does not accept the buyer's repudia-
tion may continue to prepare for delivery and accordingly 
he may incur more expenditures. 
But it is suggested that in most cases the seller may not be 
entitled to recover the reliance expenses if the contract is 
not avoided. In other words, the buyer may, in spite of the 
breach, perform his part of the contract. Since the contract 
price is the consideration for the seller's performance 
including all expenses incurred by him with regard to that 
performance, he cannot therefore recover such expenses in 
addition to the price, unless of course the buyer's delay in 
payment has caused him additional costs. 
----------~----------------------
98- =) Fridman, ibid. 
6) But see note 12, below. 
7) As far as French Law is concerned, it has been noted that 
it does not make a distinction between loss of profit and 
reliance expenses ,which is familiar to Common Lawyers, see 
Nicholas, French Law of Contract, p 221. 
8) See Beale, p 154. 
Sa) See Kercher and Noone, p 67. 
9) It has also been held that the innocent party may be allowed 
to recover even the expenditures wasted before the con-
clusion of the contract provided that they are reasonable, 
see Anglia Television Ltd. v. Reed [97~ 1 Q.B.60; but 
cf., O'neill v. Wattaker (1918)18 S.R.(N.S.W.)39: the 
........ 
commission payable by the seller before the contract to his= 
Finally, it may well be that the seller is entitled in 
case of avoidance to recover his expenses whether incidental 
or reliance only if, by applying the resale(10) or market(11) 
price test as the case may be, this test does not compensate 
him for such expenses~12) 
99. Loss of profit 
In addition to the actual loss, the seller is entitled 
in the Convention and ULIS to recover the profit he would 
have gained if the contract had properly been performed~1) 
A specific reference to such profit seems to be necessary 
because in some legal systems the concept of loss standing 
alone does not include the loss of profit~2) A similar 
rule is well-established in English Law(3) and in French 
Civil Code as well\4) 
--~--------------------------
98. =) agent is not recoverable. However, the former case was 
criticized on the ground that the plaintiffs had not been 
resorted to their pre-contract position, but had been 
placed in a better position than that by the award of 
damages, see Ogus, 35 M.L.R., 1972, P 423. 
10) Post, paras. 108 ff. 
11) Post, paras. 121 ff. 
12) See, however, Art.86 of ULIS which provides that in case 
of avoidance, damages may be increased up to the amount 
of any loss including loss of profit. But it has been con-
sidered that the underlined words do not mean that the 
court has a decision in the matter; see Graveson and Cohn, 
p 103. 
99- 1) Although CITe entitles the injured party to recover his 
loss of profit, there are indeed notable differences between 
its provisions and the provisions of both the Convention : 
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On the other hand, the loss of profit may generally be 
recovered whether or not the contract is avoided. So far as 
the unpaid seller is concerned, this may not be the situation 
in practice; and it is possible to say that in most cases he 
is entitled to claim his loss of profit only if the contract 
has been avoided. In such an event, it is possible to assume 
that the seller has actually lost the profits of a bargain, 
and he may accordingly be entitled to recover such profits. 
But when the contract is not aVOided, this means that 
the seller's claim for damages is grounded on the buyer's 
delay in making payment. Therefore, his only loss of profit, 
if any, is the proceeds of the money if put into work during 
that period; and this may be avoided in practice by borrowing 
the sum on a short loan basis. Taking into consideration, on 
the one hand, the seller's duty to mitigate his damages(5) 
by· borrowing the· money or otherwise and, on the other, his 
right to claim interest, the result is that the seller's claim 
for lost profits is unlikely to succeed in these circumstances. 
------------------~--------------
99- =) and ULIS; see s. 254 of CITC, and the comment of 
Kopak thereto, p 86. 
2) A/CN.9/116, annex 2, comment on art. 55, para.2; A/CONF. 
9/5, Comment on art. 70, para. 3. 
3) See post, paras. 119 f. 
4) Art. 1149; see further Carbonnier, p 234; Nicholas, French 
Law of Contract, p 220-221. 
5) Post, paras. 105 ff. 
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Notwithstanding that, the provisionsof both the Conven-
tion and ULIS are quite plain to the effect that the seller 
is allowed to recover his loss of profit even if the contract 
is not avoided. This question will meet further considera-
tion when discussing damages in case of avoidance~6) 
3. The foreseeability 
100. The principle and its parentage 
The principle of damages as laid down by the Convention 
and, to the above extent~1) ULIS as well limits the seller's 
recovery to losses which are foreseeable through the buyer's 
anglef 2 ) In other words, the amount of damages should not 
exceed what was foreseeable at the time the contract was made 
as a possible consequence of the buyer's breach~2a) This 
requirement is in line with French Lawf 3) In spite of that, 
a distinction has been drawn, in French Civil COde~4) between 
-----------------------------
99- 6) Post, paras. 119 f. 
100- 1) Supra, para. 93. 
2) The test of foreseeability is also adopted by CITC; see 
s.254 and the comment of Kopak thereto, ibid, P 86. There 
was, however, a proposal to delete the foreseeability from 
the new convention on the ground that it was a limitation 
on the right of full damages, but the Working Group did not 
retain that proposal, see A/CN.9/100, para. 144; see also 
the suggestion of ICC in A/CN.9/125 and add. 1, para. 56. 
2a) And this principle applies to both direct and indirect 
loss (supra, para. 98, note 1). 
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whether or not the breach is due to the dol of the contract 
breaker. If so, he is then liable for both the foreseeable 
and unforeseeable damagesf5) otherwise his liability is 
limited to the former damages. 
Certainly, this distinction has no place in either English 
Law(6) or the Convention(7) while Art. 89 of ULIS reads: "In 
case of fraud(8) , damages shall be determined by the rules 
applicable in respect of contracts of sale not governed by 
the present Law", i.e., by the proper law of the contract 
according to the rules of conflict of laws. 
Apart from the question of dolor fraud, it may be sound 
to conclude that the foreseeability test in international sale 
of goods has its origin in both Civil and Common Law~9) In 
English Law, however, the whole question of foreseeability has 
recently become arguable\10) The principles laid down in the 
leading case of Hadley v. Baxendale)11) in which an express 
--------~-----------------------
100- 3) Art. 1150 of C.C.; see also Carbonnier, para. 72; Nicholas, 
French Law of Gontract, p 223; Mazeaud, t. 2, vol. 1, para. 
629; Starck, para. 2056. 
4) Art. 1150. 
5) This has been considered as an exception to the general 
rule, see Starck, paras. 2054, 2057. 
6) Treitel, Remedies, s.81. 
7) See, however, the comment of Norway on the draft conven-
tion where it was suggested that the convention should 
contain provisions regulating the effect of fraud on damages, 
(A/CN.9/125, add. 1, paras. 52-53). 
8) The words "dol ou de fraud" have been used in the French 
text. 
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reference was made to the doctrine under French Civil 
did not in fact refer to the tlforeseeability" but 
rather to damages which were flin the contemplation of the 
partiestt~13) In analyzing these words, the rules of fore-
seeability were then declared in one English case~14) sub-
t 
sequently, the adoption of the doctrine in English Law had 
been taken for granted~15) But in a recent case, the 
doctrine has been criticised where it is suggested to recur to 
the original words as declared in Hadley v. Baxendale, i.e., 
to the term It contemplation" instead of It foreseeabili ty".( 16) 
, 
Therefore, the present criterion is the "reasonable contem-
plation" as it may shortly be described~17) 
Whether this divergency in phraseology may lead to prac-
tical consequences is not easy to answer at present stage. 
Granted, however, that the whole question has in many cases 
been regarded as a question of fact(18) the answer would 
-----------------------------
100- 9) See, however, Baer, p 101; Lagergren, 1 JBL 1958, P 139. 
10) See generally Treitel, Remedies, 5.83. 
11) (1854) 23 L.J Ex. 179. 
12) Ibid, p 181. 
13) See Koufos v. C. Czarnikow Ltd. [9621 1 A.C.350,384-385. 
14) Victoria Laundry (Windor) Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. 
[94~ 2 K.B. 528, 539. 




was assumed by all textbool~s (Trei tel, ibid, note 508). 
Koufos case, ibid • 
.. 
Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston, P 541. 
See, e.g., Andre et Cie, SeA. v. J.H. Vantol,Ltd. [95~ 2 
Lloyd's Rep. 282, 293; Mehment Dogan Bey v. G.G. Abdeni 




certainly be negative; that is to say, that no practical 
benefit may result from replacing the "foreseeability" by the 
n contempla ti on" • 
At any rate, it is to be noted that the foreseeability 
test in both ULIS and the Convention is immaterial in two 
events. Firstly, in respect of the seller's claim for 
interest; secondly, Whenever, and to the extent that, the 
seller claims, as damages, the difference between the contract 
price and either the resale or market price as the case may 
be. As was indicated, even the loss itself is irrelevant in 
these circumstancesf 19) 
101. Types and grounds of foreseeability 
In the words of the convention~1) the amount of the 
unpaid seller's damages "may not exceed the loss which" the 
buyer tf fo....eS aw or ought to have foreseen • • • in the light of 
facts and matters which he then knew or ought to have 
known ••• ~(2) Although the wording of ULIS is somewhat dif-






Sale of Goods, p 176. And for other views, see McGregor, 
para. 1528A. 
Supra, para. 93. 
Art.74, supra, para. 84. 
For a criticism of this formula, see A/32/17, annex 1, 
para. 575. On the other hand, it has been noted that the 
above formula produces an objective criterion in assess-
ing the damages, see A/CONF.97/19, p 394, para. 21. 
3) Art.82, supra, para. 92; Art.86; see also the next note. 
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Thus, the foreseeability under the Convention is of two 
kinds: actual (~resaw)(4) and imputed (ought to have fore-
seen)S5) Similarly, the grounds or sources of the facts and 
matters referred to in the text are of two kinds: actual 
(knew) and imputed (ought to have known)~6) In theor~ these 
two divisions may be important where the buyer, for example, 
might have possessed actual knowledge of some facts which 
might lead to (actual) foreseeability, at the time he ought 
not to know those facts nor to foresee the result of his 
breach. In practice, however, doubts may be expressed as to 
whether there is any advantage that could be obtained from 
either; and it might be sufficient had the text of the Con-
vention only referred to the imputed foreseeability and 
knowledge as well. 
In any case, it is plain from the Convention and ULIS 
that the test of foreseeability may be satisfied even if the 
buyer has not actually foreseen the result of his breach. It 
is also important to note that the facts or matters leading 
to the foreseeability need not be given by the seller himself; 
indeed, they may be derived from any other source whatsoever, 
e.g., an economic magazine predicting the fall of prices. 
------------------------------
101- 4) ULIS' provisions (note 1, above) do not contain this word. 
5) Although this term is not defined in ULIS, it is suggested 
that Art.13 applies to it mutatis mutandis, see Graveson 
and Cohn, pp 100, 59. 
6) Which is the same in English Law, see e.g., Victoria 
Laundry (\-lindsor) Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. [l94~ 2 
K.B. 528, 539; see also Benjamin,paras. 1308 f;McGregor, 
paras. 195 ff. 
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The approach of ULIS and the Convention may be contrasted 
with English Law where 5.50(2) of the SGA reads: "The measure 
of damages is the estimated loss directly and naturally result-
ing, in the ordinary course of events, from the buyer's breach 
of contract." Remembering that the foreseeability test is 
well-known in French Law~7) it has been considered, never-
theless, that the assessement of damages in both the SGA(8) 
and ULIS(9) is based on Common Law rules as declared in Hadley 
v. Baxendale~10) 
In brief, damages in English Law are of two types:general 
and special~11) The former, since they result from the 
ordinary course of events, are always recoverable; the latter 
are recoverable only if the defaulting party has actually 
possessed knowledge of special circumstance~ outside flthe 
ordinary course of events" of such a kind that a breach in 
those special circumstances would be liable to cause more 
10ss(12) 
--~-------------~----------
101- 7) Supra, para. 100. 
8) Schmitthoff, Sale of Goods, p 174; see also Benjamin, 
para. 1306. 
9) Graveson and Cohn, p 58; see also Baer, p 101. And as 
noted above, the substance of the relevant provisions of 
both ULIS and the Convention is the same. 
10) (1854)23 L.J.Ex 179. But it has been noted that s.50(2) 
above deals only with the general damages (below); see 
Chalmer~p 227. As to the special damages (below), it is 
considered that they are impliedly accepted by the word-
ing of s.54 of the Act, see Benjamin, para. 1309. 
11) Schmitthoff, ibid, pp 175 ff. 
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Thus, the preceding discussion shows notable divergencies 
between English Law on the one hand and, on the other, both 
ULIS and the Convention. Under the former, the general 
damages are recoverable even if they are not, at least in 
theory, foreseeablef 13 ) further, the recovery of the special 
damages is always subject to the buyer's actual knowledge of 
the circumstances leading to the foreseeability of the loss. 
But in ULIS and the Convention, the general damages are always 
subject to the test of foreseeability; and the knowledge as 
regards the special damages may be imputed and need not be 
aC~Ual. 
102. Whose foreseeability? 
If, under the Convention, the buyer has neither foreseen 
nor ought to have foreseen such part of the seller's loss, he 
is not liable to compensate him for it. This language would 
suggest that the foreseeability test does not depend merely 
on the buyer's m~ judgment1 but rather on the judgment of a 
reasonable buyer to be put in the same circumstances(1) Under 
------------------~-----------
101- 12) Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. 
IT94~ 2 K.B.528, 539. 
13) See, however, Victoria Laundry case, ibid, where it has 
been considered that the aggrieved party is only entitled 
to recover such part of the loss actually resulting as 
was at the time of the contract reasonably foreseeable as 
liable to result from the breach. In Hadley case ,ibid, 
the reference to foreseeability or, more precisely,to 
contemplation was only made to special damages. 
102-
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ULIS too the expression "ought to have foreseen ll refers to 
what should have been foreseen by a reasonable person in the 
same situation~2) The same may be said in respect of the 
expression "ought to have (or to have been) known" which is 
used in both. Here again, it seems to be difficult to con-
clude that loose words of this type may in practice lead to 
any differences between the two laws. 
Likewise, under English Law the test of foreseeability 
or say the "reasonable contemplationu (3) depends on the know-
ledge possessed by both parties or at least by the defaulting 
party S4) In all cases, Ilthe crucial question is whether ••• 
~ 
the defendant ••• should, or the reasonable man in his posi-
tion would, have realized that such loss was sufficiently 
II( 5) likely to result from the breach of contract 
•••• 
103. Time of foreseeability 
The test of foreseeability is to be satisfied at the 
time the contract vias madef 1) and, as indicated above, it 
turns on the facts and matters which the defaulting party 
------------------------------
1) Cf., however, the language of Art.10 
-fundamental breach, supra, para. 17; 
~language of 5.254.2 of CITC. 
dealing with the 
cf., also the 
-




See supra, para. 100. 
Victoria Laundry case, supra, p 539. 
Koufos case, supra, p 385. 
103- 1) Cf., the foreseeability in case of fundamental breach, 
-
supra, para. 33. And for a criticism of this rule, see = 
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knew or ought to have known(2) also at that timef3) This 
principle in the Convention and ULIS(4) is in line with both 
French(5) and English Law~6) Therefore, any information or 
knowledge which is. subsequently acquired is irrelevant to the 
measure of damages~7) 
104. Foreseeability of what? 
In both ULIS and the Convention, the foreseeability 
through the buyer's angle is directed to the "losS" suffered 
by the seller lias a possible consequence" of the breach~1) 
\i.hether it is so depends, as already mentioned, upon the facts 
and matters known or ought to have been known by the buyer at 
the time the contract was made(2) Thus, should the seller 
consider the buyer's breach would cause him exceptionally 
heavy losses he may, for example, make this known to the 
buyer; the result is that the latter becomes liable for these 
losses~3) It is suggested, further, that if the buyer has 
------------------------------
103- =) Beale, p 185; but see p 186, ibid. 
2)· Supra, para. 101. 
4 
3) Arts.82 (supra, para. 92) and 86 of ULIS; Art.74 of the 
Convention (supra, para. 92). 
4) A~d CITC too (s.254.2). 
5) Art.1150 of C.C.; see, however, para. 100, supra. 
6) S~e e.g., Hadley case, supraiKoufos case, supra, p 385; 
see also Beale, p 185; McGregor, para. 198; see further 
Samek38 Aus. L.J. 1964, P 125. 
7) Graveson and Cohn, p 101. 
104- 1) Arts.74 of the Convention and 82 of ULIS (supra,para. 92). 
2) Supra, para. 101. 
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foreseen or ought to have foreseen a particular type of loss, 
he would be liable for it even if that loss is unusual or a 
reasonable man in the buyer's position would not have accep-
ted the risk of itf4) 
In English law, as was indicated, it has been suggested 
to replace the tlforeseeabilitylf by the "contemplation" crite-
rion~5) But in practice it is doubtful to assume that English 
Law, by adopting the latter, differs from either ULIS or the 
Convention if, in particular, the question is regarded as a 
question of fact~6) Even the words "loss" and Ira possible 
consequence" used in ULIS and the Convention as well have also 
been used in the English case law~7) 
Bearing that in mind, the case law may thus give much 
guidance when applying the texts of both ULIS and the Conven-
tion. Accordingly, it may well be that it is not necessary 
for establishing the buyer's liability that he should actually 
have asked himself what loss is a possible consequence of the 
breach, because the parties at the time of contracting 
---------------------------
104- 3) A/CN.9/116, annex 2, comment on art.55, para. 7; A/CONF. 
97/5; comment on art. 70, para. 8. 
4) Cf., Benjamin, para. 1309. 
-5) Supra, para. 92. 
6) 'fuich is the principle as declared by some English cases 
(supra,para. 100). See also Parsons (H.) Livestock Ltd., 
v. Uttley Ingham and Co. Ltd. [97~ Q.B. 791, 802 where 
it has been declared that it is difficult to draw a dis-
tinction between what a man "contemplates" and what he 
"foresees". 
186 
contemplate not the breach but the performance. It suffices 
that, if he had considered the question, he would have con-
cluded that the loss was a possible consequence of the 
breach~8) 
Likewise, the seller need show only a foreseeability of 
circumstances which embrace the head or type of loss in 
question, and need not demonstrate a foreseeability of the 
quantum of loss under that head or type~9) 
Moreover, the seller need not show that the buyer ought 
to have foreseen the precise detail of the loss or the pre-
cise manner of its happening. It is enough if the latter 
should have foreseen that loss of that kind was a possible 
consequence of his breach\10) And if the buyer 
ought to have foreseen a particular type of loss, the test is 
satisfied even if he has not foreseen the extent of that 
loss~11) 
-----------------------------
104- 7) See e.g., Parsons Livestock Case, supra, 804. But in the 
leading case of Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 23 L.J.Ex.179 
reference was made to the "probable result". 
8) See Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd. v. Newman Industries 
h1f!. [194~ 2 K.B. 528, 539. 
9) See Wroth v. Tyler 0974J Ch.30, 61 (contemplation). 
10) See Christopher Hill, Ltd. v. Ashington Piggeries, Ltd. 
[1969J 3 All E.R. 1496, 1524. 
11) See Parsons case, supra. 
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4. r.li tigation of damages 
105. Texts 
Art- 88 of ULIS provides that: 
riA party who relies on a breach of the contract shall 
adopt all reasonable measures to mitigate the loss resulting 
from the breach. If he fails to adopt such measures, the 
party in breach may claim a reduction in the damages." 
While Art. 77 of the Convention(1) provides that:-
"A party who relies on a breach of contract must take 
such measures as are reasonable in the circumstances to miti-
gate the loss, including the loss of profit, resulting from 
the breach. If he fails to take such measures, the party in 
breach may claim a reduction in the damages in the amount by 
which the loss would have been mitigated .\\ 
106. No difference between ULIS and Convention 
The principle of mitigation of damages in international 
sale of goods is another restriction on the seller's full 
---------------------------
105- 1) For a legislative background of the text, see the following 
documents successively: A/CN.9/87, paras. 189 ff, and annex 
1, art.88; A/CN.9/100, annex 1, art.59(88); A/CN.9/116, 
annex 1, (art.59); A/32/17, annex 1, paras. 502 ff, and 
para. 35 of the original document (art.59); A/33/17, para. 
28 (art.73); A/CONF.97/19, pp 133, 396-398,163 (art.70) 
and 221, para. 36. 
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recovery of his loss resulting from the buyer's breachf 1) 
Although the wording of ULIS is different from that of the 
Convention, it is assumed that the substance of the doctrine 
in both is quite the same; and one may well say that there is 
no difference between them. 
It may be argued, for example, that the amount of reduc-
tion resulting from the seller's non-compliance with his duty 
to mitigate, which is stated under the Convention but not 
under ULIS, shows a difference between these two laws. But 
it is submitted that such an amount would be equal to that by 
which the adoption of all reasonable measures would have reduced 
the 1055(2) which is the same in the Convention. , 
Similarly, the non-reference by ULIS to the loss of pro-
fit, which is not the case in the Convention, does not mean 
that he is under no duty to mitigate it. In fact, the expres-
sion "loss" in both laws includes the loss of profit; and an 
express reference to it was necessary only because the loss 
standing alone did not include, in some legal systems, the 
loss of profit\3) 
107. Criticism 
However, the principle of mitigation means, so far as 
the unpaid seller is concerned, that he II shaI1"(1) or IImust~) 
-------------------------------
106- 1) In addition to ULIS and the Convention, the doctrine has 
also been adopted by CITC (5.257). 
2) See Graveson & Cohn, p 103. 
3) Supra, para. 99. 
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take reasonable steps to minimize his loss. Obviously, this 
leads to the conclusion that he is under a duty to mitigate 
though it has rightly been noticed that the doctrine of miti-
gation does not impose any actual obligation upon him. 
Certainly, he will not incur any liability if he fails to 
fulfil such a ndutyU, but his damages will be reduced up to 
the amount of losses he reasonably could have avoided~3) In 
Short, he is fully entitled to be as extravagant as he 
pleases but not at the expense of the buyerS 4) It is 
important to keep this fact in mind though the term IIduty to 
mitigate lf or the like may be used in the subsequent dis-
cussion. 
On the other hand, the language used in ULIS and the 
Convention as well for establishing the mitigation rule 
appears to be inaccurate; in both the seller is to minimize 
his loss whenever he urelies on a breach l1 of contract by the 
buyer. For example, his claim for interest certainly relies 
on the buyer's breach; even so, it is doubtful to assume in 
such a case that he is under a duty to mitigate his 10ss,1f 
any. As was indicated, even the loss itself is immaterial 
in claiming interest~5) However, the relevant provision of 
-------------------------------
107- 1) In the language of ULIS as well as CITC. 
2) In the language of the Convention. 
3) See Darbishire v. Warran [96~ 1 W.L.R.1067, 1075; see 
also Beale, p 187; Schmit~hoff, Sale of Goods, p 186; 
Treitel, Remedies, s. 100. 
4) Darbishire case, supra. 
5) Supra, para. 96. 
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either seems to be confined to the seller's claim for damages 
other than interest~6) 
108. Its parentage 
The doctrine of mitigation as provided for in ULIS and 
the Convention is completely in line with English Law(1) while 
the approach of French Law is different~2) Under this law, 
the doctrine seems to be treated as a part of the causation 
principle which simply means that there must be a causal link 
between the aggrieved party's loss and the other's fault~3) 
Thus, whenever part of the loss is due to the former's fault, 
the latter may not be liable for that lossf4) and this may 
be parallel to t"-f C,~w\'Dft l-c1W' C () v'lt. ~ pt.. .. the II contri butory 
negligence."( 5) 
-------------------------------
107- 6) It may be interesting to note that the Convention provides 
for "interest" and "damages" in separate sections and the 
doctrine of mitigation has been inserted under the latter, 
while all these questions in ULIS have been grouped under 
one section, i.e., "Supplementary Rules Concerning Damages". 
108- 1) See e.g., British Westinghouse Electric and r-1anufacturing 
Co. Ltd. v. Underground Electric Railways Co. of London 
[91~ A.C. 673, 689; Darbishire v. Warran [96~ 1 Vl.L.R. 
1067; Dunkirk Colliery Co. v. Lever (1878) 9 Ch.D.20, 25; 
Pilkington v. Wood [96~ Ch. 770; Roper. v. Johnson(1873) 
L.R.8 c.P.167. 
2) See in general Treitel, Remedies, in particular 5s.100,104. 
3) :Harty et Raynaud, para. 477; Mazeaud, t.2, vOl.1, para. 560. 
4) See Mazeaud, ibid, para. 594. 
5) Treitel, ibid, 5.100; and on this principle, see generally 
Kercher and Noone, pp 100 ff. 
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Indeed, this is not the principle of mitigation in either 
ULIS or the Convention where the aggrieved party is, 
ted above, under a duty to minimize his loss~6) and , 
rule as such appears to be missed in French Law~7) 
as indica-
an obvious 
In Short, the doctrine in both ULIS and the Convention is 
derived from Common Law in general though some of its aspects 
are known in French Law~8) 
109. Reasonable measures 
To comply with his duty to mitigate, the seller must take 
all measures reasonable in the circumstancesf 1) and at the 
same time he is not bound to adopt more than what is reasonable. 
Of course, what is reasonable in the circumstances is a 
question of factf 2) in spite of that, the English case law 
from which the doctrine of mitigation seems to be derived may, 
again, give some guidance in ascertaining whether or not the 
seller has acted in a reasonable manner. 
Accordingly, it is considered that he is not bound to take 
any step which a reasonable man would not ordinarily take in the 
--.----------------------------
108- 6) Supra, para. 106. 
7) Treitel, ibid, s.104. 
8) For example, the actual saving which is one aspect of the 
mitigation principle (post, para. 111) would be relevant in 
determining the "loss sufferedlt within Article 1149 of the 
Civil Code, see Treitel, ibid, s.104. 
109- 1) Or, in the language of CITC, ft ••• measures necessary to 
prevent or at least to mitigate" the loss (s.257). 
2) Payzu Ltd. v. Saunders [912] 2 K.B. 581. 
192 
course of his bUSinessf 3) nor is he bound to hunt the globe 
to minimize the loss suffered by him~4) Nor does the duty 
to mitigate go so far as to oblige him to embark on a complica-
ted and difficult mitigation with a third party!5) Nor need 
he take any step which may ruin his commercial reputa.t\oV\~ (6) 
Nor is he under an obligation to destroy his own property to 
reduce the damages payable by the defaulting buyer(7) 
Furthermore, the seller may not have the financial means 
to mitigate his loss; in such a case, he is not obliged, for 
the purpose of reducing damages, to do that which he cazmot 
afford to do~8) 
110. Anticipatory repudiation 
On the other hand, the buyer may repudiate the contract 
before the date of performing it; in that case,the seller has 
----------------------------
109- 3) British Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Co. v. 
Underground Electric Railways Co. of London [91~ A.C. 
673,689; see also Dunkirk Colliery Co. v. Lever (1878) 9 
Ch. D.20, 25; James Finlay and Co. Ltd. v. N.V. Kwik Hoo 
Tong Handel Maatschappij [1922) 1 K.B.400, 410. 
4) E.g., by reselling the goods if this is not possible in the 
normal market, see Lesters Leather and Skin Co. Ltd. v. 
Home and Overseas Brokers Ltd. (1948)64 L.T.R. 569(seller 
was in default). 
5) Pilkington v. Wood [195~ Ch. 770, 777. 
6) James Finlay case, supra. 
7) Elliot steam Tug Co. Ltd. v. The Shipping Controller G92~ 
1 K.B.127,140-141. 
8) Dodd Properties (Kent) Ltd. v. Canterbury City Council a 
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the option either to accept or to refuse the repudiation~1) 
In case of accepting it, the seller, who seeks damages, is 
under a duty to mitigatef 2 ) and the converse is also true, 
that is to say, that he is not bound to minimize his damages 
if he refUses the repudiation\3) The key question is, how-
ever, whether the doctrine of mitigation binds the seller to 
accept, in certain Circumstances, the buyer's anticipatory 
repudiation. 
A negative answer has been given in at least two English 
cases(4) one of them is concerned with the sale of gOOds~5) 
If strictly followed, the result of this approach is that the 
seller is entitled to continue the performance of his part of 
the contract and, consequently, he would be allowed to claim 
the contract price. But doubts have been expressed about the 
extent of applying this result to the sale of goods~6) 
-----------------------------~ 
109- =) P98g 1 All E.R.928, 935; see fruther Chalmer, p 248; 
Schmltthoff, Sale of Goods, p 187. 
110- 1) Supra, para. 65. 
2) Roth & Co. v. Taxsen, Townsend & Co. (1895) Com. Cas.240; 
Sudan Export & Import Co. (Khartoum), Ltd. v. Societe General 
de Compensation [95~ 1 Lloyds Rep. 310, 316. 
3) Anglo-African Shipping Co. of New-York, Ins. v. J. Mortner, 
Ltd. ff96~ 1 Lloyd's Rep.81, 94-95; White & Carter (Councils) 
......... 
Ltd. y. McGregor a96~ A.C. 413. But when the time of per-
formance falls due, the seller thereupon has a duty to 
mitigate his loss (Benjamin, para. 1338). 
4) Ibid. 
5) Anglo-African case, sup~a. 
6) See Benjamin, para. 1315. 
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Other domestic laws(7) directly touch the problem in 
respect of a specific case which is familiar in practice. The 
seller may, during manufacturing the goods, receive the 
buyer's repudiation; in such a case, the former must exercise 
reasonable commerical judgment for the purposes of effective 
realization and avoidance of losS. To these ends, he may com-
plete the manufacture and wholly identify the goods to the 
contract, or cease manufacture and resell them for scrap or 
salvage value. Furthermore, he may proceed in any other 
reasonable manner. Thus, the question always depends upon the 
seller's own judgment which must be reasonable in the circum-
stances. 
As to the Convention, there was a proposal to add at the 
end of Art-77 "or a corresponding modification or adjustment 
of any other remedy.II(B) But this proposal was rejected (9) 
on the ground that it would restrict the aggrieved party's 
right of requiring performancet10) and that approach might 
be, as said, in line with the practice in Common Law but it 
was not in line with the principles underlying the (draft) 
convention, according to which the buyer and seller had an 
absolute right to require specific performance so long as they 
-~-------------------------
110- 7) See e.g., s.2-704(2) of UCC; see also 5.9.6(2) of DUSA. 
8) See A/CONF.97/19, p 133 (art.73, US); see also Honnold, 
Uniform Law, para. 419. 
9) A/CONF.97/19, p 398, para. 78. 
10) See in detail the debates on art.73 of the draft conven-
tion, ibid, pp 396 ff. 
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had not had recourse to inconsistent remedies~11) 
In short, the obvious tendency of the draftsmen was that 
the aggrieved party is not bound under the Convention to 
accept the other's repudiation~10) Bearing in mind that the 
line of the Convention concerning sp ecific performance, mi ti-
gation, avoidance(12) and the injured party's right of option 
is broadly similar to that of ULIS, it may therefore be sound 
to assume that a similar rule is applied in the latter. 
111. Effects of the doctrine 
The Convention as well as ULIS provide for the effects 
of the mitigation rule only on the assumption that the seller 
has failed to comply with his duty to mitigate. In that case, 
the buyer is entitled to claim a reduction in the damages. The 
amount of reduction is, in the language of the Convention, 
equal to that "by which the loss should have been mitiga-
ted'~(1) and a, similar rule may, as seen above, be applied in 
-----------------------------
110- 11) Ibid, p 397, paras. 64 f (Ziegel of Canada). But it is 
important to note that the seller's right to reqUire pay-
ment of the price is subject to an essential requirement 
which will be considered late,.. (Eost,para. 139). 
12) Without ignoring' the doctrine of ipso facto avoidance in 
ULIS (suEra, Ch.I, s., IV). 
111- 1) A similar rule is adopted by CITC (s.257). There was, how-
ever, a proposal before the Conference to replace these 
words by "which could have been mitigated ll , but this 
proposal had not been supported, see A/CONF.97/19, P 396, 
paras. 59 f. 
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ULIS as well~2) Once again, this principle is in agreement 
with English Law!3) 
Of course, a seller who has actually minimized any part 
of his loss cannot claim recovery of that part. There is no 
provision to that effect in either ULIS or the Convention, 
but this is a corollary of the doctrine. Although the duty 
to mitigate damages is not clearly recognized by French Law, 
actual saving of expenses would be relevant in determining the 
loss suffered by the sellerS 4) In English Law, moreover, 
this is so even where the steps taken by the injured party are 
more than reasonable~5) The reason for that is plain, that 
is, the purpose of damages, as was indicated, it to compen-
sate the seller for his loss by placing him in as good a 
position as if the contract had duly been performed, but not 
in a better position\6) This logical reasoning may justify 
the application of a similar rule under both ULIS and the 
Convention. 
On the other han~ it may well be that the seller is 
allowed to recover any reasonable expenses incurred by him 
as a result of performing his duty to mitigate. This is, how-
ever, the situation under English Law(7) in which it is also 
------------------------------
111- 2) Supra, para. 106. 
3) British Westinghouse Electric and ManU£acturing Co. Ltd. v. 
Underground Electric Railways Co. of London ff91~ A.C. 
673, 689. 
4) Treitel, Remedies, s.104. 
5) Benjamin, para. 1313. 
6) Supra, para. 91. 
197 
suggested that such expenses are recoverable even if the 
seller's attempt has led to greater loss~8) The reason for 
that is, as said, to protect the plaintiff (say the seller) 
who attempts to mitigate his 10ss~9) 1ihether this approach 
is to be followed in ULIS or the Convention is doubtful, how-
ever. This is due to the .fact that the purpose of the doctrine 
is to reduce the loss and not to augment it; and, further, 
whenever the seller's attempts to minimize lead to converse 
result, namely to greater loss, it may then be sound to con-
clude that he has not acted in a reasonable manner. 
Finally, it should be remembered that the only sanction 
for the seller's failure to mitigate is the reduction in 
damages; and this does not, of course, affect his right to 
require payment of the price~10) 
------------------------------~----
111- 7) Lloyd's and Scottish Finance Ltd. v. Hodern Cars and 
Caravans (Kingstons) Ltd. G"96Gl1 Q.B. 764. 
8) Ibid, P 782; see also ~1cGregor , para. 243. 
9) Benjamin, para. 1314. 
10) A/CONF.97/5, comment on art.73, para. 3. 
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Section II 
Damages in Case of Avoidance 
112. Introduction 
After laying down the general principle of assessing 
damages, the Convention provides for the rules of measuring 
those damages where the contract has been avoided. In this 
case, a distinction is to be made between two events, i.e., 
whether the seller has actually resold the goods in conformity 
with the Convention or not. A similar approach has been fol-
lowed by ULIS though it does not contain, as seen above~1) 
general rule on damages. 
a 
It is important to note, first of all, that the amount 
of damages in case of avoidance is always calculated by 
reference to particular rules, i.e., to the resale or current 
price formula as the case may be. This is at least the 
situation in ULIS while the language of the Convention leads, 
as will be seen below, to a different understanding. If, how-
ever, the seller's loss exceeds that amount, then he may be 
entitled to recover any further damages according to the 
general rule in the Convention or Art·S4 of ULIS. 
Bearing that in mind, the present discussion will be 
concerned with two matters as follows:-
1. The resale formula. 
2. The current price formula. 
-----------------------------------
112- 1) Supra, para. 93. 
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1. The resale formula 
113. Texts 
Art. 85 of ULIS provides that: 
"If ••• the seller has resold goods in a reasonable 
manner, he may recover the difference between the contract 
price and the price ••• obtained by the resale." 
While Art. 75 of the Convention(1) provides that: 
"If the contract is avoided and if, in a reasonable 
manner and within a reasonable time after avoidance, ••• the 
seller has resold the goods, the party claiming damages may 
recover the difference between the contract price and the 
price in the substitute transaction as well as any further 
damages recoverable under article 74.,,(2) 
114. Parentage and requirements 
These provisions have no equivalent in either the SGA 
or French Civil cOdef1) and it is quite clear that they have 
--------------------------------
113- 1) For a legislative background of the text, see the following 
documents successively: A/eN. 9/87, paras. 177 ff, and annex 
1 (art.85); A/CN.9/100,annex 1, art.58(85); A/CN.9/116, 
annex 1, (art.56); A/32/17, annex 1, paras. 480 ff, and 
para. 35 of the original document (art.57); A/33/17, para. 
28 (art.71); A/CONF.97/19, pp 132 (art.71), 394 (paras. 24f), 
163 (art.71) and 221 (para. 37). 
2) Cf., CITC (s.377.3) which provides that n ••• the price in 
-
such resale shall be relevant for the assessment of damages". 
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certain parentage in American Law where s.2-706(1) of UCC 
reads as follows: 
"Under the conditions stated in Section 2-703 on seller's 
remedies, the seller may resell the goods concerned or the 
undelivered balance thereof. Where the resale is made in 
good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner, the seller 
may recover the difference between the resale price and the 
contract price together with any incidental damages allowed 
under the provisions of this Article (Section 2-710), but less 
expenses saved in consequence of the buyer's breach~,(2) 
Even so, it Should be pointed out that under English Law 
the seller's actual resale may, in certain Circumstances, 
affect his claim for damages~3) 
However, the application of the resale formula in ULIS 
and the Convention is subject to certain requirements. Firstly, 
there must be an actual resale of the goods already sold. So, 
if the seller is constantly in the market for goods of the 
type in question, it may be difficult or even impossible to 
determine which of the many contracts of sale was the sub-
stitute. In such a case the use of the resale formula may be 
--------------------------------
114- 1) But in French Law/the damages in case of avoidance are 
normally assessed by the difference between the contract 
price and the price which could be obtained on the assump-
tion that the goods have been resold to a third party, see 
Mazeaud, t.3, vol.2, para. 1016. 
2) A similar provision is adopted by DUSA, s.9.10(1). 
3) Post, para. 117. 
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impossible(4) and, accordingly, the current price formula 
would be applied. But it is submitted that a seller may, 
even in these circumstances, avoid the application of the 
latter formula by reselling the goods after identifying them 
to the broken contract~5) It is also assumed that the resale 
formula does not apply if the seller has resold only part of 
the goods and not all of them. 
Secondly, the resale must be in a reasonable mannerf6) 
what is reasonable is always a question of fact dependent 
upon the circumstances and may thus vary from case to case. 
Moreover, the Convention requires that the resale must take 
place within a reasonable time after the avoidance~7) This 
express requirement is missed in ULIS, but it is assumed that 
the words used in the second requirement are wide enough to 
cover it. 
No other restriction is imposed upon the seller; thus, 
-----------------------------------
114- 4) A/CONF.97/5, comment on article 72, note 3. 
5) Under uce, the resale must be IIreasonably identified as 
referring to the broken contract": s.2-706(2); so the seller 
cannot wait until he has made several sales of the same 
type of goods and select one of those sales as complying 
with section 2-706(2) (see Nordstrom, s.173). A similar 
approach is followed by DUSA: s.9-10(4). 
6) Or, in the language of CITC, the seller must have lI exercised 
due care" in reselling the goods (5.377-3). 
7) Under UCC, every aspects of the resale including the time 
must be commercially reasonable: s.207-6(2), which is the 
same under DUSA: s.2-10(3). 
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the resale may be made privately or by auction~8) and the 
resale price may be equal or, in certain circumstances, even 
less than the current price~9) Also, the seller is under no 
duty to notify the buyer of his intention to resell the 
gOOds~10) Once again, the seller's conduct is restricted by 
the reasonableness. 
115. Nature of the resale 
There is no provision under the Convention from which 
it may be inferred that the seller is bound to resell the 
goods, which means that he has the choice either to resell or 
to keep the goods for his own use~1) Even in case of resell-
ing them he is not under a duty to act reasonably or to resell 
within a reasonable time after the avoidance. The sanction 
for non-complying with either of these two requirements, which 
have just been discussed, is simply that the seller cannot rely 
on the resale formula for assessing his damages~2) In brief, 
the resale is the seller's right and not an obligation imposed 
upon him. 
------------------------------
114- 8) \rhich is the same under UCC: s.207-6(2), and DUSA:s.9-10(2). 
9) Post, para. 117. 
10) Which is not the case under UCC when the resale is at 
private sale: s.2-706(3). 
115- 1) A similar approach is followed under UCC, see Williston on 
Sales, 4th ed., vol.3, s.24.7; White and Summers, Uniform 
Commercial Code,2nd ed., s.7.6 (but cf., note 35, ibid). 
See also s.9.10(2) of DUSA lithe seller may resell"; s.377.3 
of CITe fllf the seller proceeded to a substitute resale ••• ". 
-
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In Common Law, by contrast, it has been considered that 
the resale by the seller is obviously one mode of mitigating 
his loss~3) In this conneXion, it has been held in New-
Ze~and that the seller is under a duty to seek an alternative 
market for the purpose of mitigating his loss~4) Whether 
this approach is strictly followed in English Law is doubtful, 
however, and no authority could be found in the case law 
supporting this view. 
The ULI~approach is the same of that of the Convention 
except in one case which is stated in Ar~61 of the former. 
This Article has already been considered(5) and it suffices 
to remember that according to which the seller is bound to 
resell the goods; accordingly, the contract becomes ipso facto 
avoided. So the resale in such a case is mandatory and the 
seller has no choice in making it. 
On the other hand, it should be observed that the resale 
under ULIS and the Convention is not a real remedy comparable 
to that provided for in the SGA(6) in fact, the two types of 
resale are completely different from all aspects. In addition, 
while the resale under the latter may be considered as an 
-------------------------------
115- 2) A similar conclusion seems to be applied under UCC (see 
Nordstrom, in particular, s.175). There is also an express 
provision in DUSA to this effect: 5.9-10(6). 
3) Fridman, p 401. 
4) Pacific Overseas COrporation Ltd. v. Watkins Browne and Co. 
(N.Z) Ltd. ff95~ N.Z.L.R. 459. 
5) Supra, para. 48. 
6) S.48; for further aspects of this section, see post,paras. 
183 ff. 
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expression of the seller's will to avoid the contract(7) 
1 
this is not the situation in either the Convention or, with-
out ignoring Art.61 above, ULIS. Both preswne that the 
seller has already declared the contract avoided(8) and the 
resale may not in itself lead to avoidance. 
116. Relation with other rules 
It is to be noted, first of all, that in reselling the 
goods the seller is entitled to retain the whole proceeds of 
the resale~1) This is simply so either because he disposes 
of the goods after avoiding the contract or, in one case of 
ULIS, because the resale itself leads to avoidancef 2) 
However, if the seller has resold the goods in conformity 
with the requirements discussed above, then the amount of his 
damages is basically equal to the difference between the con-
tract and resale price. But the language of ULIS and the 
Convention is somewhat vague; both refer to the aggrieved 
seller who "may" recover that difference, and the key question 
is whether the application of this formula is mandatory or 
permissive. 
In answering this question, it may be that the court has 
no decision in the matter at least when the seller himself 
----------------------------
115- 7) S.48.4 (resale according to a contractual power); see also 
R.V. Ward Ltd. v. Bignall \19671 1 Q.B. 534 (resale accord-
ing to s.48.3); see further Atiyah, pp 319 f. 
8) Supra, Ch., I, s. III. 
116- 1) A similar approach is followed under UCC: 5.2.706(6). 
2) SHpra, para. 48. 
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bases· his claim for damages on that forumula. In the Conven-
tion, too, the draftsmen's intention was clear that the seller 
who had in fact arranged a substitute transaction of the 
nature described above should not be allowed to claim damages 
under the current price formula where that formula would 
provide for a higher measure of damages~3) And, as sub-
mitted, a similar solution may be followed in ULIS!4) this , 
is due to the philosophy on which damages are based; that is 
to say, that the purpose of damages is to put the aggrieved 
seller into the same financial position had the buyer per-
formed the contract but not into a better Position~5) There-
fore, whenever this purpose is achieved by the resale formula, 
which is presumed to have met its requirements, and not by 
the current price formula, reference is to be made only to ~e 
former.( 6) 
If this inference is correct, the result is that the 
application of the resale formula under ULIS is mandatory 
whenever its requirements are satisfied and the sel~er has no 
alternative. But the approach of the Convention seems to be 
different; even assuming that the seller is not entitled to 
resort to the current price formula, he may nevertheless avoid 
the application of the resale formula by resorting 
------------------------------




Cf., Graveson and Cohn, p 102. 
-Supra, para. 91. 
Which seems to be the same in UCC, see White and Summers, 
s.7.7. Under DUSA too the prima facie rule (s.9-18,4) does 
not apply Whe~e the seller has resold the goods as provided= 
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to the general rule as laid down by Ar~7~(?) Of course, it 
is much better for the seller to resort first to this formula 
than to the general rule at least fo~ one reason, namely, the 
foreseeability test which is an essential requirement in the 
latter is irrelevant when applying the former~a) and in doing 
so, he would not be deprived of claiming damages for any 
further loss suffered by him!9) 
117. Relation with current price 
Thus, the resort to the current price formula under 
both ULIS and the Convention may not be possible if there is 
an aetual resale as described above. Certainly, this is the 
situation whenever the seller resells for a price higher than 
the current price. But if the proceeds of the resale are, on 
the contrary, less than the current price, it may then be 
possible to assume that the seller has not acted in a reason-
able manner, nor has he met his duty to mitigate the 10ss~1) 
----------------------------
116- =) in s.9.10 (s.9-18,5-b). 
1.) The draft text as approved by the W.G. was clear to the 
effect that the seller might rely on the resale formula if 
he did not rely on the general rule (or the current price 
formula); see A/CN.9/116, annex 2, article 56. But before 
the UNCITRAL it was generally agreed that that article was an 
illustration of the operation of the general rule, and as 
a result Art.75 in its current language came into existence: 
see A/32/17, annex 1, paras. 471, 481 and 482. ~, however, 
A/CONF.97/5, comment on article 70, para. 2. 
a) Supra, para. 93. 
9) Post, para. 118. 
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The result is that he is entitled to recover as damages the 
difference between the contract price and current (but not 
the resale) price. This is so unless, as submitted, there 
are circumstances justifying the resale for a price less than 
the current price; for example, if the market price fell 
while the seller was in negotiations with the orginal purchaser 
for amicable settlement of their disputef 2 ) 
In English Law, by contrast, the calculation of damages 
depends, prima facie, upon the test of the market price irres-
pective of whether or not the seller has resold the goods 
after the buyer's breach{3) In spite of that, such a resale 
may affect the amount of damages. In this case, a distinction 
has been drawn between two events. If the seller immediately 
resells at a price less than the market priCe, he can only 
recover the difference between the contract and market 
price~4) This obviously means that the prima facie rule 
applies here; and, as has just been indicated, a similar 
principle is generally applied in both ULIS and the Convention. 
But if he resells at a price higher than the market price, it 
----------------------------
117- 1) It has also been considered that the seller's loss in such 
a case must not be attributed to the buyer, see Fridman, 
p 395; see also Sutton, p 418. 
2) See Burns Philip and Co. v. Louis Phillips and Co. (1913)13 
S.R. (N.S.W.) 461. 
3) So, the actual resale should not be taken, as has been 
pointed out, in preferance of the market price, see McGregor, 
para. 670. 
4) See Atiyah, p 330; Benjamin, para. 1331; see also 
Fridman, p 395; Sutton, ibid. 
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is not clear whether the buyer can take advantage of this 
to reduce damages he would otherwise have to pay~5) 
Equally, as has been pointed out, the buyer may claim 
that damages should only be the difference between the 
contract and the resale. price\6) And although there is no 
authority directly touches this pOints, it may be that a 
court would hold that the seller is only entitled to the 
d.i fference between the contract and resale price ~ 7) The 
reason for that is two-fold. First, that difference repre-
sents the seller's actual loss; and damages are intended to 
compensate him for his loss~8) Secondly, in reselling at a 
price more than that prevailing in the market, the seller 
seems to have acted in compliance with his duty to mitigate 
the loss~9) If this conclusion is correct, English Law is 
again in line with ULIS and the Convention as well. 
118. Other damages in general 
Art. 86 of ULIS provides that: 
liThe damages referred to in Articles 84(1) and 85(2)' may 
--------------------------------
117- 5) See Atiyah, p 331. '.\ I 
6) Atiyah, p 330. 
7) 4tiyah, ibid; this is also the view of sutton, ibid. But 
£!., Baer, p 55; cf., also Benjamin, ibid. 
8) Supra, para. 91. 
9) But if the seller, instead of reselling the goods immedi-
ately after the breach, retained and subsequently resold 
them, the market price rule would be applied even if the 
resale price was higher than the market price; see Campbell 
Mostyn ,(Provisions)Ltd. v.Barnett Trading Co. [95i±} 
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be increased by the amount of any reasonable expenses incurred 
as a result of the breach up to the amount of any loss,includ-
ing loss of profi t,_which should have been foreseen by the 
party in breac~at the time of the conclusion of the contract 
in the light of the facts and matters which were known or 
ought to have been known to him, as a possible consequence of 
the breach of the contract." 
This provision as such has no counterpart in the Conven-
tion; instead, it has directly been inserted in other relevant 
provisions(3) including the general rule~4) 
Thus, the seller is entitled, in addition to the dif-
ference between the contract and resale price, to recover any 
further damages if the reqUirements concerning the loss and 
foreseeability are satisfied, such as the expenses of storing 
the goods or reselling them\5) It is clear, therefore, that 
there is a notable difference between the recovery of those 
damages and that which is made according to the resale formula. 
If, in the latter event, the resale price is lower than the 
contract price, the seller, subject to the above restric-
tions~6) 1s always entitled to recover the difference between 
the two prices. He need not prove more than the existence of 
-----------------------------
117- =) 1 Lloyd's Rep. 65. 
118- 1) Post, para. 121. 
2) Supra, para. 113. 
3) Arts.75 (supra, para. 113) and 76 (post,para. 121) of the 
Convention. 
4) Art.74 of the Convention, supra, para. 92. 
5) Supra, para. 98. 
210 
that difference, nor is the test of foreseeability relevant 
to this effect~7) Once again, this is not the situation in 
relation to the recovery of any damages exceeding that dif-
ference. 
Although ULIS and the Convention are generally in agree-
ment, the former requires another condition for the recovery, 
which is clearly missed under the latter; that is, the addi-
tional expenses incurred by the seller must be reasonable(8) 
and he could not, therefore, recover any unreasonable losses. 
But this requirement seems to be superfluous; if the seller 
has actually incurred such losses, this simply means that he 
has not complied with his duty to mitigate which requires the 
adoption of reasonable steps for achieving that purpose~9) 
It should also be noted that the words ttmay be increased fl 
in the above text, mean, as has justly been observed, that in 
the event that there are such expenses or losses as are 
reffered to in the text, the damages are increased. They do 
not mean that the court has a decision in the matter~10) 
119. Loss of profit 
The question of loss of profit is one of the most 
--------------------------------
118- 6) Supra, paras. 114, 117. 
7) Supra, para. 93. 
8) Under UCC the so-called incidental damages are also recover-
able by the seller on condition that they are reasonable, 
(55.2-706(1) and 2-710). £f., 5.9-18(6) and (7) of DUSA. 
9) Supra, para. 109. 
10) Graveson and Cohn, p 103. 
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important pOints concerning the seller's recovery. If strictly 
applied, the resale formula would not, in many events,entitle 
him to recover any damages. This is exactly the case in which 
the resale price exceeds or even equals to the contract price. 
In other cases, the seller may only be entitled to trifling 
damages; this always happens when the difference between the 
two prices is trivial. Even assuming that the resale price 
is much lower than the contract price, the seller may pretend 
that he has lost a sale because of the buyer's breach, and as 
a result he may claim his lost profits irrespective of the 
new bargain he has made. 
The "profit" is not defined by either ULIS or the Conven-
tion, but it is assumed that it means the net profit which the 
seller would have obtained had the contract been carried out. 
If put in a mathematical precision, which is not the method 
of measuring damages in practice~1) the loss of profit would 
be equal to the difference between the contract price and the 
total expenses(2) the seller would have incurred had he per-
formed his contractual obligations\3) Thus, the more expenses 
he incurs, the less profit he gains and the converse is true. 
It is to be note~further, that the seller cannot co~bine 
a claim for the whole difference between the contract and 
resale price with a claim for the whole net profit. Otherwise, 
he would be put into a better financial position than if the 
---------------------------
119- 1) Supra, para. 97. 
2) Including the overhead costs, see A/CONF.97/5, comment on 
article 70, para. 5. 
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original purchaser had performed the contract, which is incon-
sistent with the principles on which damages are based. Thus, 
if the requirements of both claims are satisifed, the seller 
has the right to resort to either of them but not to both, or, 
more precisely, he may first claim the amount resulting from 
the application of the resale formula, but if his lost profits 
exceed that amount then he has the right to recover the dif-
ference. 
Once again, neither ULIS nor the Convention provides some 
guidance as to when the seller is deemed to have lost profits. 
In practice, however, this may occur in various situations. 
For example, the buyer may repudiate the contract during, or 
prior to the commencement of, the process of manufacturing the 
goods; accordingly, the seller who accepts the repudiation may 
cease manufacture~4) Likewise, the seller, assuming that he 
is a dealer, may avoid the contract before acquiring the con-
tract gOOds~5) and because of that he may never acquire them. 
In these two hypotheses, it is not possible to apply either 
------------~-------~-~----
119- 3) The official comment on UCC, which also does not define the 
"profi til, indicates that "the normal measure there \\[ould 
be list price less cost to the dealer or list price less 
manufacturing cost to the manufacturer"; s.2-708, Comment 2. 
But is is considered that if the contract has established a 
different price from that listed on the goods or in some 
catalogue, the unpaid contract price should be used in the 
minuend to determine the seller's lost profit (Nordstrom, 
8.177) • 
4) American Law writers call that seller a"compenents sellerll; 
see e.g., Harris, 18 stan. L.R~~1965, pp 66,68 ff;Sebert, 
p 386; White and Summers, s.7.10. 
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the resale or current price formula, and the basic recovery 
may therefore be based on the loss of profitS 6) 
Finally, even conceding that the seller has actually 
resold the same goods, he may nevertheless be entitled to a 
claim for loss of profit instead of claiming damages on the 
ground of the resale formula. This may occur whenever he is 
deemed to have lost a sale in consequence of the buyer's 
breach, which needs further consideration below. 
120. Loss of a sale 
To simplify the question, assume that (A) has sold a 
maChine to (B) for 20 whereas the total costs of (A)'s perfor-
mance are 15; assume too that (A) has avoided the contract 
upon (B)fs repudiation and he then resold the machine for 20. 
In this setting, the application of the resale formula would 
give no damages to (A) and this result may be fair in theory; 
for (A) who has lost one profit (i.e., 5) under the first sale 
has already recovered it under the second. But (A) may allege 
that the second sale is an additional and not a substitute 
sale; and, accordingly, he would have gained two profits 
(equal to 10) had (B) performed. the original contract. If, 
however, this allegation is sound, then (A) is entitled to 
--------------------------.-
119- 5) This is called by American Law writers a "jobber seller"; 
(e.g., Harris, ibid, p 72; Sebert, ibid) on condition that 
his decision not to acquire the goods is commercially 
reasonable under s.2-208(1) (see White and Summers, ibid). 
6) A similar approach appears to be followed under UCC(vfuite 
and Summers, ibid.). 
; 
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damages equal to his loss of profit on the first sale. 
In Short, the seller's damages may be calculated on the 
ground of lost profits rather than the resale formula if the 
second purchaser is an additional one who would have bought 
from the seller anyway!1) 'ihether he is so, is ultimately 
a matter of proof{2) and it may be that the seller is deemed 
to have lost a bargain because of the buyer's breach if at 
least two requirements are satisfied. 
Firstly, the supply of the goods by the seller exceeds 
the demand~3) In that case, it is quite possible to presume 
that he has the ability to make profit from every buyer he 
could find~4) Thus, the buyer's breach would deprive him of 
one profit which otherwise he would have made had the contract 
been performed. Conversely, if the seller does not have suf-
ficient supply to meet the market demands, the second sale 
may well be considered as a substitute and not an additional 
------------------------------
120- 1) See generally Atiyah, p 335; Beale,p 199; Benjamin, paras. 
1320, 1335; see also Nordstrom, 5.177; Sutton, p 415; Vlliite 
and Summers, ibid, 5.7.9.; see further Hill and Sons v. 
Edwin Showell and Sons, Ltd. (1918)87 L.J.K.B.1106; Y1£: 
Mill Ltd. Re. [91~ 1 Ch. 465, 472-474. 
2) Sebert, p 391; see also Lazenby Garages Ltd.v. Wright [97ill 
1 Vl.L.R. 459. 
3) Thompson (\v.L) Ltd. v. Robinson (Gunmakers) Ltd. [i95~ 
Ch.177; Charter v. Sullivan cr95~ 2 Q.B.117; see also 
Atiyah, pp 328-329; White and Summers, ibid. 
4) Benjamin, para. 1320; but £f.,Sebert, p 388 where it is 
argued that the seller should also have the ability to 
meet the needs of particular buyers. 
120-
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one. This is so because the excess demand would certainly 
absorb the limited supply by the seller and it is therefore 
unsound to give him one profit more than he could originally 
acquire. 
Secondly, the goods sold are fungible and not uniqUe~5) 
that is, any unit of which is the equivalent of any other W1i t 
by nature or by usage~6) e.g., sugar, rice, cereals and 
standarized items such as (new)(7) cars, television sets and 
washing machines. And it has rightly been considered that the 
seller cannot make more than one profit from a unique 
chattel~8) 
2. Current price formula 
121. Texts 
Ar~84 of ULIS provides that: 
1f1_ In case of avoidance of the contract, where there 
is a current price for the goods, damages shall be equal to 
the difference between the price fixed by the contract and 
the current price on the date on which the contract is avoided. 
2- In calculating the amount of damages under paragraph 1 
of this article, the current price to be taken into account 
shall be that prevailing in the market in which the transaction 
---------------------------
5) See Atiyah, ibid. 
6) See s. 1-1 (1 ) , 14 of DUSA; s. 1-201 ( 1 7) of ucc. 
7) As has been held, the second hand car is a unique item, 
see Lazenbl case, supra, 362. 
8) Atiyah, ibid. 
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took place or, if there is no such current price or if its 
application is inappropriate, the price in a market which 
serves as a reasonable substitute, making due allowance for 
differences in the cost of transporting the goods 
While Art· 76 of the Convention provides that:-
"1_ If the contract is avoided and there is a current 
price for the goods, the party claiming damages may, if he has 
not made a resale under article 75, recover the difference 
between the price fixed by the contract and the current price 
at the time of avoidance as well as any further damages 
recoverable under article 74. If, however, the party claim-
ing damages has avoided the contract after taking over the 
goods, the current price at the time of such taking over shall 
be applied instead of the current price at the time of 
avoidance. 
2- For the purposes of the preceding paragraph, the current 
price is the price prevailing at the place where delivery of 
the goods should have been made or, if there is no current price 
at that place, the price at such other place as serves as a 
reasonable substitute, making due allowance for differences in 
the cost of transporting the goOds~'( 1 ) 
--------------~----------------
121- 1) For a legislative background of the text, see the follow-
ing documents 'sUccessively: A/CN.9/87, annex 3, passim; 
paras. 169 ff of the original document, and annex 1 (art. 
84); A/CN.9/100, para. 116, and annex 1, art.57(84); 
AjCN.9/11 6, (art.57); A/32/17, annex 1, paras. 484 ff; 
A/33/17, para. 28 (art.72); A/CONF.97/19, pp 132, 394-396 
(paras. 26-54),415{paras. 85-87), 163(art.72) and 222 f 
(paras. 38-50). 
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And s.50.3 of the SGA provides that: 
"Where there is an available market for the goods in 
question the measure of damages is prima facie to be ascer-
tained by the difference between the contract price and the 
market or current price at the time or times when the goods 
ought to have been accepted or (if no time was fixed for 
acceptance) at the time of' the refusal to accept." 
122. Meaning: ULIS and the Convention 
Art. 12 of ULIS provides that: 
IIFor the purposes of the present Law, the expression 
trcurrent price" means a price based upon an official market 
quotation, or, in the absence of' such a quotation, upon those 
factors which, according to the usage of the market, serve to 
determine the price .II( 1 ) 
This definition has been criticized on the ground th~t \t \$ 
complicated and misleading. Furthermore, the reference to 
the "official market quotation" raises the difficulty of deter-
mining the meaning of this expression\2) Accordingly, the 
--_ ... _-----------------------
122- 1) Cf., the definition of CITe (s.377.2):"the price prevailing 
-
at the market which ••• u the seller "would approach under 
normal circumstances in order ••• to resell the contracted 
goods". 
2) A/CN.9/52, para. 98; see also A/CN.9/WG.2/WP.6, paras. 75 
ff. But see Baer, note 127 and at p 102 where he says that 
the definition of a "current price" in ULIS avoides the 
artificial problems cormected with the concept of "available 
market lt in Common Law; see also Hague Conference", vol.1,p 38 
where it was argued that the expression "official market a 
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definition was deleted from the Convention(3) which in its 
current texts only contains the provision stated above. Even 
so, it may be sound to conclude that the existence of an 
official or even unofficial market quotation may, under the 
Convention, constitute a basis for determining the current 
price. Under ULIS, in contrast, such unofficial quotations 
may fall under IIthose factors which, according to the usage of 
the market, serve to determine the price." 
In spite of this presumed similarity between ULIS and 
the Convention, it is not possible in fact to ignore the dif-
ference between them. In determining whether there is a 
current price, reference should first be made, under the former, 
to the official market quotation; and if such a quotation exits, 
a court is bound to apply it even if it does not reflect the 
factual current price. Obviously, this is not the situation in 
the Convention where that question is intentionally left open, 
and one may therefore treat it as a question of fact. The 
result is that a court may in a given case avoid the applica-
tion of the official market quotation, if there is one, and 
resort to other factors if they express the real current price, 
e.g., an unofficial quotation~4) 
--------------------------------------
122- =) quotationU referred to an organized.market, a stock exchange 
while the expression "open market fl referred to a situation 
where one could buy and sell freely (Davies of UK). 
3) According to a recommendation adopted by the W.G., see 
A/CN.9/52, para. 97. 
4) But it has been noted that the current price is that for 
goods of the contract description in the contract amount, 
see A/CONF.97/5, comment on art.72, para. 6. In this = 
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123. Meaning in English Law 
In English Law many definitions have been given to the 
common law term II available marketn ( 1) which has then been 
adopted by the SGA~2) It has been held, for example, that 
the market means that the sellers might have sent the goods 
in waggons somewhere else where they could sell them,"just 
as they sell corn on the exchange, or cotton at liverpool 
that is to say, that there was a fair market where they could 
have found a purchaser either by themselves or through some 
agent at some particular Place.,,(3) Thus, the market in this 
meaning signifies some place where the goods can be sOld~4) 
But in another case(5) it has been noted, for example, that 
the retail prices may differ largely from wholesale prices, 
and in wholesale prices there are differences at different 
end of the chain; in times of scarcity these differences may 
be' very great indeed. Thus, Ita market for this purpose means 
------------------------------
122- =) connexion, an express reference by at least one Common Law 
case was made to the IIsame quality" of the goods sold, see 
Francis v. Lyon (1907)4 C.L.R.1023, 1036 (seller was in 
default); see also Lawson.43 Aus.L.J. 1969, P 52, 59. 
123- 1) See generally Atiyah, pp 327 ff; Benjamin, paras. 1319 ff; 
Chalmer, pp 228 f; Chitty, vol.2, para. 4327; Schmitthoff, 
Sale of Goods , P 180; and for an evaluation of the concept, 
see OLRC Report, vol.2, pp 521 ff. 
2) 88.50.3 (seller's damages) and 51.3 (buyers' damages). 
3) Colliery Co. v. Lever (1878)9 Ch.D.20, 25. 
4) Atiyah, p 328; Chalmer, p 228. 
5) Heskell v. Continental E?ffiress Ltd. [95Q) 1 All E.R.1033, 
1050. 
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more than a particular place. It means also a particular 
level of trade~(5) 
Another view is that the market means lithe buyers and 
sellers, and where it is possible for a person to go into the 
market and buy what he wants or sell what he wants.M(6) It 
has also been suggested that "there must be sufficient traders 
who are in touch with each other to evidence a market,w(7) 
Finally J the market may mean "the situation in the particular 
trade in the particular area was such that the particular 
goods could freely be sold, and that there was a demand suf-
ficient to absorb readily all the goods that were thrust on 
it, so that if a purchaser defaulted, the goods in question 
could readily be disposed of.n(S) 
Two further points have been observed. First, whether 
there is an available market is treated by the courts as a 
question of fact(9) which may be the same, as indicated above, 
in the Convention~10) Secondly, the courts are likely to 
eschew formal limitations on the meaning of available market 
especially because the rule including it is a prima facie 
measure of damages~11) 
--------------------------------
123- 6) The Arpad (1934J P.189, 191. 
7) A.B.D. (Metals and Waste) Ltd. v. Anglo Commercial and Ore 
Co. Ltd. [i95~ 2 Lloyd's Rep. 456, 466. 
8) Thompson (\;T.L.) Ltd. v. Robinson (Gunmakers) Ltd. [95~ 
Ch. 177, 187. 
9) Atiyah, p 329; Schmitthoff, ibid, p 180. 
10) Supra, para. 122. 
11) Benjamin, para. 1322; Chitty, vol.2, para. 4327. 
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124. Current price damages 
It is granted that the current price formula does not 
apply when there is no current price for the goods sold. In 
that case, the court is thrown back to the general rule as 
laid down by Arb 74 of the Convention(1) or by s.50.2 of the 
SGAf 2 ) in ULIS too damages shall be calculated on the same 
basis as that provided in Artt82f3) 
If, however, there is a current price, the seller's 
damages are calculated under ULIS and the Convention on two 
bases. 
In the first place, he is entitled to recover the dif-
ference between the contract and current price. It should be 
remembered that the test of foreseeability is irrelevant in 
this respect, which is the same in case of applying the resale 
formula~4) Thus, the seller may recover that difference even 
if the buyer has not foreseen it or any part of it. 
In the second place, the seller may also recover any 
further damages if his loss (including the loss of profit) 
exceeds the relevant difference, such as the costs of storing 
or retransmitting the goods. Similar principles relating to 
the resale formula, which have already been considered, apply 
mutatis mutandis~5) and it is therefore unecessary to repeat 
-~-----------------------------~ 
124- 1) See A/CONF.97/5, comment on art.72, para. 7. 
2) Benjamin, para. 1333; see also Fridman, pp 397 f. 
3) See Art.87 of ULIS. 
4) Supra, paras. 93, 118. 
5) Supra, paras. 118-120. 
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the discussion. 
Likewise, whether the application of the current price 
formula is mandatory or permissive, is subject to the same 
discussion already made with respect to the resale formula}6) 
and what has been said there is applied here. Only one point 
may be added; that is, the language of ULIS is quite plain to 
the effect that the application of the current price formula 
is mandatory when its requirements are satisfiedt7) indeed, 
neither the seller nor the court can avoid its application. 
As was indicated, it is suggested that a similar principle 
applies to the resale formula although the 
language used for that purpose may produce another solu-
t1on~6) 
In English Law, the seller's damages are also calculated 
on the basis of the difference between the contract and market 
price if there is an available market~8) But this is a prima 
facie rule and, therefore, the courts are not bound to apply 
it; instead, reference is to be made to the general rule as 
provided for by s.50.2 of the SGA. In practice, this is the 
case where, for example, the strict application of the market 
test leads to injust resul ts or to inaccurate assessment 
of damages~9) In particular, the prima facie rule is excluded 
whenever its application does not compensate the seller for 
his loss of profit~10) 
---------------~---------------
124- 6) Supra, para. 116. 
7) See Art.84, supra, para. 113 n ••• damages shall be equal 
••• n; see also A/CN.9/100, annex 3, para. 191. 
8) S.50.3 of the SGA, para. 121, supra. 
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It must also be remembered that the current price formula 
is not applied if the requirements of applying the resale 
formula are satisfied~11) In practice, however, the seller 
may easily avoid the application of the latter formula by non-
reselling the goods, for example, or by defering the resale 
until the expiration of S~L~ unreasonable time after the 
avoidance, or, finally, by reselling them in an unreasonable 
manner. If that occurs, the resale formula is automatically 
excluded where it would then be replaced by the current price 
formula. 
125. Relevant place 
This question obviously demonstrates significant diver-
gencies between ULIS and the Convention; under the former, the 
current price is connected with the place in which the trans-
action has taken place, i.e., the place of concluding the 
contract. As has been noted, this test is indeed difficult 
to apPly(1) where it raises the traditional complicated 
question: when the contract is deemed to have been made? In 
addition, it may well be observed that such a place may, in 
-----------------------------
124- 9) Thompson (W.L.) Ltd. v. Robinson (Gunmakers) Ltd. [95~ 
Ch.177, 188. E.g., when the goods are sold at a fixed retail 
price; in such a case, there may be no difference between 
the contract ~d current price while the available market 
requires the existence of such a difference, see Charter v. 
Sullivan [i95i) 2 Q.B.117. 
10) See Atiyaq, pp 334 f; Benjamin, para. 1320; see also 
Fridman, p 398. 
11) Supra, para. 117. 
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many situations, be accidental and therefore cannot be consi-
dered as an important factor in determining the current price. 
So this approach has not been followed by the Convention 
which provides that the place of the current price is that in 
which delivery "should have been made."( 2 ) Of course, no 
problem arises whenever the contract determines, whether 
expressly or implidtly, the place of delivery; in such an event, 
consideration may only be given to that place~3) ~en so, this 
fact may lead to difficulties where, for instance, 
the contract provides that delivery is to be made in more 
than one place;the question which arises here is whether all these 
places should be considered for determining the current price, 
or the court is likely to concentrate only on one place accord-
ing to some relevant factors, e.g., the quantity of the goods 
to be delivered in that place. 
If strictly followed, the former approach necessarily 
leads to adopting several flcurrent prices" for assessing 
damages in relation to one bargain. In addition that this 
-------------~----------------
125- 1) See A/CN.9/100, annex 3, para. 191. 
2) See also s.2-708.1 of UCC (the place for tender). But £f., 
5.377.2 of CITC: the price prevailing on the market which 
the seller would approach under normal circumstances to 
sell the contracted goods; £f., also s.9.18(4)of DUSA 
"reasonable place". 
3) If, however, there is no agreement to this effect, the place 
where delivery should have been made is determined by Art.31 
of the Convention; in such a case, consideration is to be 
given to that provision, see A/CN.9/11 6, annex 2,comment on 
art.57, para. 5; A/CONF.97/5, comment on art.72, para. 5. 
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method would complicate the matter, its application may not 
be possible in a given case i~ for example, the subject-
matter of the goods constitutes, by its very nature, parts of 
an integrated whole such as a large machine. Likewise, the 
adoption of the other approach raises the question: what 
factors are to be considered when applying the current price 
prevailing in only one place? 
In fact, this problem may never arise under ULIS where 
the place in which f1the transaction has taken place l1 is always 
one place and may never be numerous. Under the Convention, 
however, it may be wise to suggest that the court may, in 
these circumstances, be thrown back to the general rule 
stated in Art.14. 
On the other hand, the place in which delivery should 
have been made (the Convention), or in which the transaction 
took place (ULIS~ might not have a current price for the 
goods sold. In such a case, the substitute in both is the 
place which serves as a tlreasonable substituten • Obviously, 
this expression empowers the court to play amain role in 
determining which place may be regarded as a reasonable sub-
stitute; and in doing so, trade usages may be given consider-
able regard. But since the seller would normally be required 
to transport the goods to that market to obtain that price~4) 
the court should make IIdue allowance for differences in the 
cost of transporting the goods,,(5) to that place. 
-------------------------------
125- 4) See Nordstrom, s.175. 
5) This provision seems to have been derived from 5.2-723(3) 
of UCC. 
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In this connexion, another difference appears between 
ULIS and the Convention. Under the former, the Itreasonable 
substitute" is also resorted to whenever the application of 
the current price in the original place is lIinappropriate". 
Whether it is so, is a question of reasonableness to be 
determined by the court. But in the Convention, the reference 
to the substitute place may not be made except in the case 
just discussed. 
126. Relevant place: English Law 
The question o~ which market is relevant in determining 
the market price under English Law is not yet definitely 
settled. According to one view, if there is an available 
market in more than one place, the relevant place is prima 
facie the place at which the goods were to be delivered under 
the contract~1) Adopting this view means that English Law 
is in line with the Convention but not ULIS. 
Nevertheless,it has been held that "where, to the know-
ledge of both buyer and seller, goods are bought ci~ or fob 
for shipment to a particular market, the relevant values 
to be taken into consideration are the values of the goods 
upon that market on arrival there~(2) This clearly means 
that the market price in fob and cif contracts is that which 
prevails in the place of destination of goods. 
-----------------------~-----~ 
126- 1) See Atiyah, p 332 who reached this inference from Hasell 
v. Bagot, Shakes and Lewis Ltd. (1911) 13 C.L.R. 
2) Aryeh v. Lawrence Kostoris and Son Ltd. [96711 Lloyd's 
Rep. 63, 71. 
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Moreover, it has been considered that the seller is not 
bound to hunt the globe t-or seeking a substitute purchaser 
if this is not possible in the normal market(3) which is 
presumed to be fair!4) , and it might be so where the sellers 
"could have fOWld a purchaser either by themselves or through 
some agents at some particular place.,,(5) 
Accordingly, it has been suggested that the test is one 
of reasonableness in the light of the time, expense and 
trouble involved~6) Indeed, this view may also be supported 
by some other cases which have already been considered in the 
current stUdy.( 7) 
127. Relevant time: ULIS 
Under ULIS, the current price is to be determined at 
the date at which the contract becomes avoided whether by 
operation of law (ipso facto) or by the aggrieved seller's 
declaration, as the case may be~1) The potential result of 
-----------------------------
126- 3) Lesters Leather and Skin Co. Ltd. v. Home and Overseas 
Brokers Ltd. (1948) 64 L.T.R.569 (seller was in default). 
4) Colliery Co. v. Lever (1878)9 Ch.D.20, 25. 
5) Ibid. 
6) Benjamin, para. 1324; Chitty, vol.2, para. 4327. 
7) See the cases cited in notes of para. 123, supra, in parti-
cular Thompson case (note 8), and The Arpad (note 6). 
127- 1) Art.84.1, supra, para. 43; £f., s.377 of CITC where the 
relevant time is when the injured party "could repudiate 
the contract for the first time". A similar approach was 
followed by the draft convention as approved by UNCITRAL 
(art.72) but it had then been changed by the Conference 
(see,further, para. 128 below). 
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this provision is that the seller, who has the right to avoid 
the contract, may not resort to avoidance unless and until 
the market price falls down~2) So, if the current price 
formula is to be applied, this would certainly increase his 
damages but at the buyer's expense. If, on the other hand, 
the market price rises, the seller may, instead of avoiding 
the contract, insist on performance by requiring the payment 
of the price. 
Of course, this result will not occur in at least one 
situation. As was indicated~3) the seller is entitled, as a 
general rule, to require payment by the defaulting buyer. But 
he is deprived o~ that right if it is in conformity with usage 
and reasonably possible for him to resell the goods. In that 
case, the contract shall be ipso facto avoided as from the 
time when such resale should be effected; an~in these circums-
tance~, it is not possible to envisage that the seller can 
speculate on the prices. 
LikeWise, the other situation of ipso facto avoidance in 
ULIS may, to a great degree, prevent the speculation. As was 
pointed out~3) the seller who has the option either to avoid 
the contract or to affirm it because of the buyer's fundamental 
breach shall inform the latter of his decision within a reason-
able time, otherwise the contract shall be ipso facto avoided. 
Since the reasonableness is a question of fact, the court may 
therefore prevent the speculation by conSidering, in the light 
----------------------------~~--
127- 2) See further para. 128 below. 
3) Supra, para. 48. 
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ot the surrounding circumstances, that the seller's decision 
has been taken too late. Notwithstanding that, the speculation 
is likely to occur in respect of those goods O~ Wh\c~ ~ Pt'lCl"S 
are sometimes subject to unusal fluctuations, e.g., petroleum 
or gold. In that case, where the prices may rise and fall 
sharply within a very short period of time, the seller may 
speculate on the market price by avoiding the contract, for 
example, at the same date of the buyer's breach but exactly 
after the fall of the price; and it may be so difficult to 
assume here that the seller's decision has not been taken 
within a reasonable time. 
128. Relevant time: the Convention 
Indeed, this question was one 
the draftsmen of the Convention had encountered. The main 
issue was clear: the new text should eliminate the possibility 
of speculation by the aggrieved party at the others' expense, 
which is likely to occur as a consequence of applying the ULIS' 
formula~1) Many suggestions were being laid before the Work-
ing Group~2) UNCITRAL at its 10th session(3) and the Con-
ferencef 4 ) and the result was the adoption of the present 
formula which is two-fOld~5) 
-------------------------------
128- 1) See the documents cited in the following notes. 
2) See e.g., A/CN.9/87, annex 3, (comment of Mexico and Norway 
on Art.84 of ULIS); A/CN.9/87, paras. 170 f; A/CN.9/100, 
para. 116. 
3) See A/32/17, annex 1,paras. 485. 
4) See A/CONF.97/19, pp 132, 222. 
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Firstly, the current price is to be determined at the 
time of avoiding the contract, which is exactly the same in 
ULIS. To this extent, therefore, the new text does not achieve 
the drafter's intention and one may say that the door is still 
open to speculation. Moreover, it may well be that the scope 
within which the speculation operates under the Convention is 
larger than that Wlder ULIS. This is due to the fact that the 
ipso facto avoidance in the latter, which limits the specula-
tion~6) was excluded from the former$7) 
SecondlJi "if the party claiming damages has avoided the 
contract after taking over the goods, the current price at the 
time of such taking over shall be applied~(8) This formula, 
which seems to be vague enough, may lead to many difficulties 
in practice. In particular two main questions arise here:does 
this provision appl'l to both parties or only to the aggrieved 
buyer? R nd what is the meaning of the expression "taking over" 
the goods? In effect, both questions are not easy to answer. 
As regards the first question, however, the apparent 
meaning of the text may lead to the conclusion that it only 
applies to the buyer who avoids the contract as a result of 
---------------------------------
128- 5) This formula is basically based on the proposal which was 
presented to the First Committee by various countries,see 
AI CONF. 97/19, P 132, ( art. 72 ) para. 3(ii), p 415, 
paras. 85 ff and P 222, paras. 38ff • See also note 10 
below • 
6) Supra, para. 117 • 
7) Supra, para. 54 • 
8) Art.76.1, supra, para. 121 • 
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the seller's breach; this view may be supported by the fact 
that IItaking over" the goods is a part of the buyer's duty 
to take delivery;(9) and this may be the draftmen's inten-
tion. If this understanding is correct, the result is that 
the time of avoiding the contract is the only relevant time 
for determining the current price whenever the avoiding party 
is the seller and not the buyerS 10) 
But since the provision expressly refers to the "party" 
c~m'ng damages in general and not to the buyer, it is there-
fore possible to say that it applies to both parties. 
On the other hand, the Convention does not contain a 
provision determining the meaning of "taking over" the goods. 
Therefore, this problem is to be solved according to the 
domestic law applicable to the contract~11) It is granted, 
however, that tldeliverytl by the seller is other than "taking 
over" by the buyer. Sometimes, they take place at the same 
time; this is so whenever the seller delivers the goods 
directly to the buyer who takes them. In other situations, 
time of delivery may differ from that of taking the goods; 
--------------------------------
128- 9) Art.60,b of the Convention. 
10) This inference may also be supported by comparing the 
current text with the proposal referred to above (note 5). 
That proposal provided that "If ••• the party claiming 
damages has avoided the contract after receiving the goods 
or the payment, as the case may be, the current price at 
the time of such receipt shall be applied ••• 11. 
11) On the assumption that the general principles on which the 
Convention is based do not fill this gap (Art.7.2). 
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this may occur, for example, when delivery is effected by 
handing the goods to a carrier for transmitting them to the 
buyer~12) In such an event, the buyer's duty of taking the 
goods may only be fulfilled by removing them from the 
carrierf 13) 
Finally, the provision of the Convention raises another 
problem if, for example, the seller has avoided the contract 
after the buyer has taken only part of the goods and not all 
of them. The key question is: which time is relevant for 
determining the current price? IS it the time of avoidance? 
Or the time of suCh taking over? Once again, it is suggested 
that the court in such a case may be thrown back to the general 
rule. 
129. Relevant time: English Law 
The approach of English Law concerning the time for 
determining the market pric~1is different from that followed 
by ULIS and the Convention. As was indicated, the SGA 
provides that the market price is to be determined "at the 
time or times the goods ought to13ave been accepted or (if no 
time was fixed for acceptance) at the time of refusal to 
accept.,,(2) It should be remembered that the buyer's duty to 
----------------------------
128- 12) See Art.31 of the Convention. 
13) And the seller may to be interested in the buyer's prompt 
removal of the goods from the carrier's possession, for 
he may be liable to the carrier for freight and demurrage 
if the buyer fails to pay; see Honnold, Uniform LavI, para. 
343. 
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accept the goods differs from his duty to take them although 
it has been considered that the latter is one of the most 
important aspects of the former5 3) 
Thus, the time for ascertaining the market price is the 
date fixed by the contract for accepting the goodsf 4) and if 
it fixes a period within which delivery and acceptance are to 
be made, then the relevant time is the time of tendering the 
goods because they ought to have been accepted at that timef5) 
If, on the other hand, no time has been fixed for accep-
ting the goods, the relevant time is the time of the refusal 
to accept them. In spite of that, it has been considered that 
the tendency of the courts is to ignore this rule when the 
seller's damages are based upon the buyer's anticipatory 
breach~6) In such an event, damages have to be measured with 
reference to the date on which the contract ought to have been 
performed(7) or, in other words, on which the goods ought to 
--------------~-------------------
129- 1) See in general Atiyah, pp 333 f; Benjamin, paras. 1327-1329, 
1337; see also Fridman, pp 396 f. 
2) s. 50.3, supra, para. 113; as to the difficulties flowing 
from this provision, see OLRC Report, vol.2, pp 525 f. 
3) Supra, para. 94. 
4) Fridman, p 396. 
5) Benjamin, para. 1327. 
6) Atiyah, p 333; see also Benjamin, para. 1328. 
7) Millet v. Van Reek and Co. 092] 2 K.B.369, 376. 
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have been accepted by the buyer. And if the action is heard 
before this date, the court must make the best estimate it 
can of the market price on that date~8) 
--------------------------
129- 8) Atiyah, ibid; Fridman, ibid. 
CHAPTER III: 
RECOVERY OF PRICE 
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130. Introduction 
The general rule under both ULIS and the Convention is 
that the unpaid seller maintains an action for the price. But 
the application of this rule, which is in conformity with 
French Law, is subject to another provision which seems to 
have taken into consideration the Common Law view. Further-
more, ULIS contains another exception which has no counter-
part in the Convention. The questions concerning the seller's 
recovery of the price will be dealt with under two sections: 
the first will be concerned with the availability of the 




Art.61.1 of ULIS provides that: 
"If the buyer fails to pay the price in accordance with 
the contract and with the present Law, the seller may require 
the buyer to perform his obligation," 
While Ar~ 62 of the Convention provides that: 
t1The seller may require the buyer to pay the price ••• 
unless the seller has resorted to a remedy which is inconsis-
tent with this requirement.u( 1 ) 
------------------------------~-
131- 1) For a legislative background of the text, see the following 
documents successively: A/CN.9/87, annex 4, paras. 22 ff; 
A/CN.9/87, paras. 36 ff, and annex 1, art.71; A/CN.9/100, : 
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132. Nature and requirements 
The recovery of the price is a personal remedy(1)entitl-
ing the seller to require the buyer to pay the contract price 
or any part of it which is not paid yet. And in dOing so, the 
seller enforces the buyer to perform what he has undertaken 
under the contract. This action is therefore in the nature of 
IIspecific performance lf (2) though neither ULIS nor the Conven-
tion uses this expression when giving the seller the right to 
require payment. The practical importance of this fact is 
that the exception to the 11 specific performance" rule, as so 
called in both laws, applies to the seller's action for the 
price~3) 
However, this action may not be available unless the time 
of payment has elapsed; this is so even if the buyer has 
already violated the contract in respect of payment. To illus-
trate assume that a contract calls upon the buyer to make pay-
ment during three months, say May, June and July by a con-
firmed letter of credit. Assume too that on the 10th of May 
-----------------------------
131- =) annex 1, art.43(71); A/CN.9/116, annex 1, art.43; A/32/17, 
annex 1, paras 366 ff, and para. 34 of the original document 
(art.44); A/33/17, para. 28 (art.58); A/CONF.97/19, PP 11 
(art.58), 124, 371 (para. 64C), 161 (art.58) and 212 (paras. 
45 f). 
132- 1) Atiyah, p 322; Benjamin, para. 1331; OLRC Report, vol.2, 
pp 414, 415. 
2) Baer, p 47; see also Nordstrom, s.178:"specific emorcement". 
But cf., Treitel, Remedies, s.8 where it is considered that 
-in Common Law countries, actions for an agreed sum are not 
referred to as suits for specific performance;a similar view 
was also expressed in Document V/Prep/I, in Hague Conference,m 
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the buyer has opened an unconfirmed credit. In this hypothesis, 
the seller is not bound to accept such a credit, nor can he 
claim payment until the lapse of July. This means, in other 
words, that the buyer is allowed to cure any defect in payment 
as long as he is still having the time to do so~4) Thus, it 
is submitted that the reference by ULIS and the Convention to 
the buyer's failure in making payment is to be understood to 
that extent. 
Relying on the same principle, it is to be observed that 
the buyer's anticipatory breach(5) does not accelerate the 
time of payment. So the seller who desires to obtain the con-
tract price must wait until the maturity of payment; otherwise, 
he may only have an action for damages which becomes available 
immediately after avoiding the contract~6) 
Moreover, the action for the price remains available to 
the seller until he is paid. But it is suggested that a valid 
tender by the buyer does not prevent the seller from claiming 
the price although it may have some effects on other remedies 
--------------~----~------------
132- =) vol. 2, p 37. 
3) Post, para. 137. Again, it has been considered that the 
words "judgment for specific performance" mentioned in the 
text, suggest that the provision does not apply (in Common 
Law) to a suit in which the seller claims the price, see 
Farnsworth, 27 A.J.C.L. 1979, P 247, 249 f. 
4) As was indicated, a similar principle is applied in case 
of avoidance when it is based on an additional time notice 
(supra, para. 41). 
5) Supra, Ch.1, s.lV. 1 • 
6) Supra, para. 66. 
239 
available to him~7) 
Finally, the seller cannot require the buyer to make 
payment if he has already resorted to a remedy which is 
inconsistent with this requirement, namely, the remedy of 
avoidance. This will be considered below. 
Assuming always that the buyer's failure in making pay-
ment is not la~ully excused~7a) these are the only require-
ments in ~espect of the seller's action for the price and any 
other factor, such as the acceptance of goods or the position 
of property, is immaterial., This general rule in both ULIS 
and the Convention is completely in line with French Law(8) 
while the approach o£ English Law, as will be seen latef,8a)iS 
qui te different. 
133. Payment after passage of risk 
The question concerning the passing of the risk is out-
side the scope of the current study, but it is necessary to 
consider it to the extent necessary in respect of the buyer's 
duty of payment. In this connexion, Art· 96 of ULIS provides 
that: 
--~---~---------------------
132- 7) E.g., he may not recover any interest or damages for expenses 
arising after the tender (Benjamin, para. 1282). 
7a) As to the doctrine of "exemptions", see post, Ch.IV. 
8) This is, in fact, an application of the general principle 
prevailing in French Law, that is, the creditor is entitled 
to claim specific performance (execution en direct ou en 
nature) whenever that is possible, see Art.1134 of C.C. 
Starck, paras. 2034, 2041. See, however, Szakats, 15 leLa, 
1966, p 749, 761. 
8a) post, para. 140 
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"Where the risk has passed to the buyer, he shall pay 
the price notwithstanding the loss or deterioration of the 
goods, unless this is due to the act of the seller or of some 
other person for whose conduct the seller is responsible. II 
And Ar~66 of the Convention provides that: 
I1Loss of or damage to the goods after the risk has passed 
to the buyer does not discharge him from his obligation to pay 
the price, unless the loss or damage is due to an act or 
omission of the seller_"( 1 ) 
It is clear from these provisions that the buyer is bound 
to pay the contract price even though the goods are lost or 
damaged before receiving them but after the risk has passed to 
him. A similar approach is followed by English Law as well~2) 
An obvious illustration of this is the case in which the risk 
passes to the buyer after delivering the goods to a carrier 
for transmission to the buyer, which is familiar in the 
------------------------------
133- 1) For a legislative background of the text, see the follow-
ing documents successively: A/CN.9/87, paras. 207-212; and 
annex 1 (art.96); A/CN.9/100, annex 1, art.66(96); A/CN. 
9/116, annex 1, art.64; A/32/17, annex 1, paras. 523-533, 
and para. 35 (art.64) of the original document; A/33/17, 
para. 28 (art.78); A/CONF.97/19, pp 126 (art. 78), 162 
(art.78) and 212 (para. 55). 
2) A/CN.9/87, annex 2, comment of Guest (UK) on Arts. 61-64 
of ULIS, appendix A; see also Atiyah, p 202. It has also 
been noted that most if not all legal systems are rather 
unanimous in leading to the same result and thus that 
article might be quite unnecessary, see A/eN.9/87, annex 3, 
(comment of Hungary, para. 6); see also 5.380.3 of CITe; 
UCC: s.2-709(1)a; DUSA: s.9.11(1)-a. 
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international sale~3) In such a case, the buyer is obliged 
to pay the price despite the fact that the goods have lost or 
deteriorated in transit. 
Of course, neither Art.71 of ULIS nor Art. 58.3 of the 
Convention applies to the extent that its application is 
inconsistent with the foregoing provisions. Both articles 
entitle the buyer not to pay the price until he has had an 
opportunity to examine the goods. So, for instance, if the 
goods ~(t.ve been 'ost: 'It transit after the risk has passed, the 
buyer is nevertheless bound to pay the price even if no 
opportunity bas been given to him for examining the goods. 
However, the second part of Ar~96 of ULIS and of Art· 66 
of the Convention may lead to confusion. In both the buyer 
is to pay the price unless the loss or damage (or deteriora-
tion) is due to the act (or omission) of the seller. If 
strictly construed, these words mean that the buyer is 
absolutely released from his obligation to pay the price even 
if, for example, the damage to the goods is so trivial that it 
may easily be covered by reducing the price or by damages. 
Whether this is the strict intention of the draftsmen is 
doubtful, however~4) 
--------------------------------
133- 3) See e.g., ULIS,Ar ts.97. 1 and 19.2 successively; Art.67.1 of 
the Convention. In fob, cif and c & f contracts (Incoterms), 
the buyer bears the risk of the goods from the time when 
they shall have effectively passed the ship's rail at the 
port of shipment. 
4) For that reason, there was a proposal to delete that pro-
vision from the new convention. But it was argued that the 
exception was of great importance since, even though the = 
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On the other hand, the provision of ULIS differs from 
that of the Convention. Under the former, the buyer may also 
be discharged from his obligation to make payment when the 
loss or deterioration of the goods is due to the act of "some 
other person for whose conduct the seller is responsible." 
There is no similar provision in the Convention~5) accord-, 
ingly, this question is subject to the domestic law applic-
able to the contract which would also be applied in respect of 
ULIS for determining the persons for whose conduct the seller 
is responsible~6) 
134. Contrast with other remedies 
It is of prime significance to note that the seller's 
right to require payment is inconsistent with the remedy of 
avoidanc~and it is not possible to resort to both at the same 
--------------------------------
133- =) risk had passed, the seller could still interfere with the 
goods in such a manner as to cause loss. The second part of 
the article made it clear that the buyer would not have to 
pay the price to the extent that the loss or damage to the 
goods had been caused by such an act of the seller, see 
A/32/17, annex 1, para. 528. 
5) But it should be observed that it was noted, while 
di)t.(.l~$'~ the relevant provision, that that principle was 
0Eerative without express provision throughout the Uniform 
Law; so, stating it in isolated instances would cast doubt 
on the general principle; see A/CN.9/87, para. 211. And that 
was, perhaps, the reason for deleting the principle from 
the new convention. Cf., however, the text proposed by 
-
Norway, in A/CN.9/100, annex 2, art.12. 
6) On the assumption that the whole question is outside the 
scope of both ULlS and the Convention; see, however, = 
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time. If, however, the seller has avoided the contract, he 
cannot subsequently demand payment~1) The reason for that 
is obvious, that is, the avoidance generally puts an end to 
the contract and once it operates, both parties are released 
from their obligations under the contract. This principle and 
its extent have already been discussed in detail~2) and it 
suffices to remember that the seller may, in instalment 
contract~ be entitled to avoid only part of the contract while 
other parts survive. In that case, the buyer remains bound by 
his obligations under any part which has not been affected by 
avoidance~3) 
Thus, it seems that there is no need for ULIS or the 
Convention to have a particular provision stating that the 
seller cannot require payment if he has already resorted to 
any remedy which is inconsistent with that requirement; and 
this is in fact the situation in ULIS while the Convention 
expressly contains such a provision~4) It is doubtful, how-
ever, whether there is any remedy which is inconsistent with 
demanding payment other other than the avoidance~5) 
------------------------------
133- =) Graveson and Cohn, p 107. 
134- 1) A similar rule is followed under the English general law 
of contract, see Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston, p 492; 
Treitel, Law of Contract, p 641; as to an example from the 
case law, see Johnson v. Agnew [98~ A.C. 367, 392. 
2) Supra, Ch., I, s.V.1. 
3) Supra, paras. 78, 81 f. 
4) Art.62, supra, para. 131. 
5) That was also the opinion of Camara (of Spain) at the Con-
ference, see A/CONF.97/19, p 212, para. 46. Also, in an = 
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In the Convention, on the other hand, the seller does 
not lose his right to declare the contract avoided so long as 
he is still unpaid~6) which means that he can do so even if he 
has affirmed the contract by requiring payment or otherwise. 
This is not the situation in at least one case in ULIS. As 
was indicated, the seller, who bases avoidance on the addi-
tional time notice, must avoid the contract I1 promptlyll other-
wise the contract is regarded as being affirmed and, as sub-
mitted, he cannot retract the affirmation~7) 
Unlike aVOidance, however, there is no contradiction 
between the sellerts action for damages and his action for the 
price. Therefore, he can under ULIS and the Convention bring 
the two actions together if their requirements are satisfiedf8 ) 
besides, he may be entitled to claim interest on the unpaid 
sum. In English Law, by contrast, the seller may have the right 
to claim interest for the delay in making payment while his 
claim for damages in these circumstances is not well-founded 
yet~9) 
Finally, it is granted that the rules on damages dealing 
with the loss, foreseeability and mitigation do not apply to 
---------------------------------
134- =) earlier stage of drafting the relevant text there was an 
express reference that the inconsistent remedy was the 
avoidance, see A/CN.9/100, annex 1, art.43(71).3. 
6) Supra, para. 46; cf., supra, para. 66. 
7) Supra, para. 46. 
8) Supra, para. 96; see also Art.61.2 of the Convention: "the 
seller is not deprived of any right he may have to claim 
damages by exercising his right to other remedies". 
9) Supra, para. 96. 
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the seller's action for the price where all these matters are 
irrelevant~10) 
135. No period of grace 
Art. 64 of ULIS provides that: 
"In no case shall the buyer be entitled to apply -Us Cl court 
or arbitral tribunal to grant him a period of grace for the 
payment of the price." 
While Art. 61.3 of the Convention provides that: 
"No period of grace may be granted to the buyer by a 
court or arbitral tribunal when the seller resorts to a remedy 
for breach of contract." 
Obviously, this rule in both laws differs from that which 
prevails in French Law. According to which the general rule 
is that the court may, after considering the economic situa-
tion of the debtor, grant for the payment a period (or periods) 
of grace up to one year} 1 )As \JClS indicated, a period of grace 
may also be granted when the creditor demands the avoidance 
of the contract~2) 
The approach of English Law seems to be different accord-
ing to whether the seller seeks performance or avoidance. In 
the former situation, it appears that there is no authority 
-----------------------------
134- 10) lihich appears to be the same under English Law (Benjamin, 
para. 1273). 
135- 1) Art.1244 of C.C.; see also r-lazeaud, t.2, v.1, paras. 909 
ff; Starck, para. 1846. 
2) Supra, para. 37. 
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in the case Law supporting the idea of giving the buyer a 
period of grace by the court. But in the latter, equity may 
interfere by giving relief against the strictness of the 
common law in case of ~orfeiture of the deposit for non-
payment of a fixed sum on a day certainf 3) This principle, 
as has been suggested, also applies to the buyer who fails to 
pay the purchase price and equity may thus extend the time 
for payment(4) (period of grace). The precise length of the 
time so extended is a matter of discretion and it may be 
extended again on subsequent application. This is subject to 
an essential condition, that is, the balance of the price, if 
not available to the buyer, shall be paid within the time 
specified by the court~5) 
In any case, the whole idea of granting the buyer a 
period of grace for payment is expressly rejected by ULIS(6) 
as well as the Convention{7) 
------------------------------
135- 3) Re Dixon, Heynes v. Dixon [90~ 2 Ch.561 , 576. 
4) Atiyah, pp 320 f; as regards the forfeiture of the deposit, 
see supra, para. 90. 
5) Barton Thompson and Co. Ltd. v. Stapling Machines Co. 
[96~ Ch.499, 510. 
6) It was noted that the above rule in UIIS did not appear 
under other obligations of the buyer; and because of that 
omission it might be argued that ULIS did not prohibit 
applications for periods of grace with respect to those 
obligations although that result might be inconsistent with 
the intent of the draftsmen, see A/CN.9/87, annex 4, para. 
39. 
7) When the seller is in default, a similar rule is applied in 
both ULIS (Art.24.3, delivery) and the Convention (Art.45:= 
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136. Rate of interest 
In addition to the unpaid price, the seller is entitled 
to claim interest on it. Some questions relating to this 
matter have already been demonstrated in an earlier chapter 
of the current study(1) and it may suffice here to refer to the 
rate of interest. Under ULIS, that rate shall be equal to 
the official discount rate in the country where the seller 
has his palce of business or, if he has no place of business, 
his habitual residence, plus 1%~2) In the Convention, the 
provision entitling interest does not include its rate or the 
basic principle for its calculation}3) therefore, it has been 
suggested that this question would be subject to the domestic 
law applicable to the contract~4) But this view raises an 
important question: What is the solution if that law does 
not allow, for any reason}5) the payment of interest? The 
same question arises in respect of ULIS when, for example, 
the country where the seller has his place of business also 
forbids interest. 
----~------------------------
135- =) general rule). 
136- 1) Supra, paras. 95 f. 
2) Art.83, supra, para. 96. It has been noted, in this respect, 
that according to some W. German cases the seller must, 
as a rule, prove the official discount rate. Nevertheless, 
the court itself can infer it from other sources such as 
the monthly reports of the German Federal Bank. In one 
case, however, a German Court allowed only one percent 
interest on the ground that the seller could not prove the 
official discount rate in his country (Magnus, p 117). 
3) Art.78, supra, para. 96; see also Honnold, Uniform Law, = 
2~ 
In answering this question, one main fact should be kept 
in mind; that is, nothing precludes the seller from claiming 
interest when its requirements are satisfied; this is so even 
where the domestic law, on the assumption that it applies, 
forbids interest(6) and ~ven if the seller has the right to 
claim damages~7) Accordingly, it is submitted that the law 
applicable to the rate of interest is to be replaced by 
another one recognizing interest if the former is not so. This 
is of course the task of the court, and its choice would 
presumably be based on grounds reasonable in the circumstances. 
In English Law, the court has a discretion to award 
interest on any debt claimed at such rate as it thinks fit on 
the whole or any part of the debt, and to decide whether 
interest is to be allowed for the whole or any part of the 
period between the date when the cause of action arises and 
the date of judgment~8) These provisions apply to the 
seller's action for the price which 1s certainly an action 
for a debt~9) But it should be noted that when the contract 
enables the seller to claim interest, the court has no 
-~----------------~------------
136- =) paras. 420 f. 
4) See Feltham, 1981 J.B.L. P 359;see also Perrot, p 582. But 
cf., Honnold, ibid, para. 421 • 
....... 
5) E.g., religious reasons, see A/CONF.97/19, p 416, para. 10 
(Shafik of Egypt). 
6) The Conference therefore rejected a proposal that the 
question to be remitted to applicable domestic law, see 
Honnold, ibid. 
7) Supra, para. 88. 
8) 8.3 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934; 
£f., supra, para. 96. 
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discretion in the matter~10) It has also been suggested 
that a similar principle applies when a trade custom or a 
course of dealing between the parties gives the seller such 
a right~11) 
The approach of French Law is completely different from 
that of English Law. 
In the first place, the buyer is bound to pay interest 
in three cases~12) firstly, if the contract so provides; in 
that case the contract itself determines the rate of interest 
and the date on which it starts to run\13) Secondly, if the 
thing sold and delivered produces fruits or other civil or 
natural revenues; interest starts to run here from the date 
of deliVery~14) Thirdly, if the buyer has been summoned; in 
this case interest starts to run from the date of the summons or 
of the seller's claim for the price in justice~15) 
In the second place, the rate of interest, if there is 
no agreement to the cGntrary, is fixed by the law itself; in 
the civil matters it is 4% while it is 5% in the commercial 
matters~16) 
---------------------~-----------
136- 9) Benjamin, paras. 1273, 1276; see also Schmitthoff, Sale 
of Goods, p 194. 
10) Benjamin, para. 1277. 
11) Benjamin, ibid, note 54; see also Schmittoff, ibid, 
p 195. 
12) Art.1652 of C.C. 
13) Planiol et Ripert, vol.10, para. 147. 
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It should be added that, unlike English Law, the French 
court has no discretion in the matter of interest. 
----------------------------
136- 14) Mazeaud, t.3, vol. 2, para. 1003. 
15) Planiol et Ripert, ibid. 





Ar~ 61.2 of ULIS provides that: 
liThe seller shall not be entitled to require payment of 
the price by the buyer if it is in conformity with usage and 
reasonably possible for the seller to resell the goods. In 
that case the contract shall be ipso facto avoided as from 
the time when such resale should be effected." 
And Art.VII.1 of the Convention relating to ULIS 
provides that: 
"Where under the provisions of the Uniform Law one party 
to a contract of sale is entitled to require performance of 
any obligation by t~e other party, a court shall not be bound 
to enter or enforce a judgment providing for specific perfor-
mance except in the cases in which it would do so under its 
law in respect of sale not governed by the Uniform Law." 
And Art· 16 of ULIS provides that: 
"Where under the provisions of the present Law one party 
to a contract of sale is entitled to require performance of 
any obligation by the other party, a court shall not be bound 
to enter or enforce a judgment providing for specific perfor~-
ance except in accordance with the provisions of Article VII 
of the Convention dated the 1st day of July 1964 relating to 
a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods." 
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vlhile Art.28 of the Convention provides that:-
Itlf, in accordance with the provisions of this Conven-
tion, one party is entitled to require performance of any 
obligation by the other party, a court is not bound to enter 
a judgment for specific performance unless the court would 
do so under its own Law in respect of similar contracts of 
sale not governed by thi s Convention."( 1 ) 
138. The resale: ULIS 
The first exception under ULIS is that the seller is not 
allowed to require payment if it is in conformity with usages 
and reasonably possible for him to resell the goods. This 
provision has already been discussed in an earlier stage of 
the current study;1) and it is sufficient to remember the 
following points:-
1- It may be that lIusages" and "reasonably possible to 
resell" refer in practice to those circumstances where the 
seller remains in possession of the goods; otherwise, usage 
are fairly uncommon~2) 
-------------------------------
137. 1) For a legislative background of the text, see the follow-
ing documents successively: A/CN.9/52, paras. 124 f;A/CN. 
9/87,annex 1,(art.16); A/CN.9/i00, paras. 52 f, and annex 1, 
art.12(16); A/CN.9/116, annex 1, art.12; A/32/17, annex 1, 
paras. 135 f, and para. 35 of the original document, (art. 
12); A/33/17, para. 28 (art.26); A/CONF.97/19, pp 7 (art.26), 
100, 304-305 (paras. 41-52), 157 (art. 26) and 206 (para. 21). 
138- 1) Supra, Ch., I, s.I1I.1. 
2) Baer, p 105. 
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2- Inserting usages in the texts is superfluous because 
they always prevail over the Law in accordance with Ar~ 9~3) 
3~ The reasonableness is always a question of fact. 
It may also be important to remember that the relevant 
text which was liable to various criticisms had been elimina-
ted from the Convention~4) 
139. Concession to domestic laws 
As was indicated, the general rule in both ULIS and the 
Convention is that the seller is entitled to require payment 
of the price; accordingly, a court is bound to enter a judg-
ment enforcing such payment by the buyer. This approach con-
cerning specific performance is in conformity with French 
Law}1) in other legal systems, e.g., Common Law, specific 
performance is surrounded by various restrictions and regarded 
as an exceptional, discretionary remedy~2) Therefore, those 
systems could not be expected to alter fundamental principles 
of their judicial procedure in order to bring ULIS or the 
.-------------------------
138- 3) A/CN.9/87, para. 45. 
4) Supra, para. 54. 
139. 1) Supra, para. 132. 
2) Treitel, Remedies, s.10; see also Feltham (of the UK at the 
Conference) ,in A/CONF.97/19, p 304 particularly para. 44; 
Graveson and Cohn, p 61; Lansing, 18 A.Bus. L.J; 1980, 
p 269, 274; Szakats, 15 ICLQ 1966, P 749, 769. 
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Convention into forcef 3) For that reason, both provide 
that the court before which the dispute is brought is not 
bound to enter a judgment for specific performance except 
if it would do so under its (o\m) law in respect of contracts 
of sale not governed by ULIS or the Convention. This excep-
tion is of general character and therefore applies to any 
performance(4) whether is demanded by the buyer or by the 
seller}5) 
However, the phrase "its (own) lawn is capable of double 
interpretation~6) It may, on the one hand, point to the law 
of forum or, on the other, to the proper law of the contract. 
The difference between them may be illustrated by the follow-
ing example. Assume that the dispute has been brought before 
an English court, and French Law is the law applicable to the 
contract. Assume too that, in the light of the facts and 
circumstances of the case, enforcing payment is not allowed 
under English Law. In this hypothesis, the solution differs 
------------------------------
139- 3) A/CN.9/116, annex 1, comment on art.12, para. 3; A/CONF. 
97/5, comment on art.26, para. 3. 
4) Cf., the draft art.71 concerning the seller's remedies as 
-
approved by the W.G. in its 5th session, in A/CN.9/87, 
annex 1; see also A/CN.9/100, annex 1, art.43(71) as 
approved by the W.G.at its 6th session.In both, the seller's 
claim for the price was available without any exceptions. 
5) Cf., Goldenhielm, 10 Scan. Stud. in Law 1966, p 10,17 where 
-it is considered that in spite of its general character, 
Art.16 of ULIS-appears to refer only to the performance by 
the seller; £f., also supra, para. 132, notes 2 and 3. 
6) See Honnold, Uniform Law, para. 195. 
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according to whether English Law (law of forum) or French Law 
(proper law) would be applied. Of course, this problem may 
not arise if, for example, both laws allow or, on the contrary, 
do not allow enforcing payment in respect o£ the relevant 
dispute. 
Indeed, the adoption of either is not £ree from diffi-
aU~· in practice. To illustrate, suppose in the above example 
that English Law would be applied whether it is the proper law 
or the law of forum; suppose too that enforcing payment is not 
permitted in accordance with that law. In such an event, 
therefore, damages are the only remedy available to the seller; 
and this means that the contract does not exist any mor~ i.e., 
it has been avoided(7) although the rule in both ULIS and the 
Convention is that avoidance may not occur unless and until it 
is declared by the injured partyS8) And, as clear, there is 
no declaration of avoidance in this hypothesis. 
It is granted, however, that the application of the 
domestic law Should not go beyond whether or not it enforces 
payment; and if not, where damages are the substitute, then 
those damages must be calculated according to ULIS or the 
Convention and not to the domestic law. 
Moreover, it has been indicated that the seller may not, 
in one case in ULIS, resort to avoidance; he may only have the 
right to an action for the price plus interest~9) In such a 
----------------~--------------
139~ 7) Supra, para. 94. 




case, another thorny difficulty arises if, according to the 
domestic law, the seller cannot claim payment but damages. 
In these circumstances, it is clear that the seller would be 
put in a critical position in particular when remembering 
that the seller's loss, his duty to mitigate and the foresee-
ability test are relevant to his action for damages but not 
for the price~10) 
It is indeed difficult to envisage academic solutions to 
the foregoing difficulties; but it is suggested that the 
language of both ULIS and the Convention refers to the proper 
law of the contract and not to the law of forum\11) This is 
so because the court, when the contract is not governed by 
ULIS or the Convention, would (normally) apply the law applic-
able under rules of conflict of laws. 
140. Illustration: English Law 
s.49.1,2 of the SGA reads:-
"1_ Where, under a contract of sale, the property in 
the goods has passed to the buyer and he wrongfully neglects 
or refuses to pay for the goods according to the terms of the 
contract, the seller may maintain an action against him for 
the price of the goods. 
2- Where, under a contract of sale, the price is payable 
------------------------------
139- 9) .Supra, paras. 52,57. 
10) Supra, para. 134. 
11) That was also the opinion of Krispis (of Reece) at the 
Conference; see A/CONF.97/19, p 305, para. 46; but £f., 
Honnold, Uniform Law, para. 195. 
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on a day certain irrespective of delivery and the buyer wrong-
fully neglects or refuses to pay such price, the seller may 
maintain an action for the price, although the property in 
the goods has not passed and the goods have not been appor-
tioned to the contract.I'( 1 ) 
Under this section, the seller is expressly entitled to 
an action for the price in two situations. 
The first situation is where the property has passed to 
the buyer irrespective of \'lhether or not the goods have been 
delivered to him. The failure to transfer the property may 
be due to the wrongful act of the buyer; even in this event, 
the seller is not allowed to claim the price~2) If fob con-
tracts, for example, it is customary to consider that property 
passes when the goods are shipped on the vessel nominated by 
the buyer~3) Thus, if the latter refuses to name the vessel, 
the seller may claim damages but not the price~4) A similar 
principle applies to cif contracts where the buyer refuses to 
take the shipping documents, delivery of which transfers the 
property to himf 5) 
------------------------------
140- 1) Cf., s.2-709(1) of UCC; 5.9.11(1) of DUSA. And for an 
-
evaluation of the text, see OLRC Report,vol.2 pp 415 ff. 
2) Atiyah, p 323; Benjamin, para. 1288. 
3) Federspiel and Co. S.A. v. Charles Twigg and Co. Ltd. [95~ 
1 Lloyd's Rep. 240, 247, 248. But it is suggested that it 
is more accurate to state the general rule negatively, the 
property does not pass before shipment; see Benjamin,para. 
1821. 
4) Colley v. Overseas Exporters [92] 3 K.B.302 
5) Stein, Forbes and Co. Ltd. v. County Tailoring Co.(1917) 
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Moreover, it has been held that if the seller has 
shipped the goods after the buyer's repudiation of an fob 
contract, damages are the only remedy available to him}6) 
But there is a suggestion to the effect that this rule may 
need revision(7) in the light of a later case in which it 
has been held that the injured party is not bound to accept 
the other's repudiation; instead, he may continue the perfor~-
ance of his obligations where he would then be entitled to 
claim the contract price~8) 
The second situation is where the contract stipulates 
that payment is to be made on a date certain irrespective of 
delivery. Indeed, this seems to be an application of the 
principle that whether such an action may be maintaine~though 
the property has not passed, depends entirely on the terms of 
the contract~9) A day certain means a time specified in the 
contract not depending on a future contingent event~10) Thus 
where payment is to be made cash against do,euments, e.g., cif 
contracts, the subsection does not apply~11) It is irrelevant 
whether payment on a day certain is to be made before or after 
delivery~12) 
-----------------------------
140- =) 86 L.J.K.B. 448. 
6) A.A. Nortier and Co. v. WM Maclean Sons and Co. (1921) 9 
Lloyd's Rep. 192. 
7) Benjamin, para. 1287. 
8) White and Carter (Councils) Ltd. v. McGregor ff96~ A.C.413-
\ 
9) Sutton, p 411. 
10) Shell-Mex Ltd. v. Elton Cop Dyeing Co. Ltd. (1928)34 Com. 
Cas. 39, 43. 
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141. Contrast with damages: English Law 
The seller's claim for damages under s.50 of the SGA is 
available where the buyer neglects or refuses to accept and 
pay ~or the goods. It is submitted that this section is con-
fined to the situation in which the avoidance of the contract 
is inevitable~1) But damages in a wide sense may also be 
available to the seller even if the buyer has accepted the 
goods and paid the contract price. For example, the buyer, who 
delays in taking delivery, may be bound to compensate the 
expenses incurred by the seller because of that delayf 2 ) in 
such a case, neither acceptance of goods nor payment of the 
price seems to be relevant~3) 
Suppose, on the other hand, that the property has passed 
to the buyer, or that payment is to be made on a day certain; 
suppose too that the buyer refuses to accept and pay for the 
goods. In this case, the seller has the option to claim either 
damages under s.50 or the price under s.49; but he cannot , of 
course, claim both. If, however, the buyer also fails to 
perform any other obligation, e.g., taking delivery, the 
-----------------------------
140- 11) Stein case, supra, 448; a similar principle applies to an 
fob contract where it provides for its implementation by 
delivery o~ documents, not goods, and payment is to be 
made against such delivery (Fridman, pp 380 f). 
12) But see the comment of Atiyah,. P 323. 
141- 1) Supra, para. 94. 
2) See Benjamin, para. 1295; see also para. 94, supra. 
3) As has been seen, the buyer may accept the goods even 
be~ore taking delivery of them (supra, para. 94). 
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seller may claim the price and, apart from s.50, damages as 
well. 
Finally, it is to be remembered that the seller cannot 
claim the price when the contract is avoidedf 4) On the other 
hand, it may be that he is entitled to combine a claim for 
special damages for the mere delay in making payment with a 
claim for the price~5) 
-----------------------------
141- 4) Supra, para. 45. 
5) Supra, para. 96. 
CHAPTER IV: 
EXEMPTION FROM LIABILITY 
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142. Texts 
Art. 74 of ULIS provides that: 
It 1- Where one of the parties has no t performed one of 
his obligations, he shall not be liable for such non-perfor-
mance if he can prove that it was due to circumstances which, 
according to the intention of the parties at the time of the 
contract, he was not bound to take into account or to avoid 
or to overcome; in the absence of any expression of the inten-
tion of the parties, regard shall be had to what reasonable 
persons in the same situation would have intended. 
2- ~lhere the circumstances which gave rise to the non-
performance of the obligation constituted only a temporary 
impediment to performance, the party in default shall never-
theless be permanently relieved of his obligation if, by reason 
of the delay, performance would be so radically changed as to 
amount to the performance of an obligation quite different 
from that contemplated by the contract. 
3- The relief provided by this Article for one of the 
parties shall not exclude the avoidance of the contract under 
some other provision of the present Law or deprive the other 
party of any right which he has under the present Law to reduce 
the price, unless the circumstances which entitled the first 
party to relief where caused by the act of the other party or 
of some person for whose conduct he was responsible." 
While Art· 79 of the Convention provides that~1) 
"1- A party is not liable for a failure to perform any of 
263 
his obligations if he proves that the failure was due to an 
impediment beyond his control and that he could not reason-
ably be expected to have taken the impediment into account at 
the time of the conclusion of the contract or to have avoided 
or overcome it or its consequences. 
2- If the party's failure is due to the failure by a 
third person whom he has engaged to perform the whole or a 
part of the contract, that party is exempt from liability only 
if:-
a- he is exempt under the preceeding paragraph; and 
b- the person whom he has so engaged would be so 
exempt if the provisions of that paragraph were 
applied to him. 
3- The exemption provided by this article has effect for 
the period during which the impediment exists. 
4- The party who fails to perform must give notice to the 
other party of the impediment and its effect on his ability to 
perform. If the notice is not received by the other party 
within a reasonable time after the party who fails to perform 
----------------------~----
142- 1) For a legislative background of the text, see the follow-
ing documents successively: A/CN.9/87, annex 2, Passim; 
paras. 107 ff of the original document, and annex 1, art. 
76 (previously art.74); A/CN.9/100, annex 2(VI); paras. 101 
ff of the original document, and annex 1, art.50(76);A/CN. 
9/116, annex 1 (art.50); A/32/17, annex 1, paras. 432 ff, 
and para. 35 of the original document (art.51); A/33/17, 
para. 28 (art.65); A/CONF.97/19, pp 133-136, 378-387, 
(paras. 1-10), 408-412, 164 (art.65) and 227 (paras. 26 f.) • 
• 
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knew or ought to have known of the impediment, he is liable 
for damages resulting from such non-receipt. 
5- Nothing in this article prevents either party from 
exercising any right other than to claim damages under this 
Convention." 
143. Generally 
It frequently happens that the failure by one party to 
perform his contractual obligations is due to events beyond 
his control which he can neither overcome nor avoid. Many 
examples of this type of events may be given, such as war, 
strikes, governmental restrictions (e.g., embargo, exchange 
control), storm, fire, requisition, and closing of interna-
tional waterway (e.g., Suez Canal or Strait of Hormoz)$1) 
Sometimes, an intervening event may even render performance 
impossible; an obvious illustration of this is the situation 
in which the subject-matter of the sale, on the assumption it 
is uniuqe;2) is physically destroyed~3) In these circums- ~ 
tances, it may not be fair to consider the party who fails to 
-----------------------------
143- 1) As-has been noted, such events have occurred in the past 
and can be expected to occur in the future; see A/CN.9/116, 
annex 2, comment on art.50, para. 5; A/CONF.97/5, comment on 
art.65, para. 5. 
2) A/CONF.97/5, ibid, para. 4; see also example 65 A, and 
compare example 65 B (ibid). Cf., in English Law, s.7 of the 
SGA tI specific goods". 
3) See, by way of contrast, Taylor v. Caldwell (1863) 32 L.J. 
Q.B. 164, the music-hall which was the subject-matter had 
been destroyed before the day of performance. Held, that~ 
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perform liable for damages for the mere non-performance}4) 
In reality, this is not the case in any of the laws relevant 
to this study though there are, as will be seen later, con-
siderable divergencies between them. 
As far as payment of the price is concerned, however, it 
is obvious that the situations to which the doctrine of exemp-
tions applies are rare in practice. This is due to the fact 
that the price is to be expressed in money(4a) and therefore 
paying it may not, in most cases, be impeded by extraneous 
events. For that reason, it has been argued that payment of 
the price is an absolute obligation which is never legally 
impossible to perform; and on the basis of that assumption, 
it was suggested, while preparing the draft convention, that 
the relevant provisions should not be applied to that obliga-
tionf5) 
Furthermore, it may be that the doctrine of exemptions 
as a whole becomes of less importance where the contract it-
self determines in advance the rights and obligations of the 
parties when certain events beyond their control occur, whether 
or not those events lead to the exemption from liability. It 
has rightly been noted that such clauses are frequently 
---------------------------
143- =) the defendents were excused from liability and that no 
action would lie against them. 
4) But the court is empowered in English Law to make adjust-
ment of the parties mutual rights and obligations in 
accordance with the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 
1943; see in detail Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston,pp 527 ff. 
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employed in practice(6) particularly in standard contracts 
and general conditions which are widespread in international 
trade, and such an agreement is legally valid~7) 
144. Terminology 
The expression "frustration" is well-admitted in English 
Law to mean, in general, that situation in which the contract 
comes to an end automatiCally(1) if its performance by either 
party becomes Physically(2) or legally(3) impossible, or only 
possible in a very different way from that originally con-
templated~4) The equivalent doctrine in French Law is the 
-----------------------------
143- 4a) Supra, para. 5. 
5) A/32/17, annex 1, para. 441; but that proposal was rejec-
ted (ibid, para. 443); see also A/CN.9/87, para. 111. 
6) Schmitthoff's BeFort Trade, 7th ed. 1980, p 121. 
7) Para. 144, below. 
144- 1) Hirji Mulji v. Cheong Yue Steamship Co. Ltd. 1192~ A.C. 
497, 505; Joseph Constantine Steamship Line Ltd. v. 
Imperial Smelting COrporation Ltd. [94~ A.C. 154, 163. 
For a criticism of the automatic avoidance particularly 
in frustrating delay, see Stannard, 46 M.L.R. 1983, pp 
738, 744 ff. 
2) E.g., the destruction of the subject-matter of the contract; 
see Taylor v. Caldwell (1863) 32 L.J.Q.B. 164. 
3) E.g., where the performance of the contract involves trad-
ing with the enemy as a result of the outbreak of war; see 
Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour 
~. [94~ A.C. 32. So that, the supervening illegality 
resulting from the war and not the declaration of war is 
the frustrating event, see Vivana Shipping Co. Ltd. v. 
Finelvet A.G. (The Chrysalis) [g8~ 1 Lloyd! s Rep. 503. 
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"force majeure".(5) The main aspects of both doctrines will 
be considered later; suffice it here to say that the occurrence 
of either excludes the liability for non-performance_ 
The term "force majeure", on the other hand, is frequently 
used in international contracts especially in modern practice 
of English traders. It is familiar, in this context, to 
insert in a contract a so-called "force majeure ll clause; 
although it seems that this term has no precise (and compre-
hensive) meaning~6) it may be that it (normally) includes, 
as has been observed, every event beyond the control of the 
parties~7) So that, the "force majeure rr has a more extensive 
meaning than the term "Act of GOd ll;(8) while the latter only 
refers to events due to natural causes(9) as an earthquake, 
the former includes, in addition, any event caused by human 
----------------------------
144- 4) Halsbury's laws of England, vol.9, 4th ed., para. 450; or 
in case of non-occurrence of some event which must reason-
ably be regarded as the basis of the contract (Cheshire, 
Fifoot & Furmston, p 517). An illustration of this is the 
case of Krell v. Henry 1l90J] 2 K.B. 740 where the 
defendant hired a flat to view' a coronation procession \'1hich 
did not take place on the days originally fixed. Held, that 
the contract was frustrated, see further paras. 147, 157 
post. 
5) Or ficas fortuittl (Article 1148 of the C.c). 
6) See Thomas Borth\vich (Glasgo\'1) Ltd. v. Faure Fairclough, 
Ltd. II 96e] 1 Lloyds Rep. 16, 28. 
7) Schmitthoff, Export Trade, p 121. 
8) Matsoukis v. Priestman and Co. G91~ 1 K.B. 681, 686. 
9) Trent and Mersey Navigation Co. v. Wood (1785)4 Dougl. 
K.B. 286, 290; E.R.(99)884, 886; see further Halsbury's 
Laws of England, vol.9, para. 458. 
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intervention as strikes and governmental restrictions~10) 
The purpose of a force majeure clause is clear; it defines in 
advance the mutual rights and obligations of the parties if 
certain events beyond their control occur; and such a clause 
is generally valid in both English(11) and French Law}12) 
However, neither ULIS nor the Convention has used any 
. (13) of the above terms; instead, both use the term "exemptl.ons" 
as equivalent to l1frustrationtl in English Law and to "force 
majeure" in French Law~5) The reason for that may be clear, 
that is, to avoid any misinterpretation which is likely to 
occur in practice if either of these two terms were adopted. 
And this may also be the reason why the various standard 
contracts and general conditions prepared under the auspices 
of the ECE, have used either "cases of reliefU(14) or 
"reliefs".( 15) 
1 • Requirements 
145. t; Uyer' s failure 
The doctrine of exemptions presumes, in the language of 
the Convention, that there is a I1failure" by the buyer lito 
-----------------------------
144- 10) See Benjamin, para. 665. 
11) See in detail Schmitthoff, ibid, pp 121 ff; see also 
Cartoon, 1978 J.B.L. P 230. 
12) Mazeaud, t.,2, vOl.1, para. 581. 
13) Ch.5, s.2 of ULIS; part 2, s.4 of the Convention. 
14) See e.g., 5.10 of nos. 188, 574; s. 18 of no.420. 
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perform any of his obligations", or, in the language of ULIS, 
that he "has not performed one of his obligations.'~ 1 ) Follow-
ing these words, it might be argued that it would be difficult 
to talk about the non-performance of, or the failure to per-
form, an obligation without assuming the maturity of that 
obligation; if this is correct, the result is that the doctrine 
does not apply where the buyer's breach is anticipatory. But 
this is not exactly the situation where it has been suggested 
that the buyer would be exonerated from liability if his anti-
cipatory breach is inferred from circumstances other than his 
words or conduct(2) provided, of course, that the other con-
ditions of the exemption are met. So that, in applying the 
doctrine no difference may appear between whether the breach 
is actual or anticipatory. 
However, the buyer's failure to pay may relate to any 
duty imposed upon him in respect of payment; this includes the 
time, place and method of payment~3) But it should be 
-----------------------------
144- 15) See e.g., s.10 of nos. 730; s.19 of no.1 A (cereals: cif-
maritime); s.16 of no.5 A (cereals: fob-maritime). 
145- 1) There was a proposal to replace those words in the draft 
convention by "his obligations" to indicate that there 
might be a failure to perform more than one obligation, 
but that proposal was rejected, see A/32/17, annex 1, 
para. 440. 
2) Supra, para. 66. 
3) In an earlier stage of drafting the text of the Convention, 
reference was expressly made to the failure to performllin 
accordance with the Convention and the contractU, see A/CN. 
9/87, para. 115, and annex 1, art.76(74), alternatives A 
and B. 
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remembered that he is presumably entitled to cure any failure 
to perform so long as the contract is still alive and the 
time of payment has not expired yet~4) 
On the other hand, it has rightly been observed that the 
approach of ULlS and the (draft) convention is entirely con-
sistent with Civil Law system. Both talk about the failure to 
perform any (or one) of the contractual obligations and not 
about the non-performance of the contract (or any part of it) 
as a whole~5) This is indeed the approach of French Law in 
which the inexecution resulting from a force majeure event i~ 
concentrated on the obligations and not on the contract it-
self~6) Thus, a party may be exonerated from further perfor-
mance of such an obligation which has been affected by the 
force majeure(7) while other obligations may, depending on 
the case, surv!ve\8) But for the Common Lawyer, this 
approach is uncomfortable; he does not usually think in terms 
of obligations of the parties and, therefore, his doctrine of 





Supra, paras. 41, 132. 
Nicholas, 27 A.J.C.L. 1979, pp 231, 234 f; also in 48 ~. 
L.Rev. 946, 956. 





See Marty et Raynaud, para. 491, post. 
But cf., para. 156. 
-As to frustration of part of the contract, see Chitty, 
vol.1, para. 1534; Halsbury's Laws of England, vol. 9, 
para. 465. 
Nicholas, 27 A.J.C.L. 1979, P 235. 
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146. The appropriate test 
Under UL1S, the non performing party is excused from 
liability if it is proved that the non-performance is "due to 
circumstances which ••• he is not bound to take into account 
••• ". This language was liable, while clj)l.U.SSi~ the draft text 
of the Convention, to various criticisms~1) The main objec-
tion was that a party, say the buyer, had been afforded an 
opportunity to excuse his non-performance by relying on a 
wide range of factorsf 2) so that, he could readily be excused 
from liability for the non-performance~3) For example, he 
might argue that the non-payment was due to an unforeseen fall 
in prices~3a) Therefore, it may be that ULIS covers two 
. (4) 
situations in which the buyer may be exempted from liab~lity; 
the first is where performance becomes impossible which is the 
case in both English(5) and French(6) Law. The other is the 
situation in which the performance merely becomes onerous(7) 
for unexpected reason which is not the case in either 
English(8) or French(6) Law. 
---~-----------~--------------
146- 1) See generally A/CN.9/87, annex 3.1; A/CN.9/87, paras. 108ff; 
A/CN.9/100, annex 2-VI; but .21., Berman, who says that ULIS 
contains an excellent general definition of excuse of non-
performance in Art 74 (30 L. and Can. Probe 1965, p 354, 
357). 
2) A/CN.9/87, annex 3, ibid, para. 2. 
3) A/CN.9/87, para. 108. 
3a) But see Document V/Prep/1, in Hague Conference, vol.2, p 40 
where it is argued that those who prepared draft ULIS have 
unanimously recognized that an increase in prices does not 
amount to a reason for exoneration unless it is the result = 
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Accordingly, there was a proposal to replace the word 
"circumstances" by "impossibility" or alternatively by 
"impediment".' 9) But it was noted that the test of impossi-
bility would lead to ~Mbiguity since it had different mean-
ings in different legal systems~10) and the result was the 
adoption of the latter word i.e., ttimpediment". 
Furthermore, in an earlier stage of preparing the 
relevant text of the Convention, an express reference was 
made to II faul tlt;( 11) that is to say, that the alleged impedi-
ment had occurred "without fault" by the non-performing 
party. But there was a clear tendency to exclude that term 
from the text(12) on the ground that it would be possible to 
define the exemption in objective words without reference to 
------------------------------
146- =) of a general convulsion in economic circumstances. 
4) A/CN.9/87, annex 3, para. 50. 
5) Supra, para. 144. 
6) Carbonnier, para. 74; Marty et Raynaud, para. 485;Mazeaud, 
t.2, vol.1, para. 576. 
7) It may be interesting to note that while CITC distinguishes 
between the impossibility of performance and non-liability 
for damages, it expressly provides that performance shall 
be deemed possible even if it becomes more onerous or 
results in great expenditures to the debtor (5.245.2). 
8) See e.g., Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham Urban District 
Council [95~ A.C. 696. 
9) See the alternative proposals (A) and (B) of the draft 
convention, A/CN.9/87, para. 115, and annex I, art. 76(74). 
10) A/CN.9/100, annex 2, para. 4. 
11) See A/CN.9/116, annex I, art. 50 as adopted by the \'I.G. 
12) A/CN.9/125, add. 1 and 2 (Austria, para. 6; F.R of Germany, 
para. 25jNorway, para. 40; ICC, para. 52). See also a 
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tI faul tn.( 13) That suggestion was adopted without ignoring 
the fact that a party should not be exempt from liability if 
the cause of the non-performance was his own fault; and that 
might be achieved by providing that the impediment must have 
been "beyond his controln,(14) i.e., the control of the non-
performing party, which is the present test under the 
Convention~15) 
147. Causes of non-performance 
Under the Convention, therefore, the buyer may not be 
exonerated from liability unless his failure was due to an 
impediment which should also be beyond his control. Although 
the expression If impediment" is a matter of construction, it 
is assumed that it rather means the impossibility of perfor-
mance and this may be the draftsmen's intention though the 
term " impossibility" was intentionally excluded~ 1) Anyway, 
it may be that the buyer's inability to perform,which is due 
to his financial troubles in general such as his insolvency 
or bankruptcy, may not be regarded as an impediment excusing 
the non-performance~2) 
-------------------------------
146- =) A/32/17, annex 1, para. 438. 
13) A/32/17, annex 1, para. 438. 
14) Ibid, para. 439. 
15) Below, para. 148. 
147- 1) Supra, para. 146. 
2) See also A/CONF.97/5, comment on art. 65, para. 10. This 
principle is expressly adopted by CITe (s.245 and the 
comment of Kopac thereto, p 83; 5.252.2). 
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Likewise, the contract may give the buyer the option 
to perform in accordance with one of several modes of perfor-
mance; in such a case, it is suggested that the performance 
is not deemed to be impeded so long as it is still possible 
to make it in accordance ''lith at least one of these modes~3) 
To illustrate, suppose that a contract calls upon the buyer 
to make payment either cash in a specific place or by a letter 
of credit; suppose too that the payment in that place became 
impossible. In this hypothesis, payment should be made by a 
letter of credit and the buyer could not therefore plead the 
exemption from liability. 
Undoubtedly, there is no difference between whether the 
impediment is due to legal causes as a governmental exchange 
control or a law prohibiting dealings with the seller, or to 
physical causes as an earthquake or a flood at the place of 
payment. While the former events are clearly due to human 
intervention, the latter are natural events due to an "Act 
of GodU}4) Once again, no practical benefit could be 
obtained from any of these distinctions~5) The significant 
distinction is that which may be made between permanent and 
temporary impediments: 6) both excuse the buyer's non-
-----------------------------
147- 3) A similar rule is expressly stated in CITC where s.247.I 
provides "If one of several optional performances becomes 
impossible, the obligation shall be reduced to the remain-
ing ones.'1 
4) See para. 144, supra. 
5) Cf., s.252 of CITC in which the circumstances impeding 
-performance should be II of extraordinary nature ll • 
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performance, but while the former would certainly lead to 
the extinguishing of the obligation as such, and sometimes 
to avoiding the whole contract~7) this is not necessarily 
the case in the latter~8) 
If, however, the understanding of the term lIimpediment" 
in the Convention is correct, that is to say that it means 
"impossibility", then one may well say that the Convention is 
in··11ne ·with French but not English Law. Under the former, 
any intervening event does not constitute force majeure unless 
it leads to the impossibility of performance~9) In fact, 
this is not necessarily the situation in English Law. Accord-
ing to which, the frustration may occur where, in addition to 
the case of impossibility, the object which is the foundation 
of the contract becomes unobtainable even if its performance 
is literally PossibleS10) On the other hand, the contingency 
might be temporary(10a) but performance, if resumed, would 
--~---------------------------
147- 6) A particular reference is made to this distinction by 
CITC (s.~52.1). 
7) This is at least the case in English and French Law (supra, 
para. 144; post, para. 156), while this question in ULIS 
and the Convention is, as submitted, subject to the law 
applicable to the contract (post, para. 156). 
8) Post, paras. 156 f. 
9) The impossibility in French Law must, moreover, be absolute 
and not relative; see Carbonnier, para. 74; Marty et 
Raynaud, para. 485; Mazeaud, t.2, vol.1, para. 576. 
10) See para. 144 (and note 4) supra. 
10a) See generally stannard, 46 M.L.R. 1983, p 738. 
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involve something radically different from that contemp-
lated by the parties when the contract was made. In such 
an event too the delay in performance would lead to frustra-
tion~11) 
Whether the doctrine of tlexemptionstl in ULIS applies to 
the former situation is not clear, but it may be sound to 
assume that the words "due to circumstances ••• It are wide 
enough(12) to cover it. The situation in the Convention 
seems to be different since the performance has not actually 
been impeded. As to the other situation, it is granted that 
the non-performing buyer is exempted from liability so long 
as the impediment exists; and to this extent ULIS and the 
Convention are in agreement}1 3 ) but it would be seen latter 
that these (two) laws differ from each other with respect to 
the effects of the intervening event after it is removed~14) 
148. Extraneous cause 
As has just been indicated, the current test under the 
Convention is that the obstacle impeding performance by one 
party should be "beyond his control!' (1 ) It is plain from 
this phrase and its legislative background that the buyer 
would not be exempted from liability where the impediment 
--------------------------------
147- 11) See e.g., Metropolitan Water Board v. Dick, Kerr & Co. 
Ltd. ff91~ A.C. 119, 139. See also supra, para. 144 and 
-
the authorities cited therein (note 4). 
12) See supra, para. 146. 
13) Post, para. 155. 
14) Post, para. 157. 
277 
was due to his fault. This question is ultimately a matter 
of proof where the onus is rested, as will be seen later, 
with the non-performing buyer. But it must be remembered 
that whether the intervening event is due to natural events 
or to a human intervenion is an irrelevant factor. 
Although ULIS does not contain an express requirement 
as such, it may be wise to assume its adoption thereunder$1a) 
Generally speaking~2) it would be difficult to exempt a 
party from liability because of an intervening event where 
that event was due to his fault. In addition, it might be 
that the requirement that the event should neither be fore-
seeable nor be resistable, which would be considered below, 
would necessarily lead to a similar result. 
However, this requirement is in line with French Law in 
which a force majeure event should be due to a "cause etrangere" 
which cannot be imputed to the party seeking exemption~3) In 
------------------------------
148- 1) However, it has been noted that this phrase is vague and 
difficult to apply in some legal systems (A/32/17, annex 1, 
para. 439). But see the opinion of ICC where it is con-
sidered that from business contracts the expression 
"beyond his controlU is more familiar than "fault" and would 
therefore be preferable to the latter (A/CN.9/125, and add 
1-3, ICC: para. 52). 
1a) See also Document V/Prep/1, in Hagye Conference, vol. 2, 
p 201 where it is argued that the "principle is clear: the 
cause of release must be external to the activity or the 
business of the party who pleads it". 
2) See Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston, p 524 (below); see also 
Chitty, para. 1569. 
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English Law, too, it is settled that the essence of frustra-
tion is that it should not be caused by the act or election 
of either partyJ4) thus, reliance cannot be placed on a 
"self-induced frustrationn~5) Notwithstanding that, it has 
been suggested that the phrase Itself-induced frustration" 
does not imply that every degree of fault will preclude a 
party from relying on the doctrine~6) 
149. Unforeseeability: ULIS 
Moreover, the buyer would not be exempted from liability 
unless it is proved, in the words of ULIS, that "he was not 
bound to take" the intervening event Uinto account tl • As has 
rightly been observed, certain events as wars, storms and 
currency restrictions have all occurred in the past and can 
be contemplated to occur in the future~1) Thus it might be 
difficult for the buyer to prove, in a given case, that he 
was not bound to take some event into account. For that 
reason, this matter depends upon "the intention of the parties 
at the time of the conclusion of the contract". Granted that 
this phrase is vague, it is suggested that it refers to the 
parties' intention as stated in the contract~2) which 
---------------------~-----------
148- 3) See Article 1147 of C.C.; see also Mazeaud, t.2, vol.1, 
paras. 572, 557. 
4) See e.g., Joseph Constantine Steamship Line Ltd. v.Imperial 
Smelting Corporation Ltd. [94:~ A.C. 154, 160; fvIaritime 
National Fish Ltd. v. Ocean Trawlers Ltd. ff93~ A.C. 524. 
5) Bank Line Ltd. v. Arthur Capel and Co. [91~ A.C.435,452. 
6) Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston, ibid. 
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frequently happens in the form of "force majeure ll clauses. 
In other words, some events may be stated in the contract 
which may also indicate, whether expressly or implicitly, 
their effects. In that case, reference is to be made to the 
parties' intention as inferred from, or expressed in, the 
contract. 
For example, a contract may provide that an exchange 
control by the buyer's country does not affect his duty to 
pay; or that the goods sold are to be delivered as soon as 
war breaks out on the assumption that it was inevitable. In 
these two hypotheses, it is obvious that the buyer is bound 
to take the relevant event into account and cannot therefore 
plead exemption if it occurs. 
If this understanding is correct, then two points should 
be noticed. Firstly, a particular reference to the "time of 
the conclusion of the contractll appears to be superfluous. 
Indeed, that time is necessarily the only relevant time since 
the parties' intention could only be inferred from the con-
tract. Secondly, it may be that any contractual term to the 
effect that the buyer is bound or, on the contrary, not bound 
----------------~---------
149- 1) A/CN.9/116, annex 2, comment on art. 50, para. 5; A/CONF. 
97/5, comment on art.65, para. 5. 
2) See also Document V/Prep 1, in Hague Conference, vol. 2, 
p 39 where it is argued that the successive criterion is to 
be resorted to in case of default of agreement. Cf., 
A/CN.9/87, annex 3.1 (the representative of Ghana, para. 
7-d). But see a proposal by Norway in whiCh there was an 
express reference to circumstances contemplated by the = 
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to take certain events into account is a valid term, and this 
may be regarded as an exception to the general rule in ULIS 
stating that the Law does not govern the validity of the 
contract or of any of its provisionsf 3) 
But the parties' intention may not be expressed in the 
contract. In such a case, ULIS provides that "in the absence 
of any expression of the intention of the parties, regard 
shall be had to what reasonable persons in the same situation 
would have intendedll.(4) The reasonableness is a question of 
fact to be determined in the light of the surrounding circums-
tances at the time of concluding the contract. This statement 
is clearly hYPotheticalf5) in addition, it may creat dif-
ficulty in practice since a reasonable buyer and a reasonable 
seller might well have intended quite different thingsf 6) 
150. Unforeseeability: other laws 
Under the Convention, by contrast, the test is quite 
different; it directly depends on the reasonable expectation 
of the non-performing party. So that, if a buyer, who reason-
ably expected the occurrence of some event, entered into a 
contract, he would take the risks of that event. In spite of 
this divergency between ULIS and the Convention, they are in 
----------------------~----
149- =) contract (ibid, IX, para. 1). 
3) In accordance with Art.8 of ULIS (supra, para. 21). 
4) Thus, the test is of objective nature (Document V/Prep/1, 
in Hague Conference, vol. 2 p 40). 
5) A/CN.9/125, and add 1-3 (ICC, para. 49). 
6) A/CN.9/87, annex 3.1 (the representative of UK, para. 2-c). 
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agreement to the effect that the foreseeability, contempla-
tion, expectation or the like is to be considered at the time 
of making the contract. 
In French Law, too, it is an essential requirement for 
establishing the force majeure that the intervening event was 
unforeseeable at the time of making the contract~1) This is 
not exactly the case in English Law where a distinction seems 
to have been made between whether the intervening event was 
foreseeable by both parties or only by the party who alleges 
frustration. 
In the latter Situation, that party cannot generally(2) 
plead frustration upon the occurrence of the foreseeable 
event~3) which is similar to both ULlS and the Convention. 
But in the former various rules are applied. Prima facie, a 
contract may be frustrated even though the parties fO~aw or 
ought to have foreseen the eventf4) and frustration in this 
case mainly depends on whether or not the contract includes a 
clause dealing with the event in question. If so, the general 
rule is that the doctrine does not apply but rather the 
parties' agreement~5) But this rule is subject to two exep-
tions where the doctrine applies to both; the first is the 
--------------~----~----------
150- 1) Carbonnier, para. 74. 
2) See Treitel, Law of Contract, pp 681 ff. 
3) Walton Harvex Ltd. v. Walker and Humfrays Ltd. [193] 1 
Ch. 274. 
4) Halsbury's Laws of England, vol.9 para. 456; see also 
Chitty, para. 1537. 
5) Chitty, ibid; Treitel, ibid, pp 675 f. 
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case in which the frustration is grounded on the illegality 
resulting, for example, from war~6) the second is where the 
I 
contingency assumes a more fundamental and serious form than 
the parties envisaged in their contract~7) BLlt if ~ l.o~tv-CL(" r do~S net \tAducAg c.1. C(CU(.\.e cledt.·~j w~~ ~e fyuS(Yr.L.b'v\j eUi.tt, ~"" tt 
is a matter of construction whether the parties intend that 
the event, if it occurs, does not affect the contract~8) , 
or they intend that the contract would be frustrated upon the 
occurrence of that event~9) 
Apart from the parties' agreement, it is obvious that the 
doctrine of f1exemptions" in the Convention concentrates on the 
foreseeability through the non-performing party while the view 
of the other party appears to be irrelevant. The result may be 
that the doctrine does not apply whenever the event, according 
to the appropriate test,was foreseeable by the non-performing 
buyer even if it was also foreseeable by the seller; and this 
understanding would lead, in some cases, to disagreement with 
English Law. 
151 • Irresistible events 
To exempt the buyer from liability for his non-perfor-
mance, it should also be proved that the unforeseeable event 
----~--------------------------
150- 6) Ertel Bieber and Co. v. Rio Tinto Co. Ltd. [91~ A.C.260. 
7) Cheshire, Fifoot and furmston, p 521; see e.g., Pacific 
Phosphate Co. Ltd. v. Empire Transport Co. Ltd. (1920) 36 
T.L.R. 750 fl ••• the change in circumstances was so great 
that the doctrine of frustration applied." 
8) See e.g., Ocean Tramp Tankers Corp. v. vlo Sovfracht (The 
Eugenia) ff96~ 2 Q.B. 226, 238-239. 
9) See Halsbury's Laws of Ensland, ibid; or they intend that 
the effect of the event, if it occurs, to be determined by 
any relevant legal rules (Chitty, ibid). 
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was irresistible. This requirement in ULIS and the Conven-
tion is in line with French Law~1) and it could be achieved , 
by proving that the buyer could not, in the language of the 
Convention, reasonably be expected to have avoided or overcome 
the impediment itself or its consequences. Again, the language 
of ULIS is different where the same formulation of the un£ore-
seeability test is used here; that is, the non-performance 
nwas due to circumstances which, according to the intention 
of the parties at the time of the concluSion of the contract, 
he(2) was not bound ••• to avoid or to overcome". And "in 
the absence of the intention of the parties, regard shall be 
had to what reasonable persons in the same situation would 
have intended." 
In the above discussion, some notable differences between 
the two laws have been shown; while ULIS uses the phrase 
II WlLS did to ClV"(.~StC4t( e5 .. ~_n and concentrates on the parties' 
intention or alternatively on the intention of reasonable 
buyer and seller, the approach of the Convention is completely 
different. Bearing that in mind, one may conclude that 
the requirement under the present discussion also manifests 
two differences between,them. 
The first is that the Convention requires that the buyer 
----------------------------
151- 1) Marty et Raynaud, para. 487. See also s.252.1 of CITe IIwhich 
••• cannot be averted by the party obliged ••• ", and sub-
section 2" ••• obstacles ••• which the debtor was bound to 
overcome or remove ••• shall not be considered as circums-
tances excluding responsibilityll. 
2) I.e.,the non-performing party. 
284 
could neither avoid nor overcome the impediment itself or, sub-
sequently, its effects. But ULIS only refers to the former, 
i.e., to the inability of avoiding or overcoming the inter-
vening event. This difference, as suggested, is of formal 
nature and it is therefore doubtful that it may give any 
practical benefit~3) 
The second is that the time of concluding the contract 
is, under ULIS, the only relevant time for determining whether 
or not the event is irresistible according to the proper test; 
but in the Convention no reference has been made to such time 
at all~4) This difference is of practical importance; at the 
time of making the contract, it might not be expected from the 
buyer, or from a reasonable buyer, to overcome the event but 
it might be so at a later time particularly at the time at 
which the event has occurred. This may be illustrated by the 
following example. 
Suppose that at the time the contract was made a buyer 
~a.A - only one place of business and one bank account in 
state (x). In an unexpected step, an exchange control was 
imposed by that state where it became impossible for him to 
remit the contract price. Suppose too that, at the time of 
----------------------------
151- 3) In the draft convention as approved by the W.G. the relevant 
wording was as the same as in ULIS; it had then been 
changed by UNCITRAL in its 10th session but the reason for 
that is not clear, see successively: AjCN.9/116, annex I, 
art.50.1; A/32j17, para. 35 (art.51 •1). 
4) Nor in CITC (5.252). 
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concluding the contract, he was not bound according to the 
appropriate test in ULIS to overcome that event. But ~~ ~ 
several bank accounts in several 
countries where he could readily remit the sum from any of 
those countries. In this setting, the buyer might, under ULIS 
but not the Convention, plead exemption even if he did not 
make any attempt to overcome the event or its consequences. 
It is therefore submitted that the approach of the latter is 
preferable to that of the former; the relevant factor should 
be whether he can avoid the occurrence of the event and if 
not,then whether he can overcome it or its consequences. So 
long as the contract is still alive, it seems that the (exact) 
time of his ability to do so, which is the case in ULIS, is 
immaterial. 
152. Onus of proof 
The question of onus of proof is clearly settled in ULIS 
and the Convention, and they are in agreement to this effect. 
In both, the onus is rested with the non-performing party who 
claims the application of the doctrine. In such a case, he 
should prove; firstly, the occurrence of the intervening event 
and that event was, at least in the Convention, beyond .his 
control; an~ secondly, that the event in question was, accord-
ing to the appropriate test, neither foreseeable nor resist~ 
ible. In short, he is deemed to be liable unless he proves 
all these matters~1) Likewise, Article 1147 of French Civil 
-
Code expressly provides that the debtor is liable unless he 
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proves that the inexecution resulted from a "cause etranger" 
which certainly includes the force majeure. So that the causa-
tion link between the debtor's conduct and the inexecution is 
presumed unless otherwise is proved~2) 
The approach followed in English Law is somewhat dif-
ferent where it has been held that once the supervening event 
has been proved which would, apart from the defendant's fault, 
frustrate the contract,the defence of frustration succeeds; 
this is so, unless the party alleging that the event was due 
to the other's fault, i.e., to "self-induced frustrationll 
proves that fault~3) In other words, the onus of proving 
the occurrence of the event lies upon the party relying on 
frustration and the proof of the fault is on the other party. 
-------------------------------
152- 1) In CITC too the burden of proof of both the impossibility 
of performance (s.249) and circumstances having the charac-
ter of force majeure (Kopac, p 85, comment on s.251) is 
rested with the debtor. But it should be not~that the 
unforeseeability is not specifically required by CITe for 
establishing the doctrine of force majeure (s.252; see also 
Kopac in his con~ent thereto). 
2) Mazeaud, t., 2, vol. 1, paras. 563, 571. 
3) JoseEh Constantine Steamship Line Ltd. v. Imperial Smelting 




153. Notice by the buyer 
The buyer who seeks exemption from liability is bound 
under the Convention to notify the seller of the impediment 
and its effects on his ability to perform. SUch a provision 
may not be found under the doctrine of frustration in English 
Law(1) or of force majeure in French Law; nor does ULIS adopt 
it though its adoption seems to be in conformity with both 
practice(2) and other legal instruments prepared for inter-
national tradef 3) 
If, however, the seller does not receive the notice 
within a reasonable time after the buyer knew or ought to have 
known of the impediment, the latter would be liable for 
damages resulting from such non-receipt. In this respect, 
two points should be observed. 
Firstly, the risk of delay, error or loss in the trans-
mission of the notice is to be born by the sender, which is 
----------~--------------------
153- 1) Nicholes, 48 Tul. L. Rev. 946,957. But it is familiar that 
a contract which includes a force majeure clause (supra, 
para. 144) provides for such a notice. 
2) See e.g., the following general conditions and standard 
contracts prepared by the ECE: s.10.2 of nos.188, 574 and 
730; s.18.2 of no.420j s.19.4 of no.IA (cereals: cif 
maritime); s.16.4 of no.5A (cereals: fob maritime). 
3) See e.g., s.248 of CITC (impossibility of performance); 
s.69 of COMECON General Conditions. A similar provision is 
adopted by DUSA (5.8.11-2,3). See also s.615-c of UCC = 
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contrary to the general rule in the Convention where the 
"despatch" theory has been adoPted~4) Secondly, the non-
receipt of the notice by the seller does not prevent the buyer 
from relying on the doctrine and its effects, but he would 
then be liable for any damages sustained by the seller because 
of such "non-receipt". Of course, this term includes both 
absolute "non-receipt"either because the buyer has never sent 
the notice or because it has been lost in transmission, and 
improper receipt, e.g., a delay in transmitting the notice. 
Finally, it is to be noted that the duty to notify 
extends to the situation in which the buyer intends to perform, 
by furnishing a commercially reasonable SUbstitute(5) in com-
pliance with his duty to avoid or overcome the impediment or 
its consequences; for example, he may remit the price in a 
currency different from that required by the contract. 
154. Third person's failure 
Art.79.2 of the Convention reads: "If the party's 
failure is due to the failure by a third person whom he has 
engaged to perform the whole or part of the contract, that 
party is exempt from liability only if: (a) he is exempt under 
the preceding paragraph; and (b) the person whom he has so 
engaged would be so exempt if the provisions of that paragraph 
1 · d t hi II (1) were app 1e 0 m. 
-------------------------------
153- =) (the non-performing party is the seller). 
4) Supra, para. 59. 
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This provision is completely new and therefore has no 
counterpart in ULIS. Originally, it was intended to apply it 
only to the seller who might engage with a sUb-contractor to 
perform any of his obligations arising from the original 
contractf1) and so was the draft text as adopted by the 
Working Group~2) For example (A), who is a seller of a 
machine, may contract with (B) to manufacture some of its 
parts; suppose that (B) does not perform his obligation 
towards (A) who, consequently, cannot perform his obligations 
towards the original purchaser. In this setting, (A) would be 
exempt f'rom liability only if both (A) and (B) have met the 
requirements of the doctrine as discussed above. So, for 
instance, if (B)IS non-performance was due to his fault, (A) 
would be liable even if his non-performance was beyond his 
control. 
But at the 10th session of UNCITRAL the word "seller" was 
replaced by the word "party" without giving any reason justi-
fying that change~3) In addition, the representatives at the 
Conference were in disagreement about the purpose and extent 
of the text~4) 
-------------------------------
153- 5) A/CN.9/116, annex 2, comment on art.50, para. 13; A/CONF. 
97/5, comment on art.65, para. 16. 
154- 1) For a legislative background of the text, see the documents 
cited in note 1 of para. 122, supra. 
-= 
2) A/CN.9/116, annex I, art. 50.2. 
3) A/32/17, para. 35, art.51.2; the text was adopted by 
UNCITRAL after approving it by Committee of the Whole I 
established by the Commission; see the debate of the 
Committee, ibid, annex I, paras. 446-450. 
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However, as to form the text is not free from criticism 
where the phrase lithe whole of the contract" seems to be 
inaccurate. It is granted that a party to a contract may 
be able to engage with a third person to perform all his 
obligations at the very most; but by no means can he require 
that person to perform the whole of the contract. Obviously, 
this is the draftsments intention. As to substance, the 
provision in its current form applies to both the seller and 
buyer. But its background, where the debate was mostly con-
cerned with the seller's non-performance, gives no guide..Unes 
about the application of the text to the buyer's failure to 
perform. ( 5 ) 
As far as the non-payment of the price is concerned, how-
ever, it may be that that text applies where the buyer pays 
the price, for example, by a (confirmed) letter of credit; 
suppose that the issuing bank has not properly performed his 
duty, the result of which is that the actual payment to the 
seller has delayed. In this case, it is possible to exonerate 
the buyer from liability for the delay(6) if the requirements 
of lfexemptions U by applying them to both the buyer and issuing 
bank are satisfied. 
-----~--------------------------
154- 4) See in detail the debate of the First Committee in its 27th, 
32nd and 33rd meeting$, in A/CONF.97/19 particularly pp 379 
(para. 24) and 380 (paras. 36-45). 
5) See, however, the example given by Adal (of Turkey) who 
proposed the deletion of the text n ••• a buyer might excuse 
late payment on the ground that those who owed him money 
were also late with their payments ", (ibid, P 378, para. 
21). But it is submitted that the text may never be applied= 
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Finally, it may be useful in this connexion to point out 
that it has been held in English Law that the seller must be 
treated, for the purpose of exempting him from liability for 
damages, as occupying the position of the sub-contractor. 
Thus, the former cannot rely on any defence which the latter 
would be disabled from relying upon~7) This principle shows, 
to some extent, a similarity with the Convention. It has been 
argued, on the other hand, that the buyer's duty to furnish a 
documentary credit is not excused, also in English Law, by a 
delay caused by factors beyond his control~8) Thus, in one 
case the delay was not literally due to the buyer's failure 
to open the credit but rather to the issuing bank. Never-
theless, it was held that the seller, who accordingly avoided 
the contract, was not liable for damages~9) 
------------------------------
154- =) to this setting. 
6) On the assumption that the mere opening of the credit does 
not discharge, as has been held, the buyer from his obliga-
tion; and this 1s so unless there are circumstances from which 
it could be inferred that the opening of credit is to be 
regarded as an absolute payment. See e.g., E.D. & F. Mann 
Ltd. v. Nigerian Sweets and Confectionery Co. Ltd. [97~ 2 
Lloyd's Rep.50; W.J. Alan and Co. Ltd. v. £1 Nasr Export 
and Import Co. ff97~ 2 Q.B. 189. A similar principle is 
expressly stated in CITC (s.349). 
7) Lebeaupin v. Richard Crispin and Co. [92ru 2 K.B.714,718. 
8) Benjamin, para. 2172. 
9) A.E. Lindsay and Co. Ltd. v. Cook ff95~ 1 Lloyd's Rep.328. 
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155. No damages 
One of the main effects of the doctrine, and sometimes 
the only effect, in both ULIS and the Convention is that the 
buyer is not liable for damages for his failure to perform~1) 
This is so whether the intervening event is permanent or 
temporary and irrespective of whether the contract has been 
avoided or, in the latter Situation, remains alive. A similar 
principle is applied in French Law in respect of force 
majeure$2) 
In English Law, too, where the contract is frustrated 
neither party is liable for damages for the failure of mak-
ing further performance~3) If, however, the event impeding 
performance is only temporary, the position of the case law 
is not clear. For example, it has been held that temporary 
impediments only suspend, but don't dissolve, the contract. 
In that case, however, the defendant remains liable in 
damage sf 4) and this excludes, as has been said, the 
possibility that a temporary event, while not bringing the 
contract to an end, might be a defence to an action for damages 
for the delay in performance~5) But in contracts for personal 
----~-------------------~-----
155- 1) A similar principle is also applied in both DUSA (5.8.11) 
and CITe (s.250) despite the fact that the latter distin-
guishes between impossibility of performance, force majeure 
and frustration (55.245-252,275). 
2) Article 1147 of C.C. (cause etrangere). 
3) See e.g., Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Com~. 
Barbour, Ltd. ff94~ A.C. 32,70. But it has been noted that the 
philosophy of English Law with relation to the non-liability: 
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services it has been held that temporary illness, while not 
discharging the contract, will excuse the temporary non-
performance of the employee~6) Furthermore, it will be seen 
below that a temporary event may, in certain circumstances, 
lead to frustrationf 7) 
It is submitted, on the other hand, that the buyer's non-
liability includes both damages in the narrow sense and 
interest although a literal construction of Ar~83 of ULIS 
may lead to a different understanding. This article provides 
that nwhere the breach ••• consits of delay in payment, ••• 
the seller shall in any event be entitled to interest ••• n. 
It is suggested that the underlined words don't embrace the 
doctrine of Itexemptions"; rather, they refer to the fact that 
the buyer is bound to pay interest even if the seller has 
suffered no loss which is completely irrelevant to such a 
claim~8) 
-----------------------------
155- =) is different from that of French Law (Nicholas, 48 ~. 
L. Rev. 946, 956). 
4) Hadley v. Clarke (1799)8 T.R.259 ;E.R. (101) 1377; see 
also Jackson v. The Union Marine Insurance Co. Ltd. (1874) 
L.R. 10 C.P. 125, 135. 
5) Nicholas, 27 A.J.C.L. 1979, P 236. 
6) Who, further, must be paid wages during his absence, see 
Marrison v. Bell 0939J 2 K.B. 187 ; see also Cheshire, 
Fifoot and Furmston, pp 516, 525. But it has been sugges-
ted that this is not frustration in the strict sense, 
because the usual consequences of frustration do not apply 
(Chitty, para. 1534). 
7) Post, para. 157. 
8) Supra, para. 96. 
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Finally, it is to be remembered that the buyer is also 
exonerated from liability in case of anticipatory breach when 
such breach is inferred from circumstances other than the 
buyer's words or conduct!9) 
156. Effects on avoidance 
While the principle of non-liability for damages clearly 
shows a great similarity, and sometimes a conformity, 
between the various laws relevant to this study, the effects 
of the doctrine on the existence of the contract demonstrate, 
on the contrary, considerDhle differences between them. 
In English Law, a frustrating event brings the contract 
to an end automatically irrespective of the parties' will~1) 
French Law approach is quite different although it may, in 
some cases, lead to a similar result. As has been indicated, 
the doctrine of frustration in the former is broadly con-
cerned with the contract as a whole, while the force majeure 
in the latter is linked with the obligation arising from the 
contract~2) Thus, in a given case it is possible in French 
Law that some of the contractual obligations extinguish as a 
result of a force majeure event while other obligations survive. 
Once again, this view is generally(3) strange to a Common 
Lawyer whose doctrine of frustration is applied to the con-
tract as a whole or, as said, to nothing~4) 
------~----------------------
155- 9) Supra, para. 66. 
156- 1) Supra, para. 144. 
2) SUEra, para. 145. 
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However, the force majeure in French Law may lead to an 
automatic avoidance depending upon the nature of the obliga-
tion that has been affected by the intervening event. So far 
as payment of the price is concerned, this occurs as follows: 
Once the payment becomes impossible, it automatically extin-
guishes; at the same time, the correlative obligation of the 
seller, say the delivery, also extinguishes. The result is 
then clear; the contract becomes automatically avoided by 
operation of law~5) Contrary to the general rule!6) the 
court has no discretion in the matter; its role is confined to 
ascertaining whether or not the conditions of force majeure 
(7) have been met; if so, it is then bound to announce avoidance 
which is presumed to have already taken place. 
The approach of the Convention is different from that 
followed in either English or French Law. It includes no 
reference to the effect that the contract (or any of its 
obligations) becomes automatically avoided as a result of an 
obstacle impeding performance. On the other hand, it expressly 
provides that the doctrine of exemptions, while excluding 
liability for non-performance, does not prevent either party 
from exercising any right other than to claim damages~8) This 
language may lead to the conclusion that the contract may never 
come to an end automatically. Certainly, this is true where the 
-------------------------------
156- 3) See the authorities cited in para. 145, note 10, supra. 
4) Nicholas, ibid, p 235. 
5) Mazeaud, t., 2, vol. 1, particularly paras. 580 and 1110. 
6) Supra, para. 20. 
7) Mazeaud, ibid, para. 1110. 
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event is temporary which needs further d consi eration below; 
but when that event or say its effect on performance is 
permanent, it is submitted that the question becomes outside 
the scope of the Convention and this was indeed the clear 
intention of the draftsmenf 9) 
ULIS' approach, in contrast, raises two points. In the 
first place, it expressly states that the doctrine of exemp-
tions does not exclude the right of avoiding the contract~10) 
which literally means, like the Convention, that an interven-
ing event may never lead to an automatic avoidance. In the 
second place, it provides that the non-performing party is 
permanently relieved of his obligation if, by reason of 
temporary events, performance would be radically changed from 
that contemplated by the contract~11) Apparently, these words 
mean that the obligation automatically extinguishes in these 
circumstances~12) The question is therefore whether it is 
possible to assume that permanent events automatically result 
------------------------------
156- 8) Art.79.5, supra, para. 142. 
9) In the draft convention as approved by UNCITRAL in its 10th 
session (A/32/17, para. 35) the text of art.51.3 was tithe 
exemption ••• has effect only for the period during which 
the impediment exists". But at the Conference, the word 
tlonlyU- was deleted as(an alternative)best solution based on 
the understanding that that paragraph and even the whole of 
the article did not contain a provision regulating a possible 
permanent relief (A/CONF.97/19, particularly p 381, paras. 
52-53). 
10) Art.74.3 (supra, para. 142). 
11) Art.74.2 (supra, para. 142); see below, para 157. 
12) Below, para. 157. 
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in extinguishing the obligation since events of temporary 
nature may lead to such a result. 
However, it is submitted that ULIS and, as has just been 
indicated, the Convention have only faced the situation in 
which intervening events are of temporary nature, while the 
other situation, i.e., where those events are permanent, is 
outside the scope of the relevant provisions of either inso-
far as avoidance is concerned. 
157. Temporary events and avoidance 
According to the Convention,therefore,intervening events 
may never bring the contract to an automatic avoidance; 
nor can the non-performing buyer avoid it merely because the 
delay in performance renders it something completely different 
from that contemplated by the parties. In short, the position 
of the Convention is that avoidance in such a case is subject 
to the same principles applied to avoidance in general. Accord-
ingly, either party is entitled to avoid(1) the contract only 
on the ground of either the fundamental breach(2) or additional 
time notice. The remedy of avoidance is to be sought elsewhere 
in this work. Indeed, many attempts were made(3) to the effect 
-------------------------------
157- 1) See Art.79.5 (supra, para. 142). 
2) See A/32/17, annex I, para. 453. 
3) See e.g., A/CN.9/87, para. 115 (alternatives A and B), and 
annex 3-1, para. 5.i; A/CN.9/100 , annex 2-VI, para. 12 (art. 
76 bis); A/32/17, annex I, para. 451; A/CONF.97/19, p 134 
(a proposal by Norway for amending paragraph 3). 
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that the new convention should include a rule similar to that 
expressed in both ULIS and English Law~4) but all those 
attempts had failed~5) 
Thus, the Convention sharply differs from ULIS in respect 
of this point where the rule under the latter is that the non-
performing party is relieved of his obligation if, by reason 
of the delay resulting from temporary events, performance would 
be so radically changed as to amount to the performance of an 
obligation quite different from that contemplated by the con-
tract~6) Certainly, this provision f'inds its substance Wlder 
the doctrine of frustration in English Law(7) where in these 
circumstances the contract is frustrated~8) However, the 
language of ULIS is somewhat questionable; it refers to the 
relief of the obligation affected by the intervening event, 
which mostly means an automatic relief by operation of law. 
The question whiCh arises here is:. Why this result is to be 
imposed upon the non-performing party who may not, for 
any reason, wish it?(9) Moreover, it is not clear from 
--------------------------------
157- 4) And, as has been said, similar to the fltheorie de l'impre-
vision" in French Law, see A/CONF.97/19, P 381, para. 58. 
5) See A/CN.9/100, para. 107; A/32/17, annex I, para. 453; 
A/CONF.97/19, p 382, para. 68. 
6) A general principle to this effect is also stated in CITe 
(s.275.1) which adds n ••• neither a change in the financial 
standing of the debtor, nor a change in the economic situa-
tion in his country, nor a change of the conditions exist-
ing in intert\o.bot\D-\ trade constitutes such change of circums-
tances". 
7) Cf., note 4 above. 
-8) See supra, paras. 144, 147. 
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the text what is the effect of the relief on the contract 
as a whole or on other Ob\\~o. tions arising from the contract; 
and this means that the solution is to be concluded from the 
general principles on which ULIS is based~10) 
It is important to note, however, that the relief does 
not exclude the avoidance of the contract under other pro-
visions of ULIS(.11) A d' 1 th t t· ccor 1ng y, e par y expec 1ng perfor-
mance is entitled to avoid the contract even before the inter-
vening event is removed if the requirements of avoidance are 
satisfied, which is the same, as has just been seen, in the 
Convention. 
158. Effects on demanding payment 
Of course, this question does not raise any difficulty 
in either English or French Law when performance becomes 
absolutely or say permanently impossible as a result of 
frustrating or force majeure events. In brief, in no case can 
the seller demand payment in such an event; this is due to the 
fact that the contract as a whole, or at least the obligation 
in French Law, does not exist any more. If, however, the 
event is temporary, then performance according to French Law 
is suspended for the period during which that event (or its 
------------------------------
157- 9) Cf., a proposal which was presented to the W.G. by the 
-
representative of U.K. to the effect that the non-performing 
party "may declare the contract avoidedt1 in those circums-
tances (A/CN.9/100, annex 2, ibid.). 
10) In accordance with Art.17. 
11) Para. 3 of Art.74 (supra, para. 142). 
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effect on performance) exists~1) This is not exactly the 
case in English Law where a sharp distinction has been made 
between whether performance, if resumed, would be some thing 
radically changed from that contracted for or not. Some 
aspects of this question has already been considered~2) In 
the latter situation, however, it may be that the party wait-
ing performance is entitled to require it as soon as the event 
ceases to exist. But it is important to remember that tempo-
rary events, according to some cases, have no effect what-
ever~3) 
In ULIS and the Convention, by contrast, the question 
under the present discussion is not expressly solved. Putting 
aside the case in which intervening events are permanent, which 
has already been considered, it is submitted that the seller 
in not entitled to require payment as long as those events 
exist; and this seems to be a corollary of the doctrine. Not-
withstanding that, many suggestions to this effect(4) were 
rejected by the draftsmen of the convention~5) instead, Art. 
79.5 reads ffNothing in this article prevents either party from 
exercising any right other than to claim damages under this 
Convention". The apparent meaning of these words is that a 
party can claim performance, say payment of the price, even if 
------------------------------
158- 1) Marty et Raynaud, paras., 287,491 ; Carbonnier, para. 84. 
2) See s~pra, paras. 144, 147, 155 and 157. 
3) Supra, para. 156. 
4) See e.g., A/CN .• 9/87,annexes 3.1 and 3.IX, paras. 5.ffi and 1 
respectively; A/32/17, annex I, paras. 435 and 455 ~; 
A/CONF.97/19, p 134-135 (F.R. of Germany). 
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the impediment is not yet removed. But it is doubtful to 
assume that this conclusion is strictly intended~6) rather, 
• 
a distinction should be drawn between whether or not the 
impediment still exists. If so, the seller cannot, as sub-
mitted, claim performance; if not, then performance should be 
resumed whereupon he would be entitled to such a Claim~7) 
159. Failure caused by Seller 
Article 80 of the Convention provides that: 
"A party cannot rely on a failure of the other party to 
perform, to extent that such failure was caused by the first 
party's act or omisSionU.( 1 ) 
Assuming, in principle, that this provision is of 
general nature and not confined to the doctrine of l1 exemptions", 
the main area in which it operates in practice is the remedy of 
damages~2) To illustrate, suppose that the buyer's non-payment 
------------------------~-----
158- 5) See A/32/17, annex It para. 456; A/CONF.97/19, p 385, 
para. 44. 
6) See, however, A/CONF.97/5, comment on art.65, para. 9, where 
it is considered that the other party retains the right to 
require performance, and it is a matter of domestic law as 
to whether a court will order a party to perform in these 
circumstances and subject him to the sanctions provided in 
its procedural law for continued non-performance. 
7) See also the debate on that text in A/CONF.97/19, pp 383-
385, particularly paras. 18,25,26,32 and 34. 
159- 1) The text was added at the Conference according to a proposal 
submitted by Maskow (German D.R.); see A/CONF.97/19, 
pp 135,386 (paras. 50-64), 393(paras. 1-10), 164 (art.65 bis) 
and 227 (paras. 28-31). 
302 
in time was due to the seller's failure to nominate the bank 
through which the credit was to be opened; or that the latter 
has shown, without reservation, that he would accept payment 
in a currency other than that required by the contract, which 
has then been devalued~3) In these two settings, it might be 
that the seller couldnit claim damages. But this principle 
applies only to the extent that the buyer's failure was 
caused by the former's act or omission. So, for instance, if 
in the above example part of the price was to be paid by a 
cheque and the balance by a bank to be nominated by the 
seller who failed to make such nomination, the principle would 
be applied to the latter situation but not to the former. It 
is the task of the court or arbitral tribunal to determine to 
what extent the seller's behaviour has caused the buyer's 
failure~4) It has been observed, further, that the principle 
---------------------------
159- 2) See also 5.255 of CITe which reads "If the damage which was 
simultaneously caused by non-performance of a contractual 
or other duty of the injured party, such party shall bear 
a proportionate part of the damage". In French Law too the 
general rule in case of IIfaute commune" is that the victim 
is responsible for damage caused by his fault; see Mazeaud, 
t.2, vol. 1, para. 594; see also Starck, para. 2083. 
3) See W.J. Alan and Co. Ltd. v. El Nasr §3Port and Import Co. 
[97~ 2 Q.B.189. 
4) The original words of the proposal which were 11 ••• in so 
far as ••• ft had been described as sufficiently elastic to 
allow the court to determine each party's share of the 
responsibility, see A/CONF.97/19, P 393, para. 7 • 
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applies even if the seller's act or omission does not con-
stitute fault~5) 
However, this principle has been inserted in the Con-
vention under the doctrine of II exemptions" although there was 
a suggestion to place it under the title of tlGeneral Pro-
visions l1 .(6) In spite of that, it was noticed at the con-
ference that such a rule had been set out once and for all in 
Ar~ 7 of the Convention; by virtue of the principle of good 
faith stated in that article, one could not take advantage of 
a failur·e of his own which impeded the other party from per-
forming his obligations~7) It was also noted that such a 
rule constituted a basic principle underlying the whole Con-
vention and, accordingly, there was no need to state it in a 
particular provision~8) 
With relation to the doctrine of "exemptions" in parti-
cular, the main purpose of the principle is to cover the situa-
tion in which one of the parties is unable to perform any of 
his obligations because of an impediment beyond his control. 
In such an event, account should also be taken of the case in 
which the failure to perform could be imputed to the act or 
omission of the other partyS9) This party may not, for 
example, be entitled to avoid the contract. In short, it is 
--------~-----------~--------
159- 5) Ibid. 
6) That was the other alternative of the proposal; see also 
the debate on the text, ibid, paras. 1 ff. 
7) Ibid., p 386, para. 55. 
8) Ibid., para. 60. 
9) Ibid., para. 50. 
304 
generally agreed that a party Should not have rights based 
on his own (wrongful) action~10) 
In ULIS a particular reference is made to the remedy of 
avoidance~11) 
• 
an exemption given to one party does not 
deprive the other of his right to avoid the contrac~unless 
the circumstances entitling the exemption were caused by the 
act of the other party or of some person for whose conduct he 
was responsible. For instance, a seller may change his place 
of business at which payment should be made~12) and because 
of that the buyer may fail to make payment; if, in this 
setting, the requirements of exempting the buyer from 
liability have been satisfied, the seller cannot rely on the 
buyer's failure for avoiding the contract. 
--------~----------------------
159- 10) Honnold Uniform Law, para. 436. 
11) As well as to the reduction of the price which is a 
buyer's remedy, see Arts.74.3 (supra, para. 142) and 41 
of ULIS. 
12) Which is the general rule as regards place of payment 
under both ULIS (Art. 59) and the Convention (Art. 57); see 
supra, para. 9. 
CHAPTER V: 
SUSPENSION OF PERFORMANCE 
305 
160. Introduction 
In addition to the remedies discussed above, i.e., 
avoidance, damages and recovery of the price, the aggrieved 
seller has also been given, in both ULIS and the Convention, 
the right to suspend the performance of any of his obliga-
tions on the ground of what may be described buyer's "pros-
pective breach". The grounds and effects of this remedy are 
completely different from those relating to the remedy of 
"avoidance" when it is based on the "anticipatory breachll 
which has already been considered in this stUdy~1) It will 
be noted, on the other hand, that the grounds for suspending 
performance under the Convention are different from those 
adopted by ULIS; in addition, the former provides for the 
effects of suspension while those effects seem to have inten-
tionally been ignored by ULIS. It is to be observed, further, 
that the expression IIsuspension of performance" also covers 
the seller's right to stop the goods in transit though, 
strictly speaking, this may not be the situation in theory. 
At least in the Convention, however, the stoppage in transit 
is clearly deemed to be an application of the doctrine of 
suspension~2 ) 
--~----------------------------
160- 1) Supra, Ch.I, s.IV.1. 
2) See the first sentence of para.3 of Art.71 (post, para.176). 
Under both ULIS and the Convention, however, the remedy of 
suspension including the stoppage in transit has been 
inserted in one article. 
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On the other hand, both laws clearly indicate that the 
seller is entitled to withhold delivery of goods where the 
buyer's breach is actual~3) But the main questions con-
cerning this remedy find no answer under either law with the 
exception of certain rules concerning in particular som~ but 
not all, effects resulting from it. 
Finally, it may be useful to point out in advance that 
although the aggrieved seller has been given, under both 
English and French Law, the right to withhold delivery or 
even to stop the goods in transit, the "suspension of perfor-
mance" as recognized by ULIS and the Convention has no 
counterpart in either. LikeWise, the philosophy of the French 
principle of tlexceptio non adimpleti contractus" which also 
means suspension of performance is quite different from that 
on which this remedy in international sale is based. 
All these matters will be examined in the subsequent 
discussion under two headings as follows: 
Section 1 : Availability of Suspension 
Section 2 : Effects of Suspension. 
-----------------------------------




1. Grounds for suspension 
Art. 73.1 of ULIS provides that: 
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ItEach party may suspend the performance o£ his obliga-
tions whenever, after the conclusion of the contract, the 
economic situation of the other party appears to have become 
so difficult that there is good reason to fear that he will 
not perform a material part of his obligations." 
While Ar~ 71.I of the Convention(1) provides that: 
itA party may suspend the performance of his obligations 
if, a£ter the conclusion of the contract, it becomes apparent 
that the other party will not perform a substantial part of his 
obligations as a result of: 
(a) a serious deficiency in his ability to perform or 
in his credit-worthiness; or 
(b) his conduct in preparing to perform or in 
ing the contract." 
perform-
In addition, there are some other relevant provisions 
which will be referred to in the subsequent discussion. 
--------------------------------
161- 1) For a legislative background of the whole Article, see the 
following documents successively: A/CN.9/87, annex 4, 
paras.49 ff; paras.90 ff of the original document, and 
annex I (art.73); A/CN.9/100, paras.100-101, and annex I, 
art. 47(73); A/CN.9/116, art.47; A/32/17 (annex I, paras. = 
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162. ULIS 
So the seller's right to suspend performance turns, 
under ULIS, on two main factors. 
It presumes, in the first place, that after the con-
clusion of the contract, the "economic situationu (1) of the 
buyer "appears to have become so difficult n. This statement 
seems to be vague and may therefore raise many difficulties 
in practice~2) The key question is whether there must be a 
change for the worse in the economic situation of the buyer 
after making the contract, o~ I~ tt\5 Sufficient that such bad 
situation, on the assumption that it has already existed, 
becomes apparent after that time. Obviously, the answer to 
this question is very important in practice. To illustrate, 
suppose that the buyer's financial position was, while making 
the contract, so difficult; but this fact has not come to the 
seller's intention until a later time. In this setting, the 
question is whether the seller can suspend performance irres-
pective of the fact that the buyer's position remains as the 
same as it was at the time of concluding the contract; or he 
cannot do so since it is his duty to investigate that position 
---------------------------------
161- =) 398 ff) and para.35 (art.4B); A/33/17, para.28(art.62); 
A/CONF.97/19,pp 129-130,374-378,419-422,162 (art.62), 
218-219 (paras.38-59) and 220 (paras.11-17). 
162- 1) It has been observed that this expression is broader than 
"financial position" which was adopted by draft ULIS of 
1956 (Graveson and Cohn, pp 93 f). 
2) As to criticism of the text in general, see A/eN.9/87, 
particularly paras. 91, 93 and 99, and annex 4, paras.50 
ff. 
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before entering into a contract with the buyer. 
In solving this problem, domestic laws may be categorized 
into two groUps~3) The first adopts the former solution(4) 
while the other follows the latter~5) As to ULIS, it seems 
that Art. 73 above is not free from difficulties of interpreta-
tion in practice. It may be said, on the one hand, that the 
purpose of the word lIappear(s)" is that theteconomic situa-
tion of the buyer was bad or even hopeless when making the 
contract does not matter provided that the true position was 
not then flapparentUS6) On the other hand, it is quite 
possible to suggest that the phrase IIhave become so difficult" 
necessarily requires that the buyer's economic situation has, 
subsequent to the contract, changed to the worse to the extent 
that such new bad situation becomes "apparent" and this may 
be, it is submitted, the true position of ULTS. In draft ULTS 
of 1956, which was the basis of the current text , 
the relevant provision was clear to the effect that the dif-
ficulty in the buyer's (financial) situation should have 
occurred subsequent to the contract~7) and this was also the 
--~~--------------------------~--
162- 3) See Cohn, 23 ICLQ 1974, P 525. 
4) See Cohn, ibid (note 12), who referred to Art.1461 of 
Italian e.c. and ss.1025, 1066 of Austrian ABGB. 
5) See eg., Art.1613 of French C.C. which will be considered 
below (para. 168); see also Treitel, Remedies, s.189,who 
referred to Art.321 of German C.C. (BGB). This approach is 
followed by the SGA with respect to the seller's lien 
(post, para. 168). 
6) This appears to be the opinion of Cohn, ibid; but as 
regards the word "apparentll see below, para. 163. 
7) Article 82 of the draft. 
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draftsmen's express intention~8) But it is worth noting 
that the draft text did not contain the word "appear(s)" 
which came into existence at a later stage. 
On the other hand, what the word "appears" used in the 
text means is not clear. It may indicate, as said, that the 
buyer's economic situation must be known within interested 
business circ,es-j.(9) but it is possible to say that the 
seller's own knowledge of this fact is sufficient(10) which 
may mean that this word refers to a subjective factor(11) 
Finally, the whole phrase "the economic situation of the other 
party appears to have become so difficult" has been criticised 
on the ground that it is too SUbjective(12) and, therefore, 
the evaluation of the buyer's economic situation is left to 
the seller's judgment~13) 
The second factor is that the foregoing test constitutes 
good reason to fear that the buyer will not perform a material 
part of his obligations. Setting aside the nature of breach 
for the moment, it may be that this statement is objective in 
nature; it does not depend upon the seller's own view, but 
rather upon the judgment of a reasonable person to be put in 
the same situation of the seller~14) 
----------------------------------
162- 8) Document V/Prep/1, report on arts. 82 and 83. 
9) Cohn, p 526. 
10) See the examples given by the S.G. in A/CN.9/87, annex 4, 
paras. 52, 56. 
11) See A/CONF.97/19, P 432, paras. 2 (Wang of China). 
12) A/CN.9/87, para. 93. 
13) Ibid, annex 4, para. 50. 
14) See Cohn, pp 523 f. 
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In any case, it is beyond doubt that almost all the 
expressions used by ULlS for determining the appropriate test 
of suspension are elastic and therefore liable to different 
interpretations; so that it is not easy to envisage theori-
tically the real meaning of "economic si tuation'~ flappearstl, 
"So difficult", ugood reason", lito fear ll and lor "material 
part" t which have been used for establishing the test. In 
brie;it is the task of court or arbitral tribunal to deter-
mine, on a case by case basis, both the meaning of each of 
these terms and whether the test has met its conditions. 
163. The Convention 
The test of suspending performance under ULlS as a whole 
has essentially been changed so far as the Convention is con-
cerned. The main aspects of similarity and dissimilarity 
between the two laws will be considered below, and it suffices 
here to point out the two ingredients of the new test. 
The first is dependant upon the fact that the buyer will 
commit a breach; that is, "if, after the conclusion of the 
contract, it becomes apparent" that he "will not perform. a 
material part of his obligations". This statement makes it 
clear, on the one hand, that what should be "apparentll is the 
buyer's prospective breach and, on the other, that it suf-
fices for satisfying the test that this fact becomes apparent 
after making the contract. Thus, it is immaterial that the 
grounds for breach, which constitute the second ingredient 
of the test, already existed at the time the contract was 
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concluded; what is crucial is whether the prospective non-
performance based upon such grounds becomes apparent after-
(1 ) 
wards. Moreover, the word II apparent" in the text seems 
to refer to an objective fact:or~2) This means, that the 
question does not turn on the seller's own judgment, but 
rather on a reasonable seller to be put in the same circums-
tances. 
The second ingredient is that the buyer's prospective 
breach should be inferred from one of the following events 
Firstly, a serious IIdefiCiencyl1(3) in his "abilityll(4) 
to perform or in his creditworthiness. In reality, the 
buyer's inability to make payment arises, in most cases, from 
a deficiency in his creditworthiness. But this is not 
------------------------------
163- 1) The draft text as approved by UNCITRAL at its 10th session 
adopted another view and this was the main purpose of a 
proposal submitted by F.R. of Germany to the Conference, 
which had been adopted, see /A/CONF.97/19, pp 129,374-376 
(paras.4D-70);also p 431, paras. 95, 99-100 and 106. 
2) Ibid, p 431 particularly the speech made by Gregoire 
(France) on behalf of the ad hoc Working Group established 
for considering and submitting a proposed text; see also 
ibid, p 432, para.2. However, while discussing the text 
there was a clear divergency about which of the following 
words is best suited to the test:-"apparent", "appears", 
"evident" or IIclear". 
3) The word "deterioration" which appeared in the draft con-
vention as approved by UNCITRAL had been replaced at the 
Conference by the word "deficiency". See, however, the 
comment of both Honnold (US) and Ziegel (Canada) on the 
latter word (ibid, p 375, paras. 51, 58). 
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necessarily the case. In his comment on the draft convention, 
the S.G. has indicated that the circumstances justifying the 
suspension of performance may relate to general conditions 
so long as those conditions affect the other party's ability 
to perform; for example, the outbreak of war may lead to the 
fact that one of the parties will not perform his Obligation~;) 
or the excahnge control imposed by the buyer's country where 
he becomes, as a result, unable to perform. In short, the 
cause of the buyer's inability to make payment is immaterial; 
nor is it relevant that his pro~ective non-performance might 
be e~cused on the ground of extraneous causes beyond his 
control. 
It is to be noted, on the other hand, that a man may be 
liable to some deficiency in his creditworthiness or even to 
loss in his trade which is not unusual in normal commercial 
life. And that is perhaps the reason why the Convention 
requires that the deficiency should be serious which is a 
question of fact to be determined in the light of all surround-
ing circumstances. 
Secondly,. the buyer's conduct in preparing to perform 
. , 
or in, performing the contract. As to .the former situation 
--------------------------------
163- 4) Again, the word flcapacityl1 was used in UNCITRAL's draft text. 
But it was noted that that word also referred to insane 
people (A/CN.9/125 and ad.d 1 to 3-US, para. 23.h);and that 
was, perhaps, the reason for replacing it at the Conference 
by l1ability". 
5) A/CN.9/116, annex 2, comment on art. 47, para.4;A/CONF.97/5, 
comment on art. 62, para.4. 
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it may be interesting to remember Art. 54 of the Convention 
which reads:- liThe buyer's obligation to pay the pri~e 
includes taking such steps and complying with such formali-
ties as may be required under the contract or any laws and 
regulations to enable payment to be mad~f6) So that even 
the primary actions taken by the buyer for timely payment are 
regarded as a part of his obligation to pay the price~6) 
However, no practical benefit could be gained from distingui-
shing between whether the buyer's prospective breach is due 
to his conduct in preparing to perform or in performing the 
contract, since either justifies the seller's suspension of 
performance. It should be noted, further, that the language 
of the relevant provision seems to confine its application to 
the situation in which the buyer violates the same contract. 
So, for instance, if the same buyer and seller enter into two 
separate contracts and the former violates one of them, the 
latter cannot, as suggested, suspend the performance of the 
other; this is so unless of course the prospective non-
performance of this contract is based on the first ground, 
i.e., on a serious deficiency in the buyer's ability to perform 
or in his creditworthiness. 
164. Prospective breach 
According to the above provisions in both ULIS and t~ 
Convention, the seller's right of suspending performance is 
------------------------------
163- 6) §upra, para. 8; see also A/CONF.97/5, comment on art. 50, 
para.2; Honnold, Uniform Law, para. 323. 
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conf'ined to the situations in which the buyer "will not 
perform ••• " his obligations, i.e., to the case where the 
breach is "anticipatory" and not actual~1) but to distinguish , 
it from the anticipatory breach which has already been 
examined(2) it may be wise to describe the breach here as 
"prospective". And this fact obviously caused many diffi-
culties to the draftsmen of the Convention especially at the 
Conference where one of the main questions was: Why there 
should be different provisions governing the same type of 
breach? Was it possible to lump them together(3)? It was 
noted, for example, that Ar~71 (prospective breach) was 
superfluous unless it had been included in the form of an 
addition to Art. 72(4) (anticipatory breach); and if the word 
"apparent" under the former were to be replaced by "clear" as 
was Buggested~5) then the whole relationship between the two 
provisions would become meaningless and the structure would 
collapse \6) As a result, the provision under the present 
discussion (Art 71) came into existence in a form separate 
from Art .. 72. 
----------~-------------------
164- 1) The same may be true with respect to CITC (ss.213,363),UCC 
(s.2-609.I), DUSA(s.8.7-I) and some other domestic laws such 
as German and Swiss law (Treitel, Remedies, s.189). 
2) Supra, Ch., I, s.IV.1. 
3) See the proposal of Shafik (Egypt) and the debate on it, 
in A/CONF.97/19, pp 129, 420-422. 
4) A/CN.9/125 and add. I to 3 (Bulgaria, para.7). 
5) That was a proposal submitted by Sam (of Ghana), see 
A/CONF.97/19, p 431, para.97. 
6) Ibid, p 432, para. 104 (Honnold of US). 
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It would be seen below, however, that where the buyer's 
breach is actual, the seller is at least entitled to with-
hold delivery; and to this extent all the laws relevant to 
this study are in agreement~7) It has just been indicated, 
moreover, that such a breach constitutes under the Convention 
a good ground for concluding that the buyer will commit a 
breach when his obligation of paying the price falls due. 
165. Comparison: ULIS and Convention 
The preceding discussion shows some aspects of similarity 
between ULIS and the Convention without ignoring the fact that 
there are essential differences between them. 
As to form, ULlS uses the word "appears" with respect to 
the difficulty in the buyer's economic situation and -
·~\.~Y'ialn as regards the obligation that will not be performed 
by the buyer, while the Convention uses the words "it becomes 
apparent" and "~ub9t~41" respectively. In practice, however, 
it may be difficult to assume that this difference in wording, 
at least with respect to "substantial ll and "material", is 
likely to give any fruits~1) Further, the Convention had 
excluded the several elastic expressions and words used in 
ULIS; those are "economic situationll "so difficultl1 "good reason" 
------------------------~~----~--
164- 7) Post, paras. 168 f. 
165- 1) As to the word "materialU in ULIS, the W.G. in its 5th 
session replaced it by Itsubstantial" without giving any 
reason for that change, see A/CN.9/87, para. 106. As to the 
other word, see supra, paras. 1~l f. 
317 
and "to fear" B 
• Y contras~ the following terms under the former 
are innovations': tldeficiencylf , "ability" and "credit-worthiness". 
As to substance, both are in agreement to the effect that 
for satisfying the test the relevant question should "appear" or-
"become apparent" only after concluding the ·contract. Likewise, 
the test in both does not necessarily mean that the buyer's(pros-
pective) breach will certainly occur; it is sufficient,in the 
language of the Convention, that "it is apparent" or, under ULIS, 
that "there is good reason to fearl1 that such breach will occur. 
There are, on the other h~notable differences between 
the two laws. In the first place, what should appear after 
making the contract is, under ULIS, the economic situation of 
the buyer which, presumably, must have become, also subsequent 
to the contract,so difficult; while what should be apparent under 
the Convention is that the buyer will commit a breach. In the 
second place,the direct and only cause of the buyer's prospective 
breach is, under the former,his bad economic situation while the 
latter has exclusively given four,or more precisely three, events 
each of which constitutes good reason to conclude that the breach 
will occur. Thu~the buyer's economic position may be good but 
his conduct in performing the contract makes it apparent that he 
will not effect further performances; in th-is case, the seller 
is entitled, under the Convention but not ULIS, to suspend the 
performance of his obligations if, of course, the other con-
ditions of suspension are met. In short, the bad economic 
situation of the buyer is irrelevant under the Convention 
except to the extent that it amounts to a serious deficiency 
in his ability to perform or in his creditworthiness. 
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166. Material (substantial) obligation 
However, not every prospective breach by the buyer 
justifies the seller's suspension of performance; rather, it 
must relate, in the words of ULIS, to a "material" or, in 
the language of the Convention, to a "substantial" part of 
his obligations. As has just been suggested, this difference 
appears to be of formal nature and, presumably, no practical 
benefit could be obtained from it. On the other hand, it is 
clear that both laws have avoided the usage of the expression 
"fundamental breach lt , and this is a main difference between 
the avoidance on the ground of ltanticipatoryU breach, where 
that term has been used~1) and the remedy of suspension on 
the ground of "prospective" breach. The practical importance 
of this difference is quite obvious. The breach may, accord-
ing to the proper criterion, be fundamental(2) though it does 
not relate to a substantial or material part of the obliga-
tions, and the converse is true. For example, a delay in 
making part payment for one day may amount to a fundamental 
breach while such payment may not constitute a substantial 
part of the obligations. Conversely, a month late in paying 
the whole price may not amount to fundamental breach although 
such failure relates, in principle, to a material part of the 
buyer's obligation. The result of this divergency is quite 
plain, that is, the court or arbitral tribunal cannot rely on 
-~-------------------~-------~~~ 
166- 1) Supra, para. 63. 
2) On the definition of fundamental breach, see supra,para. 
17. 
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the definition of fundamental breach in ULIS or the Conven-
tion(2) to 1 d conc u e that the prospective breach relates to 
a material or substantial part of the obligations. 
It is assumed, on the other hand, that the phrase "will 
not perform" used in both laws covers, in addition to the 
absolute non-payment, the delay in paying the price. Suppose, 
for instance, that the buyer's country has temporarily imposed 
exchange control restr~tions for a certain period of time; 
suppose also that the contract has already required the buyer 
to make payment on a day falling within the same period. If, 
in this setting, the conditions of the test including the 
prospective failure to pay exactly on that day are met, then 
the seller may suspend the performance of his obligations. 
Another problem calls for consideration; that is, the 
meaning of "material or substantial part of obligations" 
which, unlike the "fundamental breach", has no definition in 
either ULIS or the Convention; nor does the legislative back-
ground of the latter give any guidelines on this problem. As 
a whole, however, it is true that the importance of any 
obligation is a matter of degree to be decided by the court 
in the light of, and with relation to, the other obligations 
undertaken by the buyer. Nevertheless, it should be empha-
sized that payment of the price constitutes not only a sub-
stantial or material part of the buyer's obligations but also 
the core of those obligations. So that where the prospective 
non-payment relates to the whole pric~no difficulty may 
arise in practice. But the problem is more difficult where, 
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for instance, the buyer has already paid part of the price, or 
where the contract is by instalments and the prospective 
breaCh only relates to one instalment. Whether the remainder 
in the former constitutes a material or substantial part of 
the buyer's obligations is again a question of degree where 
regard may also be given to the part payments already made. 
As to the latter,the solution depends, as suggested, upon 
whether payments have already been apportioned to deliveries 
to the extent that each instalment is to be treated as if it 
were a separate contract, or not. If so, the importance of 
each payment is to be estimated in comparison with the buyer's 
obligations arising from the relevant instalment but not from 
the contract as a whole; if not, then the converse may be 
true. 
167. Domestic laws 
Bearing in mind the above discussion, the doctrine of 
suspending performance as adopted by ULIS and the Convention 
has several characteristics distinguishing it from other 
principles recognized by national laws. Firstly, the doctrine 
is of general application to the effect that it applies, on 
the one hand, to the buyer as well as the seller(1) and, on 
the other, to any obligation undertaken by the aggrieved 
party. Secondly, its application is confined to situations 
-~----------------~------------
167- 1) As has been noted, the defence under ULIS is granted to 
both parties in exactly the same circumstances and with 
exactly the same effect (Cohn, p 522). See, however,Eorsy, 
31 A.J.C.L. 1983, P 333, 335. 
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in which the other party's breach is prospective. Thirdly, 
that breach should be material or substantial. Under the 
Convention, finally, the primary effect of the suspension is 
that performance should be continued upon providing an adequate 
assurance by the other party~2) 
This doctrine as such has no counterpart in either English 
or French Law. It is not the seller's right of lien or of with-
holding delivery which is well-admitted in these two laws 
although this right, as far as the aggrieved seller is con-
cerned, is the most important application of the doctrine of 
suspension; nor are the grounds for suspension similar to 
those required for withholding delivery~3) Nor is it com-
"\\ parable to the Civil Law rule e)('~i>tio non adimpleti con-
tractus" which is well-recognized in French Law~4) in short, , 
the application of this rule presumes that the reciprocal 
performances in a synallagmatic contract, say delivery and 
payment, are due; in that case, either party may suspend the 
performance of his obligation so long as the other party's 
performance is not yet received~4) 
Indeed, this doctrine has, without distortion, certain 
perantage in some other domestic laws. Under UCC, for example, 
8.2-609(1) reads: "A contract for sale imposes (J.r\ OtJliga.bda (h\ etUlA (J~ 
that the other's expectations of receiving due performance 
will not be impaired. When reasonable grounds for insecurity 
--~--------------~---------------
167- 2) Post, para. 172. 
3) See below, para. 168. 
4) See generally Carbonnier, para. 84; Marty et Raynaud, 
paras. 293 ff; Starck, paras. 2193 ff. 
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arise with respect to the performance of either party the 
other may in writing demand adequate assurance of due per-
formance and until he receives such assurance may if commer-
cially reasonable suspend any performance for W~~L~ ~t ~c15 y\t:t:. 
already received the agreed return~,~5) 
An analogous provision is likewise found in some other 
Civil Codes, eg., German Civil Code and SWiss Code of Obliga-
tions~6) where it has been argued that the doctrine of sus-
pension (under ULlS) is more nearly related to those laws(7) 
than any other law. 
168. Grounds for lien: domestic laws 
According to s.41(1) of the SGA, the unpaid seller has 
a right of lien on, or is entitled to withhold delivery(1) of, 
the goods in the following cases(2): 
-------------------------------
167- 5) £f., s.8.7(1) of DUSA which is analogous to that provision. 
6) See Treitel, Remedies, s.189; Cohn, passim, who also refers 
to the Codes of Italy,Austria and the Scandinavian coun-
tries. See further ss.213 (general principle) and 363 
(withholding delivery) of CITC. 
7) Cohn, p 522. 
168- 1) According to the Act, the seller's lien is exercised where 
property of goods has passed to the buyer; but if the 
property is still vested in the seller, he has a right of 
withholding delivery similar and co-extensive with his 
right of lien (s.39.2). 
2) It has been held, in this regard, that in the case of an 
ordinary sale of a commercial article under a commercial 
agreement, the seller has no lien other than that which ::I 
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(a) where the goods have been sold without any stipu'~­
tion as to credit. 
(b) Where the goods have been sold on credit but the 
term of credit has expired. 
(c) Where the buyer becomes insolvent~3) 
Read literally, the second case confers a lien on the 
seller even where he wrongfully refuses to effect delivery 
though the buyer may be entitled to claim damages in this 
event~4) But it has been suggested that this result is 
probably not intended and it may be that the seller cannot 
exercise his right of lien in these circumstances~5) In 
brief, however, the seller's lien may be exercised in either 
of two situations. 
The first is where payment is due which is the same in 
French Law~6) In this connexion, it may be important to 
note that Common Law writers are generally in agreement to 
the effect that granting a credit for payment does not 
necessarily mean that the seller is bound to make delivery 
-----------------------~-~----
168- -) the Act itself provides, see Transport and General Credit 
COrporation Ltd. v. Morgan [93~ 2 All E.R. 17, 25. 
3) For definition of insolvency, see s.61.4 of the Act. 
4) This seems to be the view of Atiyah, p 303; see also 
Fridman, p 348. 
5) See OLRC Report, vol. 2, p 396; see also Baer, p 6; 
Benjamin, para. 1169 where it has also been suggested 
that a wrongful refusal by the seller to deliver the goods 
should debar him from exercising his lien even if the 
buyer should late\' become insolvent. 
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before payment; it may only mean that he does not insist on 
immediate payment~7) The result of this suggestion is that 
the date of delivery is also to be postponed until payment 
falls due. If, after maturity of payment, the buyer fails to 
pay, the seller would then be entitled to withhold delivery; 
and this may be the true construction of section 4(b) above. 
The second situation in which the lien may be exercised 
is the buyer's insolvency (or bankruptcy) notwithstanding the 
fact that payment is not yet due. An equivalent provision is 
stated under Article 1613 of French C.C. which also stipulates 
for withholding delivery that the seller is in imminent danger 
of losing the price. 
Even assuming that the doctrine of suspension is ULIS 
and the Convention is to be applied to the seller's withhold-
ing delivery, the preceding discussion shows, nevertheless, 
notable differences between English and French Law, on the 
one hand, and, on the other, the first two laws. 
'While the IIsuspension" under ULIS and the Convention 
only occurs where the buyer's breach is prospective~8) this 
1s obviously not the case under the first situation of with-
holding delivery in English or French Law. As to the second 
situation, it rather faces the case in which time of payment 
has not yet matured or expired; otherwise, the seller's right 
to withhold delivery may be based on the first situation where 
----------------------~---------
168- 6) Art. 1612 of C.C.; see also s.2-703 of UCC and 8.9.8(1) of 
DUSA. 
7) Atiyah, p 303; Benjamin, para. 1164; Fridman, p 348. 
8) Supra, para. 164. 
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the insolvency is irrelevant. In ~ite of that, it is to be 
noted that while the buyer's insolvency or bankruptcy is the 
only ground for withholding delivery under English and French 
Law, the grounds for tlsuspensionu under ULIS and the Conven-
tion are, as has been seen, completely different. Thus, it 
would not be strange that the buyer's insolvency may not, in 
certain circumstances, justify the "suspensionl1 while in 
others such "suspension" may be justified even where the 
buyer is solvent. Moreover, the insolvency (or bankruptcy) 
under both English and French Law does not justify withholding 
delivery unless it occurs after the conclusion of the con-
tract~9) again, the position of the Convention is quite dif-
• 
ferent·where it is sufficient for the "suspension" that the 
grounds on which it is based become apparent after making the 
contract even though they already existed at that time~10) 
Two further points must be observed. Firstly, according 
to the SGA the mere insolvency of the buyer justifies the 
seller's lien while French e.e. also requires, as has just 
been seen, that the seller is in imminent danger of losing 
the price because of the buyer's insolvency (or bankruptcy). 
Secondly, at Common Law, as has been said(;1) the mere belief 
of one party (however reasonable) that the other party will not 
be able to perform his obligations when they fall due is not 
------------------------~------
168- 9) See 5.41.1 of the SGA (above) "where the buyer becomes 
insolvent"; Art.1613 of French C.C.;see further Cohn,p 525. 
10) Supra, para. 163. But £f., ULIS, supra, para. 162. 
11) Treitel, Remedies, s. 189. 
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a ground on which refusal to perform can be justified; while 
the same is also true in French Law, this is of course not 
the situation in either ULlS or the Convention where the whole 
doctrine of suspension is based upon the ground of "prospec-
tive breach" as described above. 
169. Actual breach: ULIS and Convention 
So that, where the buyer's breach is actual the seller 
is entitled in various domestic laws to refrain from effect-
ing delivery until the price is paid. As has been seen, a 
similar principle applies under ULIS and the Convention as 
well~1) Furthermore, where delivery is effected by handing 
over the goods to a carrier for transmission to the 
buyer~2) the seller is entitled under both laws to postpone 
their despatch until he receives payment\3) In such a case, 
however, he may despatch the goods on terms whereby those 
goods or the documents controlling their disposition will not 
be handed over to the buyer except against payment of the 
price~4) Under ULIS, further, the seller may reserve to 
himself the right to dispose of the goods during the 
transit~4a) 
-~-~---------------~-------
169- 1) Supra, para. 10. 
2) By virtue of Arts. 19.2 of ULIS and 31(a) of the Convention. 
3) Art.72.1 of ULIS; although an express provision as such is 
missed under the Convention, it has been suggested that a 
similar principle applies therein (supra, para. 10). 
4) Arts.72.1 of ULIS and 58.1 of the Convention. 
4a) Art.72.1 of ULIS. 
327 
In this connexion,the following points should be 
emphasized. 
Firstly, no further details concerning the seller's 
right of withholding delivery could be found under either 
ULIS or the Convention~5) Accordingly, it may be that this 
remedy as a whole is left, at least under the latter, to the 
law applicable to the contract provided that the general 
principles on which the Convention is based do not produce 
the proper solution~6) This in particular includes the 
goods that might be affected by withholding delivery, and 
the case in which the seller loses this right on grounds 
other than making, or say tendering, payment of the (full) 
price. Under ULIS, by contrast, reference has only been made 
to the general principles on which this Law is based~7) 
Secondly, the relationship as between the carrier and 
either the buyer or the selle~whether before the commence-
ment of the transit or during it or after it terminates,is 
outside the scope of both ULIS and the Convention where the 
general principle is that either only governs the obligations 
(and rights) of the buyer and the seller arising from a con-
tract of sale~8) 
---------------------------------
169- 5) There are, however, certain rules under both ULIS and the 
Convention relating to the effects of withholding delivery 
(post, paras. 182 ff). 
6) Art.7.2 of the Convention. 
7) Art.17 of ULIS. 
8) Arts.8 of ULIS and 4 of the Convention; as to an exception 
to this rule under the former, see post, para. 173. 
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2. Stoppage in transit 
170. Texts 
Art.73 (paragraphs 2 & 3) of ULIS provides that:-
"2- If the seller has already despatched the goods 
before the economic situation of the buyer described in para-
graph 1 of this Article becomes evident, he may prevent the 
handing over of the goods to the buyer even if the latter 
holds a document which entitles him to obtain them". 
3- Nevertheless, the seller shall not be entitled to 
prevent the handing over of the goods if they are claimed by 
a third person who is a lawful holder of a document which 
entitles him to obtain the goods, unless the documents con-
tains a reservation concerning the effects of its transfer 
or unless the seller can prove that the holder of the 
document, when he acquired it, knowingly acted to the detri-
ment of the seller l1 • 
While Art.712 of the convention(1) provides that:-
"If the seller has already desptached the goods before 
the grounds described in the preceding paragraph become 
evident, he may prevent the handing over of the goods to the 
buyer even though the buyer holds a document which entitles 
him to obtain them. The present paragraph relates only to the 
rights in the goods as between the buyer and the seller". 
-----------------------------------
170- 1) For a legislative background of the text, see the documents 
cited in para.161, note 1. 
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171. Concept of stoppage 
Stoppage of goods in transit is a real remedy given to 
the seller and, so far as ULIS and the Convention are con-
cerned, no corresponding right has been granted to the bUye~:) 
In general, this remedy is recognized by various legal 
systems(2) including Common(3) and Civil Law although the 
grounds entitling the exercise of this right may vary from 
one legal system to another. However, the doctrine is based, 
in domestic laws, upon two main factors: the location of the 
goods sold and the financial position of the buyerS 4) 
The first factor presumes that the goods have already 
been desptached to the buyer but have not yet reached him; 
or, in the words of the SGA, that the seller has parted with 
the possession of the goods but they are still in course of 
transit~5) A similar requirement could easily be inferred 
~) 
from the foregoing provisions of both ULIS and the Convention. 
---------------------------------
171- 1) It was suggested, while preparing the draft convention,to 
extend to the buyer a right to prevent the payment of the 
money parallel to the seller's right of stoppage, but that 
suggestion had been rejected, see A/32/17, annex I, paras. 
412 ff. 
2) See in detail A/CN.9/131, annex, s.2.4.3 in which very 
many domestic laws have been referred to. 
3) For reported cases prior to the Act, see Benjamin, para. 
1191. And for other Common Law countries, see e.g., 
55.2-705 of uee & 9.9 of DUSA. 
4) A/CN.9/131, ibid, s.2.4.3.1. 
5) s.44.1 of the Act. 
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The second factor shows a marked difference between national 
laws; while some of them, eg., French Law,require the buyer's 
bankruptcy; 7) his insolvency is sufficient under others(S) 
and this is the clear position of the SGA~9) The approach 
of both ULIS and the Convention in respect of this factor is, 
as will be seen below, completely different. 
If, however, these requirements are met, then national 
laws are in agreement to the effect that the seller is 
entitled to prevent delivery of the goods to the buyer where-
upon he can regain possession of them\10) A seller who stops 
the goods in transit would have a priority in respect of those 
goods over the general creditors of the buyer(;1) and this 
appears to be the main purpose-of the doctrine of stoppage(12) 
---------------------------------
171- 6) And CITC too (s.346.1). See further para.172, below. 
7) A/CN.9/131 , ibid; but it must be noted that the seller's 
right to regain possession (from a carrier) in French Law 
seems to be regarded as an extension of his lien rather 
than a right separate from it (Mazeaud, vol.3, t.1, para. 
192). 
8) It may be interesting to mention that in English Law, the 
insolvency, strictly speaking, refers to the state of 
indebtedness where the debtor is no longer able to pay his 
debts as they fall due, while the bankruptcy is the name 
given to the form of proceedings whereby a debtor who 
has committed certain acts and defaults is divested of his 
property to be equitably distributed among his creditors 
according to statutory priorities. \ihereas insolvency is 
a matter of fact, bankruptcy denotes the status of a 
person and is a question of law, (see Spatt & ~lcKenzie's 
Law of Insolvency, 2nd ed. 1972, 8.0/4). In French Law, 
on the other hand, the proceedings of bankruptcy apply only_ 
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Although the seller's right o~ stoppage is likewise 
admitted in international trade, it has justly been noticed 
that this remedy has lost much o~ its practical imPortancef 13) 
this is due to the fact that payment against documents espe-
cially that which is made by a letter of credit is the most 
usual method of payment prevailing in international trade 
nowadays. In these circumstances, the seller remains hold-
ing the documents controlling the disposition of the goods 
until he is paid. 
Finally, it will be noted that most of the main questions 
concerning the doctrine of stoppage are not governed by either 
ULIS or the Convention and, therefor~are subject to the proper 
law of the contract. Of course, it is outside the scope of 
the current study to dwell upon national laws except to the 
extent necessary for comparing them with ULIS and the 
Convention. 
-----------------------------
171- =) to merchants and commercial companies, while insolvency is 
a matter of civil law and, accordingly, its rules apply 
only to "societe civile tl , i.e., to non-merchants, (Amos & 
Walton's Introduction to French Law, 3rd ed. 1967, p 370). 
9) S.44 of the Act; and for a definition of insolvency, see 
s.61.4 of the Act. ~, 5s.2-705(1) of UCC and 9.9(1) of 
DUSA where under both the right of stoppage covers other 
situations, e.g., the buyer's repudiation. 
10) But some countries, as has been said, allow the trustee 
in bankruptcy to object to the seller's repossession, see 
A/CN.9/131, s.2.4.3.2. 
11) Ibid, 8.2.4.3.5. 
12) Benjamin, para. 1192. 
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172. Grounds for breach 
So that, ULIS and the Convention are in agreement with 
national laws in relation to the first condition of exercis-
ing the right of stoppage in transit; that is to say, that 
the goods have been despatched to the buyer but have not yet 
been handed over to him. However, the same grounds for sus-
pension in general as described above apply to the right of 
stoppage and there is no need to repeat the discussion\1) 
But it is important in this connexion to bear in mind two 
facts. 
Firstly, in giving the seller the right of stoppage, 
neither ULIS nor the Convention bas drawn a distinction 
between non-payment of the price and other (prospective) 
breaches by the buyer. It follows that the former can stop 
the goods in transit even if, strictly speaking, the buyer 
has paid the whole price5 1a) To illustrate, suppose under 
the Convention that a contract calls upon the seller to 
effect three deliveries as follows: the first is fob or cif; 
the second, which is to be made immediately after the first, 
is ex-works; and the third, which covers the great part of 
the goods, is also ex-works. Suppose too that after 
-------------------------------
171-13) Atiyah, p 310; Benjamin, ibid; OLRC Report, vol. 2, p 401; 
A/eN. 9/131, s.2 .• 4.3.4. 
172- 1) 
1a) 
See supra, paras. 162 f. Cf., Berman, 30 L. and Con. Probe 
1965, p 354, 357. 
Cf., draft ULIS (1956) which restricted both the suspension 
~ general and stoppage in particular to the buyer's failure 
of payment of the price (arts.82, 83). 
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despatching the first instalment but before handing it over to 
the buy&r, the latter has failed to take delivery of the second 
instalment. In this setting, the key question is: could the 
seller turn on such failure for stopping the first instalment 
in transit? If strictly applied, the relevant provision under 
the Convention would give a positive answer provided that it 
is apparent from the buyer's failure that he will not take 
delivery of the third instalment, and such (prospective)breach 
relates ~o a substantial part of his obligations. Whether this 
odd result is intended is very doubtful where there is no 
rational justification for applying the doctrine of stoppage 
in these circumstances; and it is doubtful, moreover, that any 
of the domestic laws adopting this doctrine follows this 
approach. Under the SGA, however,the right of stoppage is only 
given to the unpaid seller(2)in the meaning referred to abovef 3) 
Secondly, the grounds for stoppage should become 
lI evidentn (4) only after despatching the goods and this, more-
over, suffices~5) So, for instance, if such grounds were 
----~------------------------
172- 2) In accordance with 5.44 of the Act; see also ss.364, 363 
of CITC 
3) Supra, para. 2. 
4) It has been pointed out that under the Convention Art.71.1 
(the general principle of suspension) uses the word 
"apparent ll , Art.71.2 (stoppage in transit) uses the word 
"evident" and art.72 (anticipatory breach) uses the word 
IIclearu though no difference could be seen in the ideas 
which these words seek to convey; see A/CONF.97/19, P 433, 
para. 21 (Khoo of Singapore); that was also the opinion of 
Rognlien of Norway (ibid, para. 22); see further p 218, 
para. 44 (Krisbis of Greece) ibid. 
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"apparent", "evident" or the like(4) before the despatch and 
the seller nevertheless despatched the goods he could not 
exercise the right of stoppage. Conversely, where those 
grounds existed before the despatch but they became evident 
only after that time, the stoppage would be justified. Under 
the SGA, by contrast, it seems that the buyer's insolvency 
(or bankruptcy), which is the only ground for the stoppage}6) 
does not justify the exercise of this right unless it occurs 
during the transit~7) Prior to the Act, however, it was 
held that it was not necessary that the buyer should be 
actually insolvent at the time of exercising the stoppage; 
if the insolvency happened before the arrival, it would be 
sufficientf8 ) 
----------------------------------
172- 5) Which is similar to the approach of CITe (s.364.1) "If the 
seller learns of a circumstance entitling him to postpone 
the delivery of the goods only after the despatch of such 
goods ••• II • 
6) s.44 of the Act. £!.) s.2-705(1) of UCC and s.9.9(1) of 
DUSA where both provide for other reasons justifying the 
stoppage including the buyer's repudiation. 
7) See Benjamin, particularly paras.1132,1192; £f., Cohn, 
p 532, who considers that it does not matter whether the 
insolvency arose before or after the goods were despatched. 
8) The Constantina (1807) 6 C.Rob. 321, 326; (165) E.R. 947, 
950. And it has been suggested in this regard that it is 
possible to interpret 5.44 of the Act so as to enable a 
retroactive justification of a premature stoppage, in 
line with the previous Common Law (Benjamin, para. 1156). 
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173. Third parties t . rights 
It is important to note, first of all, that the mere 
fact that the buyer holds a document representing the goods, 
e.g., a bill of lading which entitles him to obtain the goods, 
does not deprive the seller of his right to stop the goods in 
translt~1) This provision in both ULIS and the Convention 
is in line with English LawS 2) 
However, the Convention expressly states that the pro-
vision dealing with the stoppage in transit relates only to 
the rights in the goods as between the buyer and the seller. 
Thus, any relationship between either of these two parties 
and any other person, e.g., a carrier, bailee or a person to 
whom the bill of lading has been indorsed is outside the 
scope of the Convention. But this rule, as has rightly been 
observed, adds nothing to the general rule stated in Ar~ 4 
to the effect that the Convention as a whole governs only the 
rights and obligations of the buyer and the seller~3) 
Although Art.8 of ULIS contains a similar general rule, there 
is an important exception to this rule with relation to the 
seller's right of stoppage in transit. In this regard, it 
----~-------------------------
173- 1) Which is the same under CITC (s.364.1). ~, s.2-705(2)d 
of UCC and s.9.9(2)d of DUSA where in both the seller loses 
his right of stoppage if a negotiable document of title 
has been negotiated to the buyer. 
2) This could be inferred, as has been noticed, from 8.47 of 
the SGA (Atiyah, p 314). As to examples from the case law, 
see Ex. p. Golding Davis and Co. Ltd. (1880)13 Ch.D.628, 
633; Schotsmans v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway(1867) • 
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provides for a principle and two exceptions. 
The principle is that lithe seller shall not be entitled 
to prevent the handing over of the goods if they are claimed 
by a third person who is a lawtul holder of a document which 
enti tIes him to obtain the goOds t1.(4) An obvious illustra-
tion of this 1s the case in which the buyer, who holds a 
(negotiable) bill of lading representing the goods, endorses 
it to a sub-buyer. In such an event, the seller loses his 
right of stoppage; an equivalent provision is stated under 
5.47.2 of the SGA. 
The language of ULIS is not free from criticism nor from 
difficulties in practice. In addition that the phrase "law-
ful holder" in particular is likely to be interpreted in dif-
ferent waYS~5) the provision as such raises two main 
questions. 
In the first place, it fails to make a distinction 
between a holder of a document for value and that who holds 
it for nothing though such a distinction appears to be very 
-----------_ ... _-----... ------------
173- =) L.R.2 Ch.App. 332, 337; The Tigress (1863) 32 L.J. Adm.97. 
3) A/CN.9/125 and Add 1-3 (Finland, para.14). 
4) As has been suggested the expression '1third person l1 
excludes any person who might be authorized to obtain the 
goods on behalf of the buyer, see Cohn, p 537. 
5) See, however, the comment of Cohn on this term, p 536 where 
he suggests that article 16 of the Geneva Convention on 
Bills of Exchange of 1932, from Which the term "lawful 
holder" has been borrowed, and such authorities as are 
available for its interpretation will have to be considered 
in interpreting this term. 
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important. In the former, it may be rational and fair as 
well to protect the holder of the document while such protec-
tion is indeed difficult to be justified in the latter 
situation where the holder loses nothing in giving the seller 
a priority Over him. And that is why the approach of the 
SGA is, as submitted, preferable; by virtue of s.47.1 of the 
Ac~the third person who holds a document of title to the 
goods is protected as against the seller only when he "takes 
it. •• for valuable considerationll;( 6) otherwise, the seller 
is not deprived of his right of stoppage. 
In the second place, a literal reading of the above 
provision may, in certain events, lead to unjust results. 
For example, a bill of lading may be transferred to a third 
person by a way of pledge, but the value of the goods may 
exceed the amount of his loan. In this setting, it may be 
sound to protect the holder by giving him a priority over the 
seller but not by depriving the latter of any right in respect 
of the goods, which is literally the situation under ULIS. So 
that, it would seem likely had ULIS made the seller's right 
o£ stoppage subject to the third person's right; and in doing 
so, it would achieve the protection intended for both parties: 
the latter by giving him priority over the former, and the 
former, as against the general creditors of the buyer, by 
granting him a right only to the surplus of the proceeds of 
------------------------------
173- 6) Which also includes past consideration, see eg., Leask 
v. Scott Brothers (1877) 2 Q.B.D. 376. 
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the goods. This is, again, the proper solution as produced 
by the SGAf 7) 
The first exception to this rule is where the document 
contains a reservation concerning the effects of its transfer, 
such as the phrase f1 negot1able subject to the seller's rightll 
or tlnot free from the seller's righttl. But, as has been 
observe~, such reservations seem to be very rare in prac-
tice~8) The second is where the II seller can prove that the 
holder of the document, when he acquired it, knowingly acted 
to the detriment of the seller ll.( 9) It follows that the 
crucial question for defeating the holder's right is not 
whether he has actually known, when obtaining the document, of 
the seller's right, but rather whether he has knowingly (or 
intentionally) obtained it" to the detriment of the latter~10) 
The burden of proving this fact is rested with the seller. 
This is clearly a serious charge; nevertheless, it may be 
justified by the fact that there is a real need to ensure 
the widest possible unimpeded negotiability of bills. Accord-
ingly, personal defences to actions of bills must be restric-
ted as far as posSible~11) Although under s.47.2 of the SGA 
the holder of a document is not protected as against the 
seller unless he takes it in good faith, it appears that this 
-----------------------------
173- 7) S.47.2(b) of the Act. 
8) A/CN.9/131, s.2.4.3.3. 
9 This phrase seems to have been derived, again, from Art.17 
of Geneva Convention on Bills of Exchange; for interpret-
ing it under this Convention, see Giles, Uniform Commercial 
Law, 1970, pp 166 ff. 
-
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requirement is substantially different from the foregoing 
exception under ULIS. By virtue of s.6\.3 of the Act, a 
thing is done in good faith when it is in fact done honestly, 
whether it is done negligently or not. So that, fraud is 
certainly inconsistent with good faith(12) and "if it be 
proved", as has been held, lithe motive of the person guilty 
of it is immaterial. It matters not that there was no 
intention to cheat or to injure the person to whom the state-
ment was made,~(\3) 
Finally, another notable difference between the Act and 
ULIS calls for consideration. Under s.47.l of the former, the 
holder of the document is not protected as against the seller 
unless that document has been lawfUlly transferred to the 
original purchaser who has then transferred it to a third 
person. So that the sub-section does not apply to the follow-
ing cases: 
1. Where the (original) purchaser has unlawfully obtained 
the document. 
2. Where that purchaser has transferred to the sub-purchaser 
a document other than that which has been transferred to 
him~14) 
------------------~-------~------
173- 10) Cf., s.364.2 of CITC under which the seller is entitled to 
-
stop the goods in transit if the third party obtaining the 
document "knew or ought to have known that the seller would 
suffer a damage as a result of the transfer of the goods". 
11) See Giles, ibid, p 166. 
12) See Schmltthoff, Sale of Goods, p 220. 
13) Derry (William) v. Peek (1889)14 App. Cas. 337. 374. 
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But under ULIS these two matters are immaterial for 
applying the relevant text where the conditions of its appli-
cation referred to above are completely different. 
174. Concession to national laws 
No more details concerning the seller's right of stop-
page in transit have been given by either ULlS or the Con-
vention. The result is of course obvious at least with 
relation to the latter; any other question is to be solved 
in accordance with the proper law of the contract provided 
that the general principles on which the Convention is based 
don't produce the appropriate SOlution~1) This is not the 
situation under ULIS which excludes the application of 
domestic laws so long as the question concerned is governed 
by the Law but not expressly settled therein; in such a case, 
reference is to be made only to the general principles on 
which ULIS 15 based~2) Appart from its difficulties~3) this 
statement does not of course ignore the fact that ULlS 
governs, as a general rule, only the contractual relationship 
between the buyer and the seller54) Thus, except the case 
in which there is a third person holding a document entitling 
him to obtain the goods, which has just been considered, any 
---------~------------------~ 
173- 14) Mount (D.F.) Ltd. v. Jay and Jay Q?rovisions) Co. Ltd. 
[96Q1 1 Q.B. 159. 
174- 1) By virtue of Art.7.2 of the Convention. 
2) Art. 17 of ULIS. 
3) See Honnold, Uniform Law, para. 96. 
4) Supra, paras. 169, 173. 
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relationship between either the seller or the buyer and any 
other person is outside the scope of ULIS. This in particul-
lar includes the relationShip between the seller and the 
carrier who holds the goods during the transit~5) In this 
connexion, it may be interesting to note that domestic laws 
which adopt the doctrine of stoppage are generally in agree-
ment at least in respect of two important pOints~6) The 
first is that the carrier is under a duty to comply with the 
seller's order of stoppage after ascertaining that its con-
ditions are met. The second is that the latter is entitled, 
as a rule, to retain the possession of the goods. These two 
principles are likewise expressed by the SGA~7) 
However, the thorny difficulty which may arise here 
-----.. ------------------------
174- 5) See, however, A/CN.9/87, annex 4, para.60 where it has 
been said that no wi thstaning the fact that ULIS only 
governs, as a rule, the obligations of the seller and the 
buyer arising from a contract of sale (Art.B, syPra,paras. 
169, 173), a wider scope for article 73 seems to be implied 
from para.2 and, more particularly, from the provision in 
para. 3 (both are concerned with stoppage in transit). And 
this has already expressed the concern over the liability 
which these provisions may inflict on carriers. 
6) See A/CN.9/131, annex , s.2.4.3.5. 
7) S.46.4 of the Act; see also ss.2-705(3) of uee and 9.9(8) 
of DUSA.Cf., Kopac in his comment on 5.364 of CITe (p 124) 
-where it is considered that it will depend on the legal 
relation, existing between the person who holds the goods 
and the buyer, whether the former will be bound to comply 
with the seller's demand. 
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relates to the situation in which the proper law of the con-
tract, on the assumption that its application to the right of 
stoppage as such is inevitable, does not recognize this right. 
Of course, this problem is not confined to the stoppage in 
transit; it has already been considered that it may also arise 
in respect of the question of interest and, therefore, the 
same suggestion given there may be adopted here~8) That is 
to say, that the rules of private international law may 
suggest an alternative law recognizing the doctrine of sto~­
page whether or not it would be the law of forum; otherwise, 
the court may, as a last resort, apply any other domestic law 
recognizing this doctrine and, presumably, its choice would be 
reasonable in the circumstances. 
175. Difficulties of interpretation 
Apart from the recourse to national laws, the provisions 
of stoppage as adopted by ULIS and the Convention are 
not free from difficulties of interpretation in practice. For 
examPle!1) both refer to the fact that the right of stoppage 
may be exercised after the despatch of the goods, and to the 
seller's right to prevent the handing over of the goods. The 
question is therefore concerned with the meaning of the under-
lined expressions~2) 
----------------------------------
174- 8) Supra, para. 136. 
175- 1) See also supra, para. 173 and note 5 therin. 
2) In this respect, Art.7.1 of the Convention provides that: 
ItIn the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be 
had to its international character and to the need to 
promote uniformity in its application and the observance of 
good faith in international trade." 
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As to the term "despatchl1 , it may be interesting to 
pOint out that the comment of the S.G. on the relevant text 
of the draft convention refers to the seller who has 
"shipped" the goods; in that case, he is entitled to order 
the "carrier" not to hand over the goods to the buyer~3) 
This might suggest that the term "despatchU would rather 
refer to the (actual) beginning of any transportation than 
to "parting with possession" of goods by the seller. As 
regards ULIS, such suggestion has clearly been supported by 
another view on the ground that any enterprise which has its 
own fleet (of lorries) on which the goods are shipped would 
not be in a better position than the small man who has to use 
a carrier and cannot retain goods, once the despatch has 
started, if by that time the buye~s precarious situation was 
already eVident~4) 
Nevertheless, this view raises the question as to the 
position of the seller after he has parted with possession 
but before the (actual) despatch starts; during this period, 
the goods may be in the custody of a person who is even 
independant from either the seller or the carrier. In such 
a case, it may be unsound to prevent the seller from exercis-
ing the stoppage though the goods are at hand whereas he is 
entitled to do so while they are afloat. Furthermore, it may 
be that the doctrine of stoppage (always) presupposes that 
-----~-~---~----------~-------
175- =) good faith in international trade". 
3) A/CN.9/116, annex 2, comment on art.47, para.6; A/CONF.97/5, 
comment on art.62, para. 10. 
4) Cohn, pp 533 f. 
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the goods a~e in the possession of a neutral middleman who 
is independant from either the seller or the buyer; this is 
at least the obvious position of Common Law countries in 
which the doctrine is well-established~5) Accordingly, 
shipping the goods on the seller's means of transportation 
may not be regarded, it is suggested, as a "despatch" in the 
sense intended by this term under ULIS or the Convention. The 
result is that he can prevent the handing over of the goods 
to the buyer not on the ground of the principle of stoppage, 
but rather in accordance with the doctrine of suspension in 
general. In brief, the term "despatchll in both laws refers, 
as submitted, to the case in which the seller, in performing 
his obligation of delivery, has parted with the possession of 
the goods to some third person who holds them on his own 
behalf. 
As to the term "handing over" of the goods, which 
clearly relates to the situation in which the transit termi-
nates, it is important to recall that the mere handing over (6) 
of documents representing the goods does not end the transit. 
On the other hand, where the carrier physically delivers the 
(whole) goods to the buyer (or his agent) at the place of 
destination, this is by all means a "handing over" of the 
-------~~-------~~---------
175- 5) See e.g., Gibson v. Carruthers (1841) 8 M and \'l 321, 328; 
(151) E.R. 1061, 1064. The approach of the SGA appears to 
be quite the same (s.45); see further Atiyah, pp 310 f; 
Benjamin, para.1196; Fridman, p 357; Schmi tthoff, Sale of 
Goods, p 160. 
6) Supra, para. 173. 
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goods. Between these two edges, however, the difficulties 
lie where there are other events which are liKely to take 
place in practice, and the key question is therefore whether 
the term "handing over lt covers them or not. Several examples 
of this may be borrowed from the SGA, such as the carrier's 
attornement to the buyer, part delivery of goods effected by 
the carrier, the carrier's (wrongful) refusal to deliver or 
the buyer's rejection of goods while the carrier continues 
in possession of them~7) In these cases or the like, one 
may even suggest that this is not a matter of interpreting 
the term "handing over", but rather a question relating to 
whether the transit is at an end on a ground other the 
"handing over" of the (whole) goods to the buyer, which 
strictly means physical delivery of them and, accordingly, it 
would be subject to the law applicable to the contract. 
-~----~----~-------------------
175- 7) S.45 of the Act. 
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Section II 
Effects of Suspension 
1. In.ease.of pr050Pective breach 
176. Generally: 
Art 71.3 of the Convention provides that: 
itA party suspending performance, whether before or after 
dispatch of the goods, must immediately give notice of the 
suspension to the other party and must continue with perfor-
mance if the other party provides adequate assurance of his 
performancJ'( 1 ) 
Although ULIS does not contain any provision concerning 
the effects of suspending performance by the (unpaid)sell~ the 
following points, which are, as submitted, agreed upon by both 
laws should be emphasized. 
First, the suspension is a temporary remedy(2) where it 
must ultimately be terminated either by continuing performance 
or, on the contrary, by avoiding the contract. 
Secondly, in suspending performance, which is presumed to 
be justified, the seller will not be in breach and, therefore, 
the buyer cannot resort to any remedy on the ground of such 
suspension. 
----------------------~------
176- 1) For a legislative background of the text, see the documents 
cited in para. 154, note 1, supra. 
2) See also Cohn, p 528; A/CONF.97/5, comment on art.62, para. 
14. 
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Thirdly, the suspension does not accelerate payment. But 
it is granted that the seller must continue with performance 
if the buyer tenders the price; otherwise he would be in 
breach. 
Finally, the suspension would not be justified where 
payment has already been secured by an assurance by the seller; 
this is necessarily so because the grounds upon which the 
whole remedy is based disappear so long as the security exists. 
177. Obligations suspended 
So the seller is allowed under both ULIS and the Con-
vention to suspend the performance of his obligations if the 
criterion discussed above is met; and this includes, as 
suggested, ~ny obligation imposed upon him(1)whether it is to 
be performed before delivery or even after the goods have 
actually been received by the buyer. For example, the subject-
matter of the goods may be a machine to be manufactured by the 
seller(2) who undertakes: firstly, to allow the buyer to make 
the acceptance tests at his works before effecting deliVeryj3) 
an~ secondly, to provide the buyer in due course after 
delivery with drawings and experts necessary for putting the 
machine into operationf 4) In this setting, the doctrine of 
suspension applies to both obligations as well as to delivery. 
------------------~--~----~---
177- 1) Cf., ss.2-609(1) and 8.7(1) of DUSA: the innocent party 
-may suspend "any performance for which he has not received 
the agreed return"; .£!.:.' also supra, para. 172, note 1a. 
2) In this respect, it may be interesting to note that by 
virtue of Arts.6 of ULIS and 3.1 of the Convention any = 
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It has been suggested, further, that the doctrine dis-
penses the aggrieved seller from his obligation to prepare 
for performancef 5) This is thoroughly true when the prepara-
tion is regarded as an obligation imposed on the seller. For 
example, the contract may provide for packing the goods in a 
specific manner to be checked by the buyer (before delivery); 
or that the goods are to be manufactured in successive stages 
where each stage is to be inspected and approved separately. 
In these Circumstances, it is admitted that the seller is 
entitled to stop the preparation upon the buyer's prospective 
breach. But such preparation may be the seller's own business 
rather than a duty imposed upon him; in such an event, it is 
submitted that the doctrine does not apPly~6) The relevant 
provisions of both ULIS and the Convention appear to be quite 
clear to this effect; that is to say that the obligations in 
the legal sense are the only area in which the doctrine 
operates. Of course, it is not possible to talk about the 
suspension of any obligation without assuming in advance that 
this obligation has already matured. 
-----~--------------------------177- -) contract for the supply of the goods shall not be considered 
sale where the party who orders the goods undertakes to 
supply an essential (and, under ULIS, substantial) part of 
the materials necessary for such manufacture. 
3) Which appears to be familiar in international contracts; 
see, e.g., the ECE General Conditions for the Supply of 
Plant and Machinary for Export (s.5 of nos.188,574); see 
also 5.8.3 of nos.188A and 574A (General Conditions for 
the Supply and Erection of Plant and Machinary for Import 
and Export). 
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178. Goods involved 
Where the suspension relates to withholding delivery 
or to stoppage in transit, it is important to determine the 
goods affected by exercising either of these two rightS. In 
this conneXion, it may be that the criterion for suspension 
is generally easy to apply. In brief, the seller is entitled 
to withhold delivery of the whole goods or any part of them 
not yet despatched; and the same is true with respect to the 
right of stoppage after the despatch but before the transit 
terminates. This principle, which has no exception whatever, 
applies even where the contract is by instalments or where 
there are more than one contract of sale entered into between 
the same buyer and seller. In the latter situation, however, 
it may well be that the seller cannot rely on the buyer's 
prospective non-payment for one contract to withhold delivery 
of (or to stop in transit) any goods under another contract 
which bas already been performed by the buyerf1 ) In fact, 
-~-----------------------------
177- 4) Again, it is noteworthy that the Convention, according to 
Art.3.2, IIdoes not apply to contracts in which the pre-
ponderant part of the obligations of the party who 
furnishes the goods consists of the supply of labour or 
other services". 
5) A/CN.9/116, annex 2, comment on art.47, para 8; A/CONF. 
97/5, comment on art.62, para. 8. A similar rule seems to 
be applied in English Law, see H. Longbottom and Co. Ltd. 
v. Bass I Walker and Co. [192~ W.N. 245. 
6) But see Cohn, p 527. 
178- 1) The general rule under CITC is expressly the same (5.213); 
but cf., s.363.2 which entitles the seller to withhold 
-delivery if the buyer is in delay in paying the purchase = 
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this is not an exception to the general principle but rather 
an application of it since no (prospective) breach is likely 
to occur in respect of that contract. 
To illustrate, suppose that the same buyer and seller 
have entered into three separate contracts; suppose also that 
the former has paid the whole price for the goods under one 
of them. In this case, the seller may be entitled to withhold 
delivery of goods covered by the other two contracts but not 
by that which has been performed. 
It is to be noted that a similar approach is followed 
under English LawS 2) 
Likewise, payments under an instalment contract may, 
according to the true construction of it, be apportioned to 
deliveries to the extent that each delivery is to be treated 
as if it were a separate contract. In these Circumstances, 
it is suggested that the seller is not entitled to withhold 
delivery of any instalment or to stop it in transit on the 
ground of prospective non-payment for other deliveries if 
payment for that instalment has already been made. In English 
Law, where there is a contract providing for several payments 
for several portions of goods in the sense that the contract 
is apportioned, the seller cannot exercise his lien in respect 
of the goods which has actually been paid for~3) I~ however, 
the contract is indivisible, the seller is not bound (upon 
---------------~-----------
178- _) price for other goods delivered by the seller; see also 
Kopac in his comment on both sections, pp 73, 123. 
2) See Atiyah, p 302; see also the c~se cited in the 
next note. 
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the buyer's insolvency) to deliver any more goods until he 
is paid the price due for those already delivered as well as 
for those still to be delivered~4) 
179. Notice by seller 
The seller who suspends performance is obliged, under 
the Convention, to give the buyer an immediate(1) notice ot 
the suspension. No similar provision could be found in either 
English Law (in respect of withholding delivery or of stop-
page in transit) or in ULIS. But it has rightly been observed 
that ULIS contains a very large number of cases in which 
notice by one party to the other is reQuiredf2) and this may 
" lead to the conclusion that giving a notice in eaCh case the 
contractual relationship is affected is one aspect of the 
general principles on which this Law is based~3) 
As to both the risk of transmission and form, the notice 
is subject to the general rules. So that the risk, according 
to the despatch theory, is to be born by the buyerf4) and no 
--------------------------------
178- 3) Merchant Banking Co. of London v. Phoenix Bessemer steel 
Co. (1877) 5 Ch. D 205, 219. 
-4) Ex. p. Chalmers. In re Edwards (1873)8 Ch. App. 289,291. 
179- 1) In an earlier stage of drafting the text, the notice was 
to be given tlpromptly"which had then been replaced by 
lIimmediately" without giving any reason justifying that 
change, see A/CN.9/100, para. 101. 
2) For a complete list of provisions under whiCh notices are 
required, see Graveson and Cohn, pp 30-41. 
3) Cohn, 23 ICLg 1974, P 527. 
4) Supra, para. 59. 
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particular form is required in the notice~5) On the other 
hand, the Convention does not require that the notice must 
contain a particular statement other than that performance 
has been suspended. I.t is assumed, nevertheless, that the 
seller should at least mention, even in a general form, the 
grounds on which the suspension is based. This statement is 
of particular importance for both the buyet; who has the right 
to know why the seller does not perform his obligations, and 
the court which would ascertain whether or not the suspension 
was justified. Otherwise, each party may refrain from per-
£orming his part of the contract and subsequently he would 
attempt to find an excuse for his non-performance. 
However, the significance of such notice in practice is 
quite plain; it informs the buyer that the performance he 
expects to receive is suspended and this is of course better 
than leaving him in mid-air. In addition, it gives him the 
opportunity to provide an adequate assurance and in doing so, 
he would certainly avoid other consequences which are likely 
to occur such as the avoidance of the contract. In any case, 
the seller 1s bound to give such notice and this is a main dif-
ference between the effects of "anticipatory" and "prospec-
tive lJ (6) breach where in the former situation he is not bound 
to give the notice except if "time allows" that~7) 
-~-----------~---------~---------179- 5) Supra, para. 58; £f., 8s.2-609(1) of UCC and 8.7(1) of DUSA 
where a written notice is required. But a telephone call 
may not constitute a valid notice if the buyer is unable 
to understand sufficiently the language of the seller 
(supra, para. 53, note 2). 
353 
180. Adequate assurance 
The main effect of the doctrine of suspension is that 
the buyer can terminate such suspension by providing an 
adequate assurance guaranteeing his performance when it falls 
due. Once again, no similar prOvision exists under ULISf1) 
but since the seller's suspension is based on the fear that 
the buyer will not perform~2) it may well be that such fear 
will no longer be justified where the buyer provides an 
adequate assurance of performance~3) 
The notion of assurance is not known in English Law~4) , 
therefore, it may be that the seller's lien does not cease to 
exist on the ground that the buyer has offered him an assurance 
securing payment; nor does such fact exclude or terminate the 
seller's right of stopping the goods in transit. And this 
seems to be the position of the SGA under which the prOviding 
of an assurance is not recognized as a reason justifying the 
termination of the lien or stoppage. 
This notion, however, is well-admitted in several domestic 
laws including French Law and UCc~5) By virtue of Article 
1613 of French C.C. the seller is no longer bound to make 
----------~---~----~----------
179- 6) Supra, para. 163. 
7) Supra, para. 67. 
180- 1) Cf., art.82 of draft ULIS (1956) which provided for an 
-
"adequate security for payment". 
2) Supra, para. 162. 
3) Cohn, p 529. 
4) Supra, para. 63. 
5) See also s.210 of CITC; 5.8.7(1) of DUSA; Article 321 of 
German c.e. (Treitel, Remedies, s.189). 
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delivery if the buyer becomes insolvent or bankrupt unless 
the latter gives him security for paying in time. Similarly, 
under s.2-609(1) of UCC the seller's suspension of performance 
may continue until he receives adequate assurance of due per-
formance by the buyer; the Code also adds that such assurance 
should be given within a reasonable time not exceeding thirty 
days after receipt of the seller's demand. 
On the other hand, the Convention does not give any 
guidelines as to what may constitute adequate assurance, and 
a suggestion to add examples to the text such as llguarantee" 
or "documentary credit" was expressly rejected~6) So it 
seems that the question has intentionally been left open to 
be decided in each case in the light of its own circums-
tancesf7) As bas already been indicated, good faith, trade-
usage and previous course of dealing between the parties may 
playa great role in solving this problem\8) Regard may 
also be given to the nature of the insecurity and the reputa-
tion of the parties; thus, the adequacy of the assurance 
may, at one extreme, be satisfied by a simple letter stating 
an intention to perform, and, at the other extreme lllay require 
posting of a guaranty~9) In this connexion, it may be useful 
to mention that some domestic codes give examples as to what 
-------------------------~-
180- 6) A/CONF.97/19, pp 62 (para. 7), 376 (paras. 72-80); see also 
A/CN.9/87, annex 4, para. 58, and paras. 92, 98 of the 
original document. 
7) See also A/32/17, annex 1, para.417. 
8) Supra, para. 67. 
9) Calamari and Perillo, 5.11.30 (p 439); see also Official 
Comment 3 on s.2-609 of UCC. 
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may constitute adequate assurance; this includes a report, 
opinion, explanation, an affirmation of due performance~10) 
mortgage, suretyship, guarantee by assignment or any other 
sufficient security agreed upon between the parties~11) 
It follows that neither the seller is entitled to demand 
nor the buyer is bound to offer any assurance more than what 
is adequate or say reasonable in the circumstances. For 
example, the seller's demand of real estate mortgage in the 
buyer's country, especially where that country forbids 
foreigners from having such right, would be considered 
unreasonable; on the contrary, the buyer's offer of a guaranty 
by a reputable bank would mostly be deemed reasonable. 
Finally, it is granted that the application of the 
doctrine of suspension in the Convention (and ULIS) always 
presumes that there is still at least one obligation under-
taken by the seller but not yet performed. If, therefore, he 
has performed all his obligations, his right of demanding 
assurance of performance does not exist any more~12) 
181. No avoidance 
Ar~ 71.3 of the Convention in its current form does not 
entitle the seller to avoid the contract even if the buyer has 
----------~--------~-----~ 
180- 10) S.8.~(5) of DUSA. 
11)8.210 of CITC. 
12) £l., OLRC Report, vol. 2, P 530 where the Commission 
recommended that the relevant text of DUSA should not be 
expressly restricted to cases where the person seeking = 
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expressly refused to provide assurance of his performance~1) 
Indeed, the situation under the draft convention as adopted by 
Working Group was different where a particular reference was 
made to the aggrieved party's right to resort to avoidance if 
the other failed to provide the assurance within a reasonable 
time after he had received the notice of suspension~2) But 
such reference was deleted by UNCITRAL on the ground that 
avoidance 1n these circumstances should only be based on the 
test given for the antiCipatory breach(3) which has already 
been discussed in this studyf4) And this was also the general 
trend of the Conference where a proposal to recur. to the 
Working Group text had been rejected~5) Thus, the seller's 
right of avoidance may be exercised as follows:-
1 • Where payment becomes mature during the suspension of per-
formance, avoidance may be based upon either the funda-




adequate assurance of performance had not performed his 
obligations under the contract. 
Cf., s.213 of CITC under which the aggrieved party is 
-
entitled in that case to IIrepudiate the contract", i.e., 
avoid it. In both UCC (s.2-609.4) and DUSA (s.8-7.3) 
the failure to provide the assurance is regarded as a 
repudiation of the contract; the result of which is that 
the aggrieved party is entitled to resort to avoidance. 
2) A/CN.9/116, annex 1, art.47.3. 
3) A/32/17, annex 1, paras. 416-418. 
4) Supra, Ch., I, s.IV.1. 
5) A/CONF.97/19, pp 129, 377 f. 
6) Supra, Ch.I, s.l. 
7) Supra, Ch.l, s.II 
2. 
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¥/here, on the contrary, the breach is anticipatory, the 
avoidance may only be turned on whether it is "clear" 
that the buyer will commit a "fundamental breach" of 
contract(8) B t th b 
, u e uyer's refusal to provide the 
assurance would mostly strengthen the seller's position; 
and this may therefore make it clear that he will commit 
a fundamental breach~9) 
2. Preservation of goods 
182. Seller's dUty to preserve 
Art. 91 of ULIS provides that: 
"Where the buyer is in delay in taking delivery of the 
goods or in paying the price, the seller shall take reason-
able steps to preserve the goods; he shall have the right to 
retain them until he has been reimbursed his reasonable 
expenses by the buyer". 
vnllle Ar~ 95 'of the Convention provides that: 
IIIf the buyer is in delay in taking delivery of the goods 
or, where payment of the price and delivery of the goods are 
to be made concurrently, if he fails to pay the price, and the 
seller is either in possession of the goods or otherwise able 
to control their disposition, the seller must take such steps 
--~------------------------~------
181- 8) According to Art.72.1 of the Convention and Art.76 of ULIS 
(supra, para. 60). See also A/CONF.97/5, comment on art. 
62, para. 15 • 
9) See also Honnold, Uniform Law, para. 394. 
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as are reasonable in the circumstances to preserve them. He 
is entitled to retain them until he has been reimbursed his 
reasonable expenses by the buyern!1) 
These provisions apply where the seller withholds 
delivery of goods in consequence of the buyer's actual 
breach(1a) I th t th f • n a case, e onner is under a duty to take, 
in the language of ULIS, reasonable steps, or, in the language 
of the Convention, such steps which are reasonable in the 
circumstances to preserve the gOOds~2) 
In fulfilling this duty, the seller is entitled to 
deposit the goods in a warehouse of a third person at the 
expenses of the buyer provided that the expense incurred is 
not unreasonable~3) this suggests that the seller would bear f 
any expenses exceeding what is reasonable in the circumstances. 
Further, the warehouse must be appropriate for the storage of 
goods of the type in question~4) Once again, neither ULIS 
nor the Convention governs the relationship as between the 
third person, say a bailee, and the seller(5) who, however, 
-----------------------~~~----
182- 1) For a legislative background of the text, see the follow-
ing documents successively: A/CN.9/8?, paras. 202 if; 
A/CN.9/100, annex 1, art.61(91); A/CN.9/1 16, annex 1, art. 
60; A/32/17, annex 1, paras. 514 f, and para. 35 of the 
original document (art.60); A/33/17, para. 28 (art. 74). 
A/CONF.97/19, pp 139 (art.74), 398 (paras. 79 ff) and 227 
(para. 36). 
1a) See supra, paras. 10, 169. 
2) See also s.367 of CITC under which the seller "shall ••• 
arrange for the safe storage of the goods at the risks and 
costs of the buyer". 
3) Art.93 of ULIS; Art.87 of the Convention. 
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is not acting for the buyer(6) but rather on his own behalf. 
Anyway, this provision seems to be superfluous and thus there 
1s no need for it. 
On the other hand, it is to be noted that the obligation 
to preserve the goods presupposes that the contractual relation-
ship between the buyer and the seller is still alive~7) If, 
therefore, the contract is avoided, this obligation does not 
eXist. Nevertheless, the seller's duty to mitigate his 
damages(8) may require him to preserve the goods; otherwise, 
any loss resulting from his failure to do so may not be 
recovered from the buyer. 
Three further points are important to be observed. 
Firstly, unlike ULIS and the Convention, English Law does 
(9) 
not place a positive duty on the seller to preserve the goods. 
Secondly, the language of the Convention is certainly 
preferable to that of ULIS. Under the former, the seller is 
bound to preserve the goods only where he is either in posses-
sion of them or otherwise able to control their possession(10) 
---------~--------------------
182- 4) A/CN.9/116, annex 2, comment on art.62; A/CONF.97/5, 
comment on art.76. 
5) By virtue of the general rule as laid down by ULIS (Art.S) 
and the Convention (Art.4); see further supra, paras. 169, 
173. 
6) Graveson and Cohn, p 105. 
7) An express provision to that effect is given by CITC(s.367) 
where the preservation Should take place until the seller 
-repUdiates the contract. 
8) Supra, paras. 105 ff. 
g) Graveson and Cohn, p 104. 
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while such requirement could not be found under Art- 91 of the 
latter. Read literally, this Article may lead to the con-
clusion that the preservation is imposed upon the seller even 
where the goods are in the possession of the buyer. But this 
result is of course not intended and it is quite sound, there-
fore, to assume that a similar requirement applies under ULIS. 
Finally, under both ULIS and the Convention the seller 1s 
entitled to retain the goods until he has been reimbursed his 
reasonable expenses by the buyer~11) So that, his right of 
withholding delivery may continue even if the buyer has 
later paid him the full price. In other words, he has a 
lien over the goods for storage charges which is not the case 
1n English Law where the seller's lien could be claimed only 
for the price (or any part of it not yet paid)5 12) 
183. Seller's entitlement to sell 
Art. 94. 1 of ULIS provides that: 
itA party who ••• is under an obligation to take steps to 
preserve the goods may sell them by any appropriate means, 
provided that there has been unreasonable delay by the other 
party in accepting them ••• or in paying the costs of 
-----------~~-----------------
182- 10) E.g.,where payment is against documents and the buyer 
refuses to pay; see A/CONF.97/5, comment on art.74 
(Example 74 B); see also Honnold, Uniform Law, para. 454. 
11) A similar principle is provided for under CITC (s.367); 
see also 5.9.8.(2) of DUSA. 
12) See Joseph Somes v. the Directors of the British Empire 
Shipping Co. (1860)8 H.L.C. 338, 345; (11) E.R. 459, 462. 
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preservation and provided that due notice has been given to 
the other party of the intention to sell." 
While Ar~ 88.1 of the Convention provides that: 
"A party who 1s bound to preserve the goods ••• may sell 
them by any appropriate means if there has been an unreason-
able delay by the other party 1n taking possession of the 
goods ••• or in paying the price or the cost of preservation, 
provided that reasonable notice of the intention to sell has 
been given to the other party.rt(1) 
Before considering the conditions of selling the goods 
in these Circumstances, it is important to note that the above 
provision of ULIS, while entitling the seller to sell for the 
buyer's failure to accept the goods or to pay the costs 
of preservation, does not apparently entitle him to do so for 
the non-payment Gf the price. Again, it may be that this 
literal construction is not intended; for it is unsound to 
entitle him to sell for the costs of preservation while he 
cannot sell when the buyer's failure relates to his basic 
obligation, i.e., payment of the price. In addition, eMtitling 
the seller to sell in this case brings Ar~94.1 of ULIS in 
(2) 
line wi th Ar~ 91, which has just been discussed, where the delay 
------------------~-----------
183- 1) For a legislative background of the text, see the documents 
c1 ted in para. 182 (note 1) supra, mutatis mutandis. 
,I , 
'2) Suer-a} pdya. 19.2.. 
'. 
362 
in paying the price 1s expressly stated therein~3) 
So the unpaid seller who preserves the goods may, under 
both ULIS and the Convention, sell them if two conditions are 
met. 
In the first place, there should be an unreasonable delay 
. i (4) ~n pay ng the price. The reasonableness is a question of fact 
depending upon the circumstances of each case. Setting aside 
the sale of perishable goods for the moment, the SGA does not 
stipulate for reselling the goods that the buyer's delay must 
be unreasonable. Nevertheless, this requirement may be con-
trasted with the general law of contract; in this respect, it 
is well-settled that where the time of payment is not of the 
essence and the seller seeks avoidance, by reselling or other-
wise, the buyer's delay in making payment should be unreason-
able, undue, improper or the like~5) 
In the second place, the seller must give the buyer, in 
the words of ULIS, a due ~6~Le notice or, in the words of the 
Convention,d..-rettsoV\o.we-i\:JtlU?oF his intention to sell~6) Thus, 
there should be a reasonable period between the notice and the 
time at which the sale would take Place~7) The reason for 
----------------------------
183- 3) And that was the reason for adding that ground for sale 
to the text by the Conference, see A/CONF.97/19, P 413, 
para. 52 (Boggiano of Argentina). 
4) It seems that there is no similar requirement under CITe 
(s.369). 
5) Supra, para. 39. 
6) A similar condition is required under CITe 11 ••• a reason-
able term ll (5.369). 
7) Graveson and Cohn, p 106. 
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this requirement is to enable the buyer who would su.ffer the 
consequence of the sale to react accordingly, which is the 
last recourse that might be preserved for him~8) In applying 
the general principles, the notice need not be given in a 
particular form and, further, the buyer would bear the risk 
in transmitting it~9) 
In English Law too a seller who, according to a statutory 
power, wishes to resell other than perishable goods must give 
the buyer a notice of reasonable time to payor tender the 
price~10) 
Whether the sale passes a good title to the new purchaser 
is outside the scope of both ULIS(11) and the Convention and 
is therefore subject to the proper law of the contract. In 
English Law, however, it is expressly settled by the SGA that 
it the unpaid seller who has exercised his right of lien or 
retention or stoppage in transit resells the goods, the buyer 
acquires a good title to them as against the original bUye~12) 
irrespective of whether or not the seller has the right to 





A/CONF.97/19, para. 54. 
Supra, paras. 58 f. 
S.48.2 of the SGA; cf., Graveson and Cohn, where it is 
-
considered that the "due: notice" in ULIS is an innovation 
so . far as English Law is concerned. Such notice, how-
ever, seems not to be required for the resale under DUSA 
(see OLRC Report, vol.2, pp 412 f). Under UCC, the notice 
is required only where the sale is made privately; s. 
2-709(3). 
11) Graveson and Cohn, ibid. 
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It is to be noted, finally, that neither ULIS nor the 
Convention defines the method of sale except that such sale 
should be made by an appropriate means(14) which is a matter 
of circumstances; and, as suggested, there is no need to refer 
to any national law in this respect~15) Therefore, it may be 
that the seller may sell to anyone he chases and the sale 
may be made by public auction or privately; and it has been 
suggested that a similar principle applies in English Law 
since neither the SGA nor the case law pr.ovides authority on 
this questfon~16) 
184. Seller's duty to sell 
Ar~ 95 of ULIS provides that: 
"Where ••• the goods are subject to loss or rapid deter-
ioration or their preservation would involve unreasonable 
expense , the party under the duty to preserve them is bound 
to sell them in accordance with Article 94." 
------------------------------
183- 12) S.48.2 of the Act; which is the same under UCC (s.2-705.5) 
and DUSA (8.9-10.5) if the new purchaser buys in good 
faith. See also s.24 of the SGA where the good faith 1s 




Benjamin, para. 1233. 
Atiyah, pp 297 i, 317; Benjamin, para. 1232. 
Cf., CITe, s.370 in which the sale must be made by public 
-
auction if the goods involved have a current price; other 
goods may be sold in the open market. 
Cf., A/CN.9/116, annex 2, comment on art.63, para. 3; 
-A/CONF.97/5, comment on art.77, para. 3; in both documents 
it has been suggested that reference should be made to the 
law of the country where the sale takes place. 
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While Arn 82 of the Convention provides that: 
fllf the goods are subject to rapid deterioration or their 
preservation would involve unreasonable expense, a party who 
is bound to preserve the goods ••• must take reasonable measures 
to sell them. To the extent possible, he must give notice 
to the other party of his intention to sel1_a,( 1 ) 
; 
'!'hus, in these circumstances the seller is bound, under 
ULIS,to sell the goods while under the Convention he must 
only take "reasonab1e measures" to make the sale~2) The 
latter language appears to be perferable to the former since 
the seller may never be able, for any reason, to sell the 
goods to another purchaser; in such an event, it may be wise 
to require him to make efforts reasonable in the circumstances 
but not to impose upon him a duty to sell the goods. 
On the other hand, the reference by ULIS to Art. 94 dis-
cussed above probably indicates that the conditions of sale 
under that article must also be met here, which means that the 
sale should not take place unless:- firstly, the delay in 
paying the price is unreasonable; secondly, a due notice to 
this effect has been given to the buyer; and., finally, the sale 
must be made by an appropriate means. If so, the first two 
------~-----------------------
18',- 16) Benjamin, para. 1260; see also ss.2-705(2) of UCC and 
9.10(2), (3) of DUSA. 
184- 1) For a legislative background of the text, see the documents 
cited in para. 182'note 1), supra, mutatis mutandis. 
2) There was a proposal to impose the sale upon the seller if 
· the buyer so requested, but it was rejected (A/32/17, 
annex 1, para. 521). 
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conditions seem to be questionable since the situation in 
these circumstances, at least when the goods are subject to 
rapid deterioration, may require an immediate action to be 
taken by the seller. And that is why it has been suggested 
that if deterioration may be expected to occur immediately, 
notice may be dispensed with, provided it cannot be given 
sufficiently speedily, even by telephone or teleprinter~3) 
Li~wise, under the Convention, the seller is not bound to 
give such notice except to the extent possible in the circums-
tances(4) 
-. . 
However, it may well be that the seller who fails to 
comply with his duty to sell (ULIS) or to take reasonable 
measures to sell (Convention) would be liable for damages~5) 
In English Law, by contrast, where the goods are of 
perishable nature, the seller has the right to resell them 
without requiring him to give the buyer a notice to this 
effect~6) Thus, it appears that the solution given by the 
Convention, so far as this notice is concerned, is a compromise 
-~----~-----------------------
184- 3) Graveson and Cohn, p 106. 
4) See further A/CN.9/1 16, annex 2, comment on art.63, para. 7; 
A/CONF. 97/5 , comment on art.77, para. 7, where it has been 
argued, moreover, that if the goods are rapidly deteriora-
ting, there may not be sufficient time to give notice prior 
to sale. See also 5.370.2 of CITC under which the seller 
"shall be free to proceed with the sale without giving 
advance notice". 
5) See A/CN.9/116, annex 2, ibid, para. 8; A/CONF.97/5, ibid, 
para. 8. 
6) According to 5.48.3 of the SGA. 
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between ULIS which provides tor it and other laws which, on 
the contrary, do not require it. 
185. Ef~ects of sale 
Art. 94.2 of ULIS provides that: 
liThe party selling the goods shall have the right to 
retain out of the proceeds of sale an amount equal to the 
reasonable costs of pres.erving and of selling them and shall 
tranS~ll the balance to the other party." 
And Av-t,- 88.3 of the Convention provides that: 
itA party selling the goods has the right to retain out 
of the proceeds of sale an amount equal to the reasonable 
expenses of preserving the goods and of selling them. He must 
account to the other party for the balance~(1) 
It is clear from these provisions that there is only one 
difference between the two laws; while the former binds the 
seller to transmit the balance to the buyer, it is sufficient 
under the latter that he accounts to him for such balance. 
However, no reference is made in either to whether the unpaid 
seller is entitled to deduct from the proceeds of sale an 
amount equal to the unpaid price; nor whether has he a lien 
over such an amount until the dispute with the buyer is 
settled. If strictly applied, both provisions would 
give a negative answer though the non-payment of the price 
-~~--~--------~~--------~ 
185- 1) For a legislative background of the text, see the documents 
cited in para. 182 (note 1), supra, mutatis mutandis. 
368 
may be the only cause for withholding delivery, preservation 
and for the second sale successively. Oddly eno~the seller is 
bound to give the buyer the proceeds of sale less subsidiary 
costs and then he would be entitled to claim his main right, 
i.e., payment of the price. But it is submitted that this 
result is, again, not intended whether under ULIS or the 
Convention~2) 
In any case, it is beyond doubt that the seller 
is accountable under both laws to the buyer for the 
proceeds of sale after making the necessary deductions~3) It 
follows that the original sale remains alive irrespective of 
the new sale. And this is another main difference between 
ULIS and the Convention on the one hand, and, on the other, 
English Law. It has been held under the latter(4) that the 
resale according to a statutory power, i.e., in compliance 
with s.48.3 of the SGA terminates the original contract. The 
------------------------------
185- 2) See, however, A/CN.9/116, annex 2, comment on art.63, para. 
9; A/CONF.97/5, comment on art.77, para.9 where it has been 
considered that if the party selling the goods has other 
claims (i.e., other than reasonable costs of preserving the 
goods and of selling them) arising out of the contract or 
its breach, under the applicable national law, he may have 
the rightto defer the transmission of the balance until the 
settlement of those claims. 
3) Which seems to be the same under CITe (s.396) in \t{hich the 
sale takes place to the account of the other party. ~, 
ss.2-706(6) of UCC and 9.10(7) of DUSA; under both, the 
seller who resells the goods is not accountable to the buyer 
for any profit made on a resale. 
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result is then clear; the seller is not bound to give credit to 
the buyer for the proceeds of the resale; nor can he claim the 
contract price. 
However. the sale here must carefUlly be distinguished 
~rom that which is provided for under the remedy of damagesf 5 ) 
In this connexion, the following points should be emphasized. 
Firstly, while the latter sale presumes that the contract 
bas already been aVOided, the former presumes, on the contrary, 
that it is still alive. 
Secondly, while the latter is relevant to assessing the 
seller's damages and may even constitute the only basis of 
such assessment, this is not the case under the former. 
Thirdly, in selling the goods in case of damages, the 
seller certainly acts on his own behalf; accordingly, he 
retains the whole proceeds of sale. Again, this is not the 
case under the former sale. 
---------------------~------
185- 4) R. V. Ward Ltd. v. Bignal [96i] 1 Q.B. 534, overruling 
Gallasher v. Shilcoch [94~2 K.B. 765. 
5) Supra, Ch., II, s.II.1. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is clear from the above discussion that the 
remedies available to the unpaid seller under ULIS and 
the Convention are: avoidance, damages, an action for 
the price and suspension of performance. Remarks, 
evaluations and/or recommendations in respect of both 
laws have already been pointed out in this study. It 
may suffice at this point to keep in mind some impor-
tant remarks. 
Firstly, there is a great similarity between ULIS 
and the Convention to the extent that some basic pro-
visions are quite the same. 
Secondly, this similarity must not give rise to 
confusion where there are still major differences between 
the two laws. These differences may be categorized into 
three sets: 1- Some of ULIS' provisions were deleted 
trom the Oonvention. 2- The conditions required for 
applying certain provisions under ULIS have been Changed 
by the Convention. 3- Many provisions under the Conven-
tion are innovations. 
Thirdly, this does not mean that whatever change 
made by the Convention is necessarily better than the 
existing texts of ULIS. While, however, this is true to 
a certain, and probably to a great, degree, it would 
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appear that some provisions under the Convention are 
not less complicated than those given by ULIS. Further, 
some other solutions under this law, though not free 
from criticism, are more feasible and easier in practice 
than those provided for by the Convention. 
Finally, it would seem regrettable that the Conven-
tion, though more than four years had passed since it 
came into existence, was not signed until 22 June 1984 
except by 18 countries of which only 8 countries had 
conceded to or ratified it. However, one should be ~~ 
optimist, and it is hopeful that this Convention would 
find wider acceptance than ULIS by different legal, 
social and economic systems, which was the clear purpose 
of UNCITRAL in preparing the new texts. 
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